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The experiments discussed in this book would not have taken place with-
out the efforts of the many people who made them happen. The experiments 
had to be designed, operated, and evaluated. They involved three groups of 
people. First, staff within the U.S. Department of Labor initiated the projects, 
selected the research contractors and participating states, and then monitored 
the projects and their evaluations. Participants included federal government 
staff and contractors, who worked side by side. At the department the key par-
ticipants included Bill Coyne, Wayne Gordon, Norm Harvey, Jon Messenger, 
Doug Scott, and Wayne Zajac. Many computer contract staff members par-
ticipated in the project, including Lynn Cao, John Chang, Jun Chen, and Shu 
Lin-Tung. 
Only a small number of research organizations in the United States have 
the capability to design, operate, and evaluate large social science experiments. 
For the Unemployment Insurance (UI) Experiments we used several of them: 
Abt Associates, Battelle Institute, Mathematica Policy Research, and the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Some of the senior researchers 
from these organizations who participated in the experiments were Jacob 
M. Benus, Walter Corson, Paul Decker, Terry R. Johnson, Stuart Kerachsky, 
Christopher O’Leary, Larry Orr, and Robert Spiegelman. 
Finally, the experiments would not have been successful without the active 
support and participation of the state and local workforce agencies. The local 
agency staff actually ran the demonstrations. The state staff worked on their 
design, implementation, and management. Some of the key state staff mem-
bers who worked on the projects include Bonnie Dallinger in Massachusetts; 
Roger Emig and Nancy Snyder in New Jersey; Howard Flot, Richard Puer-
zer, Larry Punch, and Jack Rudy in Pennsylvania; and Gary Bodeutsch, Kathy 
Countryman, Judy Johnson, Pat Remy, and Graeme Sacrison in Washington. 
After the demonstration projects were completed, interventions from two 
of the demonstrations became policy initiatives of the department and subse-
quently became legislation. Passing the legislation involved large numbers of 
people throughout the department and in Congress. Once the programs were 
enacted into law, a great number of people in the department’s national and 
regional offices, as well as in the states and localities, worked to design and 
implement the programs and assure that they worked the way they were sup-
posed to work. Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) had to 
be implemented as a cooperative program involving three workforce develop-
ment organizations. David Balducchi, Brian Deaton, and Jon Messenger coop-
eratively developed the operational design for how the Employment Service 
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and the Job Training Partnership Act program would operate with the Unem-
ployment Insurance Program at the state and local level to make it work. 
Implementation of the WPRS system and the Self-Employment Assistance 
(SEA) program was accomplished by thousands of state workforce agency 
staff at the state and local level. They are responsible for transforming a design 
and some operating procedures into a living program that has helped millions 
of workers return to work. 
At the department, the UI Experiments team made these experiments hap-
pen. Project management was divided up among members of the team. Wayne 
Zajac and Jon Messenger worked on the design of the New Jersey Experi-
ment and made sure the experiment and then its evaluation worked as planned. 
Jon Messenger managed the Self-Employment Assistance experiments, and 
he played an important role in designing and implementing an active program 
from the federal legislation. Bill Coyne and Wayne Gordon managed the reem-
ployment bonus experiments. 
In writing this book, I owe a special debt to three colleagues. Walt Corson 
was coprincipal investigator for the New Jersey experiment for Mathematica 
Policy Research. In 1995, he and I developed a draft paper on the New Jersey 
Experiment and the enactment of federal legislation. We never completed the 
paper, but much of it survives in Chapter 2. Jon Messenger and I wrote a draft 
paper on the SEA program in 1997. Parts of the paper survive as Section II 
of Chapter 8. Finally, David Balducchi and I have talked about employment 
issues for many years. Of special interest to both of us has been work sharing, 
and we finally sat down and wrote a work sharing paper that was published in 
the winter 2008 issue of Publius. Modified parts of that paper can be found in 
the middle of Chapter 9. David also made important contributions to Chapter 6 
on reemployment services policy, an area that he knows very well. 
I also owe a debt of gratitude to the many people who have patiently 
answered my questions when I interviewed them. Tom Stengle provided data 
on the Work Sharing, Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services, and Self-
Employment Assistance programs. Ralph Smith and Paul Cullinan reviewed 
Chapter 3. Markus Franz, counselor for labor and social affairs for the Embassy 
of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, D.C., arranged for German 
government officials to write a description of the German self-employment 
assistance and work sharing programs. He then had the description translated 
into English. Frank Wiessner of the Institute for Employment Research also 
took pity on my inability to read German and wrote an English description of 
the German self-employment assistance program for me. 
David Balducchi did an extraordinary job of reviewing Chapters 4 through 
7, Chapter 9, and the final chapter. He did more than review the chapters; he 
taught me a great deal about how the workforce development system works 
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and how it has evolved over time. I received excellent comments on Chapter 
8 from Jon Messenger. Two anonymous referees read the book and provided 
cogent comments. One of the referees, Ernie Stromsdorfer, emerged from ano-
nymity, many years after he had served on my PhD dissertation committee. 
Finally, my wife, Marleigh Dover, read every chapter, and her edits enormously
improved the book. I appreciate the patience of my family during the last 
months of writing this book, when I was consumed with finishing it. 
Despite my indebtedness to a great number of people whom I have had the 
pleasure to work with and who have provided input to this book, I am respon-








This book is about the interrelationships between research, policy, and 
programs that have dealt with the problems faced by experienced, unemployed 
workers over the past 25 years. Much of its focus is on a series of social sci-
ence experiments that were conducted during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It 
particularly concentrates on the Unemployment Insurance (UI) Experiments, 
which all sought to develop cost-effective ways to help dislocated workers by 
speeding their return to work or by improving their earnings. These experi-
ments are examined with respect to their evaluation results and with respect 
to the policy, legislative initiatives, and programs that flowed from them. The 
book also looks at related research and policy during this period. The major 
theme explored is how rigorous research has been used to effectively guide, 
support, and implement policy initiatives. It also tells what has happened when 
the research results have been ignored. 
The UI Experiments examined five different ways to help UI claimants 
return to work: 1) comprehensive job search assistance, 2) reemployment 
bonuses, 3) short-term training, 4) relocation assistance, and 5) self-employment
assistance (SEA). Other approaches—short-time compensation and wage sup-
plements—have been proposed as experiments, but those experiments were 
never conducted. 
The UI Experiments have had a substantial impact on employment and 
training policy. Two interventions—comprehensive job search assistance 
and self-employment assistance—were shown to be cost-effective and were 
enacted as permanent federal programs in the 1990s. A third intervention— 
reemployment bonuses—has been proposed as a federal program by the Clin-
ton and Bush II administrations but has not been enacted into law. Short-time 
compensation became a permanent part of the UI programs, and wage supple-
ments were made part of the current Trade Adjustment Assistance program, 
both despite the lack of rigorous evaluations.
I played a role in events recounted in this book because of my association 
with the experiments and the public policy and programs that flowed from 
them. In 1985, it was I who proposed conducting the experiments to Secretary 
of Labor William Brock and who requested funding for them from him. Fund-
ing was provided, and I oversaw the design, operation, and evaluation of the 
experiments between 1985 and 1996. Finally, I worked on two pieces of legis-
lation that were enacted in 1993, as well as on the design and implementation 
of the two resulting programs over the next several years. 
The book proceeds as follows. The first chapter provides an overview of 






ments and reviews the New Jersey and Job Search Assistance (JSA) Experi-
ments. The third chapter looks at the 1993 enactment of the Worker Profiling 
and Reemployment Services (WPRS) program. The fourth chapter reviews the 
WPRS program’s implementation and operations. The fifth and sixth chap-
ters deal with reemployment services research findings and public policy as 
they relate to the WPRS and other employment programs. The seventh chapter 
covers training research and evaluation and recent training policy. The eighth 
chapter reviews the SEA experiments, legislation, and program operation. 
Short-time compensation research and policy is discussed in the ninth chapter, 
followed by an analysis in the tenth chapter of the reemployment bonus experi-
ments and unsuccessful policy initiatives. The book ends with the eleventh 
chapter, which summarizes the lessons learned from the research and policy of 
the last two and a half decades. 
This book reflects the opinions of the author and not necessarily the opin-









This book examines how research and evaluation have been con-
ducted, and what public policy use has been made of research with 
respect to employment and training programs over the past 25 years. 
It focuses particularly on a series of social science experiments that 
were conducted in the 1980s and 1990s and their relationship to public 
policy, legislation, and programs. The book also looks more broadly at 
the effect of a larger body of research on public policy regarding reem-
ployment services and training. Mostly it focuses on the research and 
programs designed to help dislocated workers become reemployed. The 
theme throughout the book is that rigorous research can have, and has 
had, a strong and positive impact on public policy. 
But this book also examines instances in which the research find-
ings have been ignored, contravened, or suppressed. A summary con-
clusion of this book is that federal policymakers made good use of 
sound research findings in the mid-1980s and again in the mid-1990s, 
but frequently misused research findings in the 2000s. To a significant 
extent, the book follows the story of the employment and training social 
science experiments that identified three cost-effective, targeted inter-
ventions: 1) comprehensive job search assistance, 2) self-employment 
assistance, and 3) reemployment bonuses. All three were pursued as 
policy options, and two were enacted into federal law. 
Much of this book deals with issues with which I have been closely 
associated during my tenure at the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). 
I was in charge of unemployment insurance (UI) research during the 
1980s and 1990s, when I developed and managed the UI Experiments.1 
As deputy director of the office that conducted research, actuarial anal-
ysis, and legislative activities, I sought to have the results of applied 
research guide policy and legislation. I later directed research for the 
department’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA). As a 
result, this book follows the flow of policy development from research 









Worker dislocation emerged as a problem in the 1970s. At first, the 
problem was largely experienced by blue-collar workers as the United 
States deindustrialized. Later, worker dislocation became more wide-
spread, affecting a broad spectrum of workers. Today, most layoffs are 
permanent, and there are relatively fewer temporary layoffs even during 
recessionary periods. 
The Federal-State Unemployment Insurance Program is the first line 
of defense for dislocated workers—i.e., experienced workers who per-
manently lose their jobs. Because of dislocated workers’ strong attach-
ment to the labor force, they are nearly all eligible for UI, and if they are 
unemployed for any length of time, nearly all of them collect UI. 
As a result, UI policymakers began to explore ways that UI, 
together with other workforce development programs, could adapt 
and facilitate the transition of dislocated workers into new jobs. 
Researchers and policymakers explored numerous ways to accom-
plish this goal. This book examines a wide variety of reemployment 
services research, but it focuses mainly on reemployment services that 
researchers have tested using experimental methods. Specifically, the 
UI Experiments examined five different ways to help UI claimants 
return to work: 1) comprehensive job search assistance, 2) reemploy-
ment bonuses, 3) short-term training, 4) relocation assistance, and
5) self-employment assistance. Each of these approaches was tested 
one or more times during the life of the UI Experiments. 
The experiments received guidance from two secretaries of labor— 
Bill Brock and Robert Reich. Brock became secretary of labor in April 
1985. That September, he approved the New Jersey Experiment and 
provided it with funding. He also secured funding for other experiments 
through a new initiative in the fiscal year 1987 federal budget. While he 
was secretary, he gave speeches in which he emphasized the potential 
importance of these experiments in developing policies to assist dis-
located workers, even though he would no longer be secretary at their 
completion. 
In early 1993, Reich became secretary of labor. He and his staff 
examined the results of the experiments that had been authorized by 






first year as labor secretary, Reich supported two legislative provisions, 
one that provided comprehensive job search assistance to dislocated 
workers and another that made self-employment assistance available to 
these workers if they wanted to start their own microenterprises. Con-
gress enacted legislation including these initiatives before the end of 
Reich’s first year in office. 
The UI Experiments generated a number of policy initiatives. In 
1993, Congress enacted Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
(WPRS) legislation, which authorizes the provision of comprehensive 
job search assistance services that were tested in the New Jersey Experi-
ment. Congress also made Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) a tempo-
rary UI program in 1993 based on the Massachusetts self-employment 
experiment. The program was made permanent in 1998 (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1  The Unemployment Insurance Experiments: Evaluations and 
Legislative Activity 


















1989—final report 1993—Worker Profiling 
1991—four-year and Reemployment 
follow-up Services (enacted) 
1995—six-year 
follow-up 
1991—interim report 1993—Self-Employment 
Assistance (enacted for 
five years) 
1995—final report 1998—Self-Employment 
Assistance (permanently 
enacted) 
1987—final report 1994—Reemployment Act 
1989—final report (not enacted) 
2002—final report 
2002—final report 
2003 and 2005—Personal 
Reemployment Accounts 
(not enacted) 
2006—first “final” 2006—Career 








Although four reemployment bonus experiments and subsequent 
analyses made the case for enacting reemployment bonuses as part 
of the Unemployment Insurance Program as an incentive to speed re-
employment, no reemployment bonus provision was ever enacted. The 
Clinton administration proposed reemployment bonuses as part of the 
Reemployment Act of 1994—a legislative proposal that was an unsuc-
cessful attempt to replace the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). 
Reemployment bonus policy was reborn in George W. Bush’s admin-
istration, which twice proposed Personal Reemployment Accounts 
(PRAs), once as a free-standing bill and again as part of a bill reau-
thorizing the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). Neither proposal was 
enacted. 
The Individual Training Account (ITA) Experiment tested three 
approaches to training, including a “free choice” model that the Bush 
administration used to justify its 2006 Career Advancement Accounts 
(CAA) proposal as the centerpiece for WIAreauthorization. But because 
there was little prior research or usage of the model, the justification 
was weak, and the legislative proposal went nowhere. 
A work sharing experiment was planned, but it was never carried 
out. Nevertheless, work sharing was enacted as a temporary federal 
program in 1982 and as a permanent program in 1992. Wage supple-
ment experiments were proposed twice, but they were never conducted. 
Despite the lack of testing, wage supplements became part of the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in 2002. 
Other policy initiatives were made that flew in the face of research 
findings. Despite findings that reemployment services are cost-effective,
funding for the Reemployment Services Grants to states—used to pro-
vide services under the WPRS program—were eliminated in June 2006. 
Although the Employment Service’s (ES) provision of job matching 
and other employment services had been found to be cost-effective, 
the Bush administration repeatedly proposed eliminating the ES and 
rolling its funds into block grants to the states. Similarly, the national 
automated labor exchange system—America’s Job Bank—was evalu-
ated and found to be cost-effective. Nevertheless, it was eliminated in 
June 2007. 
The umbrella term “Unemployment Insurance Experiments”— 
described below—is used for several reasons. The experiments all 






The experiments mostly were administered by staff in the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Service rather than elsewhere in the Department of 
Labor.2 The policy recommendations that have stemmed from evalua-
tions of the experiments generally have involved amendments to fed-
eral UI legislation. The demonstration designs of two UI Experiments 
have been translated into programs and have been enacted as permanent 
provisions of UI law—the WPRS and the SEA programs. 
This book reviews a wide spectrum of research—experimental and 
nonexperimental—that sheds light on the effectiveness of reemploy-
ment services and reemployment incentives that have implications for 
public policy. Research other than the UI Experiments that is relevant 
to public policy also is included. Going beyond the research itself, this 
book examines the public policy response to these experiments and 
other related research. In general, this book considers both the effects 
on public policy when research results are considered, and the effects 
on public policy when research results are ignored. 
OVERVIEW OF ThE ExPERImENTS 
The UI Experiments represented an enormous effort by the USDOL. 
The experiments all used rigorous evaluation methods to try to develop 
practical, cost-effective policies. They involved a substantial commit-
ment of the department’s research funds and staff. They were based on 
close and cooperative relationships between departmental staff, com-
puter contractors, research contractors, and state and local staff from 
state workforce agencies. 
Random Assignment 
From a federal policy perspective, random assignment experi-
ments offer the best hope of determining what works and what does 
not work. Once researchers agree that an approach works, it becomes 
easier to forge a consensus among policymakers on whether to imple-
ment interventions. 
There is broad consensus among researchers that random assign-
ment experiments are a valuable tool for developing public policy. 
 
6 Wandner 
There is, however, disagreement about when and where to use experi-
ments, what the balance should be between the use of experimental and 
quasiexperimental (comparison group) methods, and which economet-
ric methods to use (Berlin 2007; Burtless 1995; Heckman, LaLonde, 
and Smith 1999; Nathan and Hollister 2008). The department has 
used a mixed approach to its program evaluations—a combination of 
experimental, quasiexperimental, and econometric methods to evaluate 
programs, depending on a number of different factors (Balducchi and 
Wandner 2009). 
The UI Experiments were conducted at a time when employing 
experimental methods was highly desirable if legislative change was 
going to be accomplished. Sustaining old programs or developing new 
programs required convincing policymakers in the executive branch and 
Congress, as well as stakeholders in the programs, that policy changes 
were justified. During most of the period in which the experiments were 
conducted, the executive branch and Congress were controlled by dif-
ferent political parties. Divided government made it particularly diffi-
cult to obtain consensus on new policy directions. Random assignment 
experiments facilitated gaining agreement on the policy options that 
were tested. 
Overview of the Demonstration Projects 
The UI Experiments tested a number of different interventions 
that were designed to help displaced UI claimants. The interventions 
included comprehensive job search assistance (JSA), reemployment 
bonuses, training and training vouchers, and self-employment assis-
tance. The experiments stemmed from a desire to both improve exist-
ing interventions (such as JSA and training) and test new interventions 
(such as reemployment bonuses, self-employment assistance, and train-
ing vouchers). In addition, the Department of Labor sought to use ran-
dom assignment methods to test work sharing and wage supplements, 
but neither of those experiments came to fruition. 
The UI Experiments were expensive to conduct and represented a 
significant but minority portion of the department’s research budget for 
employment and training programs. The cost of the UI Experiments can 
be broken down into operational costs and research costs. The opera-












force Investment Boards (WIBs) that participated in the demonstration 
projects. These agencies agreed to carry out the interventions that were 
proposed. Research funds were provided to private research firms that 
were selected to design, monitor, and evaluate the projects. Operational 
costs were approximately $24 million for the 11 demonstrations, for an 
average of approximately $2.2 million per demonstration, and varied 
from no cost to nearly $6 million (Table 1.2). Those costs included the 
treatments themselves as well as administrative funds for the states or 
localities that operated the demonstrations. 
In addition to the operational costs, total research costs for the 11 
experiments amounted to more than $18 million, or an average cost 
per experiment of less than $1.7 million. However, the last three dem-
onstration projects cost much more than those that were operated in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Funding for the experiments initially 
came largely from JTPA funds and later from WIA appropriations for 
research and evaluations. The UI Experiments staff obtained USDOL
research and demonstration funding. In two cases, however, the fund-
ing for the experiments came from the federal portion of the Unem-
ployment Trust Fund (UTF). Federal legislation mandated UTF funding 
both for the JSA Demonstration in Florida and Washington, DC, and 
for the Massachusetts SEA Demonstration. The UTF was available as 
a funding source because the demonstrations provided reemployment 
services to UI beneficiaries. 
The responsibilities of the research contractors consisted of design-
ing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating costs. To facilitate proj-
ect monitoring and evaluation by the research contractors and depart-
mental staff, project tracking systems were developed; they were used 
for operational purposes, for random assignment of individuals into the 
treatment and control groups, and for gathering administrative data for 
project evaluation. Because the data was entered in real time, the track-
ing system allowed constant monitoring of the quality of the opera-
tions. Moreover, in the case of the reemployment bonus demonstra-
tions, tracking was used to determine when to stop project enrollment to 
ensure that the project did not go over budget. Evaluation costs included 
the collection of project and administrative data, the administration of 
telephone surveys, and the conducting of implementation, net impact, 




8   Table 1.2  U.S. Department of Labor Experiments, 1986 to Present: Descriptive Information 
Number of Number Funding 
Experiment Dates treatments Sample sizea of sites Partners (millions $) 
UI Experiments 
New Jersey Experiment 1986–87 3 T = 8,675; C = 2,385 10 State 3.4b 
Pennsylvania Reemployment 1988–89 4 T = 11,410; C = 3,595 12 State 2.2 
Bonus Experiment 
Washington Reemployment Bonus 1988–90 6 N = 17,000 21 State 1.1c 
Experiment 
Massachusetts SEA Experiment 1990–93 1 T = 755; C = 752 7 State UTFd 
Washington SEA Experiment 1989–91 1 T = 614; C = 608 6 State ca. 5.0 
D.C. JSA Experiment 1995–96 3 N = 8,071 1e State UTF = 1.3d,f 
Florida JSA Experiment 1995–96 3 N = 12,042 10 State UTF = 1.4d,f 
Maryland Work Search Experiment 1994–95 4 N = 27,000+ 6 State ca. 0.25g 
Other Related Experiments 
Lifelong Learning Experiment 1995–97 1 T = 104,668 12h Educational 0.0i 
ITA Experiment, original 2000–04 3 T = 7,922; C = 0 8 Local boards 4.3 
Project GATE 2003–04 1 T = 2,097; C = 2,104 5 3 states 4.0 
a T = treatment group; C = control group; N = sample. 
b Mathematica Policy Research was funded by the New Jersey Department of Labor from an overall grant to conduct the New Jersey 
Experiment. The total cost of $4.7 million was split between research costs of $1.3 million and operational costs of $3.4 million. 
c The Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment was originally funded from USDOL research funds in the amount of $1.0 million. 
The Upjohn Institute conducted the design, monitoring, and evaluation of the experiment with its own funds, but it received supplemental 
research funding in the amount of $90,000 from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
d UTF = Unemployment Trust Fund. For the Massachusetts SEA and the Florida and District of Columbia JSA experiments, the states were 
able to draw funds from their state UTF accounts to pay for self-employment allowances and for job search assistance. In both cases, the 





   9 
e JSA services were provided by one site, but participants were selected based on their UI claims at all local UI offices, including those in 
suburban Maryland and Virginia, where D.C. claimants could file D.C. claims for D.C. benefits. 
f For the JSA Experiment, the funding source was the Unemployment Trust Fund. Decker et al. (2000, p. 68) put the total UTF-funded 
demonstration costs at $1,301,267 for D.C. and $1,356,659 for Florida. Greenberg and Shroder (2004) put the combined cost of the two 
demonstration projects at $2.68 million. 
g For the Maryland Work Search Experiment, Greenberg and Shroder (2004) put the cost at $250,000. But in an e-mail message to me 
on November 16, 2007, Michelle Wood said that all funding went to Abt, in the amount of $248,000. There is no indication of funding 
provided to Maryland to conduct the demonstration. This figure was confirmed by a February 25, 2008, telephone interview with Tom 
Wendell, Maryland UI director. 
h Twelve Baltimore-area institutions participated, including community colleges, private career colleges, and four-year colleges and uni-
versities.
i A portion of the funding provided to Abt for the Lifelong Learning Demonstration was used to operate the project, but no funding was 
given directly to the state of Maryland or to the educational institutions, so the amount is shown as 0. 






The UI Experiments generally tested a single intervention, but they 
frequently included multiple treatment groups to test design features 
such as the method of providing the treatment or the payment level 
for a reemployment bonus. The New Jersey Experiment, however, was 
more ambitious and tested three different treatments: 1) comprehensive 
job search assistance, 2) training (and relocation allowances), and 3) 
reemployment bonuses. 
Most of the UI Experiments offered reemployment services or 
incentives to a large group of individuals. Sample sizes of the treatment 
and control groups had to be sufficiently large to allow for evaluation 
of treatment impact both in the aggregate and with respect to important 
subgroups. Workers were randomly assigned to treatment or control 
groups in all experiments except the training voucher experiment. In 
that case, training vouchers had already been mandated by the WIA, 
so three different approaches to providing training vouchers were com-
pared to one another rather than to a control group. 
The Players and the Process: The Executive Branch and Congress 
The UI Experiments would not have been carried out without the 
support of departmental policymakers, Congress, and state and local 
workforce agencies. The department took the lead in initiating the 
experiments, administering them, proposing policy initiatives, and 
implementing the two new programs that flowed from them. In 1985, 
I had proposed the experiments for consideration by the incoming sec-
retary of labor, William Brock.3 Secretary Brock previously had been 
United States Trade Representative, the country’s chief trade negotia-
tor; in that capacity, he had been concerned about the plight of Ameri-
can workers dislocated by the effects of international trade. He quickly 
supported the experiments as a new departmental initiative. Indeed, he 
went to the Office of Management and Budget and gained support for 
a special appropriation to begin the experiments. A number of assistant 
secretaries for Employment and Training and many other policymakers 
and staff also supported the experiments. 
The final evaluation of the New Jersey Experiment was completed 
in 1989, and an interim evaluation of the SEA experiments was com-
pleted in 1992. In 1993, Secretary Reich used these findings to pro-










job search assistance component of the New Jersey Experiment, and 
2) SEA, based on the Massachusetts SEA Demonstration. The Clin-
ton administration supported these two initiatives, and administration 
staff members were able to gain bipartisan congressional support for 
both initiatives. General confidence in the integrity of the evaluations 
of these two interventions helped them to garner widespread support. 
Congress supported the UI Experiments at their inception in 1985 
and appropriated $5.0 million to fund some of the experiments in 1986. 
Later, Congress relied on evaluations of the JSA and the Massachusetts 
SEA experiments, and the project designs were the basis for the federal 
legislative proposals. Congress supported the proposals for JSA and 
SEA programs and enacted them into law in 1993. The SEA program 
was enacted with a five-year sunset provision. In 1998, Congress made 
the program permanent. In contrast, Congress considered reemploy-
ment bonuses in 1994 and 2003 but did not authorize states to offer 
them as a means of encouraging the unemployed to return to work. 
Cooperative Effort 
Setting up and operating the UI Experiments was a cooperative 
effort between state, federal, and contractor staff. Labor Department 
staff generally selected the participating state workforce agencies and 
the research contractor with the concurrence of the assistant secretary 
for Employment and Training. State workforce agencies and local 
offices were recruited, although in cases where many states were inter-
ested in participating, competitive selection processes were established. 
The research contractor and USDOL staff secured the interest and sup-
port of states for random assignment methods and the experimental 
design of the project. Participating state and local staff were trained so 
that they could carry out the experimental design. State and local staff 
then operated the demonstration project. 
Close monitoring of the experiments by USDOL staff and the 
research contractors helped ensure that they were carried out as they 
had been designed. In many cases, state work agency staff from the 
state central office also participated in the monitoring. 
The evaluations of the experiments were conducted by research 
contractors but with the close cooperation of Labor Department staff. 
Evaluations required the gathering of high-quality project and adminis-
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trative data from the states. Expensive surveys conducted by the evalu-
ators provided input to the evaluation. The survey data were needed 
when the project evaluation required more than UI wage records— 
employment, earnings, and retention data—to measure project out-
comes. When the evaluations were completed, the department reviewed 
and commented on the evaluation reports before accepting them. 
The Players and the Process, Part 2: The State 
Workforce Agencies 
State workforce agencies and the local offices that run their pro-
grams often do not like random assignment projects. Random assign-
ment is a rigorous process that is very different from the way individu-
als are normally selected to participate in reemployment services in 
ongoing programs. The idea of random assignment is sometimes seen 
as inequitable, whereas describing this approach as a “lottery” is more 
easily understood and supported.4 
The UI Experiments were carefully designed to test the treatments 
while not interfering with the regular operations of the UI, the ES, or 
training programs. State program administrators would not support 
demonstration projects that interfered with the daily operations of their 
programs or with the state computer systems that are critical for their 
operation. 
The state workforce agencies played a crucial role: they volunteered 
to participate in the experiments, participated in developing the dem-
onstration designs, implemented the demonstrations, provided admin-
istrative data, made participating staff available for interviews, and 
facilitated the conducting of the evaluations by the researchers. State 
workforce agencies were involved in all of the projects, although for the 
Lifelong Learning Demonstration the participating organizations were 
a number of Maryland community colleges and universities, and for 
the Individual Training Account Experiment the participating agencies 
were local WIBs. 
When two of the experiments resulted in changes to federal legisla-
tion, the entire state workforce system was affected. Since participation 
in the WPRS initiative became mandatory for state UI programs, all 






pation in the SEA program is voluntary, and fewer than a dozen states 
have been involved in program implementation and operation. 
The Research Contractors That Conducted the UI Experiments 
The UI Experiments were conducted by a relatively small number 
of research contractors because few research firms in the United States 
have experience in running social science experiments for workforce 
programs. In each experiment, a single research group designed, moni-
tored, and evaluated the project. Although consideration was given to 
using different contractors—one to design the project and another to 
evaluate it—that approach was ultimately considered impractical. 
For all of the experiments except the Washington Reemployment 
Bonus Experiment, the contract to design, conduct, and evaluate the 
demonstration project was competitively bid. In the case of the Wash-
ington experiment, the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
offered to conduct the experiment without a fee, so its arrangements 
with the USDOL were contained in a nonfinancial agreement. 
The research contractors used in the experiments were Abt Associ-
ates, Battelle Memorial Institute, IMPAQ International, Mathematica 
Policy Research (MPR), Social Policy Research Associates, and the 
Upjohn Institute. Of the 11 experiment evaluations listed in Table 1.1, 
the principal evaluators of these projects were tightly concentrated: 
MPR evaluated five, Abt three, and Battelle, the Upjohn Institute, and 
IMPAQ International one each (Table 1.3). 
The concentration of evaluators for UI Experiments followed a 
similar pattern for social experiments in general. A review of 70 U.S. 
social science experiments conducted between 1983 and 1996—when 
most of the UI Experiments were initiated—found that 47 percent of 
experiments were evaluated by the “Big Three”: Abt, MDRC, and 
MPR. Of the rest, 19 percent were evaluated by academics, 10 percent 
by government employees, and the remaining 24 percent by a diverse 
group of think tanks and private sector firms. Academics generally 
evaluated smaller experiments, and government employees were gen-
erally the evaluators of state-sponsored experiments (Greenberg and 
Shroder 2004, p. 466). Since the UI Experiments were large in size, the 
dominance of the Big Three is not surprising. Because MDRC works 










Table 1.3  U.S. Department of Labor Experiments, 1986 to Present: 
Research Contractors and Funding Levels 
Contractor funding 
Experiment Contractor (millions $) 
UI Experiments 
New Jersey Experiment MPR 1.23a 
Pennsylvania Reemployment MPR 1.00 
Bonus Experiment 
Washington Reemployment Upjohn Institute Nonfinancial 
Bonus Experiment agreementb 
Massachusetts and Washington Abt/Battelle 1.65 
SEA Experiments 
D.C. and Florida JSA Demos MPR/Battelle 1.50 
Maryland Work Search Demo Abt/Battelle 0.25 
Other experiments 
Lifelong Learning Experiment Abt 2.88c 
ITA Experiment, original MPR/SPRA 3.53d 
Second Survey MPR/SPRA 1.30 
Project GATE IMPAQ/MPR 6.40e 
a Mathematica Policy Research was funded by the New Jersey Department of Labor 
from the overall grant that it was awarded to conduct the New Jersey Experiment. The 
total cost of $4.7 million was split between the research cost of 1.3 million and the 
operational cost of $3.4 million (Greenberg and Shroder 2004). In an e-mail message 
to the author on December 10, 2007, Paul Decker, president of Mathematica Policy 
Research, indicated that, according to Mathematica contract files, the research cost 
was $1.23 million. 
b Self-financed by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, with additional 
research funding provided to the Upjohn Institute by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
USDOL had a nonfinancial agreement with Upjohn to conduct the evaluation. Green-
berg and Shroder (2004) incorrectly indicate that the cost was $450,000. 
c Some of the funding provided to Abt was used for project operations. 
d The contract for $2.2 million was supplemented with $0.7 million in 1998. Greenberg 
and Shroder (2004) put the total at $2.2 million. 
e In a telephone conversation with the author on June 9, 2007, Janet Javar gave the fol-
lowing figures: the MPR contract was for $4,027,990. About $500,000 of that was 
used for the ITA/ETP (Eligible Training Provider) Demonstration, and the balance of 
$3,528,000 was used for the ITA Experiment. 









tions rather than with dislocated workers, it did not bid on any of the 
UI Experiments. 
The USDOL contracted directly with all of the contractors except 
in three cases. For the New Jersey Experiment, the state of New Jersey 
contracted with Mathematica Policy Research. For the Maryland Work 
Search Demonstration, the state of Maryland contracted with Abt Asso-
ciates. For the Washington Reemployment Bonus project, the USDOL
signed a nonfinancial agreement with the Upjohn Institute. 
U.S. Department of Labor Staff 
Within the department, all eight of the UI Experiments were con-
ducted by the Unemployment Insurance Demonstration Group within 
the Unemployment Insurance Service. This group was formed in 
response to the high level of effort required to conduct the experiments. 
The purpose of the group was to conduct the series of demonstration 
projects to determine whether new approaches could be found to help 
dislocated workers—most of whom were also UI claimants—return to 
work. The group formed in 1985 to work on the New Jersey Experiment 
and continued in existence for over a decade, until the last of the eight 
projects had been completed. Three related projects were conducted by 
the staff in the ETA’s Office of Policy Development and Research.5 
Contract computer staff worked along with departmental staff in 
designing, developing, maintaining, and overseeing the data systems. 
They developed an operational and research database that allowed the 
USDOL and the research contractor to monitor and manage the experi-
ments with data that was available in real time. The project data systems 
could be used both to manage the projects and to accumulate the data 
that would be needed to evaluate the demonstrations.6 
ThE UNEmPLOymENT INSURANCE PROgRAm 
The UI Experiments were conducted within the national UI pro-
gram. They were all designed to transform the UI program into a reem-




The UI program was established by the Social Security Act of 1935, 
and it has operated for more than seven decades. It pays unemployment 
insurance benefits to workers who are unemployed through no fault of 
their own. UI benefits replace about half of lost wages up to a maxi-
mum amount that is set by each state. The average weekly payment 
was $300 in 2008. In almost all states, workers can receive up to 26 
weeks of regular benefits. Thus, in normal economic times the aver-
age unemployed worker can receive up to approximately $7,500 while 
unemployed during a year. 
Workers drawing UI must show that they are able, available, and 
actively searching for work. Indeed, they must certify that they are 
searching for work each time they request another UI payment. Workers 
who are permanently separated from their previous jobs must register 
for work with the local Wagner-Peyser Act agency—i.e., the Employ-
ment Service. They must accept a job to which they are referred if that 
job is determined to be suitable. The suitability determination includes 
consideration of whether the job to which the unemployed worker is 
referred pays a wage similar to the worker’s previous job. 
Wagner-Peyser agencies provide a wide variety of reemployment 
services to workers permanently separated from their jobs who receive 
benefits. However, these workers are not assured that they will actu-
ally receive all of the options in the wide spectrum of assistance when 
searching for a new job. Wagner-Peyser agencies target reemployment 
services to individual workers based on a determination of which ser-
vices are likely to work for which individuals. Because of limited fund-
ing, ES staff also have to make allocation decisions among a broad 
group of workers who could benefit from the various possible services. 
Unemployed workers can receive UI benefits whether they are on 
temporary or permanent layoffs, but it is the permanently displaced 
workers who need assistance in finding new jobs. This book therefore 
concentrates on displaced workers and the ways of providing reemploy-
ment services—or reemployment incentives—to them. 
The UI Experiments were established to determine which reem-
ployment services and incentives were most effective in returning per-
manently separated UI beneficiaries to work. It is important to know 
what interventions work so that workers can receive those services that 
will speed their return to work or increase their human capital. 
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In addition, because of limited resources, not all workers can be 
provided all services, even among those services that were determined 
to be effective for a wide variety of unemployed workers. Thus, a sys-
tem of targeting had to be developed. The system of targeting treat-
ments to workers who are most likely to exhaust their entitlement to UI 
benefits is called worker profiling. 
DISLOCATED WORkERS AND ThE NEED FOR
REEmPLOymENT SERVICES 
The UI Experiments focused on UI beneficiaries who were perma-
nently separated from their jobs both because of the increase in worker 
displacement over the preceding decade and because most dislocated 
workers who are unemployed for more than a few weeks collect UI 
benefits. Thus the UI system searched for ways to help these UI ben-
eficiaries speed their return to work or assist them in improving their 
skills through education and training. In addition, at the time the exper-
iments commenced, prior research had concentrated more on disad-
vantaged than on dislocated workers, and more was known about the 
effectiveness of workforce programs for disadvantaged workers than 
for dislocated ones because policymakers were more concerned with 
this population (LaLonde 1995, p. 161). The time was ripe to devote 
federal resources to conducting large-scale experiments to determine 
what worked to help reemploy dislocated workers. 
The targeting of dislocated workers by the UI Experiments was 
atypical: a study of 193 social science experiments that were undertaken 
between 1962 and 1996 found that most of them targeted a population 
of disadvantaged individuals or families. Taken together, these experi-
ments served welfare recipients (35 percent), low-income families (14 
percent), the unemployed (13 percent), and youth (12 percent) (Green-
berg and Shroder 2004, p. 461). The UI Experiments were a subset 
of the 13 percent of experiments serving the unemployed; they served 
the less disadvantaged portion of that population, since they dealt with 
unemployed workers who had had a strong enough attachment to the 
labor force to qualify for unemployment insurance but were neverthe-






ents had prior annual earnings that placed them and their families at 
about double the poverty line, and when these workers become reem-
ployed they are not likely to join the poor. For example, the average 
weekly wage for all workers in UI-covered employment was $854 in 
2007, and the average annual wage in covered employment was over 
$43,000. 
The Problem of Worker Dislocation 
Worker dislocation has been a significant problem in the United 
States over the past three decades. By 1984, the problem was widely 
recognized, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) responded by ini-
tiating a biennial series of special dislocated worker surveys as supple-
ments to the Current Population Survey (CPS), in order to estimate the 
magnitude of the problem and to discern any trends in worker disloca-
tion. These surveys showed that in the 1980s approximately 2 million 
long-tenured workers were dislocated each year. While the numbers 
increased during periods of recession, they remained high in all years, 
even years with relatively low unemployment. In the 1980s, worker 
dislocation was concentrated in the goods-producing sector of the econ-
omy, but there also was significant dislocation among workers in the 
service sector and among white-collar workers (CBO 1993). 
The nature of worker dislocation has changed since the 1980s, 
however, and the problem has become more pervasive. In the 1990s, 
the share of worker dislocation among service-sector and white-collar
workers increased, narrowing the gap relative to goods-producing 
industries (Hipple 1999). While the rate of worker dislocation remained 
higher in manufacturing and construction than in other industries, in 
2002 the actual number of dislocated white-collar workers (1.2 million) 
was almost twice the number of dislocated blue-collar workers (0.65 
million) and nearly 10 times the number of those in service occupa-
tions. The total number of long-tenured dislocated workers in 2002 was 
2.0 million (Helwig 2004). 
The BLS definition of “dislocated workers” is a narrow one, 
restricted to unemployed workers who lost jobs they had held for three 
years or longer because 1) their plant closed, 2) their employer went 
out of business, or 3) their employer laid them off and they were not 





are permanently separated from their previous jobs by their employers. 
A study of UI recipients by Corson and Dynarski (1990) shows that 
while more than half of unemployed workers had no expectation of 
recall, only about 36 percent of them met the BLS definition of worker 
dislocation.7 
In the seven fiscal years from 2000–2001 to 2006–2007, the number 
of unemployed workers collecting a UI first payment varied between 
7.4 million and 10.4 million. In February 2008, the department pro-
jected the number to remain steady at approximately 8 million over the 
next six years (USDOL 2008a). At least half of these UI recipients, or 
approximately 4 million of them, are likely to be permanently separated 
from their jobs and likely will benefit from receiving reemployment 
services. In addition, reemployment services may be needed by workers 
who do not collect UI, including reentrants to the labor force. 
What has changed in the past two decades is that laid-off work-
ers are decreasingly on temporary layoff. For many decades now, the 
permanent layoff rate has been much greater than the temporary layoff 
rate. In addition, the permanent layoff rate always has been, and contin-
ues to be, highly cyclical, increasing sharply in recessionary periods. In 
contrast, while the proportion of workers on temporary layoffs formerly 
was highly cyclical—spiking during recessions—the temporary lay-
off rate is now steady and low over the cycle. Since the mid-1980s, in 
fact, the temporary layoff rate has been relatively flat and has remained 
well below 2 percent. Groshen and Potter (2003, p. 3) find a structural 
change in the U.S. economy with respect to temporary layoffs. “In the 
four recessions before 1990,” they write, “unemployment from tem-
porary layoffs rose throughout the downturn and fell sharply after the 
trough, adding substantially to the run-up and then the decline in total 
unemployment. In the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions, by contrast, tem-
porary layoffs contributed little to the path of unemployment. These 
layoffs barely increased in the 1990–91 recession and figured even less 
importantly in the 2001 recession.” 
With permanent layoffs becoming predominant, more unemployed 
workers need assistance in returning to work. Studies show that dis-
located workers experience substantial earnings loss when they return 
to work (Kletzer 1998). Based on BLS survey data comparing their 
wages before and after unemployment, Farber (1997) estimates that, 










13 percent. Those dislocated also have a tough time finding work: in the 
2001–2003 BLS survey, 35 percent of job losers remained unemployed 
at the survey date, and 13 percent of those who had lost full-time jobs 
were only employed part time (Farber 2005). Dislocated workers also 
experienced longer durations of unemployment before they returned to 
work. 
For those dislocated workers served by the WIA and ES systems, 
there are an array of available services consisting of core, intensive, and 
training services. Because of funding limitations, however, training ser-
vices cannot be made available to all dislocated workers. Since 2002, 
approximately 200,000 WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker program 
participants have received training annually.8 Under the 2006 Bush 
administration proposal that would have replaced much of the employ-
ment and training system with a CAA training voucher, the number 
of workers receiving public training would have increased to between 
500,000 and 600,000 per year. 
Even if CAAs had been implemented, training would have been 
offered to only a small portion of the approximately 2 million workers 
that become dislocated each year and an even smaller portion of all 
UI recipients who are permanently separated. For the vast majority of 
workers, when they come to the department-funded One-Stop Career 
Centers, they can expect to receive no more than the core and intensive 
services available under the WIA and ES programs. As a result, we need 
to look at what is known about the effectiveness of the delivery and 
targeting of comprehensive job search assistance and other reemploy-
ment services. 
Dislocated worker studies reveal that dislocated workers have labor 
force characteristics that can be used for statistical targeting by apply-
ing worker profiling methods. While not all dislocated workers have 
difficulty becoming reemployed, a large portion of those having long 
job tenure are likely to need some type of reemployment assistance. 
Workers who accumulated three years’ tenure or more with their previ-
ous employer have been found to experience longer spells of unem-
ployment and to be more likely to experience a reduction in earnings of 
20 percent or greater than workers with less than three years of tenure 
(CBO 1993). Thus, tenure at job separation may be an important indica-







riencing an earnings loss. This and related findings were considered in 
designing a worker profiling methodology. 
Reemploying Dislocated Workers: The Role of the Unemployment 
Insurance Program 
The traditional role of the unemployment insurance program is to 
pay temporary income support to unemployed workers. UI’s underly-
ing premise is that unemployed workers’ skills will match job vacan-
cies in local labor markets, and that vacancies can be discovered with 
a combination of reasonable search efforts and watchful waiting. This 
premise has determined the states’ basic approach to administering their 
UI programs. State UI programs test whether unemployed workers are 
able, available, and actively seeking work. In most states, program 
administration stresses monitoring workers’ continuing attachment to 
the labor force for those to whom it pays UI benefits, to make sure they 
are searching for work. Providing reemployment services to help them 
return to work has received less emphasis. 
The UI system began paying benefits in 1938, but the UI program 
soon became insignificant with the advent of World War II, a period of 
relatively full employment. From the end of that war through the early 
1970s, workers displaced from their jobs tended to represent a suffi-
ciently small number of all UI claimants that the UI program’s limited 
emphasis on reemployment services appeared warranted. It was only 
with the emergence of worker dislocation as a major phenomenon in 
the late 1970s and the 1980s that the need to provide UI claimants with 
reemployment services emerged.9 
Even today, dislocated workers with long tenure make up only a 
minority of all UI claimants—perhaps one-quarter of the claimants 
served in a year. These workers, however, have needs beyond income 
support, and they frequently have great difficulty returning to work 
without the receipt of reemployment services from the ES or from 
WIA’s Adult and Dislocated Worker programs. 
In recent years, worker dislocation has become an area of increas-
ing concern to the UI program. Overall, the UI program serves just 
half of all dislocated workers. However, the UI system serves nearly 
all dislocated workers likely to experience long-term unemployment, 
the group most in need of reemployment assistance. Many dislocated 
 





workers return to work quickly, even if they have been permanently 
separated, and many of these early returnees never file for UI benefits 
(Vroman 1991, 2008; Wandner and Stengle 1997).10 Thus, over a year, 
UI serves fewer than one-third of the dislocated workers who have been 
unemployed for less than five weeks, but it serves 80 to 90 percent of 
those unemployed for 15 weeks or longer (O’Leary and Wandner 1997). 
This latter group represents the great majority of all dislocated workers 
who need reemployment assistance to obtain new jobs. Because the UI 
program serves these workers when they first become unemployed, it is 
well-positioned to act as a gateway for early referral to reemployment 
services. 
TREATmENTS TESTED AND mEThODS OF EVALUATION 
The treatments provided in the UI Experiments are typical of those 
provided by most social experiments. In a study of the 193 experiments 
started between 1962 and 1996, 293 different treatments were tested. 
Only 26 of these treatments focused on areas outside of employment. 
The 267 employment treatments provided education and training (92), 
job placement and job search assistance (94), information and counsel-
ing (57), and income transfers (24). Thus, the concentration of experi-
mental treatments on employment is common across all organizations 
sponsoring experiments and across all populations served (Greenberg 
and Shroder 2004, p. 461). 
More specifically, the UI Experiments tested the following treat-
ments in the following states or other sites: comprehensive job search 
assistance (Washington, New Jersey, the District of Columbia, Florida, 
and Pennsylvania); training and education (New Jersey, Lifelong Learn-
ing, and ITA experiment sites); reemployment bonuses (New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington state experiments); and self-employment
assistance (Massachusetts and Washington). The fact that there were 
multiple tests of the same treatment generally served three functions: 
1) to verify earlier results (i.e., comprehensive job search assistance 
and reemployment bonuses); 2) to search for more cost-effective 
approaches (i.e., training and education); and 3) to test new reemploy-
ment approaches (i.e., self-employment assistance). 
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Because over 90 percent of the 293 treatments studied by Greenberg 
and Shroder concentrated on employment and work, the evaluations 
of these treatments have tended to concentrate on the same outcomes. 
Four-fifths of the studies begun between 1983 and 1996 examined the 
effect of the treatments on employment and earnings (Greenberg and 
Shroder 2004, p. 461). Similarly, all of the UI Experiments examined 
the treatments’ effects on employment and earnings. 
The 193 social experiments frequently included process analyses 
and benefit-cost analyses. For the completed studies that Greenberg and 
Shroder examine, benefit-cost analyses were conducted in just under 
half of the evaluations. Benefit-cost analysis has become increasingly 
prevalent. 
In general, Greenberg and Shroder find that social experiments have 
become simpler, more streamlined, and cheaper over time. Experiments 
have increasingly tested incremental changes in existing programs, 
rather than testing new programs. Between 1962 and 1974, over four-
fifths of experiments tested new programs, whereas since 1983 only 
one-quarter of experiments completed have tested new programs. This 
change may stem from declining public funds to conduct more ambi-
tious experiments and a perception that incremental changes to existing 
programs are more likely to be implemented. 
The way experiments have been operated also has been stream-
lined. The cost of administering the treatments tested has declined 
because of at least six factors: 1) increased use of administrative data 
rather than the use of more expensive surveys, 2) reduced sample attri-
tion, 3) administration of experiments by agencies already serving the 
target population, 4) shorter follow-up tracking periods, 5) a declining 
number of treatment groups, and 6) more rapid evaluation, comple-
tion, and release of results. As a result both of less expensive treat-
ments and project administration and of simpler project designs, sample 
sizes for treatments have increased (Table 1.1). The median sample size 
for experiments has increased from 401 in the period 1962–1974 to 
870 during 1975–1982 and to 2,312 during 1983–1996 (Greenberg and 
Shroder 2004, pp. 462–465). Because the UI Experiments were look-
ing for treatments that worked, they tested both new programs (self-
employment assistance, reemployment bonuses, and training vouchers) 
and programs with incremental changes (enhanced training, education, 







Social experiments are highly concentrated in certain areas of the 
United States. Although Greenberg and Shroder find that experiments 
have been run in every state except Alaska and Idaho, they also find 
that the same states have participated repeatedly. The nine states that 
participated most frequently in completed experiments were New 
York (27); California (26); Illinois (19); Pennsylvania (19); Ohio (16); 
and Florida, Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington, all with 13 each
(Greenberg and Shroder 2004, p. 469). It is thus not surprising that the 
UI Experiments were run in five of these nine states (Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, Florida, Massachusetts, and Washington). In addition, Texas 
unsuccessfully applied to participate in the reemployment bonus dem-
onstrations, and California would have been one of the work sharing 
experimental sites if the experiment had not been canceled. 
The funding source for social experiments has changed over time. 
The federal government has been the dominant funder of experiments, 
but its role has declined: it went from funding 80 percent of experiments 
during 1962–1982 to funding 64 percent during 1983–1996. Over that 
same period, state funding increased from 18 to 40 percent, but most 
of that increase was due to the evaluations of welfare reform under 
state waivers that took place before the enactment of the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in 1996 (Greenberg 
and Shroder 2004, p. 465). 
The UI Experiments ended without testing other promising treat-
ments for dislocated workers. For example, they did not test the effects 
of providing wage supplements to dislocated workers. A wage supple-
ment experiment for trade-affected workers who found new jobs pay-
ing less than their old ones was required by federal law in the late 
1980s, but the requirement was dropped because states were unwilling 
to participate. A more recent legislative proposal—this one for a wage 
supplement experiment for TAA-eligible workers—instead became an 
entitlement program in 2002. 
Some treatments that have already been tested experimentally have 
not been revisited. Although classroom training has been closely stud-
ied, a number of additional training experiments could be tested. For 
example, researchers could compare alternative training methods (e.g., 
on-the-job training versus classroom training), could vary training by 
duration or intensity, could focus more on incumbent training, could 





ing providers (e.g., nonprofit versus for-profit). A number of compre-
hensive reemployment services also need to be tested or retested using 
experimental methods. 
TARgETINg 
The UI Experiments tested various ES and WIA reemployment ser-
vices and incentives that might help displaced claimants return to work 
more quickly and in some cases increase their earnings. 
The experiments were designed with two types of targeting in mind. 
First, since the goal of the experiments was to find cost-effective treat-
ments, the treatments had to be targeted to the workers for whom they 
would be most cost-effective. Second, even if cost-effective treatments 
could be identified, the limited availability of funding meant that an 
objective targeting mechanism was needed to select and limit the claim-
ants who would be referred to services. 
Targeting thus was an integral part of the UI Experiments. Later 
chapters will show that the experiments’ design included both built-in 
targeting and the use of subgroup analysis in project evaluation to deter-
mine for whom the treatments would be most cost-effective. 
When federal legislation was enacted in the form of WPRS and 
SEA, the legislation mandated targeting, and the Department of Labor 
developed a worker profiling method that was adopted by the partici-
pating state workforce agencies. Worker profiling also would have been 
mandated by reemployment bonus programs that were unsuccessfully 
proposed by both the Clinton and Bush II administrations. 
More recently, new targeting methods have been developed and 
used for TANF, welfare-to-work, and training and education programs 
(Eberts, O’Leary, and Wandner 2002). The Frontline Decision Support 
System (FDSS), which operated in Georgia, incorporated a comprehen-
sive approach to targeting reemployment services for workforce devel-
opment programs at local One-Stops. The FDSS project systematically 
helped dislocated workers return to work by matching them with job 
openings, helping them search for work, and referring them to targeted, 







The United States was an innovator in the development of worker 
profiling methods. Similar approaches have been studied and adopted 
elsewhere, first in Australia and Canada and then in other industrial 
nations (OECD 1998; Rudolph and Konle-Seidl 2005).
Targeting is recognized as an important component of active labor 
market policies throughout the industrialized world. An International 
Labour Organization review of the provision of reemployment services 
in industrialized countries finds that “carefully targeted measures can 
achieve better results than broad measures applying to everyone or 
larger groups” (Auer, Efendioğlu, and Leschke 2005). 
BUDgET NEUTRALITy 
The design of the UI Experiments and the eventual enactment of 
both WPRS and SEA in 1993 were greatly influenced by federal budget 
rules initiated in the 1980s. These rules were designed to reduce the 
budget deficit, and they constrained the development of all new fed-
erally sponsored programs that might eventually be enacted into law, 
including any new approaches to reemployment services. 
The congressional budget process was established by the Congres-
sional Budget Act of 1974. Because of persistent federal budget deficits 
in the early 1980s, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emer-
gency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (also known by the name of its spon-
sors as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings [GRH] Act) to impose additional 
discipline on the federal budget. Under the temporary GRH Act, federal 
deficit targets were set to decline each year until they reached the final 
target of a zero deficit by fiscal year 2000. While deficits did shrink 
somewhat under GRH, the budget targets were not met, in large part 
because of economic and other factors that were beyond the control of 
the budget process. 
When GRH did not succeed in bringing the deficit to zero, Congress 
tried a new approach, enacting the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 
1990. The BEA had a two-part approach to enforcing budget discipline: 
it established separate constraints on discretionary and mandatory 
(“direct”) spending, but for both types of spending it only attempted to 
make Congress responsible for actions within its control. The BEA rules 
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were in effect for fiscal years 1991 through 2002. During that period, 
discretionary spending—which annual appropriation acts controlled 
and provided the funds for—was constrained by statutory limits. Viola-
tions of those limits were subject to a process of sequestration, which 
corrected such violations with automatic, across-the-board spending 
reductions for all discretionary spending. For mandatory spending, a 
“pay as you go” (PAYGO) rule placed limits on new legislation that 
was estimated to result in either increased expenditures or decreased 
revenues. Congress could not enact new legislation that would increase 
the cost of entitlement programs, such as the UI program, without pro-
viding simultaneous offsetting reductions in expenditures or increases 
in revenue. If Congress did not adhere to these PAYGO rules, manda-
tory expenditures could also be subject to sequestration (Holtz-Eakin 
2004; Keith 2007). 
By the time the first UI Experiment was being designed, GRH had 
already taken effect. Thus, all of these experiments operated within the 
strictures of these budget limits, and any policy and legislative proposals 
developed were also subject to these limits. New proposals could avoid 
the GRH constraints only by fully paying for themselves within the fed-
eral government sector. As a result, the UI Experiments were designed 
with the goal of being cost-effective, not just to society as a whole, but, 
more restrictively, to the federal government. The evaluations of the 
UI Experiments therefore also examined the cost-effectiveness of these 
interventions, both from the perspective of the federal government as a 
whole and from the perspective of the Department of Labor budget. The 
goal was to have an intervention be at least budget-neutral, in the sense 
that the cost of the intervention and its administration would be offset 
by the benefits to the government, which included reduced UI payments 
and increased tax payments to the U.S. Treasury. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The UI Experiments were designed to enable workforce develop-
ment systems to find new or improved ways to help unemployed work-
ers. The experiments showed that some approaches were cost-effective 





enactment of federal legislation establishing new programs. In other 
cases, completed experiments led to legislative initiatives that were 
not enacted. In still other cases, failed attempts at launching experi-
ments were nonetheless followed by program enactment. And in yet 
other cases, completed experiments have validated findings that had not 
been tested previously through experimentally evaluated demonstration 
projects. 
This book examines the UI Experiments and other research, the pol-
icy proposals to implement research results, and the programs that have 
been implemented. It examines these experiments in the political and 
economic environment in which they were considered and operated. 
That environment included three factors: 1) concerns about worker dis-
location, 2) a restrictive federal budgetary environment, and 3) the need 
for careful targeting to achieve cost-effective results. 
The UI Experiments were targeted at dislocated workers, most of 
whom are eligible for UI benefits. The goal of these demonstrations was 
to assist UI claimants in returning to work by developing or enhanc-
ing reemployment assistance approaches likely to be cost-effective. 
The demonstrations operated in an environment of budget austerity in 
the 1980s, which guided their design. Their budget-neutral design was 
helpful in getting two treatments enacted into law: 1) enhanced com-
prehensive job search assistance and 2) self-employment assistance. 
Budget neutrality also helped to gain bipartisan support for another 
treatment option—targeted reemployment bonuses, which were rec-
ommended for legislative implementation by both the Clinton and the 
Bush administrations. As the UI demonstrations proceeded, it became 
clear that effective targeting of reemployment services was critical for 
developing cost-effective approaches to providing reemployment ser-
vices and for allocating scarce program resources in an environment of 
declining funding. 
This book demonstrates that rigorous research can have an impact 
on employment policy, and indeed, that such research has had that 
effect, especially in the mid-1990s. Conversely, the book also describes 
how employment research can be ignored in developing public policy, 
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Notes 
1. In this work I have chosen to capitalize the term “UI Experiments,” since that is 
the term used by USDOL staff and researchers to bring together the work they did 
in running experiments serving UI claimants and dealing with job search assis-
tance, training, reemployment bonuses, and relocation allowances. 
2. The Unemployment Insurance Service is now called the Office of Workforce 
Security. 
3. At that time, I directed unemployment insurance research and developed the pro-
posal to conduct a multitreatment experiment as an enhancement to the fiscal year 
(FY) 1987 federal budget. 
4. The Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration was approved by the sec-
retary of labor and industry for the state. He was replaced by a new secretary early 
in the operation of the experiment. I attended a conference of state workforce 
administrators at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., and was walking in 
through the lobby when I heard the new secretary call out loudly to me, “Hello, 
Mr. Random Assignment!” Needless to say, the secretary was not a strong sup-
porter of the experiment. 
5. The key staff who worked on most of the UI Experiment projects were Wayne 
Gordon, Jon Messenger, and Wayne Zajac. Other staff members who worked on 
one or more of the projects included Bill Coyne, Norm Harvey, and Doug Scott. 
Many individuals within the Unemployment Insurance Service worked on actu-
arial, budget, legislative, and program implementation issues. For the projects that 
operated in the Office of Policy Development and Research, the key staff were 
Gordon, Messenger, Janet Javar, and Jonathan Simonetta. 
6. Among the computer staff working on the experiments were Jun Chen, Lynn Cao, 
and John Chang. 
7. Because of the decline in temporary layoffs in the past two decades, the percent-
age of UI claimants who have no recall expectation would be much higher now. 
8. In program year (PY) 2007, the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs pro-
vided training to 176,000 individuals who exited the program. 
9. In 1992, the Unemployment Insurance Service developed its first “Mission, Vision, 
Values, Goals” statement. It stated, “The program’s mission is to provide unem-
ployed workers with temporary income support and facilitate reemployment.” I 
was a member of the work group that came up with that language, and even in the 
early 1990s my suggestion to include the words “and facilitate reemployment” 
met with initial resistance (O’Leary and Wandner 1997, pp. 702–703). 
10. A substantial number of American workers never file for UI benefits when they 
become unemployed. Only about one-third of all unemployed workers appear to 
apply for UI benefits. Even among job losers, who are the prime potential UI 








Insurance Experiments Begin 
The New Jersey and Job 
Search Assistance Experiments 
with Walter Corson 
SEARChINg FOR COST-EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS: ThE
DECISION TO BEgIN ThE NEW JERSEy ExPERImENT 
The New Jersey Experiment was the first of eight UI Experiments 
undertaken by the U.S. Department of Labor between 1985 and 1996. 
The economic and political environment of the time made these experi-
ments possible and shaped their design. Three key aspects of this envi-
ronment were 1) the need to create efficiently operating employment 
and training systems, 2) the impact of the federal budget on the ini-
tiation of new policy, and 3) concern about worker dislocation in the 
United States. 
U.S. employment and training programs continued to operate in the 
1980s, but their staffing and funding was reduced at the federal, state, 
and local level.1 As a result, attention was focused on ways to make 
employment and training programs administratively more efficient by 
making greater use of interprogram coordination, linkages, and con-
solidation. At the same time, an effort was made to determine the most 
effective methods for delivery of services to participants. 
Underlying the UI Experiments was the belief that the UI program 
could improve the coordination and linkages of reemployment services 
for dislocated workers by becoming a part of the reemployment service 
delivery system. Thus, it was expected that the UI program would join 
the Employment Service (ES) and Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 







was posited as a potential gateway for directing unemployed workers 
to reemployment service providers. UI staff were expected to be able to 
identify unemployed workers in need of reemployment services when 
they first became unemployed and filed for benefits. However, from the 
UI program’s perspective, it was recognized that while many perma-
nently separated UI claimants needed services, effective reemployment 
services had to be targeted at those claimants for whom reemployment 
services would be most cost-effective. The resulting service delivery 
system would provide quicker, more effective, and more efficient reem-
ployment services. 
The experiments were rooted in the reality of the 1980s federal bud-
getary process, which made it exceedingly difficult to initiate a new 
federal program. Experimental methods were expected to make any 
positive finding of cost-effectiveness more widely accepted and more 
difficult to refute. To use these experiments to initiate public policy, 
their evaluation results would have to be sufficiently positive that they 
would be cost-effective not only to society as a whole but to the govern-
ment sector as well. Furthermore, given the nature of the federal budget 
process, which divides the budget into separate cabinet-level appro-
priations, it also was desirable to have new program proposals be cost-
effective to the USDOL to ease the enactment of federal legislation. 
The UI Experiments were rooted in the growing concern about eco-
nomic dislocation that stemmed from the large number of mass layoffs 
and plant closings, including those resulting from international trade 
competition. Economic dislocation thus emerged as a policy issue. 
Recognizing the importance of this issue, the USDOL in 1984 initiated 
biennial surveys of worker dislocation. At that time, worker dislocation 
resulted in long durations of unemployment for workers: more of the 
unemployed were remaining unemployed for 27 weeks or more. For 
the UI program, this meant that more workers were exhausting their 
26 weeks of UI benefits, even after the 1980–1982 recession came to 
an end. Changing labor markets and increased numbers of long-term 
unemployed workers forced the UI program to adapt. Its traditional role 
of providing income maintenance was expanded to incorporate help-
ing the long-term unemployed return to productive employment. At the 
same time, the worker dislocation surveys showed that the UI program 
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for more than a few weeks. Thus, UI was indeed an appropriate gate-
way to dislocated worker programs. 
As the numbers of dislocated workers grew, the federal govern-
ment took note of the problem. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Department of Labor conducted an experiment in the downriver area 
of southeastern Michigan (Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer 1984). 
Similar experiments were run at several sites, including Buffalo, New 
York; Delaware; and Texas (Corson, Long, and Maynard 1985). These 
experiments concentrated on providing training and other comprehen-
sive reemployment services to dislocated workers. They were local in 
nature and tended to focus on blue-collar dislocated workers. What 
emerged during the 1980s, however, was a broader form of displace-
ment that spread to other occupations, including the white-collar occu-
pations. Within the department, the UI program began to offer a more 
promising possibility—that of serving as a gateway for a diverse set of 
dislocated workers. The idea was that when these workers first became 
unemployed and filed their initial claims for UI benefits, they might 
be identified as being in need of reemployment services and referred 
to reemployment service providers. What was needed, however, was 
a champion for a new approach to serving dislocated workers with 
department-funded programs. 
As the U.S. trade representative in the Reagan administration, Wil-
liam Brock worked to protect free trade, which both he and President 
Reagan believed in. Political pressure, however, was growing in the 
early 1980s to protect the United States against foreign goods and ser-
vices. Brock thought that the United States could do a better job of 
adapting to global competition. Critical to making that adaptation was 
improving education, training, and methods of rapid transition to new 
jobs for American workers, such as comprehensive job search assis-
tance. He was concerned that no one was talking about the critical 
issues of human development and job transition, and he started to speak 
out on this issue, as he would do for many years to come.2 
On April 29, 1985, Brock was appointed the sixteenth secretary 
of labor. He replaced Raymond Donovan, who had resigned under a 
cloud of larceny and fraud charges. Under the circumstances, the Rea-
gan administration wanted a clean and distinguished replacement for 











Reagan’s chief of staff, Donald Regan, offered it to him, he refused. He 
was happy as U.S. trade representative and believed that he was better 
suited for that job. If he were going to take a cabinet position, he wanted 
to be secretary of state or the treasury. He ultimately accepted the Labor 
job, but only after being asked personally by President Reagan (Buhl 
1989, pp. 111–118). 
In his years as chair of the Republican National Committee and as 
U.S. trade representative, Brock was considered by many to be a trans-
formational leader, and was known to be supportive of new ideas and 
policies. At the Labor Department, Brock wanted to generate a sense of 
mission among the staff. He wanted to improve the quality of life on 
the job by creating excitement, trying new things, and making programs 
work better. He wanted to show that things were changing. He opened 
the doors to his office suite, which had been closed during Secretary 
Donovan’s tenure. Believing training to be crucial for staff, he founded 
the DOL Academy in 1987. He sent a memorandum to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) saying that he was in charge of the 
department, and that as such he was not going to follow an OMB direc-
tive to close three regional offices (Buhl 1989). 
Brock’s tenure at the Labor Department was short. He left in 1987 
to join Senator Robert Dole’s presidential campaign. His efforts to 
innovate and transform the department were concentrated in the first 
year of his two-year tenure. He tried to transform the department by 
communicating his policy vision to his top managers at a conference 
attended by more than 200 career and political managers. In a 1987 
publication, Workforce 2000: Work and Workers for the Twenty-First 
Century (Johnston and Packer 1987), he also sought to give a sense of 
direction to the USDOL as a whole by communicating a vision of where 
the department and the American workforce were headed as well as the 
institutional transformations that would be required to get there (Buhl 
1989). 
Through his work as U.S. trade representative, Secretary Brock had 
become interested in worker dislocation, in part as a result of its ori-
gins in international competition. He wanted to know the impact of this 
phenomenon on American workers so he could make the U.S. economy 
more competitive. He believed strongly in free international trade, but 
he also knew that he had to do something for workers who paid the 





The Unemployment Insurance Experiments Begin 35 
Anticipating Brock’s interest in the worker dislocation issue, I pro-
posed in the spring of 1985 to conduct a series of dislocated worker 
experiments that would test alternative approaches to returning these 
workers to employment. The proposal was developed as a request for 
new funding in the Labor Department’s proposed budget for fiscal year 
1987. This proposal was the beginning of a long and uncertain funding 
process. The various components of the department were developing 
proposals for submission by the secretary to the OMB in September 
1985. These proposals then would be considered for inclusion in Presi-
dent Reagan’s budget proposal to be announced in February 1986. The 
budget would have to be approved by Congress and would not become 
effective until October 1, 1986. In an administration that was trying to 
cut government spending, the prospects for the proposal seemed dim 
at best. 
My proposal was reviewed by the Unemployment Insurance Ser-
vice administrator, Carolyn Golding. Golding enjoyed being the UI 
administrator. She believed that the UI program was underrated as a 
component of macroeconomic stimulus. Golding welcomed the idea of 
UI becoming more active in helping workers to become reemployed. 
Supportive of research, she saw research as the “seed corn” to develop 
the UI program in the years ahead. She believed that future improve-
ments of the UI programs would require evidence in order to cause a 
slow and conservative political process to support an expanded reem-
ployment role for employment and training programs. Golding thought 
that Bill Brock would be interested in my proposal. She approved it and 
forwarded it to her boss, Assistant Secretary Roberts T. Jones, whom 
she believed was an “excellent reader of the political tea leaves” and 
would pass the proposal on to Secretary Brock.3 
In the spring of 1985, Jones approved the proposal on behalf of 
the Employment and Training Administration (ETA). He sent the pro-
posal forward to the department’s budget office to be considered for 
incorporation into the department’s overall budget submission to the 
White House. This proposal, if approved, would result in a $10 mil-
lion increase in the department’s budget for fiscal year 1987. Secretary 
Brock reviewed the proposed FY 1987 budget in late August 1985 and 
asked for a briefing by Jones. Jones briefed Brock about this demon-
stration project in a meeting attended by a number of Brock’s political 









Brock understood the demonstration project’s content and implications, 
and he and Jones discussed them in detail. Brock liked what he heard, 
and at the end of the meeting Brock quickly made up his mind, saying, 
“Let’s do it.” The matter was settled, and Jones was surprised by how 
quickly and decisively the issue had been resolved.4 
Brock thought that the proposal to start the UI Experiments made 
“perfect sense.” He had been concerned about human capital develop-
ment and job transition in a competitive world economy, and the UI 
Experiments showed ways to “make it work” with respect to job train-
ing and comprehensive job search assistance. He hoped that some of 
the tested reemployment services would be shown to be effective as 
methods of improving the employment adaptability of American work-
ers, making them more competitive in the world market. These cost-
effective services could then “spread out,” becoming well-funded, 
national programs that could make a difference.5 
At the department, Brock’s concern about promoting human devel-
opment for American workers was first expressed in his support of the 
UI Experiments. He wanted to get the word out that the United States 
had been “coasting” in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s instead of 
coming to grips with the education, training, and job transition issues 
it faced. He did so by jointly sponsoring a Youth 2000 conference with 
the secretaries of education and health and human services. The con-
ference found that America was not doing enough to develop human 
resources nor to adapt to technological and other challenges. Brock was 
concerned that no one was talking about these issues. He got out the 
word by publishing Workforce 2000, which grew out of the conference.6 
Brock approved the proposed budget increase for the UI Experi-
ments. He was highly supportive of the experiments, but he did not want 
to wait over a year—from his approval in August 1985 to the beginning 
of FY 1987 on October 1, 1986—for project funding to become avail-
able. He therefore directed Assistant Secretary Jones to have the ETA
initiate a demonstration project with unobligated FY 1984 funds over 
the next five weeks—before the fiscal year ended on September 30, 
1985. Assistant Secretary Jones called me into his office on the day fol-
lowing Labor Day, told me what Brock wanted to do, and made avail-
able the remaining ETA discretionary funds for the fiscal year. He told 
the ETA’s contracting office to be ready to complete the contracting 
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With one month remaining in the fiscal year, there was a mad dash 
to accomplish two things: 1) complete a preliminary design for an 
experiment that would test three alternative packages of reemployment 
services and 2) find a state that was both willing to participate and able 
to negotiate and sign a cooperative agreement with the department in 
under a month. In less than a week, Ray Uhalde from the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and Research and I devel-
oped a design for a three-treatment demonstration project, determined 
its approximate sample size, and estimated the cost of operating and 
evaluating it. I was interested in a range of treatments and in assuring 
that they could be compared to each other to determine which worked 
best. Uhalde was working on an evaluation of the JTPA training pro-
grams, so he was particularly interested in having a targeted training 
treatment that was linked to the UI program. He hoped that such tar-
geting could increase the effectiveness of dislocated worker training 
programs.7 
The department decided that the state of New Jersey would be a 
good site for the demonstration. As a Republican, that state’s gover-
nor, Thomas Kean, was compatible with the Reagan administration. 
Assistant Secretary Jones knew the assistant commissioner of the New 
Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, and so did UI administrator 
Golding. One of Golding’s office directors, Robert Schaerfl, was dis-
patched to Trenton to talk to the assistant commissioner. The goal of 
the meeting was to convince New Jersey to participate. The assistant 
commissioner was concerned about whether the project would be fully 
funded, whether he could convince the New Jersey agency leaders to 
participate in a random assignment experiment, and whether the results 
would shed a favorable light on New Jersey. The lunch ended with a 
promise that New Jersey would seriously consider participating.8 
New Jersey agreed to be the demonstration site, and a cooperative 
agreement was signed on September 30 providing New Jersey with 
funding in the amount of $4.7 million for operating the demonstration 
and evaluating the demonstration results.9 Mathematica Policy Research 
was competitively selected to conduct the research and evaluation. 
Brock also took action to assure that there would be additional UI 
experiments. Fiscal year 1987 was a very tight budget year. The depart-
ment proposed a number of budget increases that were sent to OMB, 











James Miller for only one proposed budget increase—the one to fund 
additional UI Experiments.10 Brock won the appeal, and the UI Experi-
ments were incorporated into the president’s budget request to Con-
gress. The House of Representatives accepted the proposal at the pro-
posed $10 million level, but the Senate reduced it to $5 million. In con-
ference committee negotiations to reconcile the differences between the 
two budgets passed by the two houses of Congress, the House acceded 
to the Senate’s $5 million funding level. 
Once the $5 million was appropriated by Congress, USDOL staff 
developed a plan to test two additional types of interventions for dislo-
cated workers: 1) reemployment bonuses and 2) self-employment assis-
tance.11 The $5 million was used to fund two reemployment bonus dem-
onstrations—one in Pennsylvania and the other in Washington State. 
The department continued to support the UI Experiments as the 
experiments examined alternative new employment interventions; 
USDOL funded a total of eight experiments. In early 1987, the depart-
ment also funded a Washington State self-employment assistance (SEA) 
experiment. In December 1987, Congress mandated three additional 
self-employment experiments, only one of which was implemented— 
in Massachusetts.12 The Massachusetts demonstration was the first to 
be authorized to use state accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund to 
fund the experimental operations, while the USDOL paid for the proj-
ect evaluation. Congress mandated a Job Search Assistance Demonstra-
tion in 1991, once again authorizing use of Unemployment Trust Fund 
resources for this purpose. Two such demonstrations were conducted, 
one in Washington, D.C., and another in Florida. Finally, the depart-
ment funded a Maryland work search experiment, also in 1991. 
ThE NEW JERSEy ExPERImENT 
Overview
The New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration Project (the 
“New Jersey Experiment”) tested whether the UI system could identify 
dislocated workers early in their spells of unemployment.13 The project 
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individuals’ return to work. Three packages of services, or treatments, 
were tested: 1) job search assistance (JSA) only, 2) JSA combined with 
training or relocation assistance, and 3) JSAcombined with a cash bonus 
for early reemployment. A key component of the demonstration was 
that eligible claimants were identified and provided services through 
the coordinated efforts of the UI, ES, and JTPA systems. Another key 
component was that the UI program required claimants to report for 
services; failure to report could lead to the denial of benefits. 
The demonstration began operations in July 1986. By the end of 
June 1987, 8,675 UI claimants had been offered one of these three pack-
ages. Another 2,385 claimants who received services currently being 
provided were randomly selected to provide a control group. Services 
to eligible claimants continued into Fall 1987 to ensure that all eligibles, 
if they wished, were able to receive a full set of demonstration services. 
During the demonstration period, the New Jersey economy experienced 
worker dislocation, generated by a long-term secular decline in manu-
facturing, while substantial growth occurred in other sectors. Overall, 
the state economy was quite strong, and the unemployment rate was 
about 5 percent. 
The initial evaluation of the demonstration (Corson et al. 1989), 
combined with two follow-up studies that extended the analysis for 
approximately six years after the initial UI claim (Anderson, Corson, 
and Decker 1991; Corson and Haimson 1996), found that each treat-
ment reduced UI benefit payments for the current UI benefit year—and 
for one or more additional years—and increased employment and earn-
ings for at least the initial year. Although the initial evaluation found no 
evidence that the training component of the second treatment increased 
earnings in the year after the initial claim, the follow-up studies sug-
gested that each component of the treatments—JSA, training, and 
the reemployment bonus—contributed to the impacts on reduced UI 
receipt and increases in earnings and that the treatments helped work-
ers find more stable jobs than those found by control group members. 
The evaluation also indicated that the demonstration succeeded in tar-
geting claimants who, in the absence of the demonstration treatments, 
would have experienced more severe long-run reemployment diffi-
culties. Finally, the evaluation found that all three treatments offered 
net benefits to claimants and to society, when compared with existing 








also led to net gains for the federal government. Whether the policy 
proposal is cost-effective to the government sector has important public 
policy implications when federal budget constraints make new program 
implementation impractical if its impact is less than budget-neutral. 
These findings of net benefits to claimants and to the government 
suggested that the demonstration treatments represented useful reem-
ployment tools that could be directed toward UI claimants. However, 
several other evaluation findings had to be considered if the treatments 
were to be implemented as full-scale programs. First, with respect to 
reemployment services, two aspects of the treatments significantly con-
tributed to their success—the mandatory participation requirements and 
the high degree of interagency coordination in service provision. These 
aspects could not be ignored in future applications. Second, analyses 
of the treatments by population subgroup suggested that the treatments 
were most successful in promoting the reemployment of individuals 
who already had marketable skills. Finally, benefit-cost analyses of the 
individual treatments provided the strongest support for the JSA-only 
treatment. Indeed, these findings suggested that the mandatory compre-
hensive JSA-services emphasized in the New Jersey demonstration are 
cost-effective for a broad range of permanently displaced UI claimants. 
Demonstration Design 
The New Jersey demonstration addressed three objectives: 
1) It examined the extent to which UI claimants who could ben-
efit from reemployment services could be identified early in 
their unemployment spells. 
2) It assessed effective policies and adjustment strategies for 
helping such workers become reemployed. 
3) It examined how such a UI reemployment plan could best be 
implemented.
To achieve these objectives, the design called for identifying
demonstration-eligible individuals in the week after their first UI pay-
ment, and then assigning them randomly to one of three treatment 
groups offered alternative packages of reemployment services or to a 
control group receiving existing services. The demonstration sites were 
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ability of their selection proportional to the size of the UI population in 
each office. 
Definition of eligibility 
The demonstration plan incorporated specific screens to identify 
experienced workers who were likely to be permanently dislocated 
from their jobs. The following eligibility screens were chosen: 
First payment. The demonstration excluded claimants who did not 
receive a first UI payment. To promote early intervention, it also ex-
cluded claimants who did not receive a first payment within five weeks 
of an initial claim. Individuals who were working and, consequently, 
received a partial first payment also were excluded, because their job 
attachment meant that they had not necessarily been dislocated. Fi-
nally, special claims (e.g., unemployment compensation for ex–service 
members or federal civilian employees, interstate claims, and combined 
wage claims) were excluded. 
Age. An age screen of age 25 or older was applied to eliminate the 
broad category of young workers, who have traditionally shown limited 
attachment to the labor market, and whose employment problems may 
be quite different from those of older, experienced workers. 
Tenure. Demonstration-eligible claimants had to exhibit a substan-
tial attachment to a job, so that the job loss was likely to be associated 
with one or more reemployment difficulties. Each claimant was re-
quired to have worked for his or her last employer for three years prior 
to applying for UI benefits and could not have worked full time for any 
other employer during the three-year period. The department’s Bureau 
of Labor Statistics used the three-year requirement to define dislocated 
workers (Helwig 2004). 
Temporary layoffs. Because the demonstration treatments were 
not intended for workers who were temporarily laid off, it was desir-
able to exclude claimants on temporary layoff. However, previous re-
search and experience showed that some claimants say they expect to 
be recalled even when their chances of actual recall are slim. To ensure 






individuals who both expected to be recalled and had a specific recall 
date were excluded. 
Union hiring hall arrangements. Individuals who are typically 
hired through union hiring halls exhibit a unique attachment to a spe-
cific labor market and were thus excluded from the demonstration. 
The treatments 
The demonstration tested three treatment packages designed to 
enhance the likelihood of reemployment. Eligible claimants were ran-
domly assigned to a control group that received existing services or to 
one of the three treatment groups: 1) job search assistance only, 2) JSA
plus training or relocation, or 3) JSA plus a reemployment bonus. 
The initial components of all three treatments were the same: noti-
fication, orientation, testing, a job search workshop, and an assessment/ 
counseling interview. These services were delivered sequentially, early 
in claimants’unemployment spells. First, a notification letter was sent to 
claimants approximately four weeks after they filed their initial claims. 
Claimants usually began to receive services during their fifth week of 
unemployment. Services were provided when claimants reported to 
a demonstration office (usually an ES office). They received orienta-
tion and testing during a one-week period. In the following week, they 
attended a job search workshop, consisting of five half-day sessions, 
and a follow-up, one-on-one counseling/assessment session in the sub-
sequent week. These initial treatment components were mandatory; 
failure to report could lead to the denial of all UI benefits. 
The job search workshop was conducted from Monday through 
Friday for approximately three hours per day, for a total of approxi-
mately 18 hours. The workshop followed a standard curriculum that 
included sessions on topics such as the following: adjusting to the job 
loss, conducting an effective self-assessment, developing realistic job 
goals, organizing an effective job search strategy, developing resumes 
and job applications, and practicing interview techniques. The curricu-
lum included both individual activities and group discussions. 
Beginning with the counseling/assessment interview, the nature of 
the three treatments differed. In the JSA-only group, claimants were 
told that, as long as they continued to collect UI, they were expected 
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directly with staff to discuss their job search activities or by engag-
ing in search-related activities at a resource center in the office. The 
resource center offered job search materials and equipment, such as job 
listings, telephones, and occupational and training literature. Claimants 
were encouraged to use the center actively and were told that, if they 
did not come to the office periodically, ES staff would contact them and 
ask them to do so. These periodic follow-up contacts were to occur 2, 
4, 8, 12, and 16 weeks following the assessment interview. Local ES 
staff were expected to notify UI when the claimant did not report for 
services. 
Claimants in the JSA-plus-training group also were informed about 
the resource center and their obligation to maintain contact during their 
job search. They were told about the availability of classroom and on-
the-job training and were encouraged to pursue training if interested. 
Staff from the local JTPA service delivery area worked directly with 
these claimants to develop training options. These claimants also were 
advised about the availability of relocation assistance, which those who 
elected not to pursue training could use for out-of-area job searches and 
moving expenses. 
Claimants in the JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus group were offered 
the same set of JSA services as the first group (JSA only), in addition to 
a bonus for rapid reemployment. The maximum bonus equaled one-half 
of the claimant’s remaining UI entitlement at the time of the assessment 
interview. This amount would be paid if the claimant started working 
either during the assessment week or within the next two weeks. There-
after, the potential bonus declined at a rate of 10 percent of the original 
amount per week, until it was no longer available. Claimants recalled 
by their former employer could not receive a bonus; neither could those 
who were employed by a relative or in temporary, seasonal, or part-time 
jobs. Claimants who collected a bonus received 60 percent of the bonus 
if they remained employed for four weeks, and the remainder if they 
stayed employed for 12 weeks. 
Each treatment tested a different aspect of the employment prob-
lems dislocated workers faced. The JSA-only treatment was based on 
the assumption that many dislocated workers have marketable skills but 
do not have enough job search experience to identify these skills and 
sell them in the job market. In contrast, the training treatment was based 





upgraded. Finally, the reemployment bonus treatment was based on the 
assumption that JSA alone is an insufficient incentive for claimants to 
seek to obtain employment rapidly, and that an additional incentive will 
help them recognize the realities of the job market and accept a suitable 
job more quickly. 
With the exception of the reemployment bonus and relocation assis-
tance, the demonstration services were similar to those available under 
existing ES and JTPA systems in New Jersey. However, there were 
important differences. The likelihood that a claimant would be offered 
and would receive demonstration services was considerably greater 
than under the existing system. The timing of the receipt of services 
also differed: demonstration services generally were provided earlier 
in the spell of unemployment. In addition, the mandatory nature of the 
initial services differed. Under the existing system, non-job-attached 
claimants were expected to register with the ES, but registration was 
sometimes delayed during peak load periods, and subsequent ser-
vices were generally not mandatory. In the demonstration, claimants 
were expected to report for initial services, and this requirement was 
enforced. 
Findings 
Effectiveness of the eligibility definition 
The eligibility requirements targeted demonstration services to 
about one-quarter of the claimants who received a first UI payment. 
The first round of exclusions (for delayed first payments, partial first 
payments, special claims, and under 25 years of age) was made on the 
basis of routinely collected UI agency data and an examination of the 
records of all claimants who received a first payment. This process 
excluded about 28 percent of the claimants, with the largest number 
being excluded because of the age restriction. 
The rest of the eligibility requirements (consisting of screening out 
workers based on job tenure of less than three years, temporary layoffs, 
and union hiring-hall arrangements) were applied with data collected 
specifically for the demonstration by UI staff. The most restrictive 
screening device applied at this point was the tenure requirement, which 
excluded individuals who had not worked for their pre-UI employer for 
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three years. This requirement excluded about half of the claimants who 
passed the initial eligibility screens. 
The other important eligibility requirement was the temporary lay-
off screen, which excluded claimants with a definite recall date. This 
screen excluded about 13 percent of the claimants who survived the 
initial examination. In devising this screen, the demonstration designers 
decided it was important to establish that the layoff was indeed tempo-
rary, rather than relying solely on the claimant’s expectation of recall 
to his or her prior job. Having a defined recall date was used for this 
purpose. As expected, the percentage of claimants who said that their 
layoff was temporary was substantially larger than the number who 
actually had a recall date. Only half of the claimants who expected to 
be recalled, but who had no recall date, did return to their pre-UI job. 
The New Jersey Experiment findings indicate that the eligibil-
ity screens directed demonstration services to a population that faced 
reemployment difficulties. An examination of the characteristics of the 
eligible population showed that it contained a substantial percentage of 
individuals whose age, industry of employment, and other character-
istics are usually associated with a dislocated worker population and 
with difficulties in becoming reemployed. Moreover, compared with a 
sample of individuals who were not eligible for the demonstration, the 
eligible population experienced considerably longer periods of UI col-
lection and longer unemployment spells, on average, during the initial 
benefit year. During the full six years of follow-up, the group targeted in 
the New Jersey demonstration continued to experience large reductions 
in earnings relative to group members’ base-year earnings. These earn-
ing reductions were considerably larger than those realized by noneli-
gibles, indicating that a dislocated worker population had indeed been 
identified. The long-term UI receipt of demonstration eligibles was sig-
nificantly shorter than that of noneligibles, a finding that can be attrib-
uted, in part, to the fact that workers in seasonal industries were among 
the noneligible population. 
However, it is unlikely that all demonstration eligibles actually 
required services. Some were in the prime of their working lives, and 
some were individuals from industries (e.g., service industries) that 
were strong and growing in New Jersey. Moreover, some claimants 







Receipt of initial services 
All claimants who were selected to participate in the demonstration 
treatment group were offered a common set of reemployment services 
early in their UI claim period. These services occurred in sequence and 
consisted of orientation, testing, a job search workshop, and an assess-
ment/counseling interview. 
Data on the receipt of these initial services show that 77 percent of 
the selected claimants attended orientations as requested. Most attended 
their scheduled session, but some attended a later session, generally 
after a follow-up contact by the UI claims examiner. Three-quarters 
of the claimants who attended orientations continued in the program 
through the assessment/counseling interview. However, not all such 
individuals received career testing or attended a job search workshop. 
Some were excused from participation, generally because their recall 
expectations could be substantiated. In addition, a large number were 
excused from testing and the job search workshop because of their lan-
guage or reading comprehension difficulties, which precluded testing. 
Most claimants attended orientation during the fifth week after their 
UI claim, and most completed assessment during the next three-to-
four-week period. Thus, the goal of early intervention generally was 
achieved as planned. 
The level at which treatment group members received the initial 
services—testing, job search workshops, and counseling—substantially
exceeded the level at which control group members received such ser-
vices from the ES and JTPA through existing referral mechanisms. 
Thus, the demonstration achieved its objective of increasing the level 
of services delivered. 
Receipt of additional services 
The additional services that were offered to claimants at the assess-
ment/counseling interview included the periodic JSA activities, training 
and relocation assistance, and the reemployment bonus. 
JSA follow-up. The objective of the follow-up activities was to en-
courage all claimants, except those engaged in training, to pursue an 
ongoing, intensive job search. This intensive job search was promoted 
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quiring claimants to maintain periodic contact with demonstration staff, 
either through the resource centers or in person. 
Data on claimants who were collecting UI at the five follow-up 
points (2, 4, 8, 12, and 16 weeks after assessment) showed that 92 per-
cent satisfied the first follow-up requirement (that is, the two-week con-
tact) and that 80 percent had a contact at 16 weeks. Although the rate 
of contact declined, the degree of contact was high relative to other 
employment and training programs, which typically do not have sys-
tematic follow-up procedures. However, these periodic contacts did not 
always follow the strict schedule that had been laid out in the design, 
nor were all contacts made in person as desired. In addition, only a few 
of the resource centers appear to have been extensively used; conse-
quently, the use of these centers probably had a minor impact on dem-
onstration outcomes. 
Training and relocation assistance. Classroom and on-the-job 
training opportunities were offered to claimants in the second treatment 
to test the efficacy of a service package that, early in the unemployment 
spell, attempted to alter or upgrade skills no longer in demand.14 About 
15 percent of the claimants who were offered training took advantage 
of it. Most of this training was classroom-based. Much of the classroom 
training was geared toward business and office services or computer 
and information services, while the on-the-job training tended to be in 
technical, clerical, and sales occupations. It appears that the training of-
fered was in fact directed toward occupations with strong employment 
prospects in New Jersey. 
The rate of training received through the demonstration project was 
higher than the rate observed for comparable groups of claimants who 
were offered training opportunities through referrals from the regular 
New Jersey JTPA program. Thus the offer of training under the demon-
stration achieved the objective of increasing the receipt of training, even 
though the overall rate of training was lower than initially expected. 
Two general reasons appear to explain the lower-than-expected
increase in training participation. First, the nature of the training 
intervention differed from that offered by other programs. The offer 
occurred early in the layoff period, which may have been before many 
individuals were ready to accept the fact that an occupational change 





were interested in or needed reemployment services, let alone training. 
However, they were offered services because of the mandatory nature 
of the initial services. 
The second reason that training participation was less than might 
have been expected pertains to the manner of the demonstration imple-
mentation. The training treatment relied on existing JTPA program 
operators to provide training placement, and some operators were con-
siderably more successful than others at placing claimants in training.15 
Their success stemmed from a number of factors, including an early 
and enthusiastic presentation of the training option and the capability to 
offer a wide range of individual training slots. 
Reemployment bonus. The third treatment package included a re-
employment bonus that was offered at the assessment/counseling inter-
view. The purpose was to provide a direct financial incentive for claim-
ants to seek work actively and become reemployed. The full bonus offer 
averaged $1,644 and was paid for jobs that started by the end of the 
second full week following the interview. After that, it declined by 10 
percent of the initial amount each week, falling to zero by the end of the 
eleventh full week of the offer. 
Nineteen percent of claimants who were offered the bonus received 
a first bonus payment, which was paid to individuals who held a bonus-
eligible job for at least four weeks. Eighty-four percent of this group 
also received the final bonus payment, which was paid after 12 weeks 
of work. Overall, the total of the two bonus payments averaged close 
to $1,300. 
Thirty-one percent of the claimants who were offered a bonus began 
a job within the bonus period, compared with 19 percent who were 
offered and then received a bonus. The remaining 12 percent appeared 
to be largely ineligible for the bonus, primarily because they obtained a 
job with their pre-UI employer. 
Impacts of the demonstration on unemployment insurance 
receipt 
The demonstration treatments were expected to affect the re-
ceipt of UI benefits by eligible claimants. The JSA-only and JSA-
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claimants become reemployed rapidly, thereby reducing the amount 
of UI benefits received by treatment group members relative to the 
amount received by control group members. Further, the JSA-plus-
reemployment-bonus treatment was expected to have a larger impact 
on UI receipt because of the reemployment incentives created by the 
bonus. Expectations about the effect of JSA plus training or the reloca-
tion treatment on short-run UI receipt were less clear. Individuals who 
received this treatment offer but did not participate in training were 
expected to experience a reduction in UI receipt, but those who entered 
training would experience an increase in receipt, since individuals who 
accepted training continued to collect UI while being trained. 
Estimates of the treatment impact on the receipt of regular UI 
benefits show that all three treatments reduced the number of weeks 
claimants collected benefits over the benefit year: by a half-week for 
the JSA-only and JSA-plus-training treatments and by one week for 
the JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus treatment (Table 2.1). As expected, 
these reductions were largest for JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus. These 
impacts were mirrored in the amount of benefits collected. 
Longer-run reductions in UI receipt were also observed. Significant 
reductions occurred in the second year for the JSA-only and JSA-plus-
reemployment-bonus treatments. In addition, there was a significant 
reduction in extended benefit program payments for the JSA-plus-
training-or-relocation-assistance treatment group.16 During the six-year 
follow-up period, the treatments reduced the receipt of UI benefits 
by about three-quarters of a week for the JSA-only treatment group, 
by one-and-a-half weeks for the JSA-plus-training-or-relocation-
assistance treatment group, and by nearly two weeks for the JSA-plus-
reemployment-bonus treatment group. These findings suggest that each 
of the treatment components—job search assistance, training, and the 
reemployment bonus—contributed to the longer-term impacts and that 
the treatments led to employment that was more stable than the employ-
ment of control group members. 
Employment and earnings impact 
The treatments were expected to promote quicker reemployment of 
claimants. Short-run impacts were expected to be greater for the JSA-
only and JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus treatments than for the JSA-
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Table 2.1  New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project: Estimated Treatment 
Impacts on UI Receipt 
JSA plus training/ JSA plus 
JSA only relocation reemployment bonus Control group mean 
Regular UI 
Weeks paid in benefit year −0.47** −0.48** −0.97*** 17.90 
Weeks paid in second year −0.53*** −0.02 −0.44** 31.99 
Weeks paid over six years −0.76 −0.93 −1.72 31.99 
Dollars paid in benefit year −87* −81** −170*** 3,228 
Dollars paid in second year −94*** −39 −78** 600 
Dollars paid over six years −181 −165 −333* 6,031 
All UI programs 
Weeks paid over six years −0.78 −1.47 −1.92 35.70 
Dollars paid over six years −222 −293 −375 6,852 
NOTE: The category “All UI programs” includes regular UI, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC), and two special state 
extended benefit programs. JSA = job search assistance. * statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; 
** statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level for a two-tailed test. 
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plus-training treatment, since individuals who entered training were 
expected to sacrifice short-run earnings for longer-run earnings gains. 
Estimates of the short-run impacts of the treatments on employment 
and earnings suggest that JSA-only and JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus 
increased the claimants’ short-run earnings. For these two treatments, 
the estimated earnings impact based on interview data was positive and 
statistically significant for the first two quarters in the year after the 
initial UI claim. The earnings impact estimates based on wage records 
for the JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus treatment also were positive 
and significant for the first calendar quarter after the initial UI claim 
(Table 2.2). In addition, employment impact estimates (not reported in 
the table) were also positive and significant for the same period. The 
timing of these impacts indicates that the treatments promoted early 
reemployment. 
Another short-run employment and earnings issue was investi-
gated—the impact of the treatments on the characteristics of the claim-
ants’ first job after receiving UI benefits. This is important because, by 
promoting rapid reemployment, the treatments might have prompted 
claimants to accept jobs that were less appropriate than those obtained 
by claimants who were not offered special services. An examination of 
this issue indicates that the early reemployment promoted by the treat-
ments did not entail any sacrifice in hourly wages or hours worked. In 
fact, the treatments appeared to have led to modest increases in hourly 
wage rates in post-UI jobs (Table 2.2). 
The evaluation also looked at long-run employment and earnings 
impacts. These estimates, based on wage record data, showed no statis-
tically significant treatment impacts over the six-year follow-up period 
(beyond those observed in the initial quarters following the UI claim). 
Also, a relatively small number of claimants participated in training, so 
the impacts of training would have to have been quite large to have been 
detected through treatment-control comparisons. 
For this reason, the evaluation examined the earnings experiences
of trainees to determine whether the pattern of earnings suggested that 
training might have had an impact not detected in the treatment-control 
comparisons. This analysis showed that trainees who participated in 
classroom-based occupational skills training had relatively low earn-
ings while they participated in training, but that compared with simi-
lar claimants not offered training they had relatively higher earnings 
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Table 2.2  New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project: Estimated Treatment 
Impacts on Earnings and Post-UI Wages 
JSA plus training/ JSA plus Control 
Earnings JSA only relocation reemployment bonus group mean 
Interview data ($) 
Claim quarter 1 125** 82 160** 687 
Claim quarter 2 263** 103 278*** 1,945 
Claim quarter 3 171 83 131 2,701 
Claim quarter 4 49 77 22 3,012 
Wage records data ($) 
Calendar quarter 1 28 58 176** 1,638 
Calendar quarter 2 75 −23 79 2,174 
Calendar quarter 3 101 47 46 2,507 
Calendar quarter 4 31 28 79 2,517 
Post-UI wages 
% change in post-UI relative to 0.041** 0.030** 0.041** 
pre-UI hourly wage 
NOTE: For percentage change in post-UI wages relative to pre-UI hourly wage, data came from the demonstration project interview. 
Quarters for the interview data are defined relative to the data of the UI claim. That is, Quarter 1 is the first three months following the 
date of claim, Quarter 2 is the next three months, and so on. Quarters for wage record data are calendar quarters beginning with the first 
full quarter after the date of UI claim. ** statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** statistically 
significant at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
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in later periods (relative to their base period earnings). Claimants 
who participated in on-the-job training had substantially higher earn-
ings throughout the six-year follow-up period. Although these impact 
estimates could be biased, because the analysis could not completely 
control for unobserved factors that affect self-selection of training par-
ticipants, the analysis suggests that both classroom (occupational skills) 
and on-the-job training did enhance trainees’ earnings. 
Benefit-cost analysis 
An important question with respect to any program or policy is 
whether the benefits obtained from offering the services exceed their 
costs. This question was examined for the three treatments in the dem-
onstration by examining the benefits and costs from the perspective of 
claimants, the government, and society as a whole. For example, reduc-
tions in UI benefit receipt represent a cost to claimants, a benefit to the 
government, and neither a benefit nor a cost to society, since UI pay-
ments are a transfer payment. The analysis for the government sector 
considered net benefits (including gains in earnings and taxes paid) and 
net costs, relative to the existing service system. 
In terms of costs, the costs of providing the three treatments were 
estimated at $169 per claimant for the JSA-only treatment, $491 per 
claimant for the JSA-plus-training-or-relocation treatment, and $299 
per claimant for the JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus treatment. Because 
some reemployment services were already provided to UI claimants 
under the existing service system, the net cost of providing these treat-
ments was lower: $155 for the first treatment, $377 for the second, and 
$276 for the third. 
The results of the benefit-cost analysis indicated that each of the 
treatments offered net benefits to society as a whole as well as to claim-
ants, when compared with existing services (Table 2.3).17 The JSA-only 
and JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus treatments also led to net gains 
for the government sector as a whole and for the USDOL subagen-
cies that actually offer the services, since the reductions in UI benefits 
outweighed the net cost of providing additional services to claimants. 
Overall, net benefits were similar for these two treatments, and the JSA-
plus-training/relocation treatment was more expensive than the other 






Table 2.3  New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment 
Demonstration Project: Benefit-Cost Comparison with 
Existing Services ($ per claimant) 
JSA plus 
JSA plus training/ reemployment 
Perspective JSA only relocation bonus 
Society 581 41 565 
Claimants 407 200 400 
Government 175 −159 165 
Labor Department 52 −219 45 
Other government 123 60 120 
NOTE: Entries are net benefits (the sum of benefits minus costs) relative to existing 
services. 
SOURCE: Corson and Haimson (1996). 
Policy Implications of the New Jersey Experiment 
Of the three treatments, job search assistance was the most cost-
effective. Based on the strength of these findings, the job search assis-
tance component quickly had an impact on workforce policy. The final 
evaluation report was published in 1989. Six years later the WPRS sys-
tem was enacted into law, taking the lessons learned about the effec-
tiveness of job search assistance for dislocated workers from the New 
Jersey Experiment and using them to launch a nationwide program. 
The lessons learned from the job search assistance treatment went 
beyond the effectiveness of JSA. The requirement for claimants to 
participate in initial JSA demonstration services also played a role in 
the treatment’s success. Failure to report to the orientation session was 
reported to UI local office staff, and UI staff members were expected 
to follow up with a fact-finding interview with the claimant. A formal 
determination of eligibility (a nonmonetary determination) was to be 
conducted if the interview raised a potential eligibility issue.18 This 
issue could result in the denial of benefits (a nonmonetary denial). In 
accordance with the project design, the evaluation found that manda-
tory participation was enforced, resulting in increased nonmonetary 
determinations and denials for the treatment groups compared to the 
control group. Nonmonetary determinations were made for 40 percent 
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and most of the issues raised were related to reporting for demonstra-
tion services. Denials for treatment group members exceeded those for 
control group members, 19 percent to 15, with denials being higher 
for those not reporting for the orientation than for those who did. The 
evaluators found that enforcing mandatory participation in initial dem-
onstration services contributed significantly to the reduction in duration 
of UI receipt, not only directly through the increase in benefit denials 
but also indirectly through the establishment of a rigorous compliance 
process (Corson et al. 1989, pp. 273–277). These findings, in combi-
nation with the findings from the other experiments that are reviewed 
below, argue for rigorous enforcement of the UI work test.
The lessons learned about the other two treatments—JSA plus train-
ing and JSA plus reemployment bonuses—had no immediate impact. 
As discussed below, reemployment bonuses were revisited as a policy 
initiative in 1994 and again in 2003. For training, there has been a con-
tinuing search for what kind of training works. Researchers have con-
tinued to review the evidence, and the department began an Individual 
Training Allowance (ITA) Experiment in 2001, a new experiment to 
determine what kind of training voucher is most effective. 
JOB SEARCh ASSISTANCE DEmONSTRATIONS IN ThE
DISTRICT OF COLUmBIA AND FLORIDA 
Overview 
The efficacy of job search assistance for UI claimants that was 
found in New Jersey created interest in determining whether these 
results could be expanded and generalized to other states. This interest 
led to enactment of federal legislation in the early 1990s that authorized 
additional demonstration projects, requiring the department to conduct 
a new job search assistance demonstration to replicate the New Jer-
sey Experiment. This requirement was contained in the initial 1991 law 
authorizing the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) pro-
gram, which extended benefits during the recession of the early 1990s.19 
Operational funds for the JSA Demonstration were provided from the 










setts SEA Demonstration. The JSA Demonstration provisions were 
incorporated into the 1991 EUC extension in the expectation that fur-
ther research work would be needed before a permanent JSA program 
for dislocated workers could be enacted. However, such a job search 
assistance program was enacted in 1993 as the Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services, before the new demonstration project even 
began (see Chapter 3). 
The legislation authorizing the JSA Demonstration, Title II of the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, required the 
department to implement and evaluate a demonstration to provide job 
search assistance to UI claimants. The act’s provisions defining the JSA
program were modeled on those of the New Jersey demonstration. The 
provisions were as follows: 
Eligibility. Eligible individuals would be those who were receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits and who had at least 126 weeks of 
work with their last base-period employer in the three years prior to the 
end of the base year. Individuals were not eligible if they had definite 
recall dates or if they were seeking employment through union hiring 
halls. 
Comprehensive job search program. Eligible individuals would 
be provided with a comprehensive job search program that included ori-
entation, testing, a job search workshop, an individual assessment and 
counseling interview plus ongoing contact with program staff, follow-
up assistance, resource centers, and job search materials and equip-
ment. These were the same service components and the same support 
services that were provided in the New Jersey Experiment. This basic 
job search assistance package was to be tested by using a design similar 
to that previously tested in New Jersey but also by testing alternative 
treatments building on the basic treatment. 
mandatory participation. Eligible individuals were required to 
participate in services, with failure to participate leading to benefit dis-
qualification of up to 10 weeks. The state could waive the participation 
requirement for good cause or if the state determined that participation 
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The legislation specified that the demonstration should use an ex-
perimental design, with random assignment of eligible claimants to each 
of the treatments. A control group would receive nondemonstration ser-
vices. Thus, experimental methods would be used to measure the effec-
tiveness of the treatments in promoting reemployment. This approach 
assured that the demonstration project could be rigorously evaluated, 
yielding results that Congress could use in its future decision-making. 
Following a precedent from a 1987 congressionally authorized SEA
demonstration sponsored by Congressman Ron Wyden of Oregon, the 
Unemployment Trust Fund was directed to fund the demonstration. For 
participating states, trust fund dollars equal to the state average weekly 
benefit amount per individual were authorized to fund demonstration 
services. This funding meant that the department could proceed with 
the demonstration project without seeking new appropriations to fund 
it, but that the department would still have to pay for the design, over-
sight, and evaluation of the project from its research budget. 
The USDOL proceeded to implement the demonstration project as 
soon as authorizing legislation was enacted in 1991. In early 1992, the 
department announced a competition to participate in the project, and 
states applied to participate. In September 1992, three sites—the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, and Wisconsin—were selected to participate 
in the demonstration.20 As a result of the enactment of the WPRS initia-
tive in 1993, implementation of the demonstration was delayed and did 
not begin until 1995. That April, just as implementation was about to 
begin, Wisconsin withdrew as a participant, leaving only two demon-
stration sites. 
In 1993, a competition was conducted to select a research firm to 
design, oversee, and evaluate the project. Mathematica Policy Research 
was selected as the research contractor. The cost of the contract with 
Mathematica was $1.4 million. The demonstration project operated in 
one local office in the District of Columbia. Based on statistical analy-
sis, the demonstration targeted a sample of UI claimants from the entire 
population of claimants, selecting 8,071 of them to participate between 
June 1995 and June 1996. The Florida demonstration operated in 10 
local offices and assigned 12,042 claimants to the project between 







Job Service Assistance Demonstration Design 
In accordance with the authorizing legislation, the JSA Demon-
stration tested three packages of reemployment services designed to 
promote rapid reemployment among UI claimants expected to experi-
ence long spells of unemployment. Eligible claimants were identified 
early in their claim periods—in fact, as soon as their first UI payments 
were made—using a profiling model similar to the one developed by 
the department for the WPRS system. These claimants were then ran-
domly assigned either to a control group that received regular services 
or to one of the three treatments: 1) structured job search assistance, 
2) individualized job search assistance, or 3) individualized job search 
assistance with training. 
Structured job search assistance (SJSA). This treatment replicat-
ed the basic JSA treatment tested in New Jersey. Claimants who were as-
signed to this treatment were sent a letter telling them to report to an ES 
orientation session. This letter was sent during approximately the fourth 
week of unemployment, assuming claimants applied for UI as soon as 
they were laid off. Claimants reported for orientation during approxi-
mately the sixth week of unemployment. At the orientation, claimants 
were told generally about the reemployment services available to them 
and specifically about the demonstration services. They were tested the 
same week and scheduled for a one-week job search workshop lasting 
approximately three hours per day, to be conducted the following week. 
After the workshop, they were scheduled for a one-on-one assessment/ 
counseling interview to discuss their reemployment plans. Attendance 
at this initial set of services was mandatory, unless the claimant was 
explicitly excused from services. Individuals who continued collecting 
UI benefits had a minimum of two additional contacts with local office 
staff. In addition, each office established a job search resource center 
for participants. 
Individualized job search assistance (IJSA). This treatment was 
similar to the job search assistance treatment, except that a decision 
was made on an individual basis about the services a claimant should 
receive. Eligible claimants were sent a letter telling them to report for a 
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week of unemployment. At that session, they were given an overview 
of the services available to them and scheduled for an individual as-
sessment interview later that week or the next week. An individual 
service plan was developed during the assessment interview. This plan 
varied by individuals, but the services agreed to—such as testing, the 
job search workshop, or additional assessment/counseling interviews— 
were mandatory. Additional ongoing contacts could also be required. 
Claimants in this treatment could also receive any other services, such 
as placement assistance, from the local Employment Service office. 
Individualized job search assistance with training (TJSA). This 
treatment was identical to the preceding one, except that a special effort 
was made to enroll interested claimants in training. In all treatments, the 
availability of JTPA dislocated worker training was mentioned during 
the orientation session. Referrals to JTPA were made for claimants who 
expressed interest in training. However, in this treatment, the discus-
sion of training opportunities during the orientation was more exten-
sive. (When possible, a JTPA staff member made the presentation.) In 
addition, the possibility of training was explicitly discussed during the 
individual assessment interview. Any claimant who expressed interest 
was scheduled to talk to a JTPA staff member. To the extent possible, 
this discussion took place in the Employment Service office immedi-
ately following the assessment interview. This one-stop approach to 
service delivery was facilitated by having the assessment interviews for 
this treatment scheduled on a day in which a JTPA staff member could 
be stationed at the Employment Service office. To ensure that training 
was available, the states participating in the demonstration were asked, 
as indicated in their agreements with the department, to designate a 
portion of their JTPA dislocated worker funds to provide training to 
members of this group (Decker et al. 2000, pp. 10–13).
Eligibility criteria for the demonstration 
Before the JSA Demonstration could be implemented, a national 
WPRS program was enacted in 1993, and all states began to prepare 
to implement this JSA program. As a result, it made no sense to have 
the demonstration eligibility criteria—as specified in legislation— 
differ from those for WPRS, since the WPRS provisions were being 











department to test the new legislative design experimentally and would 
allow the department and the research contractor to provide technical 
assistance to Florida and the District of Columbia in setting up their 
state WPRS programs. This issue was solved by having staff from the 
USDOL and the House Ways and Means Committee meet and agree to 
allow the demonstration to follow the WPRS eligibility provisions. 
As a result, demonstration-eligible claimants were identified using 
the worker profiling statistical model approach developed by the depart-
ment during 1993. This model (discussed in Chapter 4) uses a two-
step process to identify claimants who are expected to experience long 
spells of unemployment. The research contractor and the states agreed 
that the contractor would estimate the model for each of the states for 
their use not only during the demonstration but also for the WPRS pro-
gram (Decker et al. 2000, pp. 7–9). 
Delay of WPRS implementation
The enactment and upcoming implementation of WPRS also would 
have adversely affected the current services environment of the demon-
stration project if members of the control groups had been required to 
participate in WPRS and receive program services that were similar to 
demonstration JSA services. Once again there was agreement between 
USDOL and House Ways and Means staff that the demonstration was 
an adequate substitute for WPRS, and hence WPRS implementation 
could be delayed in the District of Columbia (since the entire District 
participated in the demonstration) and in the 10 participating Florida 
local offices until the project was completed (Decker et al. 2000, pp. 
7–9). 
Findings of the Job Search Assistance Demonstration 
The JSA Demonstration, conducted in the District of Columbia and 
Florida, replicated the New Jersey Experiment. Participation rates in 
the JSA Demonstration varied from those of the New Jersey Experi-
ment. More treatment group members participated in reemployment 
services in New Jersey than in D.C. and Florida. The orientation atten-
dance rate of 79 percent in New Jersey was similar to that in D.C. (77 
percent) but was higher than that for Florida (62 percent). Attendance 
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rates for services beyond orientation tended to be higher in D.C. than 
in New Jersey, while the Florida rates tended to be lower. For example, 
job search workshop attendance was 60 percent in D.C., while the New 
Jersey rate was 50 percent and the Florida rate was only 44 (Decker et 
al. 2000, p. 42). 
Impact on UI receipt 
The impact on UI receipt was measured in four ways: 1) the effect 
of the demonstration treatment on the number of weeks claimants drew 
benefits, 2) the rate at which UI benefits were exhausted, 3) the percent-
age of beneficiaries with at least one nonmonetary determination, and 
4) the percentage of beneficiaries with at least one nonmonetary benefit 
denial. The four measures reflected the intent of speeding the return 
to work. The measures also recognized that calling UI claimants into 
a local UI office to offer them job search assistance would raise eli-
gibility issues for some claimants, and those issues could relate either 
to whether they reported to receive demonstration services or whether 
they continued to be eligible for UI benefits. 
For both D.C. and Florida, each treatment had a significant impact 
on all four measures of UI receipt during the initial benefit year (Table 
2.4). Job search assistance treatments were expected to have short-term 
impacts rather than long-term impacts. In accordance with those expec-
tations, none of the treatments had a significant impact after the initial 
benefit year. This result, however, is inconsistent with the New Jersey 
Experiment, which found that participants who received job search 
assistance had reduced receipt of UI in the second benefit year. 
The structured job search assistance (SJSA) treatment in D.C. expe-
rienced a reduction of 1.1 weeks in UI receipt, far greater than the expe-
rience for all of the other treatments in D.C. and Florida, which varied 
between reductions of 0.4 and 0.6 weeks and were more in line with the 
New Jersey results. The rate of exhaustion of benefits decreased in all 
cases, declining between 2 and 5 percent. Examining the week-to-week 
exit rates from UI benefit receipt, the evaluators found that most of the 
effect of the JSA treatments was felt soon after the offer of services, 
indicating that exiting from UI benefit receipt was caused more by the 
requirement to report for services than by the job search skills learned 







Table 2.4  Job Search Assistance Demonstration: Estimated Impact of 
the JSA Treatments on UI Receipt in year 1 
District of Columbia Florida 
Outcome SJSA IJSA TJSA SJSA IJSA TJSA 
Weeks of benefits 
received in 
benefit year 
Dollars of UI 
benefits received 











NOTE: SJSA = structured job search assistance; IJSA = individualized job search assis-
tance; TJSA = individualized job search assistance with training. * statistically signifi-
cant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; ** statistically significant 
at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** statistically significant at 
the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
SOURCE: Decker et al. (2000). 
The evaluation did not yield a definite conclusion about which treat-
ment was most successful at reducing UI receipt because of differences 
in outcomes between D.C. and Florida. These differences seemed to be 
primarily due to stricter enforcement of participation in the mandatory 
services under the SJSA treatment. Also contributing to the disparity 
was a substantial difference in economic conditions—spells of unem-
ployment were longer in D.C. than in Florida. However, it appears that 
with strict enforcement, the mandatory participation approach of the 
SJSA is the most effective approach in reducing UI receipt. 
As in the New Jersey Experiment, participation in the Job Search 
Assistance Demonstration was mandatory. If claimants did not report, 
UI staff conducted fact-finding interviews that could result in nonmon-
etary determinations and denial of benefits. In both D.C. and Florida, 
this process resulted in a significant increase in the rate of nonmonetary 
determinations conducted and denials of UI benefits based on those 
determinations—for all treatment groups. Because of stronger enforce-
ment by the District of Columbia, these effects were much greater there 
than in Florida: they increased from 29 percent to 37 for the rate of non-
monetary determinations and from 7 percent to 11 for the denial rate. 
More specifically, for the structured JSA treatment there was a fourfold 
increase in denials stemming from determinations that claimants were 
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determinations went beyond enforcement of mandatory participation 
in the demonstration project: local office staff also used information 
gathered during enforcement of demonstration participation to increase 
the enforcement of UI continuing eligibility requirements. Much of 
the decline in UI receipt was related to that enforcement (Decker et al. 
2000, pp. 122–135). 
Impact on earnings 
The JSA treatments had very different earnings impacts between the 
locations, with some statistically significant impacts in D.C. but none 
in Florida (Table 2.5). In D.C., the structured JSA treatment yielded 
positive earnings impacts throughout the 10-quarter period of follow-
up, whereas for the other treatments there were positive and significant 
results only for some quarters during the first six quarters. In Florida, 
the earnings results were not significant. Thus, no apparent impact on 
earnings occurred in Florida. 
In designing the Job Search Assistance Demonstration, one concern 
was whether the provision of JSA could result in workers taking lower-
quality jobs. However, the results showed that the treatment groups 
found jobs paying as well as or better than those taken by the control 
group (Decker et al. 2000, pp. 137–164). 
Impact on job search 
Another purpose of the JSA Demonstration was to provide UI 
claimants with job search skills, and to have them make intensive use 
of these skills. Participants were expected to search for work more and 
receive more referrals to job openings from Employment Service staff. 
The impact of the treatments on claimants’ ability to successfully search 
for jobs was measured by the following three factors: 1) the number of 
employer contacts claimants had per week, 2) the hours of job search 
per week, and 3) the percentage of claimants receiving a job referral 
from the Employment Service. The results showed a positive impact 
on the number of employer contacts and receipt of job referrals, but no 
effect on the hours of job search per week (Table 2.6). 
Even though treatment members were more likely to receive job 
referrals from the Employment Service, there was no indication that 








Table 2.5  Job Search Assistance Demonstration: Estimated Impact of 
the JSA Treatments on Earnings ($) 
District of Columbia Florida 
Quarter SJSA IJSA TJSA SJSA IJSA TJSA 
1 30 22 22 53 −48 −24 
2 172*** 102 147*** −4 −6 20 
3 152** 111 176** −53 −18 14 
4 281** 161** 83 −2 112 50 
5 280** 913** 180 −92 −36 −12 
6 241** 183** 106 −66 −36 5 
7 177** 96 −23 −57 −5 63 
8 263** 129 38 −98 −41 −20 
9 185* 76 10 −98 −41 −49 
10 224** 100 50 123 −30 −44 
NOTE: SJSA = structured job search assistance; IJSA = individualized job search assis-
tance; TJSA = individualized job search assistance with training. * statistically signifi-
cant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; ** statistically significant 
at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** statistically significant at 
the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
SOURCE: Decker et al. (2000). 
from these referrals. Nonetheless, the learning process of seeking jobs 
from job referrals may have had a positive impact on claimants’ ability 
to search for work on their own (Decker et al. 2000, pp. 165–176). 
Cost-effectiveness of the treatments 
The benefit-cost analysis for the JSA Demonstration was examined 
from three perspectives: that of the U.S. Department of Labor, that of 
the federal government as a whole, and that of society in general (Table 
2.7). Thus the government sector was considered both from the nar-
rower perspective of the agency administering the UI programs and 
from the broader perspective of the entire federal government. During 
the budgetary stringency period of the 1980s and early 1990s, the inter-
ventions being tested were expected to be more policy-relevant if they 
were cost-effective from one or both government perspectives. 
The evaluators measured the cost and benefits of each of the treat-
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Table 2.6  Job Search Assistance Demonstration: Estimated Impact on 
Job Search 
District of Columbia Florida 
Outcome SJSA IJSA TJSA SJSA IJSA TJSA 
Employers contacted 1.6* 1.9* 3.0* 1.4* 1.5* 2.1* 
per week 
Hours of search per 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.7 1.7*** 
week 
% receiving a job 8.7*** 2.9 8.7*** 3.4* 3.8* 10.3*** 
referral from 
the Job Service 
NOTE: SJSA = structured job search assistance; IJSA = individualized job search assis-
tance; TJSA = individualized job search assistance with training. * statistically signifi-
cant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** statistically significant 
at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
SOURCE: Decker et al. (2000). 
was low, varying between $100 and $300, while the cost of the struc-
tured JSA was between $200 and $300. The benefit-cost results showed 
that none of the treatments produced net benefits in Florida. In D.C., 
each of the treatments resulted in net benefits to the government sec-
tor as a whole and to society at large, but did not produce net benefits 
from the perspective of the Department of Labor (Decker et al. 2000, 
pp. 177–193). 
Summary 
The findings for the structured JSA treatment in the District of 
Columbia confirmed those from the New Jersey Experiment. The struc-
tured approach in both experiments led to net benefits to society and to 
the government as a whole. The findings for Florida, with its weaker 
enforcement of participation, were less favorable because of the lack of 
positive earnings outcomes. 
The positive findings regarding a structured approach to the pro-
vision of job search assistance services suggest that the states’ offer 
of these services at the One-Stop centers—whether through the WPRS 
system or some other mechanism—will be more effective if participa-







Table 2.7  Job Search Assistance Demonstration: Cost-Effectiveness of 
Treatments ($ per claimant) 
Other Gov’t 
Benefits and costs Claimant USDOL gov’t total Society 
District of Columbia 
SJSA 
Net benefits ($) 1,930 −126 557 431 2,361 
Rate of return (%) — −44 — 151 826 
IJSA 
Net benefits ($) 1,136 −110 327 217 1,353 
Rate of return (%) — −55 — 109 680 
TJSA 
Net benefits ($) 806 −186 223 37 844 
Rate of return (%) — −86 — 17 391 
Florida 
SJSA 
Net benefits ($) −653 −224 −127 −351 −1,004 
Rate of return (%) — −93 — −146 −416 
IJSA 
Net benefits ($) −196 0 −20 −20 −215 
Rate of return (%) — 0 — −20 −222 
TJSA 
Net benefits ($) −12 −55 7 −48 −61 
Rate of return (%) — −54 — −47 −59 
NOTE: — = data not available. SJSA = structured job search assistance; IJSA = indi-
vidualized job search assistance; TJSA = individualized job search assistance with 
training. 
SOURCE: Decker et al. (2000). 
for all participating claimants or through individual service plans that 
are customized for each claimant. 
Beyond the provision of job search assistance services themselves, 
the JSA Demonstration had an effect on state workforce agency local 
offices. These offices used the information gathered as part of the JSA
Demonstration in their administration of regular services to UI claim-
ants. In the process, they increased the enforcement of the UI work test. 
Enforcement of the UI work test yielded an increase in the identi-
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nonseparation, nonmonetary determinations) and, in some cases, denial 
of benefits to claimants who were found to be collecting benefits but 
should not have been. Thus, making JSA participation mandatory was 
critical to identifying issues of continuing eligibility for UI benefits. 
The result was a more rigorous enforcement of the UI work test, both 
to determine whether UI claimants are unemployed and to determine 
whether they are searching for work. The evaluation showed that, if the 
provision of job search assistance is done rigorously, as it was in the 
District of Columbia, it is likely that eligibility issues will be identified 
and benefit denials will substantially increase (Decker et al. 2000, pp. 
128–130, 195–207). 
PROFILINg ThE NEW JERSEy ExPERImENT RESULTS 
The New Jersey Experiment’s evaluation results were used to jus-
tify the WPRS system. The targeting of treatment group members (and 
control group members), however, did not use the worker profiling 
mechanism that is part of the ongoing program. Rather, unemployed 
workers were selected for participation in the project based on several 
screens. While the purpose of the screens was to identify dislocated 
workers, they did so in a very different way from the WPRS system. 
The New Jersey Experiment included two follow-up studies which 
took place after the 1989 final evaluation report. The main purpose of 
the follow-ups was to measure the long-term impacts of training. The 
four-year follow-up did not find positive training results, and neither 
did the six-year follow-up. 
The six-year follow-up study also tested the new worker profiling 
mechanism that was put into effect in 1994. The study included a simu-
lation analysis that was applied to the original New Jersey Experiment 
microdata. Corson and Haimson (1996) conducted the simulation and 
found that, indeed, profiling both treatments and controls increased the 

















LESSONS LEARNED FROm ThE JOB SEARCh 
ASSISTANCE ExPERImENTS 
Much was learned from the evaluation results of the New Jersey 
and JSA demonstrations: 
• Workers who are permanently separated from their jobs and who 
are likely to have difficulty becoming reemployed can benefit 
from receiving help as they seek to return to work. That help can 
come from a range of reemployment services, including job re-
ferrals, if a job is available, and job search training that provides 
tools for self-search for jobs. At the same time, stronger enforce-
ment of the UI work test can also reduce the compensated dura-
tion of unemployment and speed claimants’ return to work. 
• Providing a comprehensive package of job search assistance 
(e.g., orientation, assessment, testing, counseling, job search 
workshop, and follow-up services) can reduce the duration of 
unemployment. The cost of these services is low, and savings 
from reduced UI benefit payments and increased tax payments 
can make the provision of these services cost-effective (Corson 
et al. 1989; Decker et al. 2000; USDOL 1990). 
• For job search assistance to be cost-effective, participation must 
be mandatory. Otherwise, most workers who are offered the ser-
vices will not participate, and the overall impacts on workers will 
be small (Corson et al. 1989; Decker et al. 2000). 
• Required participation in job search assistance can be tied to 
either a standardized, comprehensive package of services or a 
customized package of services based on the development of an 
individual employability plan. A standardized, comprehensive 
package has a greater impact on reducing the duration of unem-
ployment, but a customized package can also have a substan-
tial impact if participation is carefully monitored and enforced. 
Without claimants’ participation in a number of substantive ser-
vices, JSA will not be effective (Corson et al. 1989; Decker et al. 
2000). 
• There is a synergy that results from calling dislocated UI claim-
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offering JSA services, local office staff can provide immediate 
referrals to jobs from available job openings. Also, if UI claim-
ants do not report or participate in JSA services, UI staff can use 
this information to enforce the UI work test (Decker et al. 2000). 
• Cooperation between UI and ES staff can contribute to the ef-
fectiveness of providing reemployment services to UI claimants 
(Corson et al. 1989; Decker et al. 2000; USDOL 1990). Inter-
agency cooperation and coordination is particularly needed in an 
era of remote claims-taking, in which UI staff generally are not 
available in the One-Stop Career Centers. 
• Local office staff can refer these UI claimants and others to job 
openings. When claimants are provided with job search assis-
tance services, referrals to job openings can result in significantly 
higher placement rates than normally result from such referrals 
(Corson, Long, and Maynard 1985; Decker et al. 2000). 
• Stronger enforcement of the UI work test can reduce the duration 
of compensated unemployment, whether enforcement is done 
separately or in conjunction with job search assistance services. 
An enhanced UI work test can take the form of requiring claim-
ants to report to the One-Stop center and demonstrate that they 
are able, available for work, and actively searching for work. It 
can also take the form of requiring a more intensive job search 
(Corson, Long, and Maynard 1985: Decker et al. 2000; Johnson 
and Klepinger 1991, 1994). 
• Conducting eligibility reviews is an effective method of enforc-
ing the UI work test and can be performed separately either by 
One-Stop Career Center staff or by UI staff. However, joint ef-
forts by both One-Stop center and UI staff have been found to be 
more effective (Almandsmith, Adams, and Bos 2006; Corson et 
al. 1989; Decker et al. 2000; USDOL 1990). 
• An effective way to increase the enforcement of the UI work 
test is to enhance the work search requirement by increasing 
the number of job search contacts. Verifying a sample of those 
contacts can also reduce duration (Johnson and Klepinger 1994; 















• The implication for a program such as Worker Profiling and Re-
employment Services is that, whereas providing reemployment 
services separately can be cost-effective, bringing together the 
three separate components of reemployment services can be 
even more cost-effective. [The three components are 1) a com-
prehensive job search assistance package of services, 2) referral 
to job openings, and 3) an enhanced UI work test.] A program 
that provides all three sets of services to UI claimants can reduce 
costs and create synergy. 
• Simulations of the worker profiling mechanism used by the 
WPRS system starting in 1994 were shown to make the New 
Jersey Experiment more cost-effective (Corson and Haimson 
1996). While the job search assistance treatment of the New 
Jersey Experiment was cost-effective for the government sector 
in the Corson et al. (1989) analysis, the result improved signifi-
cantly when more focused targeting was achieved by applying 
the worker profiling mechanism. 
Notes 
1. For example, full-time-equivalent staff of the Employment and Training Adminis-
tration peaked in Program Year 1971, numbering 4,283, but had declined to 3,185 
by 1980. After two reductions in force in the early 1980s, the number of staff 
has been less than 2,000 since 1983, and has been less than 1,400 since 1996 
(O’Leary, Straits, and Wandner 2004, p. 316). By 2008 the staffing level was less 
than 1,000. 
2. William Brock, telephone conversation with the author, October 24, 2008. 
3. Carolyn Golding, telephone conversation with the author, December 5, 2008. 
4. Roberts T. Jones, telephone conversation with the author, July 15, 2008. 
5. Brock, conversation. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ray Uhalde, in-person interview with the author, August 12, 2008. 
8. Robert Schaerfl, telephone conversation with the author, July 15, 2008. 
9. Normally the department signed financial agreements either as contracts or grants, 
and with a state the department typically would have signed a grant agreement. 
However, in order to have more leverage on how the New Jersey Experiment was 
conducted, the department signed its first cooperative agreement to provide the 
department with more authority over the operation of the experiment. 
10. Because of his stature in the Reagan administration, Brock had easy access to the 
president and to other senior officials, and, according to Assistant Secretary Jones, 
he took advantage of this access. 
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11. I developed the plan for the Department of Labor to conduct a series of UI experi-
ments for testing interventions to assist dislocated workers to return to work. 
12. The department selected three states to participate—Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
and Oregon—but the last two states dropped out of the project before operations 
began. 
13. Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on Corson et al. (1989), Anderson, 
Corson, and Decker (1991), and Corson and Haimson (1996). Walter Corson wrote 
most of this section for an article on the New Jersey Experiment that we never 
completed. 
14. Individuals in this treatment group were also offered relocation assistance. As pre-
vious experience had suggested, few individuals were interested in relocation, and 
fewer than 1 percent of those who were offered relocation assistance received it. 
15. The participation rate in training varied widely among the 10 demonstration sites, 
from 8 to 27 percent (Corson et al. 1989, p. 108). 
16. Specifically, the reduction was in Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
(EUC) benefits. 
17. The net benefits to society occur largely because it is assumed that claimants’
increased employment and earnings represent a net increase in output; that is, the 
more rapid reemployment of claimants does not displace the employment of other 
individuals. This no-displacement assumption was reasonable given the strength 
of the New Jersey economy at the time of the study. 
18. A nonmonetary determination is a determination of UI eligibility made at an initial 
level by state UI staff based on facts related to issues detected about either the 
conditions under which UI claimants were first separated from their jobs or about 
their continuing eligibility for benefits. 
19. The JSA Demonstration provision was included in the EUC bill following discus-
sion about the New Jersey demonstration and the usefulness of its replication for 
future policy purposes between Rich Hobbie (then senior majority staffer for the 
Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee) and 
me. At the time of this discussion, he and I did not anticipate the enactment of 
the JSA program in the form of the WPRS system without further experimental 
replication of the New Jersey demonstration results. 
20. The District of Columbia—along with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands—is con-






Enacting Worker Profiling 
and Reemployment Services 
FROm RESEARCh TO POLICy TO LEgISLATION 
For research to have a direct impact on public policy, a number of 
planets have to align, as they did for the enactment of Worker Profiling 
and Reemployment Services (WPRS) in 1993. The New Jersey Experi-
ment and related research about job search assistance (JSA) had been 
completed, and their evaluations had been published and widely dis-
seminated. The research findings used a methodology that all research-
ers and policymakers could agree upon—random assignment methods. 
The research had been widely read by researchers and policymakers. 
The new Clinton administration selected a number of politi-
cal appointees for posts at the U.S. Department of Labor who knew 
and understood the research findings. Discussion between the politi-
cal appointees and key career staff at the department revealed agree-
ment about the effectiveness of providing comprehensive job search 
assistance through the employment and training system. The depart-
ment proposed enacting WPRS to the White House, and key political 
appointees in the White House, along with career staff at the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), supported the initiative. WPRS 
could not have been enacted unless the budget gatekeepers at OMB and 
at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) accepted the budget sav-
ings derived from JSA recipients’ returning to work sooner. The budget 
assessments of both agencies accepted the New Jersey Experiment’s 
findings. Finally, Congress needed to enact legislation that included 
WPRS provisions. All of these things happened in March and again in 







ThE NEW JERSEy ExPERImENT 
It took four years after the New Jersey Experiment results were 
published before the WPRS system was enacted. Although three secre-
taries of labor—Ann McLaughlin, Elizabeth Dole, and Lynn Martin— 
had supported the ongoing UI experiments during their tenures between 
1988 and 1992, no political leaders in the executive branch advocated 
any legislative initiatives based on the results of the New Jersey Experi-
ment. Nonetheless, staff interest as well as congressional and execu-
tive branch activity continued to focus on the New Jersey Experiment’s 
evaluation findings. 
Between 1989 and 1993, the USDOL, OMB, and members of 
Congress expressed convictions about the need to provide dislocated 
workers with reemployment services and additional UI benefits. High 
unemployment lingered after the 1990–1991 recession. The continu-
ing dislocated worker problem was spreading from manufacturing into 
white collar and service occupations. The interest in reemployment 
services was due, in part, to briefings and reviews of the New Jersey 
Experiment’s evaluation results. Staff from all of these organizations 
had received both the design report for the experiment and its evalua-
tion reports. Many from both the legislative and the executive branches 
of government had attended meetings at the department on the demon-
stration, including on its evaluation designs and the draft of the final 
evaluation report. Early on, they were given a chance to make recom-
mendations about the project and evaluation designs and later for the 
final evaluation report. The published final evaluation report (Corson et 
al. 1989) was widely distributed. In 1991, a four-year follow-up report 
was published on the employment experiences of the treatment and 
control groups, as well as reestimates of the net impacts and benefit-
cost results. 
Acting Chairman Thomas Downey (D-NY) of the House Ways and 
Means Committee’s Subcommittee on Human Resources, which has 
legislative authority over the UI program, called a hearing in February 
1991 to focus on the reemployment of dislocated UI claimants. Much of 
the questioning of witnesses was done by Rich Hobbie, then a committee 
staffer. He had formerly worked on employment and training issues for 
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Experiment closely. The hearing featured the New Jersey Experiment 
and its findings. As part of the research panel, staff members from Math-
ematica Policy Research, the research contractor that had conducted
the experiment, were asked to testify. While no permanent legislative 
proposal flowed from the hearing, in November 1991 Congressman 
Downey successfully proposed adding a Job Search Assistance Demon-
stration to the bill (the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act 
of 1991, or P.L. 102-164) that initially enacted Emergency Unemploy-
ment Compensation (EUC), a program that provided additional UI ben-
efits to long-term unemployed workers during and after the 1990–1991 
recession.1 The Job Search Assistance Demonstration replicated the 
New Jersey Experiment, and its goal was to prepare the way for later 
legislation. 
In 1990, Rep. Sander Levin (D-MI), a member of Congressman 
Downey’s subcommittee, requested a briefing by Mary Ann Wyrsch, 
administrator of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) Service, about the 
permanent extended benefit program and the New Jersey Experiment. 
Wyrsch and I jointly conducted the briefing in her office. Levin was 
concerned about his state’s high unemployment during the 1990–1991 
recession. He wanted to understand why the triggering process for per-
manent extended benefits was not working and what could be done to 
improve the process. He knew of the efforts to reemploy workers in 
New Jersey, and he was interested in doing the same for Michigan’s 
workers. Levin later would support EUC legislation in 1991, as well as 
WPRS when it was proposed as a section of the March and November 
1993 extensions of EUC. At the briefing, Levin was accompanied by 
his legislative director, Kitty Higgins, who had interned in the ETA’s 
research and policy office in 1969 and knew a great deal about employ-
ment and training programs. She would support WPRS legislation when 
she returned to the department in 1993 as Secretary of Labor Robert 
Reich’s chief of staff.2 
In the spring of 1992, the Subcommittee on Human Resources 
asked the USDOL to brief its majority and minority staff members on 
the UI Experiments.3 I conducted the briefing, which reviewed the out-
comes of the New Jersey and other department-sponsored experiments, 
including interventions relating to job search assistance, training, reem-
ployment bonuses, and self-employment assistance. The attendees dis-
agreed about the effectiveness of other workforce development inter-
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ventions, but they all agreed that comprehensive job search assistance 
was a cost-effective public policy. The stage was set for staff-level sup-
port of a bipartisan policy initiative, but an advocate within the execu-
tive branch was still needed. 
FINDINg WhAT WORkS 
Secretary Reich became the champion of a series of public pol-
icy initiatives that were based on the UI Experiments. While he was 
interested in a wide variety of public investment issues, “workforce-
development programs . . . were closest to the hearts of Reich and his 
inner circle” (Donahue 2008). Before he could guide employment pol-
icy as secretary, however, he first had to bring policymakers with him 
to the department who were familiar with the lessons learned from the 
UI Experiments. 
When Reich had worked on the Clinton campaign in 1992, he had 
searched for policy options that past research had shown to be cost-
effective. Reich was a consumer rather than a creator of research: he 
relied on others to bring him a synthesis of the findings about which 
programs or program initiatives worked. During 1992, he worked regu-
larly with Larry Katz of the Harvard Department of Economics and 
Jack Donahue of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.4 
Robert Reich was an old friend of Bill Clinton’s. They had met in 
1968 on their way to Oxford University, where they both were Rhodes 
Scholars. They later went to Yale Law School together. They remained 
friends and became political allies. In 1992, Reich was teaching at 
the Kennedy School and developing domestic economic policy for 
Clinton’s presidential campaign. He worked on the public investment 
plan to devote $50 billion a year to education, job training, preschool-
ing, mass transit, and other issues (Reich 1997). 
Reich believed that the answer to global competition and technologi-
cal change was education and job training, so when Clinton asked him in 
late November 1992 what office he wanted, he said secretary of labor or 
chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. He was nominated to be sec-
retary of labor on December 11 and had his confirmation hearing in early 
January 1993. During 1992 he had been looking for new policy options, 
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Larry Katz became active in the Clinton campaign after the July 
1992 Democratic convention. At first he worked more broadly on eco-
nomic stimulus and microeconomic issues for the Clinton team headed 
by Gene Sperling and Robert Rubin. He began concentrating more nar-
rowly on labor issues and working more closely with Reich after Reich 
was named secretary of labor. He had read a great deal of the labor 
research literature and had taught advanced seminars that examined 
which labor policies worked and which did not—a matter on which 
Katz consulted with other economists, especially Bruce Meyer, a labor 
economist at Northwestern University. Katz’s goal was to identify those 
policies that might be the basis for Reich’s policy agenda as secretary.5 
Jack Donahue’s interests were complementary to those of Katz: he 
had less of a background in labor issues and was more concerned with 
the delivery models for government. At USDOL he dealt with gover-
nance issues for proposed employment and training programs, design-
ing the relationships between local, state, and federal government. He 
also was in the middle of the debate about the choice of public versus 
private provision of traditionally publicly provided services. And he 
worked on tax issues, including the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit.6 
Like Clinton, Donahue had a long relationship with Reich. He had 
gotten his PhD from the Kennedy School, where he had been a research 
assistant to Reich, who later became his thesis adviser. He joined the 
Kennedy School faculty and continued to work with Reich; they wrote 
a book together (Reich and Donahue 1985). 
The USDOL’s policy agenda had to fit within the policy framework 
of the Clinton-Gore campaign. That framework was set forth in their 
campaign book, Putting People First (Clinton and Gore 1992). The 
country was coming out of a recession, and unemployment was still 
high. In this sluggish economic climate, James Carville coined the cam-
paign’s unofficial motto: “It’s the economy, stupid.” The Clinton/Gore 
proposal was a national economic strategy that, as noted above, would 
invest $50 billion a year to put America back to work. The emphasis of 
the strategy, which promised to fight for the “forgotten middle class,” 
was definitely populist. Investments would be paid for by “making 
the rich pay their fair share” and by policies encouraging “corporate 
responsibility.” The department’s role in this strategy would be to help 
“make sure American workers can get training and retraining through-
out their careers so that America can achieve a high-skill, high wage 
economy” (4President.org 1992). 
	 	
	







The Clinton-Gore agenda included numerous labor and employ-
ment policy recommendations. Employers would be required to spend 
1.5 percent of their payrolls to provide continuing education and train-
ing to all of their workers. An apprentice-style training program would 
be developed for non-college-bound youth. The minimum wage would 
be increased to keep pace with inflation. The prevailing wage provi-
sions of the Davis-Bacon Act would be enforced (Clinton and Gore 
1992). Reich would bring many of these themes and policy proposals 
with him to the Labor Department. He was comfortable with the ideas 
in Putting People First—as he should have been, since many of the 
themes and proposals in the book had come from his own book, The 
Work of Nations (Reich 1992).7 
Reich and Katz came up with a workforce development agenda 
that they believed should be pursued. Their list included five items:
1) a school-to-work program, 2) expanding the Job Corps, 3) changing 
youth employment programs to make them more effective, 4) creating 
One-Stop Career Centers to better integrate employment and training 
programs, and 5) implementing the effective interventions of the UI 
Experiments. Reich championed new One-Stop centers, while Katz and 
Meyer touted UI Experiment implementation.8 
Meyer was the academic expert on the UI Experiments. He had 
started by reading the evaluation reports about the Illinois Reemploy-
ment Bonus Experiment. In 1988, he received the microdata of the 
Illinois experiment’s evaluators from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research and reanalyzed the data, writing a number of 
working papers dealing with the Illinois experiment (Meyer 1988, 
1991, 1992). After a comprehensive review of the available literature 
on the reemployment bonus and job search assistance experiments, he 
completed an early version of his review article on the UI Experiments 
by early 1992 and submitted it to the Journal of Economic Literature. 
He had shared drafts of the paper with Katz and other academics and 
with the department, and he received 11 pages of written comments 
from me and other departmental staff working on the UI Experiments.9 
Meyer continued to add to his UI Experiments paper through 1993 as 
new evaluation results were published. When his article was finally 
published (Meyer 1995), he had reviewed two of the three reports on 
the New Jersey Experiment. While Meyer did not leave Northwestern 
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would work for Reich, bringing with them the policy ideas they and 
Meyer had developed during the campaign. 
Meyer and Katz had gone to graduate school together at MIT. They 
had discussed the UI Experiments since 1988. Katz liked the idea of tar-
geting reemployment services to workers on permanent layoff because 
it fit with his own research, which had shown great differences in 
behavior between workers on temporary layoffs and those on perma-
nent layoffs. It made sense to him to have special programs targeted at 
permanently separated workers (Katz 1985; Katz and Meyer 1990).10 
Katz had even assigned a portion of the 1989 New Jersey Experiment 
evaluation report as a reading in his graduate labor economics seminar.11 
From the evaluations of the UI Experiments, Katz was convinced 
that the three approaches of 1) job search assistance, 2) self-employment
assistance, and 3) reemployment bonuses were cost-effective, worked, 
and should be pursued as public policy. Katz was shocked that noth-
ing was being done to implement these powerful findings. However, he 
thought that of these three, the area that presented the most compelling 
case for new policy was that of comprehensive job search assistance. 
He also believed that the case for funding self-employment assistance 
was stronger than that for funding reemployment bonuses. Nonethe-
less, all three policy options looked promising when combined with 
worker profiling, and he assumed that this targeting mechanism would 
be used for all of them.12 He knew that Secretary Reich would be ready 
to champion all three of the interventions derived from these successful 
UI Experiments. 
Reich had known about the UI Experiments before he became sec-
retary of labor. Katz initially had briefed him about them, and Reich 
had appreciated the analysis’s strength and rigor. Reich also knew that 
a Clinton White House would be receptive to new ideas, would want to 
introduce new policy, and would want to know about facts that justified 
any new policy proposal.13 
Katz became the department’s first chief economist in January 1993 
and served as a key research and policy leader, playing a major role in 
the enactment of both the WPRS and the SEA programs. Katz asked 
two economists in his office, Marcus Stanley and Isaac Schapiro, to syn-
thesize the lessons learned during 1992 in a monograph called What’s 
Working (and what’s not). The monograph’s conclusion about the job 






found a new job more quickly, and the need for UI benefits was reduced 
. . . The program was cost-effective for the government . . . Shorter job 
searches did not lead to jobs that paid less” (USDOL 1995b). Meyer 
(1995) published his careful review of the UI Experiments as “Lessons 
from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments.” 
REDUCINg ThE DEFICIT VERSUS INVESTINg 
IN PEOPLE 
Reich expected to have wide latitude in implementing new labor 
programs that would stimulate the economy and improve the condi-
tions for workers. However, he lost the battle for implementation of this 
package of wide-ranging labor legislation before he even took office. 
After the election, Clinton asked Reich to coordinate the economic 
transition team. Members of the team included Roger Altman, Ira Mag-
aziner, Robert Rubin, Gene Sperling, Larry Summers, and Laura Tyson 
(Reich 1997). The economic transition team began meeting in Novem-
ber 1992; its goal was to develop a plan to fulfill Clinton’s promise to 
“get the country moving again.” The team met frequently to develop 
this plan, and Clinton presided over many of these meetings (Stepha-
nopoulos 1999). 
As Inauguration Day approached, the economic team expanded 
and split into two opposing groups. Reich led the faction that sought to 
make a series of new public investments and to create new programs 
as the main economic thrust of the new administration. Reich’s camp 
wanted to follow through on a number of campaign promises, includ-
ing a middle-class tax cut and human capital investments. This faction 
included Sperling, deputy director of the National Economic Council; 
and George Stephanopoulos, senior political adviser to the president. 
On the other side were the deficit hawks, who wanted to reduce the bud-
get deficit using macroeconomic policy. This faction was led by Rubin, 
director of the National Economic Council, and included Lloyd Bent-
sen, secretary of the treasury; Leon Panetta, OMB director; and Vice 
President Al Gore (Stephanopoulos 1999). 
The conflict among administration economic policy officials was 
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between the center and the left of the Democratic Party was known to 
policy and budget staff as the “Battle of the Bobs.” Some 15 years later, 
during the 2008 presidential campaign, Bob Reich and Bob Rubin were 
still active in economic policy, and the economic struggle still had the 
same name among staffers (Leonhardt 2008). 
The deficit hawks were stronger and more influential, but they also 
were aided by new information obtained after the November 1992 elec-
tion. The OMB had revised its budget assessment in December 1992, 
and the results revealed that the deficit was larger than had previously
been estimated. Any room for increasing federal expenditures and 
reducing taxes that might previously have existed was now greatly 
diminished. In early January 1993, the president’s economic team met 
to establish a policy framework for the new administration. Reich did 
not attend. The team decided to implement a macroeconomic approach 
aimed at reducing the deficit. This approach severely limited the pos-
sibility of developing expensive new federal programs, and so it sharply
diminished Reich’s hope of developing new training programs and 
other major reemployment initiatives (Clinton 2004; Stephanopoulos 
1999). Reich thus was faced with identifying new initiatives that did not 
result in large new expenditures. 
Reich realized the deficit had grown substantially—to about $350 
billion—when he met with outgoing OMB director Richard Darman in 
early December 1992, but it took him a while to realize how the deficit 
would circumscribe his ability to affect public policy. He wanted to 
“focus like a laser beam on jobs and incomes,” but he saw his pub-
lic investment plan cut back in January, and in mid-February Clinton’s 
State of the Union address made it clear that the main message was 
deficit reduction, with public investment secondary (Reich 1997). 
mARCh 1993 WORkER PROFILINg AND REEmPLOymENT
SERVICES LEgISLATION 
Jack Donahue came to Washington during the Clinton transition 
in late 2002, and he walked in the door of the department with Bob 
Reich on January 21, 1993. He studied the inventiveness of the depart-







high level of innovation during that period, which he attributes in part 
to “Reich’s motives, background, and character,” describing him as a 
“thick-skinned, softhearted, risk-tolerant, camera-loving intellectual.” 
Reich created a culture that was “emphatically and explicitly supportive 
of innovation,” and he was “convinced that a wealth of untapped inven-
tiveness lay dormant within the career workforce.” As evidence of the 
success of this unleashed inventiveness, Donahue cited the enactment 
of WPRS as “the single most elegant policy innovation of the Reich 
years” (Donahue 2008). 
Reich continued to focus on “jobs and incomes”; his goal was to 
reemploy American workers in the context of an American labor mar-
ket suffering from lingering unemployment initiated by the 1990–1991 
recession. He explored options that might still be available to him with-
in the deficit reduction policy on which the Clinton economic policy 
was focused. 
Another budget constraint would affect the ability of the department 
to enact new legislation: the federal budget enforcement provisions 
installed in the mid-1980s were still in effect. Congress had imposed 
them to try to reduce the large budget deficit. If Reich was going to seek 
funds for USDOL programs, and especially if he wanted money for new 
initiatives, he would have to better understand how to work within the 
federal budget process. He found an expert in the process, Darla Letour-
neau, a careerist who had recently moved from the ETA to the Office of 
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs within the Labor Depart-
ment. Letourneau would help to ensure that department policy options 
fit within the budget process. Not only did she have extensive budget 
experience in Congress, she had also served as the budget officer in the 
UI Service, where she had worked closely with me and had followed 
the progress of the UI Experiments. 
Meetings about policy options at Labor began as soon as Reich 
arrived. Reich’s method was to run policy meetings that operated like 
Harvard seminars, but the goal was always to quickly develop policy 
options. Reich was searching for new ideas that could further his goal 
of getting Americans back to work. One of the first issues that had to be 
dealt with was the extension of the EUC program, which was expiring 
in early March. 
Secretary Reich convened a number of meetings in late January 
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political staff—Deputy Secretary Tom Glynn, Chief of Staff Higgins, 
Chief Economist Katz, and Assistant Secretary for Policy Donahue—as 
well as careerists such as Carolyn Golding, acting assistant secretary 
for Employment and Training, and Letourneau and Gerri Fiala of the 
Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs. They engaged 
in freewheeling discussions about new policy options. Reich’s theme 
was reemployment services that might get workers back to work. One-
Stop Career Centers—an expansion of the local employment security 
agencies to encompass multiple agencies, including those outside of 
the department’s funding realm—were one concept identified; One-
Stops would be implemented in 1994. Other options were considered, 
including providing comprehensive job search assistance to dislocated 
workers based on the experience of the New Jersey Experiment. Job 
search assistance for dislocated workers fit into Reich’s goal of captur-
ing the public imagination by restarting and regenerating the U.S. labor 
market.15 
At these early meetings, Reich was gathering information. Golding
was promoting two issues—the findings of the UI Experiments and the 
need to expand youth programs. She believed there was a unique oppor-
tunity to promote reemployment services approaches based on the hard 
evidence of the UI Experiments, and she was advocating for the group’s 
taking advantage of the narrow window she saw for the administration 
to adopt new programs and provide new funding.16 
At one meeting, Katz reviewed the findings of the New Jersey 
Experiment and related rigorous research dealing with the provision of 
comprehensive job search assistance. He presented the arguments for 
implementing this cost-effective approach to returning workers to pro-
ductive employment. Around the room heads were nodding in support; 
Reich, Higgins, and Glynn all “loved it.” At the end of the meeting, 
Glynn gave the attendees a chance to poke holes in the proposal, asking 
if anyone saw “any traps” in a job search assistance initiative. No one 
spoke up.17 
Comprehensive job search assistance was half of WPRS; the other 
half was targeting workers through the worker profiling mechanism. At 
a smaller meeting Katz excited Reich and others by presenting an argu-
ment for how powerful—i.e., efficient and effective—targeting could 
be, using worker profiling.18 The wheels were set in motion for WPRS. 
84 Wandner 
Reich responded positively to the worker profiling proposal. He 
appreciated the concept of cost-effectively getting workers back to 
work. He also realized that although the administration was focused on 
deficit reduction, Bill Clinton was still interested in new ideas if their 
cost was low. This idea, he thought, would be “gobbled up.”19 
Katz wrote a memorandum about implementing WPRS as part of 
the effort to extend EUC. Reich revised the memo and sent it to Clinton, 
bypassing the National Economic Council. Clinton approved the pro-
posal, but the council admonished Reich to go through proper channels 
in the future.20 
Katz was known as a brilliant young labor economist, but it was 
not clear how he would do in his first foray into Washington politics. 
He adapted quickly and took charge of the WPRS initiative. He would 
play a key role in many other issues—among them the labor issues 
relating to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
involved the Self-Employment Assistance initiative.21 
In early 1993, the temporary EUC program was being adminis-
tered by the ETA. Golding, a senior career official, was serving as act-
ing assistant secretary for Employment and Training until a political 
appointee could be named. Reich told her he wanted to do more than 
just reauthorize EUC; he wanted to introduce a new initiative at the 
same time. The two discussed introducing a comprehensive job search 
assistance program modeled after the New Jersey Experiment. Golding 
was familiar with the New Jersey Experiment and its evaluation results, 
since the experiment had been conducted in the UI Service while she 
was administrator of that agency. She was highly supportive of the new 
initiative.22 
Golding thought it essential to provide reemployment services to 
dislocated UI recipients, and she was convinced that the New Jersey 
Experiment demonstrated the effectiveness of such services. Although 
she had believed in their effectiveness even before the New Jersey 
Experiment, she found that experiment to be innovative because it 
showed that early intervention was the key to making early reemploy-
ment happen. The early intervention aspect was what made her most 
supportive of this policy effort.23 
Reich was pleased with the department’s career staff—they were 
better than he had expected. He was hungry for evidence, and the UI 
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“happy moment” when information met opportunity. She spoke to Reich 
about my role as director of research for the UI program, explaining that 
since I had been in charge of the experiments, I was the best person to 
work on preparing the legislative and policy material to implement such 
a comprehensive initiative.24 
Reich heard more about the UI Experiments at a huge, all-employee 
meeting held in late January, shortly after his taking charge. He spoke of 
his vision for the department and asked employees for new policy ideas. 
A scribe took down the names of the employees who spoke, where they 
worked, and their recommendations for policy innovations. Steve Mar-
ler raised his hand, identified himself, and said that he had worked for 
me on the UI Experiments. He described the New Jersey Experiment 
and suggested that Reich make use of its policy findings. A month later, 
he and I were summoned to the White House and attended President 
Clinton’s March 4 signing of the EUC extension legislation, which also 
enacted WPRS provisions. At the ceremony, Marler and I were given 
credit for the idea behind the WPRS legislation.25 
In May 1993, an issue of The Labor Exchange, a new departmental 
publication distributed to all employees, carried the lead article “Idea 
Packs a Punch: ETA Employees Plant Seed That Sprouts into Law,” 
which again credited Marler and me with initiating the WPRS legisla-
tion (USDOL 1993). No mention was made of the significant role Katz 
and Golding had played. Reich was making a point. He wanted to dem-
onstrate to the career workforce at the department that he was listening 
to them. 
When Marler had mentioned the UI Experiments at the January all-
employee meeting, Reich loved it. It fit with his hope that ideas could 
and should bubble up from the department’s career staff, and it gave 
him the opportunity to provide recognition for a specific instance where 
that had occurred.26 
I met with Reich in late January to discuss an initiative to incorpo-
rate comprehensive job search assistance as part of the EUC reauthori-
zation. Reich had recruited me to work with other department staff to 
quickly develop a concrete proposal and supporting materials. Within a 
week we had prepared the material that would allow Clinton and Reich 
to announce the new initiative. 
Reich and Katz conducted discussions with White House Chief of 








extension. Agreement was quickly reached to include the WPRS initia-
tive.27 On February 8, 1993—only three weeks after taking office—Clin-
ton announced a new policy to help dislocated workers: “No short-term 
solution to their problem is adequate; many, many of those unemployed 
workers are what we call permanently displaced—and they need much 
better access to reemployment services that will provide them with the 
information and changing skills necessary to compete in a changing 
world” (Clinton 1993). 
The initiative would include “reforms to the unemployment insur-
ance programs that will dramatically improve the reemployment ser-
vices available to structurally unemployed workers,” Clinton said. “A
number of demonstration projects, particularly the New Jersey reem-
ployment demonstration, showed that this kind of profiling and referral 
can significantly reduce the time these workers spend unemployed.” 
Reich (1993) said when the announcement was made, “With this 
initiative, we plan to go beyond business as usual in our efforts to spur 
job creation and assist the unemployed.” 
The WPRS bill created a program for states to profile new UI claim-
ants “to determine which claimants may be likely to exhaust regular 
unemployment compensation and may need reemployment assistance 
services to make a successful transition to new employment” (P.L. 103-6,
Sec. 4[a]). Such workers would be offered reemployment services. 
States’ participation in WPRS would be voluntary, and UI claimants’
participation in services they were referred to would also be voluntary. 
States would bear the cost of providing the reemployment services, 
using state funds or federal Wagner-Peyser Act ES or JTPA funds. 
The bill was only the sixth that President Clinton had signed into 
law. Senators and House members stood behind Clinton; Reich, Mar-
ler, and I stood to the right; and out of the sight of the cameras stood 
McLarty. At the signing ceremony in the Roosevelt Room, Clinton 
joked to the attendees and the press that he was still learning how to 
sign his name with 20 different pens so that he could give each attendee 
one of the signing pens. 
The bill’s WPRS provisions were tentative. They announced that 
the Clinton administration thought that comprehensive job search assis-
tance was a good idea, but that participation in the profiling system 
was voluntary on the part of both the states and the UI claimants. The 
secretary was to encourage participation, but he could not compel it. 
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Reich had been able to act quickly to incorporate something new 
into the EUC extension because of the nature of WPRS and the manner 
in which it had been enacted. Any amendment added to the EUC exten-
sion had to be noncontroversial so it wouldn’t provoke a congressional 
hearing. WPRS was less controversial because of the rigor with which 
comprehensive job search assistance treatments had been evaluated 
using random assignment methods. WPRS was even less controversial 
because it was adopted as a voluntary program. The WPRS provision 
was also enacted because it had been administratively easier and less 
time consuming to add an amendment to the extension of existing legis-
lation than it would have been to adopt the measure through the regular 
legislative process. Finally, the imminent expiration date of the EUC 
program gave Reich additional leverage, because delay would have 
meant a gap in the payment of extended UI payments.28 
Thus, WPRS was enacted quickly and painlessly. However, depart-
ment policymakers knew they would have to revisit WPRS and make 
participation in the program mandatory. The opportunity arose in 
November. 
NOVEmBER 1993 LEgISLATION 
Six months after enactment of voluntary WPRS, in November 1993, 
unemployment levels remained high, and the temporary EUC program 
was expiring again. The administration proposed a fourth and final 
extension of the program. Under congressional budget rules, the cost 
of Emergency Unemployment Compensation would have to be offset 
either by an increase in taxes or a cut in expenditures by the amount of 
the extension’s cost. 
At the same time, while the USDOL had been enthusiastic about 
enactment of the new profiling provisions and had begun to encourage 
and support state implementation, a number of departmental policymak-
ers wanted to ensure that the system would be applied nationally and 
that participation by UI claimants would be mandatory. The New Jer-
sey Experiment’s findings and other research evidence had shown that 
providing comprehensive job search assistance was more cost-effective 







comprehensive JSA had been found to be less than the combined sav-
ings from reduced UI benefit payments and increased tax payments by 
workers who returned to work more rapidly. 
Paying for another EUC extension and making WPRS mandatory 
became linked when the idea of using the cost savings from WPRS to 
fund the EUC extension was born. If the budget estimators at the OMB 
and the CBO would accept the New Jersey evaluation results, making 
WPRS mandatory could “pay” for the EUC extension. Taxes would not 
have to be raised nor expenditures cut. The expected change in behavior 
of UI beneficiaries who were offered reemployment services might thus 
be used to pay for EUC under the federal budget rules. 
Whose idea was it to fund the extension by making participation 
in WPRS mandatory? Reich (1997) claims Higgins originated the idea 
of changing WPRS to require state and individual participation. She 
understood that the participation requirement was the key to the suc-
cess of the New Jersey Experiment and could contribute to the success 
of the WPRS system. She also understood that, under budget rules, the 
extension of EUC had to be paid for by offsetting reduction in expen-
ditures somewhere else. The potential cost reductions in UI benefits, 
which would be derived from UI claimants going back to work sooner 
if WPRS were made mandatory, might be used to pay for the EUC 
extension. The department estimated these budgetary savings using the 
savings in UI benefits indicated in the evaluation of the New Jersey 
Experiment. These savings were projected forward to yield a five-year 
savings figure that was used to fund the EUC extension. A few members 
of Congress questioned both the projected savings and the appropriate-
ness of making the program required, but the bill passed easily with 
bipartisan support (Reich 1997). 
Although Reich credited her with the approach, Higgins makes no 
claim that she originated the idea.29 In fact, both Katz and Meyer knew 
that the key to the success of the job search assistance intervention in 
the New Jersey Experiment had been mandatory participation, without 
which it would not have been cost-effective. When the EUC came up 
for renewal in November, since neither tax increases nor expenditure 
cuts were palatable, Katz recommended using the savings that would 
accrue from reducing the duration of UI compensation.30 
Finding a noncontroversial method of funding EUC was important 
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did not want EUC renewal to imperil the enactment of NAFTA, which 
Clinton had made a priority and which Congress would be considering 
at the same time as EUC (both were enacted in November 1993).31 
Reich knew it was critical to have Congress accept the savings 
projections from implementing WPRS to fund the renewal of the EUC 
program. He spoke to OMB director Panetta to convince him to support 
the budget scoring of the new legislation. Traveling on Air Force One 
with President Clinton, Reich spoke to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL), 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, to urge him to sup-
port the legislation and its budget scoring method.32 
The arbiters determining the costs and savings of proposed legisla-
tion at the OMB (for the executive branch) and at the CBO (for Con-
gress) would have to accept the projected budget savings from enacting 
a mandatory WPRS program. While department leadership anticipated 
that the OMB would accept the use of WPRS to finance EUC, con-
vincing the CBO about this financing approach was considered to be a 
problem.33 
At the OMB, Panetta, although initially skeptical, was ready to be 
convinced. His concern about avoiding controversy in funding the EUC 
extension and enhancing NAFTA’s chances made seizing on the WPRS 
budget savings irresistible.34 
However, before embracing the EUC legislative proposal, Panetta 
called a meeting with the USDOL. Department political leaders Reich, 
Higgins, and Glynn were accompanied by senior career staff includ-
ing Letourneau, Golding, and Wyrsch. OMB senior staff were skeptical 
about the estimated budget savings derived from WPRS and had to be 
convinced by USDOL staff members, who were knowledgeable about 
the proposal and the research. While the subject of the meeting was the 
EUC extension legislation, Secretary Reich pressed for the message to 
be about reemployment services. Reich inflated the role of WPRS in 
the extension of UI benefits; it otherwise would have been treated as a 
side issue.35 
The OMB career budget examiners estimated the impact of the 
EUC extension on the budget. They were concerned that they had to 
assume a behavioral response by UI claimants without any new fund-
ing for the WPRS system. At the same time, OMB staff had to assume 
that the Employment Service would commit existing funding to pro-






comfortable with the process if new funds had been appropriated and 
had a realistic chance of generating the savings: it appeared to them 
to be an unfunded mandate. The pressure put on the OMB was part of 
a larger issue—that of the Clinton administration trying to bypass the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) process during a period of high unemploy-
ment. Neither the OMB nor the CBO was happy with the proposed 
funding process for EUC. Nevertheless, the estimators concluded that 
the cost of implementing WPRS—the cost of providing comprehensive 
job search assistance to profiled workers—was more than offset by the 
cost reduction. 
Katz worked to gain support for the bill. After he received con-
currence from Higgins and White House staff about using WPRS sav-
ings to offset EUC extension costs, he went to the CBO to discuss the 
budget scoring of WPRS under the federal budgetary PAYGO rules. 
Since enacting mandatory WPRS could be shown to result in a like-
ly reduction in the compensated duration of unemployment, logically 
that would reduce the level of unemployment. The problem was that, 
under the budget rules, the expected unemployment rate could not be 
changed. Hence, Katz developed the theory that the behavioral response 
to WPRS would not reduce the unemployment rate but would change 
the mix of the unemployment rate between insured unemployment and 
all other unemployment. Thus, only the mix of unemployment would 
change, not the level.36 The CBO accepted Katz’s approach and incor-
porated it into its cost estimates.37 
Within the ETA, Golding supported the effort to make participation 
in WPRS mandatory. She understood that budget scoring is a political 
process, but she thought that this effort made a good deal of sense. She 
believed in the WPRS system, and she knew that the money to provide 
the reemployment services was already available within the Unemploy-
ment Trust Fund—if Congress would appropriate it.38 
The actuarial division of the UI Service also made budget estimates 
of the WPRS proposal. The actuaries believed in the results of the New 
Jersey Experiment. They believed that WPRS—implemented as in the 
New Jersey Experiment—would result in a decline in the duration of 
insured unemployment which would reduce compensated duration of 
unemployment and increase payment of taxes. However, the UI actuar-
ies doubted the magnitude of the estimated savings and thought that 
WPRS might result in some displacement of workers who did not 
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Thus, the CBO, the OMB, and the USDOL all estimated the net 
budget costs of the WPRS initiative. In estimating budgetary impacts, 
they all used the data from the New Jersey Experiment evaluation and 
consulted with departmental research staff. Not surprisingly, their esti-
mates were fairly close to one another. The closeness of their estimates 
made them more believable and made it easier to enact the WPRS pro-
visions: it was difficult to dispute the budget savings if the budget gurus 
of two branches of government embraced the same savings estimates.40 
Enactment of the WPRS provision depended on congressional sup-
port. The congressional leaders also had to be educated about the sav-
ings that could be derived from mandatory WPRS. The White House 
and USDOL lobbyists were enlisted to talk to members of Congress 
and their staffs. Ultimately, WPRS received wide support, although 
Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), now House minority leader, was a lone but 
strong opponent of the program.41 
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993 (P.L. 
103-152), enacted on November 24, 1993, made participation in WPRS 
mandatory both for states and for UI claimants who are identified and 
referred to reemployment services. Section 4(a) reads as follows: 
The state agency charged with the administration of the State 
[unemployment compensation] law shall establish and utilize a 
system of profiling all new claimants for regular compensation 
that . . . identifies which claimants will be likely to exhaust regular 
compensation and will need job search assistance services to make 
a successful transition to new employment . . . [and] refers claim-
ants identified . . . to reemployment services, such as job search 
assistance services, available under any State or Federal law. 
Reemployment services provided by state employment security 
agencies could be broader than job search assistance, but the main focus 
would be on comprehensive job search assistance (JSA). However, the 
legislation still did not provide any new sources of funding for these 
services. Rather, states had to make use of whatever funds were avail-
able under current law. The lack of funding would be a problem for the 






FUNDINg OF WORkER PROFILINg AND
REEmPLOymENT SERVICES 
WPRS started on weak financial footing: it was enacted without 
Congress’s authorizing additional funding for the reemployment ser-
vices. As enacted, the initiative assumed that sufficient funds would 
be provided from existing employment and training programs. The 
Employment Service was assumed to be the primary provider of the 
additional reemployment services, but the ES national funding level 
was about to decline sharply, and JTPA/WIA funding would drop as 
well. ES grants to states peaked in 1995 at $839 million and steadily 
declined to $703 million by 2008. (See Table 6.1.) 
Budget increases were critical to funding WPRS and Reich’s other 
policy initiatives. These policy proposals required and assumed in-
creases in the department’s budget. In fact, Reich was able to propose 
and get budget increases for the first two years of the Clinton admin-
istration: in 1993 and 1994, federal funding increased for many of the 
employment and training programs, including Dislocated Workers and 
the Job Corps. When the Republicans took control of Congress after the 
1994 midterm elections, budget increases ended.42 
The WPRS system was weakened not only by the lack of a new 
funding source but by an actual decline in employment and training 
funding available to states after 1995. New programs would inevitably 
falter if they could not be adequately funded. Departmental staff later 
recognized the WPRS funding weakness and proposed new funding for 
it, and Congress approved approximately $35 million a year between 
2001 and 2005. 
SUmmARy AND CONCLUSIONS 
The enactment of the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
provisions in 1993 was a classic case of research informing and guiding 
policy and legislation. The WPRS legislation flowed directly from the 
New Jersey Experiment and related, rigorous research. 
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The New Jersey Experiment used random assignment methods and 
was rigorously evaluated. It found that comprehensive job search assis-
tance provides net benefits to the government sector. The evaluation 
was widely disseminated and read. The findings were consistent with 
those from other rigorous evaluations of job search assistance. 
Specifically, the research cited by the department to justify WPRS 
included the New Jersey Experiment, the Charleston Claimant Place-
ment and Work Test Demonstration, and three state-funded experiments 
operated in Minnesota, Nevada, and Washington.43 
Larry Katz, the USDOL’s chief economist, brought the research 
findings to the attention of the department’s political leadership in 
January 1993. Katz based his conclusions on his review of the job 
search assistance experiments and on Bruce Meyer’s analysis of the UI 
Experiments. 
Robert Reich was receptive to new policy approaches based on 
research evidence. Katz recommended the WPRS approach to him, 
and he responded positively. Because of his outreach to career staff, 
he received the same recommendation from Acting Assistant Secretary 
Carolyn Golding and from a staff member on the UI Experiments team, 
Steve Marler. 
The WPRS initiative benefited from the support of other senior 
officials at the USDOL, including Deputy Secretary Tom Glynn, 
Chief of Staff Kitty Higgins, Assistant Secretary for Policy Jack
Donahue, and Darla Letourneau of the Office of Congressional Affairs. 
It also had support from staff at the House Ways and Means Committee, 
the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congressional Budget 
Office. Just as importantly, virtually no one opposed the initiative, in 
either the executive branch or the legislative branch. 
The WPRS initiative provided no new funding for the provision of 
reemployment services. Reich assumed that new funding would be pro-
vided from increased funding of employment and training programs. 
In fact, grants to states for employment and training programs declined 
after 1995. WPRS did receive limited funding in the form of Reemploy-
ment Services Grants between 2001 and 2005, but there was no further 
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Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services 
Implementation and Operations 
This chapter reviews the implementation of the Worker Profiling 
and Reemployment Services (WPRS) program and the results of the 
first decade and a half of its operation. The first section of this chapter 
reviews the WPRS legislation; the second discusses the development 
of the WPRS program. The worker profiling mechanism is discussed 
in the third section. The fourth section describes the delivery of reem-
ployment services from 1994 to the present; it also discusses the use 
of worker profiling in other industrial nations. The chapter ends with a 
summary and conclusions. 
FEDERAL LEgISLATION 
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993, which 
became Public Law 103-152 on November 24, 1993, are the basis of the 
WPRS initiative. This statute amended the Social Security Act by add-
ing a new subsection, 303(j), which requires each state agency charged 
with the administration of the state unemployment compensation law to 
establish and utilize a worker profiling system for all new claimants for 
regular compensation. 
Worker profiling is a system that 
1) identifies which claimants will be likely to exhaust regular com-
pensation and will need job search assistance services to make a 
successful transition to new employment; 
2) refers such claimants to reemployment services, such as job 








3) collects follow-up information relating to the services received 
by such claimants and the employment outcomes of such claim-
ants subsequent to receiving such services and utilizes this 
information in making identifications (Step 1, above); and 
4) meets such other requirements as the secretary of labor deter-
mines appropriate.1 
In addition, the conference report for P.L. 103-152 defined the 
reemployment services that should be provided to profiled and referred 
claimants: “Reemployment services will include job search assistance 
and job placement services, such as counseling, testing, and provid-
ing occupational and labor market information, assessment, job search 
workshops, job clubs and referrals to employers, and other similar 
services.” 
Thus, the system’s emphasis is on speeding the return to work of 
job-ready dislocated workers. 
The WPRS legislation is part of federal unemployment insurance 
(UI) law and requires that state workforce agencies establish WPRS 
systems and make participation in reemployment services mandatory 
for claimants referred through profiling.2 It does not, however, provide 
any new or additional funding for the provision of these reemployment 
services: state agencies must provide reemployment services from 
existing state and federal funding sources. If the funds for reemploy-
ment services are not available, states are not required to supply them. 
The ultimate size and adequacy of the WPRS system thus has been con-
strained by the existing funding for reemployment services. In every 
state, WPRS funding has generally fallen well short of the potential 
demand that can be identified by profiling methods. The identification 
and referral process under WPRS must adjust the number of referrals 
to the available capacity of state and local service providers, and that 
capacity has been quite limited. 
In March 1993, WPRS was enacted as a national program, but state 
participation in reemployment services was voluntary. Before the pro-
gram became operational, however, the law was changed in November 
1993 to make state participation mandatory (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1  Chronology of Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
Period Development 
1986–1987 New Jersey Experiment is conducted. 
1989 New Jersey Experiment final report published. 
March 1993 WPRS enacted as a national program with voluntary par-
ticipation in reemployment services. 
Summer 1993 National worker profiling model developed. 
September 1993 UI Program Letter 45-93 broadly describes the WPRS pro-
filing model and the design of the WPRS system. 
Fall 1993 Maryland is first state to implement WPRS. 
November 1993 New WPRS legislation makes individual WPRS participa-
tion mandatory. 
December 1993 ETA Basic Understanding Team makes recommendation 
on the WPRS process to ETA executive staff. 
Winter 1994 State WPRS profiling model completed and implemented 
by Maryland. 
March 1994 Field Memorandum 35-94 provides detailed description of 
WPRS. 
Late 1994 WPRS guidance compiled and released in “Green Book.” 
Spring 1996 All states implement WPRS. 
June 1996 National WPRS Colloquium. 
1994–1999 WPRS evaluation conducted. 
October 1997 Employment Service Program Letter 1-98 published. 
1998–1999 Federal-State WPRS Policy Workgroup meets and makes 
recommendations. 
February 1999 WPRS Policy Workgroup issues its final report and recom-
mendations. 
1999 Significant Improvement Demonstration Grants awarded 
to 11 states to improve WPRS reemployment services. 
1999 Funding for WPRS services ($35 million) requested by 
USDOL. 
2000 WPRS reemployment services funded. 
July 2001 WPRS reemployment services funding of $35 million per 
year begins. 
2002 Targeting Employment Services (Eberts, O'Leary, and 
Wandner 2002) published. 






Table 4.1  (continued) 
Period Development 
2004 USDOL budget request excludes WPRS reemployment 
services funding. 
2005 USDOL budget enacted without WPRS reemployment ser-
vices funding. 
June 2006 WPRS reemployment services funding terminates after 
five years of funding at an annual level of approximately 
$35 million. 
2007 Study of worker profiling models completed. 
June 2007 Government Accountability Office report on WPRS pub-
lished. 
February 2009 Reemployment Services Grants appropriated in amount of 
$250 million as part of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act. 
DEVELOPmENT AND ImPLEmENTATION OF ThE
WORkER PROFILINg PROCESS 
Overview 
Under the permanent WPRS system, each state program has two 
components: 1) a worker profiling mechanism to identify dislocated 
unemployment insurance claimants who are likely to exhaust their UI, 
and 2) provision of available reemployment services during the early 
weeks of unemployment for these workers. There was no precedent 
for the WPRS initiative; state workforce programs had never before 
developed a statistical model as the targeting mechanism. Similarly, a 
large-scale, coordinated system of providing reemployment services to 
UI claimants had never existed. Ultimately, it would prove far easier 
to develop and implement worker profiling models than to provide eli-
gible claimants with reemployment services. It has also proven difficult 
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how the Profiling mechanism Works 
Following their initial development between 1993 and 1995, worker 
profiling mechanisms for state UI programs are now operating through-
out the United States. Generally the profiling mechanisms were devel-
oped by state workforce agency staff. In some cases, state agencies had 
assistance from state universities and private research organizations. 
Most state models reflect the technical guidance given by the depart-
ment. Many models also reflect individual state policy or state technical 
innovations and adaptations. 
A worker profiling model predicts the likelihood that given claim-
ants will exhaust their total UI entitlement. States have considered two 
approaches to developing worker profiling mechanisms: statistical 
models and “characteristic screening.” Nationally, 45 states use a sta-
tistical model (Sullivan et al. 2007). Under this approach, profiling is a 
two-step process to identify permanently separated workers who have 
difficulty finding reemployment. First, permanently separated workers 
are identified by screening out two groups of unemployed workers who 
are considered job-attached: workers subject to recall and workers sub-
ject to a union hiring hall agreement.3 Claimants must also be eligible 
to receive UI benefits. They must pass these profiling screens before 
moving to the second step. 
Second, reemployment difficulty is predicted statistically by using 
a logit regression analysis applied to historical data. The measure of 
reemployment difficulty is the dependent variable. It is generally 
a binary variable (i.e., a zero or a one, depicting whether or not the 
worker is likely to exhaust all entitlement to UI benefits).4 This variable 
facilitates creation of a profiling model where the outcome measure 
is the predicted probability that claimants will remain unemployed for 
about six months. 
The worker profiling model estimates the probability of exhaustion 
for individuals based on their demographic characteristics as well as 
current state labor market conditions (i.e., the independent variables). 
These variables are evaluated for their impact on exhaustion. The 
impacts produce state-specific weights for the independent variables. 
The weights are incorporated into computer programs that apply the 
profiling model to identify and refer selected claimants to receive reem-











In addition to the two variables used to identify permanent separa-
tion (i.e., recall status and union hiring hall agreement), the USDOL
recommended that states use five additional variables in designing and 
estimating their worker profiling statistical models. The variables are 
1) education, 
2) job tenure, 
3) change in employment in previous industry, 
4) change in employment in previous occupation, and 
5) local unemployment rate. 
States have generally adopted this modeling approach, but some 
states have incorporated substantial variations from the department’s 
approach. These variations include three broad types: 1) introducing 
additional variables, 2) changing the specifications of some of the 
department-recommended variables, and 3) delaying introduction of 
one or more variables for which states did not have sufficient data when 
they implemented their WPRS systems.5 Despite the aging of state pro-
filing models, many states have neglected updating their models. Never-
theless, the department encourages states to make continuing improve-
ments to their profiling mechanisms and to update them every year or 
two to address changes in demographic and economic conditions. 
In 1993, staff from the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Divi-
sion advised the department that federal civil rights legislation prohib-
its states from using certain variables as part of their worker profil-
ing mechanisms, including age, race or ethnic group, and gender. As 
a result, these variables are excluded from the statistical models. An 
analysis comparing the results of worker profiling selection when these 
variables are included or omitted indicates that the effect of omission 
is very small.6 
In those few states that use characteristic screening, the process 
relies on a small number of characteristics, each of which has a pre-
set cutoff value or criterion. Individuals are selected if they meet the 
criterion for each screen used, without any weighting mechanism. A
number of states that initially used characteristic screening converted 
to statistical models because models have proven to be a more flex-
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ment services. For example, the model can rank referrals by probability 
of exhaustion, which characteristic screens cannot do. Thus, the model 
more precisely scales inflows to available services. After reviewing the 
two approaches, the department recommended that states use statistical 
models instead of characteristic screening. 
Development of Early Intervention/Profiling models 
The New Jersey Experiment did not develop a worker profiling 
mechanism. While it targeted a dislocated worker population, it used 
a series of screens to select the treatment and control group members 
rather than a statistical model (Corson et al. 1989).7 Once WPRS was 
enacted, state employment security agencies needed an administratively 
simple mechanism that would allow them to target reemployment ser-
vices. The mechanism would both select individuals in need of these 
services and allow limiting the provision of services in a rational and 
defensible manner. 
No mechanism for conducting worker profiling existed, and the 
development of such a mechanism became a priority after the enact-
ment of WPRS in March 1993. I was responsible for developing such a 
system during the summer of 1993. Kelleen Worden Kaye, who previ-
ously had worked on UI research projects as a researcher at the Urban 
Institute, developed a national worker profiling model, using a data set 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) that was provided by Ralph 
Smith of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Kaye documented the 
approach, and a worker profiling approach was ready for adoption and 
use by states by the end of the summer (USDOL 1994b, pp. 121–163). 
This national model was designed to be a prototype for state use in 
developing state-specific worker profiling models. It was based on past 
research regarding the nature and characteristics of dislocated workers. 
It was designed to provide a flexible, accurate, and defensible mecha-
nism for selecting unemployed workers to participate in reemployment 
services.8 In 1994, the department began providing technical assistance 
to the states, helping some of them to develop and test their own worker
profiling models using their own state data (USDOL 1994b).9 The 
department had a small technical assistance staff, consisting of federal 







states requesting such help. Technical assistance to update and improve 
worker profiling models has been ongoing: every few years, a worker 
profiling seminar is conducted to provide assistance to the states.10 
In the fall of 1993, Maryland became the first state to implement 
WPRS. It did so without a statistical worker profiling model. Late that 
year, concerned about the inflexibility of its characteristic screening 
model, Maryland volunteered to be the first pilot state to implement the 
new worker profiling model.11 The state model was developed by the 
department profiling modeling team that had been brought together to 
assist the states (USDOL 1994b, pp. 164–272). 
Since WPRS implementation was mandatory for all state workforce 
agencies, states reviewed the national worker profiling model as adapted
for use by Maryland. Initially, most states adopted this model, generally 
without changes. A small number of states developed a characteristic 
screening system for UI claimants, selecting WPRS participants who 
met the screens and excluding those who did not. 
While the worker profiling model is a relatively crude tool for iden-
tifying dislocated workers who require reemployment services, it has 
worked reasonably well. A long-term follow-up study to the New Jer-
sey Experiment simulated what would have happened if the New Jer-
sey worker profiling model of the mid-1990s had been used to select 
participants for the 1986–1987 experiment. The simulation measured 
how accurately the worker profiling model would have identified UI 
program exhaustees if it had been used as part of the experiment. The 
report provides additional support for the WPRS approach, stating that 
“using a profiling model to target reemployment services on workers 
with high probabilities of UI benefit exhaustion directs reemployment 
services to a group of workers who are likely to benefit from the ser-
vices . . . thereby generating relatively large savings in UI receipt for the 
given level of expenditures on services” (Corson and Haimson 1996). 
The department sponsored an evaluation of profiling models in 
order to better understand how the models are working and to deter-
mine how they might be improved (Sullivan et al. 2007). In 2005, the 
researchers conducted a survey of all 50 states and the other three juris-
dictions that have UI and WPRS programs (Table 4.2). With respect to 
the operation of the WPRS models, the study found that most states use 
statistical models and update their models with new data but have never 
revised the structure of their models (Sullivan et al. 2007). 
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Table 4.2  State WPRS Profiling model Characteristics, 2005 
Date of Model 
State Model type Functional style last update revision 
Alabama statistical logit never 2000 
Alaska statistical logit 1/06 1/05 
Arizona statistical — 7/03 7/03 
Arkansas statistical linear regression never none 
California statistical logit 12/01 none 
Colorado statistical logit never none 
Connecticut statistical neural network never none 
Delaware characteristic never none 
D.C. statistical logit 1/04 10/04 
Florida no scoring never 1/02 
Georgia statistical logit 1/98 none 
Hawaii statistical logit 1/95 1/02 
Idaho characteristic 5/05 5/05 
Illinois statistical logit 1997 none 
Indiana statistical linear regression never none 
Iowa statistical logit never none 
Kansas statistical logit never none 
Kentucky statistical tobit 1/97 none 
Louisiana statistical logit 6/03 6/03 
Maine statistical logit 9/04 1/00 
Maryland statistical logit 1/00 none 
Massachusetts characteristic never 5/05 
Michigan statistical linear regression 6/03 6/03 
Minnesota statistical logit 5/05 5/05 
Mississippi statistical — never none 
Missouri statistical logit 12/04 12/04 
Montana statistical logit never none 
Nebraska statistical logit 2000 2000 
Nevada statistical logit never none 
New Hampshire statistical logit 4/05 none 
New Jersey statistical logit 1/04 1/04 
New Mexico statistical logit 1/04 none 
New York characteristic 6/05 1/03 
North Carolina statistical logit never none 
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Table 4.2  (continued) 
Date of Model 
State Model type Functional style last update revision 
North Dakota statistical logit 9/05 1/03 
Ohio characteristic 1/00 none 
Oklahoma statistical linear regression 8/06 none 
Oregon statistical logit 7/03 none 
Pennsylvania statistical logit 1/05 1/03 
Puerto Rico characteristic never none 
Rhode Island statistical linear regression 1/00 none 
South Carolina statistical logit 3/05 none 
South Dakota statistical logit never none 
Tennessee statistical logit 8/03 none 
Texas statistical logit 9/03 7/03 
Utah statistical logit never none 
Vermont statistical logit 3/05 3/05 
Virginia statistical logit never none 
Virgin Islands characteristic never none 
Washington statistical logit never 7/04 
West Virginia statistical logit 8/01 8/01 
Wisconsin statistical logit 1994 none 
Wyoming statistical discriminate 7/05 5/05 
analysis 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable; — = information not available. 
SOURCE: Sullivan et al. (2007), pp. 98–102. 
By 2007, of the 50 states and three other jurisdictions, the over-
whelming majority—45—used statistical WPRS models. Seven states 
use characteristic screening models, and one state—Florida—uses no 
variables at all. Florida provides local One-Stop Career Centers with a 
list of all UI claimants who are eligible to participate in WPRS services, 
and the centers determine the number and type of claimants to be called 
in for services regardless of their worker profiling scores. Thus, despite 
urging by the department to adopt statistical models, eight states use 
less objective methods, and Florida uses a totally subjective method. 
Although it is important to update the data in statistical models, 
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models reflect the characteristics of unemployed workers of more than 
a decade ago. These models do not reflect either the current state of the 
economy or the characteristics of workers who are currently searching 
for work. For the states that have updated their models, many model 
changes reflect data collection modifications, particularly the conver-
sion of occupational and industrial coding. 
Of the 45 states with statistical models, 26 have never revised the 
structure of their models. Twenty-three states have revised their models
since 2000. As a result, the structure of most state models is in need of 
updating. 
Having reviewed and analyzed state profiling models, Sullivan et 
al. (2007) recommend a number of technical modifications to state 
WPRS profiling models. They recommend use of logistical regression 
models and adoption of an expanded number of independent variables, 
including continuous variables, second-order, and cross-term variables. 
Identification and Referral 
Most states use the following general process to identify and refer 
workers to reemployment services. All unemployed workers who file 
for UI benefits and receive a first UI check are required to be profiled. 
However, state agencies may profile workers prior to UI benefit receipt. 
When claimants file for UI benefits, data are collected for use in the 
worker profiling model. Identification and referral are conducted on a 
weekly basis. If claimants are determined to be permanently separated 
and not job-attached, they are run through the state profiling model and 
assigned a probability of benefit exhaustion. For each local employ-
ment security office, UI claimants are arrayed by their exhaustion 
probability—from high to low—which is the basis for their referral 
to reemployment service providers. The number of claimants referred 
to receive reemployment services can be adjusted weekly. States are 
encouraged to establish flexible referral procedures that can adjust the 
number of UI claimants referred according to the availability of reem-
ployment services.12 
Under WPRS, identification and referral to services can only be 
done using the worker profiling mechanism. State workforce agency 
staff are not authorized to use their own subjective judgment as a factor 









(e.g., job finding and placement services) is not restricted to WPRS 
participants. As a result, WPRS participants often participate in ser-
vices alongside nonparticipants.13 These nonparticipants in WPRS can 
be selected by any method consistent with federal requirements that the 
state or locality chooses. 
Participation in reemployment services is a UI program require-
ment for workers who are identified and referred to reemployment ser-
vices through worker profiling. Claimants who refuse to participate can 
be denied UI benefits. 
The purpose of WPRS is to provide reemployment services as 
soon as possible after the onset of unemployment, so states select and 
refer claimants to services within five weeks of claimants’ filing their 
UI claims (USDOL 1994b). Unemployed workers can only be profiled 
once during a period of unemployment, and if reemployment services
are not available to them within five weeks, they are generally not 
enrolled in WPRS. States’ agencies have referred claimants to services 
in a timely manner. At least two states—Georgia and Illinois—have 
accelerated the process to assure early identification and referral to ser-
vices by completing the profiling process in local offices at the time the 
initial claim is filed. 
Once participants have been referred to reemployment services, 
they report to a designated reemployment service provider, generally 
the local Wagner-Peyser Act/Employment Service agency. The service 
providers develop an individual service plan for participation in WPRS-
required reemployment services, which must be approved by their state 
agency counselor and is subject to the availability of services. There is 
wide variation among states regarding the extent to which counselors 
participate in plan development and in the degree of individualization 
of plans. Participants are required to complete all the services included 
in their plans in a timely manner—usually within one to three weeks. 
Upon completion, there is no further participation requirement, even 
if workers remain unemployed. The WPRS system does not affect the 
continuing entitlement to UI benefits, unless referred workers refuse to 
participate in reemployment services. 
Unemployed workers can request additional services beyond those 
available through WPRS, including training. However, these additional
services are provided separately from the WPRS program, usually 
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ment Act’s (WIA) Dislocated Worker program, and thus participation is 
not guaranteed. Program slots must be available and program eligibility 
criteria must be met. 
The WPRS system has succeeded in drawing attention and provid-
ing reemployment services to UI recipients who are permanently dis-
placed. Virtually all initial claimants were profiled in the early years of 
WPRS—over 90 percent were profiled through 2002—however, that 
percentage has declined to between 80 and 85 percent. 
The interim WPRS evaluation report funded by the department 
found that states were successful in implementing their profiling mod-
els, and that the models successfully identified those UI claimants most 
likely to exhaust their UI benefits. States appeared to be successfully 
determining service capacity for providing reemployment services. In 
some states this determination was done by the state, while in others it 
was conducted locally. The study found two common obstacles to the 
provision of services in many states: a shortage of employment coun-
selors to provide services, and a lack of space in many local offices to 
provide orientations, workshops, and other group services (Hawkins et 
al. 1996). 
ImPLEmENTINg AND OPERATINg 
REEmPLOymENT SERVICES 
Background 
The 1993 WPRS legislation required that reemployment services 
be provided in a manner that necessitated close cooperation at the state 
and local level between staff working for the UI, ES, and JTPA/WIA
programs. The cooperative effort would be much greater than was usual 
at that time. Many department staff members developed new working 
relationships as they came together to design the new system. They 
had to create the reemployment services component of the WPRS sys-
tem from scratch. The worker profiling model had to be developed. 
The model was implemented as a prototype in one or more states and 
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approach that involved statistical methods that are not normally part of 
the operation of workforce development programs. 
Mary Ann Wyrsch was the administrator of the UI Service when 
WPRS was enacted. A history major in college, she had studied the 
annals of the employment security system. She also had worked in 
employment security in Washington State. WPRS made sense to her: 
WPRS went back to the roots of the employment security system under 
which the ES had always provided reemployment services to UI claim-
ants and administered the UI work test. WPRS also fit with her under-
standing that job search assistance was more cost-effective than train-
ing, and that WPRS would be beneficial to UI claimants. She was ready 
to support the implementation of WPRS.14 
Enacted as an amendment to federal UI legislation, WPRS was con-
sidered by many to be the primary responsibility of the federal UI staff. 
Staff in the national UI office oversee the development of the worker 
profiling model, and state and local UI staff refer UI claimants to reem-
ployment services. The provision of reemployment services, however, 
cannot be done by the UI program; it has to be done by state Wagner-
Peyser Act and JTPA/WIA programs, which provide reemployment and 
training services. At the federal level, a complex system was developed 
quickly, involving a number of partners. Each program agency had to 
agree to the design of the system, determine how to implement it, pro-
vide guidance to the state and local workforce development partners 
who would carry out the program, and provide support for implementa-
tion and devotion of resources to carry it out.15 
Thus, implementation of a WPRS system in every state represented 
a significant effort by the federal employment security agency com-
munity, especially the UI, ES, and JTPA dislocated worker programs.16 
Implementation required the establishment of operational linkages 
between employment and training programs at the state and local lev-
els. It also required cooperation between local, state, and federal gov-
ernment entities. 
Federal planning for the WPRS program was based on a broad leg-
islative interpretation of what it meant and how it would work. This
interpretation of the WPRS legislation was provided to the states in 
three UI program letters during 1994 (USDOL 1994b, pp. 22–50). 
During the spring of 1993, WPRS system design began with the 
development of the WPRS components and the claimant flows through 
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the new voluntary system. The design included four aspects: 1) the pro-
cess and timing of worker profiling, 2) the referral process to reemploy-
ment service providers, 3) the content and design of the reemployment 
services, and 4) the responsibilities among agencies for providing these 
services. The basic design was reduced to a simple flow diagram that 
was distributed in September 1993 in UI Program Letter 45-93. 
Shortly before the November enactment of the mandatory WPRS 
program, the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) formed 
a team consisting of ES, JTPA Dislocated Worker, and UI Service staff, 
representing the three major ETA programs. It was referred to as the 
Basic Understandings Workgroup, and its mission was to design the 
operational features of the WPRS system at the national, state, and local 
workforce area levels.17 At the time, the ETA recognized that WPRS was 
the first component of the emerging One-Stop delivery system, and the 
manner in which it was implemented reflected upon the potential suc-
cess of the department’s entire workforce reform initiative. The work 
group met daily for several months to hammer out a process that would 
foster cooperation between key state workforce agency partners.18 
The Basic Understandings Workgroup reached an agreement in 
mid-December 1993 that was the basis of all subsequent ETA field 
guidance to the states.19 The agreement included a description of the 
delivery of reemployment services and training, a standard menu of 
reemployment services, requirements for individual service plans, a 
refined flow diagram of state and local operational responsibilities, and 
other state agency requirements. Subsequently, ETA program offices 
began work on developing specific operational guidance.20 
The overall WPRS design was summarized as a flow diagram, which 
evolved when program participation became mandatory. The design 
also was a summary of the efforts of the Basic Understandings Work-
group to develop the individual parts of the system, determine responsi-
bilities for carrying them out, and ensure that the parts fit together well. 
This cooperative effort culminated in a final detailed design—including 
a new flow diagram—that was issued as Field Memorandum 35-94 and 
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Federal guidance 
Field Memorandum 35-94 encompassed a broad view of WPRS. 
It emphasized the department’s commitment to proactively support 
the goals of WPRS and serve the needs of its dislocated-worker cus-
tomers. It attempted to encourage the development and implementa-
tion of comprehensive state WPRS systems, coordination and linkages 
between individual state employment and training organizations (i.e., 
UI, ES, and JTPA/WIA programs), and provision of the most effective 
possible services for dislocated workers (USDOL 1994a, pp. 57–103).22 
The department tried to ensure that states understood the purpose of a 
WPRS system and how the profiling mechanism worked. The depart-
ment also developed prototype designs for the provision of customized 
but comprehensive reemployment services, particularly comprehensive 
job search assistance. 
In August 1994, the department provided comprehensive instruc-
tions to state UI programs as field guidance that described minimum 
requirements states had to meet to conform to federal law. These 
requirements encompassed such matters as the nature and process of 
identification and referral, the relation of the UI system to reemploy-
ment service providers, the definition of reemployment services, and 
a number of UI program administration issues, such as notification of 
claimants, what mandatory participation means for UI claimants, and 
due process considerations (USDOL 1994b, pp. 35–50).23 
By mid-1994, the department had issued four UI program letters, 
three field memorandums, and four UI Service information bulletins 
about the WPRS system. After discussion with state employment secu-
rity agency staff who were concerned that they did not have all of the 
information they needed to implement the WPRS program, I assembled, 
edited, and wrote an introduction to all the material the department had 
produced about the program (USDOL 1994b). For the remaining two 
years of WPRS implementation, this “Green Book”—the color of its 
cover—was used by the states to implement their WPRS programs. The 
ETA issued three supplements to Field Memorandum 35-94 containing 
a total of 47 answers to questions posed by the state agencies. Further-
more, the ETA developed a WPRS implementation guide that was used 
by federal staff to conduct on-site reviews of each state’s WPRS system 
as input to develop a statutorily mandated report to the Congress.24 
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The ES took a strong and active role in implementing WPRS. It 
examined the early experience of WPRS implementation and provided 
guidance to states in late 1997 in ES Program Letter No. 1-98. The 
program letter emphasized the “long-standing” relationship between UI 
and ES programs and the “need to provide improved reemployment 
services to UI claimants.” To provide “quality reemployment services,”
states were urged to consider a number of recommendations based 
on knowledge gained from past studies about how to best speed the 
return to work. UI claimants should receive job search assistance early, 
including “immediate job referrals” if they had suitable skills and expe-
rience. Reemployment services should be individualized to increase the 
likelihood of rapid reemployment. Specifically, it was recognized that 
many WPRS participants were only receiving a group orientation and a 
group job search assistance (JSA) workshop, rather than a more robust 
set of personalized services. Finally, states were encouraged to provide 
an “expansion of the variety, length, and number of services provided 
to claimants,” which had been shown to increase customer satisfaction. 
Specific examples of types of counseling, workshops, and technologi-
cal procedures were recommended. 
Implementation Process and Funding 
The implementation of WPRS required new techniques and proce-
dures. It was implemented in such a manner that the states could learn 
from one another. Five states (Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, New Jer-
sey, and Oregon) were selected early in 1994 to develop prototype sys-
tems. They were followed by “first wave” states, which began imple-
menting their systems later in 1994; a second and final wave of states 
began in 1995. 
Because worker profiling is technically complex and represented a 
departure from prior methods of identifying program participants, the 
department provided extensive technical assistance to individual states 
to initially develop their profiling mechanisms. This assistance was pro-
vided by a small team skilled in econometrics and UI data systems. The 
team began by assisting a single state (Maryland) in developing and 
testing its profiling mechanism in early 1994. Gradually, it expanded 
the scope of assistance to other states, and it served a large number of 
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In addition to providing technical assistance to individual states, 
the department conducted a series of seminars for state technicians to 
help them develop and update their profiling models. These seminars 
included computer laboratory sessions during which state staff could 
work on developing state profiling models using their own state’s data. 
Beginning in 1994, the Department of Labor provided the states with 
start-up funding to initially establish their individual WPRS systems 
and to build capacity to provide reemployment services to claimants 
referred by WPRS. The UI national office provided over $20 million in 
funding to assist states in building their own state profiling mechanisms 
as well as to develop other infrastructure for their WPRS systems. In 
addition, the JTPA Dislocated Worker Program provided states with 
nearly $20 million in funds held in a national reserve account to expand 
their capacity to provide reemployment services to claimants through 
WPRS. In both cases, this funding was for one-time, capacity-building 
activities; the states were not provided with ongoing funding for WPRS 
reemployment services (Wandner 2008). 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services Reporting 
Since WPRS is a client-based system that involves the entire U.S. 
employment and training system, its analysis requires data that indicate 
how unemployed workers move through the system and what impact 
the system has on them. Two WPRS state reports were developed in 
1996. The ETA-9048 Report is a quarterly report of the flow of UI 
claimants into and through the system. It follows claimants through the 
identification and referral process and counts participation in and com-
pletion of reemployment services.25 In addition, the ETA-9049 Report 
is a quarterly report on program outcomes. It gathers data on employ-
ment and wage outcomes of program participants. It was hoped that 
the ETA-9049 Report could be used for evaluation purposes, but it has 
never been used for that purpose. 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services Evaluation 
The department funded an evaluation of WPRS in 1994, shortly 
after the program was enacted. The goal of the evaluation, conducted by 
Social Policy Research Associates (SPRA), was to provide an analysis 
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of the operations and effectiveness of state WPRS systems, so state and 
national policymakers could learn how to improve WPRS. The evalu-
ation included an implementation and process analysis, based on case 
study site visits and a customer satisfaction survey. It also included an 
analysis of program impacts and effectiveness, using a comparison 
group methodology. 
Two interim reports preceded the SPRA’s 1999 final report. The 
first was based on the implementation and process analysis and the sec-
ond (which went to Congress) on the program impact analysis, both for 
six early participating states (Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker 1997; 
Hawkins et al. 1996). The final report included program impact analysis 
for the six participating states, as well as a national survey of all states. 
The evaluation was hampered by significant problems. First, unlike 
the New Jersey Experiment and the JSA Demonstration, which were 
run as random assignment experiments, SPRA evaluated an ongoing 
program. Second, much of the data needed to conduct the demonstra-
tion were not available because states did not retain WPRS data after 
the data were used to conduct the program. For example, without data 
on profiling scores for UI claimants, comparison groups were difficult 
to construct for an ongoing program. Finally, impacts were expected to 
be much lower than for the experiments because state WPRS-provided 
reemployment services were found to be quite limited because of the 
lack of direct funding for the program. 
The second interim report’s impact study determined the net impact 
of providing WPRS services on program outcomes. The study found 
that WPRS significantly reduced UI receipt. Evidence was insufficient 
regarding the expected increased employment and earnings under 
WPRS, although there was strong positive evidence in one of six states. 
The study found that WPRS claimants received substantially more 
reemployment services than comparison group claimants. In particular, 
they were much more likely to receive an orientation and assessment, 
which are key initial components of the WPRS service package. Receipt 
of other services varied, as individual states had their own strategies 
for achieving reemployment. The study also found that under WPRS 
the states successfully accelerated the provision of services (Dickinson, 
Kreutzer, and Decker 1997). 
The final report (Dickinson et al. 1999) presented the WPRS net 
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WPRS significantly reduced the receipt of UI. The two states for which 
there was little or no impact on UI receipt—Kentucky and South Caro-
lina—were the states providing the least number of hours of services.26 
Participating states, however, generally appeared to provide fewer ser-
vices and considerably fewer hours of reemployment services than in 
the New Jersey and JSA experiments. In comparing participating claim-
ants, those with higher profiling scores (that is, scores indicating greater
difficulty in securing new employment) were found to experience 
greater reductions in receipt of UI. Reduction in UI receipt also was 
greater in states with greater enforcement of WPRS participation, as 
measured by UI administrative determinations and denials of benefits. 
These results generally were consistent with the findings of the New 
Jersey Experiment and indicate that the WPRS system is more effec-
tive in states that both provided comprehensive services and enforced 
program participation. 
The study’s 1997 survey of all states found that many were provid-
ing relatively few hours of reemployment services through their WPRS 
systems. Forty-five percent of the states provided between one and nine 
hours of services (Table 4.3). Unlike the New Jersey and JSA experi-
ments, the majority of claimants did not receive the most time-intensive 
Table 4.3  Percentage of Profiled and Referred Workers Receiving 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) and 
Length of Required Services, 1997 
Receipt of WPRS services % of claimants 
Assessment 60.4 
Counseling 20.9 
Job placement 58.4 
Job search workshop/job club 37.2 
Referral to education or training 16.6 
Duration of required services % of states 
1 to 4 hours 16 
5 to 9 hours 29 
10 to 19 hours 18 
20 or more hours 9 
Claimants required to participate until 22 
UI benefits stop 
SOURCE: Dickinson et al. (1999). 
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services: counseling and job search workshops/job clubs (Dickinson et 
al. 1999). 
When the WPRS initiative was proposed, some interest groups 
expressed concern about possible negative effects flowing from its 
requirement of participation in reemployment services. Specifically, 
they were concerned that the enforcement of participation in reemploy-
ment services would be used to increase UI disqualification rates. These 
fears have not been realized. As is consistent with its policy goals, pro-
gram operations appear to be directed toward helping unemployed 
workers find jobs; the program is not pushing claimants off the UI rolls. 
Program participants appear to be willing to participate, and UI local 
staff have rarely found reason to deny benefits because of refusal to par-
ticipate. In fact, early results showed that less than 2 percent of claim-
ants referred to services were denied any benefits for nonparticipation 
(Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker 1997). 
The final report (Dickinson et al. 1999, II-14, II-15) found that ES 
programs were the major providers of WPRS services in over two-thirds 
of the states, while JTPA programs took the lead in the other states. 
Since the study found that the ES also was an active partner in the states 
where JTPA programs had the lead, I estimate that ES provides over 
four-fifths of reemployment services nationwide. 
Funding of Services 
Since its inception in November 1993 as a mandatory program, 
WPRS largely has been an unfunded mandate. That is, states are 
required to conduct work profiling and provide reemployment services 
to targeted dislocated workers within their existing budgets. No new 
funds were appropriated for this initiative in the early years of the pro-
gram. States had to decide how much of their ES and JTPA (and later 
WIA) funds to commit to providing WPRS reemployment services. It 
quickly became clear to some federal policy officials that if the provi-
sion of job search assistance to UI claimants was going to become more 
widespread, dedicated funding would be needed to provide these and 
other reemployment services under WPRS. 
One solution was to build reemployment services into the design 
of a new dislocated worker program. That was the proposal contained 
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by the Clinton administration shortly after the enactment of WPRS. 
REA envisioned a workforce program built from the bottom up. The 
cost analysis for the bill estimated the mix of services based on his-
torical data and the expected take-up rates for job search assistance, 
other employment services, and training. Department staff estimated 
that the combined participants served by both Rapid Response teams 
and WPRS would be 1.6 million in 2000, when the program would 
reach a steady state. Funding to serve these participants was estimated 
to be $652 million per year. Thus, the WPRS funding per participant 
would have been approximately $400—enough to provide comprehen-
sive services similar to those provided in the New Jersey Experiment. 
If appropriations had been forthcoming, WPRS reemployment services 
would have been fully funded by the new REA program (Reed and 
Uhalde 1994). However, REA was not enacted. It was introduced in 
the year that the Republicans won control of the Congress. The Clin-
ton administration would have to negotiate a compromise approach to 
replace JTPA. 
New employment and training legislation was not enacted until four 
years later, as the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998. However, 
the WIA dislocated worker provisions did not address the provision of 
WPRS reemployment services. WIA authorized core and intensive ser-
vices that might include reemployment services for WPRS participants, 
but provision of reemployment services to WPRS participants was not 
addressed directly by the legislation. 
At the time, section 3(c)(3) of the Wagner-Peyser Act was amended 
to specifically authorize the provision of reemployment services. How-
ever, the authorization to provide reemployment services to UI claim-
ants required to participate in reemployment services was not accompa-
nied by any increase in federal funding for ES grants to the states. 
From its enactment, provision of reemployment services by the ES 
under section 3(c)(3) would have been facilitated by dedicated funding 
for reemployment services. Increased funding was needed if these ser-
vices were going to reach a reasonable scale and intensity. As a result, 
in 1997 the ES requested additional funds to provide reemployment 
services. For FY 1998, 1999, and 2000, the ES unsuccessfully proposed 
special formula funding from the Wagner-Peyser Act annual grants to 
provide reemployment services to UI claimants. These requests were 
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FY 2001, the Reemployment Services Grants were proposed again, and 
this time they became part of President Clinton’s budget request. Con-
gress provided funding for these Reemployment Services Grants in the 
amount of $35 million for FY 2001 and then again in approximately the 
same amount for the next four years—through FY 2005.27 The funds 
were provided to the state ES agencies based upon the number of state 
UI first payments and other factors. They were targeted for use in pro-
viding reemployment services to individuals referred to the Wagner-
Peyser Act programs through the WPRS process, and they partially 
supplemented other ES funds. 
These Reemployment Services Grants provided only a small por-
tion of the funds needed to provide WPRS services. For example, in 
2005 approximately 850,000 UI recipients reported to the One-Stop 
centers to receive reemployment services under WPRS. Assuming that 
80 percent of these workers were served by Employment Services and 
that comprehensive provision of these reemployment services cost $400 
per worker, the total cost of providing comprehensive WPRS services 
by the ES would have been approximately $270 million. This means 
that 2005 Reemployment Services Grants paid for about 13 percent of 
comprehensive reemployment services. Because the underfunding was 
so great, the reemployment services provided by the states were far 
less comprehensive than they should have been, and funding for WPRS 
reemployment services in excess of the $35 million came from the basic 
state Wagner-Peyser Act allocations. 
Funds for Reemployment Services Grants were terminated in June 
2006 at the end of program year 2005. The Bush administration did 
not request funding for FY 2006 or any succeeding year. In the FY
2006 appropriation, Congress did not include funds for the Reemploy-
ment Services Grants. The grants also were not included in the FY 2007 
through 2010 budgets (Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 497; 
Balducchi and Pasternak 2004, pp. 42, 43, 62).28 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services Policy Workgroup 
In 1998, USDOL policymakers reviewed how the fully implemented
WPRS program was working and what could be done to improve it. 
They established a WPRS policy work group and asked me to chair 











as well as representatives of state employment security agencies. The 
group members came to a broad consensus about what needed to be 
done to improve the WPRS system, and their recommendations were 
comprehensive. 
The work group made seven recommendations: 
1) The worker profiling model should be updated regularly by 
states. The department should provide technical assistance to 
states and information on best practices. 
2) States should profile all new initial claimants. 
3) States should accelerate their profiling and referral process 
to ensure that WPRS is an early intervention system. States 
should ensure that workers referred to reemployment services 
are the workers most likely to exhaust their benefits. 
4) Reemployment services provided should be greater in number 
and be comprehensive because provision of greater numbers 
of reemployment services yields greater customer satisfaction 
and is cost-effective. 
5) For WPRS purposes, operational linkages between Wagner-
Peyser Act, JTPATitle III (now WIA), and UI programs should 
be further strengthened. 
6) Additional resources should be devoted to WPRS reemploy-
ment services through increased appropriations and reallo-
cation of resources between employment and training fund 
sources. 
7) The states and the department should work to improve WPRS 
communications, feedback systems, and reporting. 
The work group’s recommendations represented a consensus and 
were reasonable and balanced. They were consistent with prior federal 
guidance. These recommendations represented the views of practitio-
ners and policy staff about what ought to be done to improve the WPRS 
program. The members also understood the mutual responsibilities that 
had to be exercised at all levels of government and by all employment 
and training programs. Beyond commitment to make WPRS work, the 
work group recognized that a key issue was the need for direct funding 
of reemployment services. While it was clear to the members that such 







Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services: Implementation  121 
bility of the president and Congress, and in 1999 it did not appear that 
such funding would be forthcoming (Wandner and Messenger 1999). 
Significant Improvement Demonstration grants 
By 1999, the WPRS system had been operating nationally for three 
years. Two evaluations of the program had been conducted—an exter-
nal evaluation by SPRA and an internal evaluation by the WPRS pol-
icy work group. They both made recommendations for improving the 
program. The department provided more than $5 million to 11 states 
to develop and demonstrate improvements in WPRS operations. The 
states receiving these Significant Improvement Demonstration Grants 
(SIG) conducted three types of demonstration activities: 1) making 
changes in the worker profiling mechanism and process to better target 
workers most in need of reemployment services, 2) improving reem-
ployment services, and 3) improving the coordination and communica-
tion between agencies participating in the WPRS process. 
An evaluation of the SIG grants was conducted by a third-party 
evaluator. The evaluation identified a number of ways to improve the 
WPRS program from the demonstration results. These recommended
improvements in the WPRS system derived from best practices observed 
while conducting an implementation analysis for the demonstration 
states. The recommendations dealt with changing the worker profiling 
process, improving reemployment services, and enhancing commu-
nications between programs and agencies (Needels, Corson, and Van 
Noy 2002). The SIG grant recommendations were ignored. The Bush 
II administration marginalized the WPRS program and the provision of 
reemployment services in general. Despite research results to the con-
trary, Bush administration policy recommendations placed nearly all of 
the administration’s emphasis on expanding short-term training. 
government Accountability Office 2007 Report 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a review 
of the WPRS program for the House Ways and Means Committee in 
June 2007. The study addressed three questions: 










2) To what extent do states provide reemployment services in the 
manner recommended by the department? 
3) What is known about the extent to which WPRS speeds the 
return to employment? 
The study used the USDOL-sponsored study of the worker profiling 
mechanism (Sullivan et al. 2007) to reiterate that 45 states use statisti-
cal models to identify and select individuals to participate in WPRS but 
that these models are not regularly updated. The GAO recommended 
that the department take a more active role in ensuring the accuracy of 
the worker profiling models. 
The GAO found that states tended not to provide the recommended
comprehensive reemployment services. The office examined seven 
states and found that six of them provided a weak service package: 
they referred individuals to services and made participation mandatory 
but then provided only one or more group sessions that included an 
orientation and job search skills. Only one state conducted an in-depth 
assessment and developed individual service plans for participants. The 
GAO recommended that the department take an active role in encour-
aging states to provide a more comprehensive package of reemploy-
ment services. 
The GAO further concluded that little was known about the cur-
rent effectiveness of WPRS because no evaluation had been conducted 
since the Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker (1997) study, and that study 
had made use of early WPRS data from the period 1994 through 1996. 
The department had no plans to conduct a new evaluation of WPRS, but 
the GAO recommended that it do so (GAO 2007). 
While the GAO recognized state agency claims that the termination 
of the Reemployment Services Grants in June 2006 was a key reason 
for the decline in provision of WPRS reemployment services, the GAO 
did not deal with the key issue of inadequate funding for the WIA and 
ES programs, which made it unrealistic to expect these programs to 
provide comprehensive WPRS reemployment services. 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services under the 
Bush Administration 
The Bush administration took no interest in the WPRS program. 
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the administration were at variance with the WPRS goal of providing 
reemployment services to dislocated workers. 
In 2003, the Workforce Investment Act expired and required re-
authorization. The key component of the Bush WIA reauthorization 
legislative proposal was the consolidation of the ES and all WIA com-
ponents into a block grant. Consolidation meant eliminating the ES
program, which is the principal provider of WPRS reemployment ser-
vices. The elimination of the ES would likely result in a precipitous 
decline in the provision of WPRS reemployment services. Similar Bush 
administration bills were proposed in 2005 and 2007. 
In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush announced 
the American Competitiveness Agenda. It was a many-faceted proposal, 
but one without new funding. One component of the proposal was 
Career Advancement Accounts (CAAs), training vouchers designed to 
provide maximum individual choice. Under a new Bush administra-
tion WIA reauthorization proposal that incorporated CAAs, funding 
for CAAs would consume nearly four-fifths of all employment and 
training funding. With no new funding, almost no funds would remain 
to provide WIA core and intensive services or to keep open the more 
than 3,000 One-Stops, located in almost every county across the United 
States. The likely effect of this proposal would have been to shutter the 
employment and training system and to eliminate virtually all funding 
for reemployment services for WPRS participants and other individuals 
in need of services. 
When Congress rejected the Bush proposals for WIA reauthoriza-
tion, the USDOL acted administratively to eliminate the U.S. Employ-
ment Service within the department. The organization that had provided 
leadership to provide WPRS reemployment services through Wagner-
Peyser Act programs was thus silenced. 
In an effort to justify the destruction of the ES, the creation of an 
employment and training block grant program, and the moving of nearly 
all funding into training vouchers, Bush administration spokespeople 
disparaged as wasteful the overhead costs to provide core and inten-
sive services to more than 10 million individuals. WPRS was neglected, 
and no guidance or technical assistance was provided to the states with 
respect to the program requirements or the provision of reemployment 
services. Strangely, however, continuing technical assistance was pro-
vided to states to update and evaluate their worker profiling models. 
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The result was an effort to maintain good worker profiling models, 
while disparaging the reemployment services that were to be provided 
to likely UI exhaustees based on these profiling models. It was not clear 
what the worker profiling models would be used for if not to provide 
reemployment services. 
Thus, there were two phases of WPRS from 1993 to 2008. In the 
first phase, WPRS was developed and encouraged. In the second phase, 
it was ignored and reemployment services were impugned. An exami-
nation of the provision of reemployment services under the WPRS pro-
gram reveals that these two phases corresponded to a rise and decline in 
the provision of reemployment services. 
ThE SCOPE OF REFERRAL TO AND PROVISION OF
REEmPLOymENT SERVICES 
WPRS Operations Begin 
WPRS makes early provision of reemployment services to UI 
claimants practical. In the past, serving UI recipients soon after they 
became unemployed was a daunting task: UI recipients are too numer-
ous to all be referred to service providers, and many of them do not 
need assistance. There was no rapid and systematic way to sort through 
all UI claimants to make appropriate referrals. WPRS allows referral of 
just those claimants who most appear to need services—and then, only 
of those claimants for whom services are actually available. 
The USDOL recommended that the states provide a systematic and 
structured set of reemployment services that would provide customized 
assistance to dislocated claimants referred through worker profiling. 
Under this approach, a comprehensive set of reemployment services 
would be offered, but all participants would not receive the same set of 
services. Rather, the policy focus was on the development of an indi-
vidual service plan for each referred worker, to meet the needs of the 
individual customer and to avoid the approach of “one size fits all.” 
Although the WPRS process makes early provision of reemploy-
ment services practical, the states and their reemployment service pro-
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delivers the services, what kinds of services are provided, and how 
many workers are served. 
Reemployment services are generally funded by the ES and the 
WIA programs. Although WIA programs are a major service provider 
in a number of states, states have generally used the ES rather than the 
WIA programs to provide most reemployment services. This choice is 
related to the U.S. institutional history. The public Employment Ser-
vice and Unemployment Insurance were created as two interdependent 
programs in the 1930s, and they have been closely associated at both 
the state and the local level. Organizationally, they are located in the 
same state workforce agency, and the Wagner-Peyser Act, in Section 
7(a)(3)(F), has long required that the ES provide UI claimants with job 
finding and placement services and administer the UI work test. Before 
state UI staff began moving out of local offices in the mid-1990s in 
response to the introduction of telephone and Internet claims-taking, 
9 out of 10 local employment security offices around the country were 
colocated, housing both the ES and UI units. It is this close working 
relationship between the two programs that explains why the great 
majority of WPRS reemployment services have been provided through 
ES programs. 
By contrast, the WIA program and its predecessors have more 
recent origins. They were established as an alternative program deliv-
ery system, with operational authority that was locally rather than state-
based, and they rarely have been colocated with the UI program. Pro-
gram linkages with UI seldom developed prior to the implementation of 
the WPRS system. In addition, WIA’s main focus was on the provision 
of training and intensive services rather than on job search assistance 
or labor exchange services. As a result, WPRS operational linkages 
with WIA remain limited. In most states, WIA has been the recipient 
of WPRS referrals to training by local WPRS service providers, rather 
than the provider of WPRS job search services. 
The WPRS evaluation report politely found that “coordination link-
ages between the UI and ES programs were working relatively well, 
but in most sites, the linkages between UI and ES with EDWAA [JTPA
Dislocated Worker] were less well established” (Hawkins et al. 1996). 
The report recommended improving linkages with the JTPA Dislocated 
Worker (now the WIA Dislocated Worker) program to take advantage 









The capacity to provide reemployment services varies widely by 
state. This capacity depends on factors such as which agencies pro-
vide the reemployment services, their resource availability, and their 
commitment to the system. There also are wide variations in capacity 
between localities within states. 
From its inception, the nationwide WPRS system had a substantial 
effect on the behavior of reemployment service providers. For example, 
the ES has experienced a dramatic increase in the services it has pro-
vided to UI claimants. Of the 8 to 9 million UI claimants served by the 
ES in the three program years ending on June 30, 1996, the percent-
age of claimants receiving some “reportable services” increased during 
these three years from 46 to 52 and then to 54 percent. More specifi-
cally, from the perspective of the WPRS program, the percentage of UI 
claimants receiving job search assistance during this period increased 
from 17 to 23 to 29 percent. The ES expended a great deal more effort 
helping return UI claimants to work during this period of WPRS imple-
mentation than it did before. 
An early analysis of WPRS national reporting on program partici-
pation showed the types of reemployment services that WPRS partici-
pants received (Johnson 1996). For the early period of October 1995 
through June 1996, 87 percent of all workers receiving UI first pay-
ments were profiled, and 11 percent of those profiled were referred to 
services. The number of referrals reflects only those dislocated workers 
for whom reemployment services were available. The larger population 
of UI claimants in need of reemployment services was not measured, 
but it was likely to number between 1 and 2 million claimants annually. 
The percentages of referred claimants reporting to individual services 
were as follows:29 
• orientation, 62 percent 
• assessment, 61 percent 
• counseling, 27 percent 
• placement assistance, 70 percent 
• job search workshops, 42 percent 
Thus, the largest number of referred workers who received services 
between October 1995 and June 1996 were provided with an orienta-
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in job search workshops and still fewer received individual counsel-
ing. It was the more costly and time-intensive services that had lower 
participation. 
In looking at the level and mix of services provided by individual 
states, Johnson (1996) observed wide variation in service provision by 
state. The six WPRS service components that were reported consisted 
of orientation, assessment, counseling, placement, job search work-
shops, and referral to education and training. Levels of services were 
measured in terms of the percentage of referred claimants who reported 
to services. “High” and “low” participation rates were set at rates 25 
percent higher or lower than the national average, respectively: 
•	 Comprehensive Services: One-fifth of the states provided a high 
level of services in three or more services. Two-fifths of the 
states provided a high level in two or more services. 
•	 Limited Services: Nearly one-fifth of the states provided a low 
level of services in three or more services. Twenty-nine states 
provided low levels of services in two or more services. Of 
these 29 states, 16 did not provide high levels of services in any 
service. 
Thus, early in the operation of WPRS, state systems provided
widely different levels of services to participating dislocated workers. 
Perhaps two-fifths of the states provided reasonably comprehensive 
services, while nearly one-third of the states provided minimal levels of 
services. The remaining states fell in between. 
Individual participation in training is not a part of WPRS. Rather, 
if other reemployment services are not adequate to help unemployed 
workers return to work because they lack transferable skills, service 
providers are encouraged to refer workers to training. As part of the 
WPRS assessment process, participants may be referred to training on 
a voluntary basis. Early in its program operations, WPRS linked nearly 
one-fifth of referred workers with training and educational services. 
The 1996 WPRS interim evaluation report found that the states 
were, in many cases, providing services that were neither comprehen-
sive nor intensive. A major reason for the limited nature of the services 
provided was that many WPRS staff members were reluctant to refer 
claimants to an increased number of services because claimants might 







tained in their service plans. To guard against this possible outcome, 
staff members instead might offer claimants only what was minimally 
required. The staff’s concern, however, was at odds with the results of 
the WPRS evaluation’s customer satisfaction survey, which found that 
customers’ satisfaction increased substantially as the number of ser-
vices provided increased. As a result, the evaluation recommended that 
states “develop more comprehensive and intensive services, including a 
wider array of services and longer-term services appropriate for WPRS 
claimants” (Hawkins et al. 1996). 
To achieve the WPRS system’s goals, states must offer reason-
ably comprehensive reemployment services to WPRS participants. 
The effectiveness of the WPRS system depends on dislocated workers’
receiving enough reemployment assistance to enhance their search for 
work, resulting in a more rapid return to work. In the mid-1990s, the 
WPRS system had not yet reached a steady state, and it was hoped 
that the delivery of reemployment services would increase. In fact, 
because of funding limitations, the provision of reemployment services 
declined as the state WPRS systems matured. Thus, the WPRS system 
as described below is but a shell of what it was supposed to be, refer-
ring fewer WPRS-profiled workers to reemployment services and then 
having participants receive a weaker mix of services. 
Operations of the WPRS Program, 1994–2008 
While some states began implementation of WPRS in 1994, all 
states did not have operational programs until mid-1996. Thus, we must 
also look at the evolution of the program from 1996 to the present. Table 
4.4 summarizes the state WPRS reports to the USDOL on the provision 
of WPRS reemployment services. The table demonstrates the nature of 
the WPRS program and how it has evolved over time. The table reveals 
the scope of the program, the effectiveness of WPRS at identifying and 
referring workers to reemployment services, and the number and type 
of reemployment services that UI beneficiaries can receive. 
The data show that first payments in the UI program have numbered 
between 7 and 10 million since 1994. Since WPRS became operational 
nationally in 1996, the great majority of UI beneficiaries have been pro-
filed. Of the beneficiaries profiled, over 1 million have been referred 
to reemployment services each year since 2001. Most of the referred 
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Table 4.4  Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) Data 
and Unemployment Insurance Program First Payments, 
1994–2009 
Year First pays Profiled Referral Reported Orientation 
1994 7,959,281 122,065 23,087 17,184 14,126 
1995 8,035,229 4,061,731 456,533 453,005 283,508 
1996 7,995,135 7,208,694 821,443 1,036,806 512,045 
1997 7,325,093 6,985,048 745,870 990,041 474,891 
1998 7,341,903 6,882,571 783,779 1,033,482 477,913 
1999 6,967,840 6,483,514 803,401 990,737 447,032 
2000 7,035,783 6,475,605 977,440 1,229,352 557,250 
2001 9,868,193 8,952,312 1,154,743 1,499,364 666,610 
2002 10,092,569 9,178,024 1,220,466 986,719 619,917 
2003 9,935,108 8,238,485 1,147,448 919,450 595,564 
2004 8,386,623 7,037,337 1,106,776 880,263 602,833 
2005 7,917,301 6,441,561 1,128,710 845,789 607,905 
2006 7,350,734 6,340,253 1,170,126 856,587 627,668 
2007 7,652,634 6,586,553 1,230,093 911,055 644,797 
2008 10,052,694 8,539,918 1,262,651 935,378 665,376 
2009 14,182,053 12,165,239 2,304,519 1,392,985 1,061,971 
Year Assessment Counseling Placement JSW Training 
1994 9,876 5,883 5,671 11,042 4,492 
1995 246,655 140,301 267,281 213,512 74,292 
1996 507,824 214,528 613,544 338,508 166,456 
1997 455,914 194,818 630,760 336,959 160,741 
1998 416,027 191,315 676,284 296,681 156,462 
1999 403,195 198,571 668,492 253,451 141,398 
2000 471,712 146,917 645,170 342,856 113,879 
2001 531,020 129,136 506,172 452,439 120,093 
2002 462,643 125,103 376,757 369,756 76,448 
2003 423,977 114,142 378,180 400,245 70,295 
2004 343,903 93,215 378,181 379,735 73,508 
2005 350,443 109,697 376,342 355,843 77,915 
2006 406,158 134,837 405,558 369,564 92,200 
2007 425,711 149,101 437,744 390,454 100,780 
2008 479,230 141,806 402,902 382,888 122,234 






Table 4.4  (continued) 
NOTE: Data is from the Unemployment Insurance Data Base as of July 2009. For 
WPRS data, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and New Mexico are missing in the 2004 
and 2005 data; Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are missing in the 2006 data; and 
Puerto Rico is missing in the 2007 and 2008 data. Data for 2009 is from the Unem-
ployment Insurance Data Base as of June 2010. 
The column headings are defined as follows: 
Concept Definition 
UI first pays Number of first UI payments for new benefit years established. 
Profiled Number of UI claimants profiled by state WPRS systems. 
Referred Number of profiled claimants referred to reemployment services. 
Reported Number of profiled and referred claimants who report for WPRS 
services. 
Orientation Number of profiled and referred claimants who report to an orientation. 
Assessment Number of profiled and referred claimants who report to an individual 
assessment. 
Counseling Number of profiled and referred claimants who report to job 
counseling. 
Placement Number of profiled and referred claimants who report to placement 
services. 
JSW Number of profiled and referred claimants who complete a job search 
workshop. 
Training Number of profiled and referred workers who are referred to
government-funded education or training. 
SOURCE: Summary of monthly state reports to the ETA. UI first payment data from 
ETA Report 5159. Other WPRS data from ETA Report 9048. 
workers have reported for services, but, strangely, substantially more 
beneficiaries reported for services than were referred for the years 1996 
through 2001. A state-by-state analysis indicates that this anomaly was 
caused by the misreporting of a small number of states.30 
Most, although not all, claimants who reported to reemployment ser-
vices received an orientation. However, a group orientation is not a true 
reemployment service; it only provides information about the WPRS 
process and requirements. After receiving an orientation, reportees can 
receive five true reemployment services: 1) assessment, 2) counseling, 
3) placement services, 4) a job search workshop, and 5) referral to train-
ing.31 Recently, the most prevalent service is placement assistance, while 
referral to training and counseling are least prevalent. Assessment and 
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Assessment, counseling, and placement assistance are types of 
employment services that are less staff intensive and costly than skill 
and occupational training. Since 1994, as a result of technological inno-
vations in job matching and decreased ES and WIA funding, there has 
been greater reliance on self-administered services and facilitated self-
help and less on staff-assisted (i.e., person-to-person) reemployment 
services. Thus, it is not surprising that the decline in program funding 
has resulted in the provision of fewer staff-assisted WPRS reemploy-
ment services and that services are being provided as cheaply as pos-
sible: only job search workshops have not experienced a steady decline. 
This decline is not cyclical but occurred generally through the years 
of the Bush administration. By contrast, counseling has been declining 
ever since the establishment of the WPRS national program in 1996. 
A countercyclical component also can be seen in the WPRS sys-
tem. With the program having reached a steady state before the onset 
of the 2001 recession, WPRS activity peaked by some measures dur-
ing the recession. The number of beneficiaries profiled and referred to 
reemployment services peaked in 2002, while the number reporting 
and receiving an orientation peaked in 2001. UI program beneficiaries 
reached a cyclical maximum of 10.1 million in 2002. The number of 
UI beneficiaries profiled (9.2 million) and referred (1.2 million) to the 
WPRS system also reached a maximum in 2002. The number of benefi-
ciaries reporting for services peaked at 1.5 million in 2001. 
The recession that began in December 2007 again created greater 
demand for WPRS. In 2008, worker profiling and referral to reem-
ployment services increased sharply. Without new funding, however, 
the receipt of reemployment services did not keep pace. Orientations 
and assessment increased, but counseling, placement services, and job 
search workshops declined. Only referrals to training increased sharply, 
as WPRS referrals became an increasingly important source of trainees 
for the WIA system.32 
While the increase in unemployment during the 2001 recession 
resulted in a proportional increase in profiling, referral and reporting 
for reemployment services, and receipt of orientations, the receipt of 
WPRS services did not similarly increase. Between 1999 and 2001, 
UI first payments increased by 42 percent and the number of claimants 
profiled, reporting for services, and receiving an orientation increased 
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correspondingly. During the same period, however, only assessments 
and job search workshops increased substantially, while counseling, 
placement services, and referral to training declined substantially. Lack 
of funding significantly undermined the provision of needed services. 
The same was true in 2008, when the recession that had begun at the 
end of the previous year did not yield increased funding, and the provi-
sion of reemployment services under WPRS did not rebound. 
Examining the changing percentage of UI beneficiaries who are 
profiled, referred, and receive reemployment services adds perspec-
tive to the provision of services (Table 4.5). The extent of the profiling 
and referral of UI recipients has changed over time. From 1996, when 
WPRS was fully operational in all states, through 2002, over 90 per-
cent of workers receiving a first payment were profiled. Thus, nearly all 
UI recipients, and probably virtually all permanently separated recipi-
ents, were profiled during these years. That percentage has declined 
to between 81 and 86 percent in the period from 2003 through 2008. 
The number of UI beneficiaries who were profiled declined from 2002 
through 2005, stabilized in 2006 and 2007, and increased sharply in 2008. 
The number of beneficiaries who were referred to reemployment 
services was fairly stable at between 700,000 and 800,000 from 1996 
to 1999, with a referral rate of 9 to 11 percent. That number actually 
increased and has remained at approximately 1 million or more from 
2000 through 2008. These referrals have remained at this level because 
the percentage of profiled workers who were referred to reemployment 
services has increased to between 11 and 16 percent through 2007. 
Because the state UI program only refers as many UI claimants to 
WPRS services as the availability of services in an individual career 
center permits, the referral rate approximates the capacity to serve 
profiled workers. This capacity has been quite steady over time. Thus, 
the referral of between 11 and 16 percent of all UI beneficiaries to the 
career centers represents the centers’ ability to receive and serve them. 
Because of steady decreases in ES funding, some states have cur-
tailed the provision of WPRS service provision in recent years. This is 
often referred to as a WPRS “resource threshold”—the point beyond 
which profiled claimants who are likely to exhaust benefits are not 
referred to service providers, or beyond which providers do not call 
claimants in for services because of a lack of local workforce staff. 
For example, at various times in 2003, up to one-third of Wisconsin 
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Table 4.5  WPRS, Percentage of UI Beneficiaries Profiled and Referred to WPRS Services and of Referrals 
Receiving Reemployment Services and Referral to Training, 1996–2008 
As % of UI beneficiaries As % of referrals 
Year Profiled Referred Orientation Assessment Counseling Placement JSW Training 
1996 90.2 10.3 62.3 61.8 26.1 74.7 41.2 20.3 
1997 95.4 10.2 63.7 61.1 26.1 84.6 45.2 21.6 
1998 93.7 9.4 70.1 53.1 24.4 86.3 37.9 20.0 
1999 93.0 11.5 55.6 50.2 24.7 83.2 31.5 17.6 
2000 92.0 13.9 57.0 48.3 15.0 66.0 35.1 11.7 
2001 90.7 11.7 57.7 46.0 11.2 43.8 39.2 10.4 
2002 90.9 12.1 50.8 37.9 10.3 30.9 30.3 6.3 
2003 82.9 11.5 51.9 36.9 9.9 33.0 34.9 6.1 
2004 83.9 13.2 54.5 30.7 8.5 35.7 34.1 6.7 
2005 81.3 14.2 53.8 31.0 9.7 33.3 31.5 6.9 
2006 86.3 16.0 53.6 34.7 11.5 34.7 31.6 7.9 
2007 85.6 16.1 52.4 34.7 12.1 35.6 31.8 8.2 
2008 85.0 12.6 52.7 38.0 11.2 31.9 30.3 9.7 
NOTE: Data is from the Unemployment Insurance Data Base as of July 2009. For the WPRS data, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and 
New Mexico are missing in the 2004 and 2005 data; Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are missing in the 2006 data; and Puerto Rico is 
missing in the 2007 and 2008 data. 
SOURCE: USDOL, ETA Report 9048 and ETA Report 5159. 
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workforce areas were not providing WPRS services because of lack of 
reemployment service funding (Almandsmith, Adams, and Bos 2006). 
Looking at individual reemployment services, a downward trend 
developed in the provision of almost all services. Orientations were 
initially given to 60 to 70 percent of UI claimants reporting for ser-
vices (“reportees”) from 1996 to 1998, but orientations have declined 
to between 50 and 60 percent since then. Assessments were given to 
over 50 percent of workers through 1999 but have declined sharply 
since then—down to between 30 and 35 percent—with a small increase 
in 2008. Counseling was initially provided to one-quarter of reportees 
but is now provided to only 1 in 10. Placement services were initially 
provided to over two-thirds of reportees but are now provided to only 
1 in 3. Job search workshops were initially provided to over 40 percent 
of reportees, but subsequently have been provided to between 30 and 
40 percent. Referral to training was initially provided to 20 percent of 
reporting workers, but is now down to between 6 and 10 percent. 
As expected, the one service that is provided to most reporting 
workers is an orientation session. However, less than 60 percent of 
reportees receive an orientation, when nearly all should. Placement ser-
vices—trying to match job seekers with job openings—make up the 
second-most-used service, yet only about one-third of reportees receive 
placement services. The next most frequently provided services are 
assessments and job search workshops. Less than one-tenth of reportees 
receive counseling, and referrals to counseling services have declined 
in the 2000s. Referrals to training have declined the most sharply of any 
of the services, from a high of over 160,000 in 1996 and 1997 to fewer 
than 80,000 between 2002 and 2005. They now represent less than one-
tenth of referees. Thus, the more time-intensive and expensive reem-
ployment services—assessment and counseling, job search workshops, 
and referrals to training—are the least-used services. 
All UI beneficiaries who report to WPRS reemployment services 
receive one or more reemployment services. While state data reports do 
not determine the number of the WPRS-reported services each worker 
receives, the average number of services provided is between two and 
two-and-a-half services per reporting worker. For example, in 2005, the 
911,648 beneficiaries reporting to the career centers received 1.9 mil-
lion services, for an average of 2.1 services per reporting worker. More 
reemployment services would be expected to be provided if states were 
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following the model of the New Jersey Experiment, especially since an 
orientation is an introduction to WPRS rather than a reemployment service. 
WPRS-referred Unemployment Insurance claimants are closely 
related to the population of dislocated workers. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ biennial surveys of displaced workers show that between 
two-fifths and three-quarters of them collect UI benefits. The percent-
age is higher in recessionary periods, and at all times the percentage is 
higher still when those displaced workers who are unemployed for less 
than five weeks (and therefore not likely to apply for UI benefits) are 
excluded (Helwig 2004). 
According to the Current Population Survey (CPS), the trend in the 
duration of unemployment has been one of increasing length, whether 
measured by the insured duration or the proportion of individuals who 
are unemployed for longer than 26 weeks. More reemployment services 
should be provided to dislocated workers as the difficulty of becoming 
reemployed increases, but the WPRS programs have not been able to 
respond to this need. Dislocated workers thus have been getting less 
reemployment assistance just when they need it more. 
Role of the Employment Service in the Provision of WPRS Services 
The ES has served UI claimants since the UI system began paying 
benefits in 1938. A statutory function of the ES is to conduct the UI 
work test, including work registration of UI claimants. Between 1994 
and 2001, approximately 85 to 95 percent of individuals who receive a 
first payment from UI registered with the ES (Table 4.6). Generally all 
UI claimants are required to register with the ES unless they are subject 
to recall, and in recent years fewer of the unemployed are on temporary 
layoffs. The number of registrants is highly cyclical, increasing during 
periods of high unemployment. 
In program year (PY) 2002, however, as a result of the advent of 
electronic self-help services and companion WIA performance require-
ments, new ES performance measurement and reporting require-
ments were established. The new requirements made it voluntary as to
whether to register UI claimants who went to the state ES agency but 
did not receive staff-assisted services (Smole 2004, pp. 116–121). State 
agencies continued to be required to register UI claimants who used 
staff-assisted services. In PY 2002, unemployment increased, and we 
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Table 4.6  Employment Service Registrants and a Percentage of UI First 
Payments, 1984–2007 
Registrants as a ratio 
Year Eligible UI claimants UI first payments of UI claimants 
1984 6,776,674 7,742,547 0.88 
1985 6,504,592 8,372,070 0.77 
1986 7,001,207 8,360,752 0.84 
1987 6,431,701 7,203,357 0.88 
1988 6,256,440 6,860,662 0.91 
1989 6,525,583 7,386,766 0.88 
1990 7,096,457 8,628,557 0.82 
1991 8,973,942 10,074,550 0.89 
1992 10,436,910 9,243,338 1.13 
1993 9,235,977 7,884,326 1.17 
1994 7,662,050 7,959,281 0.96 
1995 7,413,036 8,035,229 0.92 
1996 7,254,009 7,995,135 0.91 
1997 6,663,475 7,325,093 0.91 
1998 6,406,794 7,341,903 0.87 
1999 6,165,645 6,967,840 0.88 
2000 6,600,708 7,035,783 0.97 
2001 8,432,026 9,868,193 0.94 
2002 6,187,161 10,092,569 0.59 
2003 5,648,894 9,935,108 0.54 
2004 5,655,186 8,368,623 0.68 
2005 4,822,914 7,917,301 0.61 
2006 4,805,817 7,350,734 0.65 
2007 5,573,634 8,338,028 0.67 
SOURCE: USDOL, ETA Report 9002 and ETA Report 5159. 
would have expected the number of registered UI claimants to have 
increased from the 2001 level of 8.4 million to somewhere in the vicin-
ity of 10 million. Instead, many states began selective registration, 
resulting in a sharp decline nationally in the number of registrants, 
which fell to 6.2 million in 2002. Although these 2002 registrants aver-
aged 59 percent of UI beneficiaries nationwide, they made up only 10 








Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services: Implementation  137 
and West Virginia, and less than 10 percent in the District of Colum-
bia, Michigan, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Additional changes to the 
Wagner-Peyser Act performance measures and reporting requirements 
were instituted in PY 2005, which eliminated the term “registered job 
seeker” and replaced it with “participant.” 
Wagner-Peyser Act programs have demonstrated their ability to 
handle the flow of UI claimants referred to state ES programs, both to 
register for employment and to receive WPRS reemployment services. 
In response to the enactment of WPRS, the U.S. Employment Service 
(USES) made clear that serving UI claimants was a priority through 
its policies and practices. Since full implementation of WPRS in 1996, 
over half of the eligible UI claimants have received “some reportable 
service,” according to the ETA 9002 report. In addition, comparing data 
for WPRS and state ES programs, we see that the state ES programs 
provided “some reportable service” to approximately three to four 
times the number of workers who reported for WPRS services. Thus, 
the ES has adjusted its priorities to handle the flow of workers referred 
to reemployment services through the WPRS system. 
In national ES reporting data, the best measure of the responsive-
ness of the ES to the introduction of WPRS is the increase in the num-
ber of UI claimants who participate in a job search activity. A “job 
search activity” under ES is defined as job search assistance, the pri-
mary form of reemployment service that is to be provided under WPRS. 
The number of individuals participating in job search activities more 
than doubled—from 1.6 million in 1993, before the implementation of 
WPRS, to a high of 3.9 million in 2001 (Table 4.7). Participation in 
a job search activity, as a proportion of UI claimants who received a 
reportable service, also more than doubled from 1993 to 2001. This 
indicates that the state Wagner-Peyser Act agencies took the WPRS 
program seriously and made great efforts to increase their provision of 
job search assistance.33 
The impact of the USES policy of providing increased and improved 
JSA services to UI claimants is also evident in the concentration of the 
growth of state Wagner-Peyser Act agency provision of JSA compared 
to all reportable ES services. While the percentage of UI claimants 
receiving a reportable service increased slowly from 1992 to 2001, the 
percentage of claimants receiving JSA increased much more rapidly, 
more than doubling. 
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Table 4.7  Labor Exchange Activities of Eligible UI Claimants Registered for Work, 1984–2007 
Activity 
Received some reportable Participated in a job search 
service (RRS) activity Entered employment 
Eligible UI 
Program claimants 
year (EUI) Number % EUI Number % RRS Number % RRS 
1984 6,776,674 2,264,907 — 716,327 31.6 
1985 6,504,592 — — — — 
1986 7,001,207 — — 651,992 — 
1987 6,431,701 — — 648,064 — 
1988 6,256,440 — — 642,178 — 
1989 6,525,583 — — 647,994 — 
1990 7,096,457 — — 644,070 — 
1991 8,973,942 — — 835,251 — 
1992 10,436,910 4,681,358 44.9 — 924,632 — 
1993 9,235,977 4,270,711 46.2 1,588,223 37.2 890,504 20.9 
1994 7,662,050 4,012,523 52.4 1,740,209 43.4 885,721 22.1 
1995 7,413,036 4,004,707 54.0 2,149,171 53.7 879,562 22.0 
1996 7,254,009 3,985,194 54.9 2,306,738 57.9 924,322 23.2 
1997 6,663,475 3,599,511 54.0 2,262,883 62.9 918,294 25.5 
1998 6,406,794 3,343,018 52.2 2,287,296 68.4 959,248 28.7 
1999 6,165,645 3,417,600 55.4 2,428,242 71.1 1,116,840 32.7 
2000 6,600,708 3,788,435 57.4 2,867,806 75.7 1,300,663 34.3 
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2001 8,432,026 4,965,528 58.9 3,911,278 78.8 1,477,455 29.8 
2002 6,187,161 4,799,028 77.6 3,731,966 77.8 — — 
2003 5,648,894 4,119,382 72.9 3,126,384 75.9 2,723,057 66.1 
2004 5,655,186 3,969,739 70.2 2,958,718 74.5 2,881,434 72.6 
2005 4,822.914 3,599,279 74.6 1,703,166 47.3 2,575,368 71.6 
2006 4,552,614 3,198,429 70.3 1,544,704 48.3 2,049,253 64.1 
2007 5,573,634 3,512,898 63.0 1,863,699 53.1 3,089,304 87.9 
NOTE: Eligible UI claimants are ES registrants who are monetarily eligible for UI benefits. The requirement that UI claimants register 
with the ES was relaxed in PY 2002. The immediate state response to the relaxing of this requirement can be seen in the decline in eligible 
UI claimants beginning in 2002. — = not available; blank = not applicable. 
SOURCE: Program years 1984–1994, Employment Security Automated Reporting System (ESARS); 1993–1995, USDOL (1996); 1996– 





In the recession year of PY 2001, the 3.9 million UI claimants who 
received a job search activity from state ES agencies was more than 
double the 1.5 million workers who reported receiving WPRS services. 
The ES served a substantial plurality of the 9.9 million UI beneficiaries 
that year. 
Data for the “Great Recession” is limited, as the data for PY 2007 
ends in June 2008. The data show that the percentage of eligible UI 
claimants receiving a reportable service declined, while the percentage 
of individuals receiving a reportable service and participating in a job 
search activity increased. The response to the recession, however, will 
be seen mostly in later program years. 
In general, the ES has provided job search assistance to UI claimants 
well beyond those claimants who are required to participate in WPRS 
reemployment services: no more than 1.5 million workers reported for 
WPRS reemployment services in any year between 1996 and 2004, but 
the ES provided job search services to more than 2 million UI claim-
ants in each of those nine years. In some of these years, the ES provided 
reemployment services to between two and four times more UI claim-
ants than were required to participate. The ES response to WPRS can 
also be shown by the Wagner-Peyser Act programs’ provision of job 
search assistance to an increasing proportion of UI recipients between 
1994 and 2004. Over that 10-year span, the proportion increased from 
about one-fifth to more than one-third. 
Beginning in 2005, the ES’s support of the WPRS system declined 
sharply. Provision of job search activities dwindled from 3.0 million 
in 2004 to 1.7 million in 2005 and 1.6 million in 2006. The proportion 
of UI beneficiaries served with job search activities fell back to about 
one-fifth. 
Promoting Reemployment 
While all states offer job search assistance to UI claimants, a 2003 
survey of state employment security agencies by the National Associa-
tion of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA) provides some perspec-
tive on how these services are provided. The survey finds that the most 
common source of such assistance is through the WPRS process. The 
states cite the dissemination of labor market information, the provi-
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improve job interviewing skills (e.g., job search assistance) as the prin-
cipal services they provide to UI claimants (O’Leary 2006; O’Leary 
and Wandner 2005). 
In the same state survey, state workforce agencies report that the 
only two methods they used to promote reemployment were WPRS and 
the state Eligibility Review Programs (ERPs). Since very few states have 
been operating such ERP systems in recent years, the principal method 
of promoting reemployment is currently WPRS. UI recipients, however, 
are free to use WIA core and intensive services to find reemployment 
services without being required to do so by state UI programs, and some 
UI recipients do this (O’Leary 2006; O’Leary and Wandner 2005). 
The conclusion to be drawn from the survey results is that the 
WPRS system plays a key role in the provision of reemployment ser-
vices and, in some sense, in enforcing the UI work test. Unfortunately, 
the decline in what was formerly the robust provision of WPRS reem-
ployment services makes the WPRS program a weak reed to lean on. If 
WPRS is little more than a group orientation and perhaps a brief group 
workshop in job search, UI beneficiaries will get little help in returning 
to work, and the UI system will receive little information about whether 
beneficiaries are actively seeking work. 
OThER USES OF TARgETINg EmPLOymENT SERVICES 
While the worker profiling aspect of WPRS is a targeting mecha-
nism to determine which workers receive the limited supply of employ-
ment services, similar mechanisms can be used to serve a variety of 
populations who are in need of reemployment services. The worker 
profiling mechanism itself is being used for the Self-Employment 
Assistance (SEA) program, which is also a part of the UI program. 
Studies have explored the potential uses of such targeting mecha-
nisms for other employment, training, and welfare programs. Targeting 
mechanisms have also been researched and adopted by other countries. 
The status of these targeting efforts is reviewed in the book Targeting 
Employment Services (Eberts, O’Leary, and Wandner 2002). 
Targeting mechanisms also can be used more systematically to help 






by sponsoring a Frontline Decision Support System (FDSS) demon-
stration project to help local One-Stop office staff provide workers 
with the best and most appropriate services among those available. The 
demonstration used labor market and demographic information about 
workers seeking jobs and then determined how to best match them with 
available jobs. If the workers could not find jobs immediately, FDSS 
could direct them to the services that would be most effective for each 
individual worker. The demonstration was conducted in the offices of 
the city of Athens and the counties of Cobb and Cherokee in the state 
of Georgia, but it was never implemented statewide (Eberts, O’Leary, 
and Wandner 2002). 
WORkER PROFILINg IN OThER COUNTRIES 
The United States was an innovator in targeting reemployment 
services through the WPRS system. Interest in this targeting approach 
increased in the mid-1990s. In 1996, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) convened a meeting of experts 
from countries either interested in worker profiling or currently using 
it. At that meeting, the United States and Australia reported on pro-
grams they had made fully operational. I reported on the WPRS sys-
tem. Canada reported on extensive research and developmental work it 
was doing to develop a sophisticated worker profiling approach (OECD 
1998). Ultimately, Canada did not implement its profiling approach, 
in part because much of the responsibility for workforce development 
programs devolved from the national to the provincial governments. 
The use of worker profiling spread to other industrial nations in the 
following decade. The European Union conducted a seminar on pro-
filing in 2005 at which 12 countries presented what they had learned 
about worker profiling (Rudolph and Konle-Seidl 2005). The partici-
pating countries used profiling for three conceptual functions: 
1) As a diagnostic tool 
2) To target the scope and type of reemployment assistance 
provided 
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Thus, a number of industrial nations, trying to get the right reem-
ployment services to the right workers, have adopted worker profil-
ing as a targeting mechanism (Table 4.8). Australia has changed its 
approach to profiling. Some countries have used variables (such as age, 
gender, and nationality) that are not used in the United States because 
of antidiscrimination statutes. The Danes, Swiss, and Germans have 
developed statistical tools to assign workers to reemployment services, 
and the Swiss have conducted an experiment to assess the acceptance 
and use of their model by frontline case workers (Frölich 2006; Staghoj, 
Svarer, and Rosholm 2007). 
The common goal of the industrialized nations using targeting 
mechanisms to provide workforce development services is to rational-
ize the provision of services. 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Implementation of the state WPRS systems has resulted in a coop-
erative and interdependent relationship between the UI, ES, and WIA
programs at the state and local levels. This interdependence and coop-
eration first developed over the period 1994–1996 with the inception of 
state and local One-Stop delivery systems and provided an added foun-
dation for One-Stop shops for dislocated workers. The UI program has 
become a gateway through which dislocated workers pass to receive 
reemployment services from the ES and WIA programs and other ser-
vice providers, including community colleges. 
The primary emphasis of the WPRS system initiative has been the 
early identification of dislocated workers and their referral to reemploy-
ment services, especially comprehensive job search assistance. But as 
both state and federal experiments and the early implementation of the 
WPRS system have shown, a small but significant portion of dislocated 
workers cannot find employment through reemployment services alone. 
Some of these workers are referred to voluntary retraining services. 
The future of the WPRS system depends on what state and local 
practitioners do to improve the system. Improving WPRS program 
outcomes depends on data gathering, data analysis, and application of 
improved methods of operation. States can also learn from each other. 
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Table 4.8  Uses of Profiling in Selected Industrial Nations 
Country Approach 
Australia In 2003, an “active participation” model replaced an earlier profiling 
approach. Job seekers are classified as at risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed (receive case management) or not (receive job search work-
shop after 3 months of unemployment and intensive customized assis-
tance after 12 months), using a Job Seeker Classification Instrument—a 
statistical diagnostic tool that assesses risk of long-term unemployment 
using 14 factors, including age, gender, work experience, and training. 
Denmark In 2004, Denmark introduced the “Job Barometer” for use by placement 
officers to standardize profiling across the country. The Barometer is a 
statistical model calculating the probability of one’s finding employ-
ment within the next six months based on customer account information. 
France Since 2001, job seekers are assigned to one of seven groups that deter-
mine the type of services that are provided to them. A GAPP profiling 
tool has been used to assign job seekers to one of these groups. 
Germany A classification tool uses individual data, including gender, age, and job 
experience, to assign jobless workers into four categories of need for 
reemployment services, from none to intensive: 1) none, 2) job search 
assistance, 3) vocational training, and 4) special attention for long-term 
unemployed. 
Hungary For the PHARE project, which assesses the risk of long-term unemploy-
ment, Hungary tested a statistical model for estimating the expected 
duration of unemployment, using variables that included gender, age, 
general and vocational educational attainment, last wages earned, and 
place of residence. 
Netherlands Beginning in 1999, a number of different approaches to profiling were 
developed and used or were under development to determine job seek-
ers’ job search readiness and to classify workers to determine what 
reemployment services they will receive. 
Switzerland A “Statistically Assisted Program Selection” tool identifies programs 
and reemployment services that have proved to be the most cost-effective 
for job seekers based on their characteristics. It was tested as a demon-
stration project in 16 regional agencies, and the results were compared 
to a control group. 
United For the “Job Search First” strategy, statistical models were tested to 
Kingdom estimate the probability of rapid reemployment and to model the most 
efficient forms of assistance for job seekers for use in “customer seg-
mentation” in the provision of reemployment services. 
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An early information exchange took place at the National WPRS Col-
loquium, held in June 1996 in Atlanta, Georgia. It was an opportunity 
for state, local, and federal officials to gather and exchange ideas about 
what works and what can be done to improve state WPRS systems to 
better serve dislocated workers in need of assistance in returning to 
productive employment. Celebrating the successful implementation of 
state WPRS systems, Secretary Robert Reich recorded a videotaped 
message for the colloquium participants: “Now, the old unemployment 
system was fine for its time, but it often failed to quickly deliver reem-
ployment services to workers in transition from old to new jobs,” Reich 
said. “Our new ‘reinvented’ unemployment insurance system uses 
worker profiling and reemployment services to both identify and retrain 
but also place in new jobs those workers who would otherwise face 
long-term unemployment. Dislocated workers can now get the services 
they need to find the jobs they want—and it works” (Reich 1996). 
The WPRS Colloquium included presentations that demonstrated 
the accomplishments states had made with regard to innovative design, 
development, and implementation of WPRS. It also offered a challenge 
to strengthen nascent partnerships in order for the ES, JTPA Dislocated 
Worker, and UI programs to better serve their common customers—dis-
located workers (Balducchi 1996). Such WPRS exchanges of informa-
tion should be renewed. 
State worker-profiling models need be updated regularly, and states 
should consider whether to respecify them. The seven states with char-
acteristic screening models should be encouraged to convert to statisti-
cal models, and Florida should be required to adopt an objective WPRS 
model. 
The WPRS system cannot be effective without the provision of 
comprehensive reemployment services and without adequate funding. 
Yet WIA Dislocated Worker and Employment Service real funding lev-
els declined markedly in the period after the enactment of WPRS. As 
a result, WPRS became “WPRS Lite”: few reemployment services are 
made available to most participants. 
WPRS cannot achieve the promise of the New Jersey and JSA
experiments unless reemployment services are more comprehensive 
and better funded. Funding to the ES must be increased, and the Reem-
ployment Services Grants must be resuscitated. Reemployment Ser-
vices Grants would need an estimated funding level of $200–$300 mil-
 
 







lion per year to provide adequate reemployment services to all of the 
dislocated workers who could benefit from them.34 
Any assessment of what the WPRS system could achieve in today’s 
economy would require a new demonstration project with strong, well-
funded treatments. Without a buildup in resources, an evaluation of the 
current WPRS system would simply show that a weak treatment results 
in weak net impacts. Instead, a new WPRS demonstration should be 
conducted, providing reemployment services that are at least as strong 
as those used in the New Jersey Experiment. Such a demonstration is 
likely to reveal the greater effectiveness of providing comprehensive 
reemployment services, compared to the very modest services that were 
being provided through 2008. 
Launching the WPRS system represented an innovative public pol-
icy approach. Implementation of the profiling component of the system 
reflects federal and state governments’ willingness to identify and select 
program participants using a new and sophisticated targeting tool. 
Worker profiling has become a unique and highly flexible method for 
selecting those participants most in need of reemployment assistance 
and for allocating scarce government resources. WPRS also represents 
a willingness to implement a new system based on research results 
when those results reveal that a particular reemployment intervention 
(i.e., comprehensive job search assistance) is both effective and efficient. 
The WPRS system also has broader potential than simply providing 
job search assistance for dislocated workers. Worker profiling is cur-
rently being used by states operating the SEA program, and it has been 
proposed for a reemployment bonus program. The profiling mechanism 
could be used for purposes other than for predicting who could make 
the best use of a dislocated worker program. For example, worker pro-
filing could be used by the Job Corps to assist in selecting participants. 
A very different profiling mechanism could be used to identify hard-
to-employ persons or former TANF recipients who also require reem-
ployment and career advancement services (O’Leary and Kline 2008). 
The challenge in upcoming years is to provide states with sufficient re-
sources to strengthen the WPRS system, expand targeting, and provide 
early intervention so that workers can quickly return to the labor market. 
The proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 was designed to pro-
vide reemployment services to all unemployed workers who needed 
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and other research about the effectiveness of reemployment services. 
The reauthorization of the WIA should again build from the bottom up, 
and appropriations should assure that sufficient resources are provided 
to dislocated worker programs, so that they can provide reemployment 
services to the workers who need them. 
Notes 
1. Section 4(a)(1) of Public Law 103-52. 
2. To require WPRS participation, Public Law 103-152 amends section 303(a) of 
the Social Security Act, adding a “requirement that, as a condition of eligibility 
for regular compensation for any week, any claimant who has been referred to 
reemployment services pursuant to the profiling system . . . participate in such 
services.” 
3. The WPRS system is designed to provide reemployment services to permanently 
separated workers who are likely to be unemployed for long periods while they 
search for new jobs. Workers who find their jobs exclusively through union hiring 
halls, e.g., longshoremen, are considered to be job-attached and not searching for 
new jobs but waiting to return to their old jobs. They are not eligible to participate 
in WPRS reemployment services. 
4. Benefit exhaustion takes place when claimants use up all of the potential duration 
of regular benefits to which they are entitled. In most states, potential duration 
varies among individuals according to their prior job attachment. The maximum 
potential duration is 26 weeks in all states except Massachusetts, where it may be 
as long as 30 weeks. 
5. For initial screening, most states use recall status and union hiring hall participa-
tion. For statistical models, most also use some form of education, industry, and a 
measure of local economic conditions. Tenure is used to a lesser extent, in some 
cases because it has a negligible effect, in others because of lack of availability 
of data. Occupation is the least reliable of the original data elements, and it is 
the least used. Among the new variables used in some states are measures of five 
variables: 1) delay in UI filing, 2) former earnings, 3) work search requirement, 
4) number of employers in the base period, and 5) potential duration of benefits. 
6. Prohibited variables and the effect of their omission are discussed in USDOL
(1994b), pp. 63, 151–152. Before the department completed the national worker 
profiling model, in the summer of 1993 I discussed the issue of prohibited vari-
ables with staff of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Justice Department lawyers made clear that although a variable such as age might 
be prohibited, using a variable such as job tenure that is correlated with age would 
not be prohibited. 
7. The screens used in the New Jersey experiment were the following five: 1) UI first 
payment receipt, 2) temporary layoff exclusion, 3) union hiring hall use, 4) age 25 
 

























or greater, and 5) tenure of three years or more with last employer. Most of these 
screens were ultimately used as variables in the WPRS profiling process. 
8. The national worker profiling model was developed from a CPS data set by Kelleen 
Worden Kaye during the summer of 1993 in anticipation of Maryland’s implemen-
tation of WPRS, which occurred during the winter of 1994. 
9. Papers presenting the results of two prototype profiling mechanisms—a national 
model and a Maryland state-specific model—are contained in USDOL (1994b). 
10. Scott Gibbons of the Office of Workforce Security, interview with the author, June 
22, 2006. 
11. Chuck Middlebrooks was the administrator of the Maryland employment security 
agency. He had previously worked on a temporary assignment at the USDOL
and had observed the development of the WPRS system. He initiated the WPRS 
program in Maryland. When the characteristics screening model was not working 
well, he called the department to ask for help in developing the statistical worker 
profiling model. 
12. Identification and referral are generally conducted subsequent to initial claims fil-
ing, on a weekly basis, in a batch mode on states’ mainframe or personal comput-
ers. The profiling mechanisms can either refer a specified number of UI claimants 
to reemployment services, or the service provider can select WPRS participants 
ranked in order of probability of exhaustion. The need to vary the flow of referrals 
is related to those factors that may influence the resources available to provide 
reemployment services, including the following four: 1) statewide resource avail-
ability, both annual and seasonal; 2) local resource variability within a state; 3) 
business cycle variation in the demand for services; and 4) competing needs for 
resources by other employment and training programs and other (nondislocated 
worker) populations. 
13. WPRS group services such as job search workshops or job clubs may have slots 
available for unemployed workers not participating in the WPRS system. These 
workers may have been selected through other methods, e.g., dislocated workers 
selected by rapid response efforts at the plant site prior to layoff. They may also 
represent other populations, e.g, walk-ins to the One-Stop centers under its open-
access eligibility, or veterans who receive preferential access to some reemploy-
ment services but not under the WPRS system. 
14. Mary Ann Wyrsch, interview with the author, July 29, 2008. 
15. The establishment of the name of the WPRS system reflects concern that it be 
seen as a part of the entire employment and training system. In the postenactment 
period, ETA staff referred to the emerging system as “UI profiling,” and early ETA
field guidance uses this terminology. During the drafting of the March 1994 oper-
ating instructions, David Balducchi of the ES suggested to Jon Messenger of UI that 
there appeared to be staff resistance to mounting the cross-cutting effort required 
to implement a nationwide system. Many ETA staff believed that they were imple-
menting another UI-type program and did not yet see how other program services 
fit into the overall design. Balducchi said that you don’t profile UI, you profile 
workers; therefore, by changing the name of the emerging system, perhaps ETA
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proposal to me. Capitol Hill staffers provided similar feedback, not completely 
understanding that the UI profiling system would require coordination and support 
from the ES labor exchange and JTPA (Job Training Partnership Act) training ser-
vice providers. At the same time Messenger suggested that ETA include the word 
“system” to describe the process. I agreed with both changes, and henceforth the 
name associated with the profiling system has been known as the Worker Profil-
ing and Reemployment Services system. David Balducchi, interview and written 
materials provided to the author, July 31, 2008. 
16. When WPRS was enacted, the JTPA Dislocated Worker Program was the principal 
dislocated worker program in the United States. Since the enactment of the Work-
force Investment Act in 1998, the WIA Dislocated Worker program has taken its 
place. It has traditionally recruited participants through either 1) early outreach 
(“rapid response”) to workers experiencing mass layoffs/plant shutdowns, or 2) 
walk-ins to local intake centers. The Employment Service serves all employed and 
unemployed workers, including dislocated workers. Both programs now supple-
ment their recruitment of program participants with WPRS referral and are active 
participants in the overall WPRS system. For the WIA Dislocated Worker pro-
gram, most but not necessarily all WPRS-referred workers are eligible for WIA
Dislocated Worker services. 
17. The Basic Understandings Workgroup was a subgroup of the overall Workforce 
Security Team, a group formed to draft legislative specifications for the admin-
istration’s workforce reform bill. The U.S. Employment Service (USES) coordi-
nated activities of the work group, and members included David Balducchi, Brian 
Deaton, Ingrid Evans, Eric Johnson, Wayne Zajac, and me. In the development 
of subsequent WPRS field guidance, ETA staff participation expanded to include 
Maurice Birch, Kitty Fenstermaker, Jon Messenger, and Richard Puerzer. 
18. One final point of contention was how to classify “orientation.” The question 
became, “Was an orientation a reemployment service and therefore to be counted 
as meeting the states’ minimal provision of service requirements, or was it part of 
a standardized WPRS process?” By a narrow decision, it was held that an orienta-
tion would be classified as a reemployment service. In retrospect, this decision 
was wrong: an orientation provides basic information, but it does not provide 
reemployment services that help a UI claimant return to work. An orientation 
can count as a WPRS activity, and orientations should be provided as a standard 
practice, but states should subsequently provide at least one or more reemploy-
ment services. David Balducchi, interview and written materials provided to the 
author, July 31, 2008. 
19. Wyrsch, January 4, 1994, memorandum to Jim Van Erden, Grace Kilbane, Robert 
Schaerfl, and Sue Schlickeisen titled “Basic Understandings, December 17, 1993.” 
20. David E. Balducchi, interview with the author and written materials provided to 
the author, July 31, 2008. 
21. Issuances of field memorandums then and now were instructions to the Employ-
ment and Training Administration’s regional offices. However, to expedite the dis-
semination of FM 35-94, Assistant Secretary Doug Ross took the unprecedented 
step of sending it directly from Washington, D.C., to the state employment security 
  
  









    
 
    
    
    
    










agencies and the state JTPA coordinators, in addition to the regional offices. This 
is the single known instance of such dissemination of a field memorandum, dem-
onstrating the importance to ETA of WPRS implementation. 
22. The primary field guidance was Field Memorandum 35-94, issued in March 1994.
This and other guidance discussed in this section are reproduced in USDOL (1994b). 
23. In USDOL (1994b), see “Unemployment Insurance Program Requirements for the 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services System,” UI Program Letter 41-94, 
August 16, 1994. 
24. The supplements to Field Memorandum 35-94 were issued as Change 1, dated 
May 2, 1994; Change 2, dated June 9, 1994; and Change 3, dated July 31, 1996.
Field Memorandum 50-95 contained the “Assessment/Review of State Implemen-
tation of Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services,” dated July 19, 1995. 
25. These early WPRS program results are for the period October 1995 through June 
1996, when the WPRS system became fully operational. 
26. In Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, and New Jersey, WPRS had the expected impact 
on UI durations, reducing the receipt of UI benefits by between one-quarter week 
and one full week, and reducing the receipt of UI benefits by $62, to $140. In Ken-
tucky and South Carolina, the results for UI effects were mixed or without impact.
The study found little evidence that WPRS increased employment or earnings for 
referred claimants; the main effect of WPRS was the reduction of duration of com-
pensation. More recently, a single state evaluation of WPRS in the state of Ken-
tucky has shown that WPRS reduces the duration of unemployment by more than 
two weeks (Black, Smith, Berger, et al. 2003). 
27. Because of rescissions, the Reemployment Service Grant funding levels were re-






FY 2005 $34,290,000 
28. Balducchi, interview and written materials. 
29. Orientation is considered to be a service under WPRS, but it consists of an intro-
duction to WPRS and an overview of available services rather than constituting 
a true reemployment service. Job search assistance provides instruction in job 
search skills. It may consist of a variety of components including resume writing, 
methods of searching for jobs, and interviewing techniques. 
30. An analysis of data for 1998 shows that only 12 states recorded fewer referrals 
than they reported, and three states—New Jersey, North Carolina, and Texas— 
accounted for most of the national difference. By 2007, only four states showed 
reporting greater than referrals, and the differences were small. 
31. Referral to the Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) program is also a WPRS ser-
vice, but referrals can only be made in the seven states with active SEA programs.
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32. Reemployment services increased sharply in 2009, as state workforce agencies 
responded quickly to an infusion of $250 million in Reemployment Services 
Grants made available in early 2009. 
33. “Received Some Reportable Service” is defined as “all applicants that have 
received some reportable service during the program year. Services include: refer-
ral to job; job placement; placement in training; obtaining employment; assess-
ment services, including an assessment interview; testing; counseling and employ-
ability planning; case management services; vocational guidance services; job 
search activities, including resume assistance; job search workshops; job finding 
clubs; specific labor market information and job search planning; federal bonding 
program; job development contacts; tax credit eligibility determination; referral 
to other services, including skills training, educational services, and supportive 
services; and any other services requiring expenditure of staff time although not 
required to be reported. Application-taking and registration are not included as a 
reportable service” (ETA Handbook No. 406, ETA 9002 Data Preparation Hand-
book, March 1993, III-13, III-14). “Job search activities” are defined as follows: 
“All applicants provide services which are designed to help the job seeker plan and 
carry out a successful job hunt strategy. The services include resume preparation 
assistance, job search workshops, job-finding clubs, provision of specific labor 
market information, and development of a job search plan” (ETA Handbook No. 
406, ETA 9002 Data Preparation Handbook, March 1993, III-11).   
34. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5), enacted on February 
17, 2009, appropriated $400 million for additional Wagner-Peyser Act services, 
of which $250 million was targeted exclusively for reemployment services to UI 
claimants. Funding could be expended over a two-and-a-half-year period ending 






Reemployment Services Research 
Job Referrals, Job Search Assistance, and 
the Unemployment Insurance Work Test 
INTRODUCTION
A great deal of research other than the Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) Experiments has provided guidance for employment and training 
programs since the 1990s. This chapter reviews the results of a selec-
tion of research, demonstrations, and evaluations that have studied the 
effectiveness of job search assistance (JSA) and other forms of reem-
ployment services provided to adult American workers by USDOL-
sponsored One-Stop Career Centers. It reviews the evaluations of the 
services that have been provided separately and in service sets and 
assesses what these past studies mean for the workforce development 
system of today. The chapter puts particular emphasis on a number of 
research and evaluation projects that were completed during the Bush 
II administration and were suppressed for a number of years, until the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) compelled the department 
to release them during the summer of 2008. The overarching finding is 
that the major forms of reemployment services and administrative pro-
cedures—job search assistance, enhancing the UI work test, and refer-
rals to job openings—are cost-effective separately and gain synergy 
when offered jointly. 
Many workers need the reemployment services—core and inten-
sive services in Workforce Investment Act (WIA) terminology—pro-
vided by the One-Stop centers. Whether workers who receive services 
are classified as adults or dislocated workers under the WIA programs, 
increasing numbers of them seek help when they become unemployed 
and permanently separated from their previous jobs. Demand for the 






tion of layoffs that are permanent rather than temporary, resulting in an 
increase in worker dislocation (Groshen and Potter 2003); and 2) the 
hard-to-employ are more likely now to have been previously employed 
than they were in the past. Indeed, welfare reform has increased the 
likelihood that former welfare recipients—who make up a significant 
portion of WIA Adult program participants—either have previously 
been employed and are applying for UI benefits, or are seeking reem-
ployment services after becoming unemployed (O’Leary and Kline 
2008). 
Core and intensive services provided as Wagner-Peyser Act 
employment services are what most customers receive when they come 
to a One-Stop center. The One-Stops generally serve 13 to 20 million 
workers each year, whereas the current and planned capacity for pro-
viding occupational and on-the-job training is a few hundred thousand 
per year. Yet the Bush administration’s 2006 proposal to create train-
ing vouchers (Career Advancement Accounts, or CAAs) for fewer than 
600,000 workers would have absorbed most of the funds available to 
run the One-Stop centers and to provide reemployment services. The 
result would have been a crippling of the ability of department-funded 
programs to continue to provide reemployment services to the millions 
of other job seekers who come to the One-Stops for help in finding jobs. 
Reemployment services discussed below are divided into three 
categories: 1) job search assistance, 2) an enhanced work test, and 3) 
referrals to job openings. Helping workers return to work can be done 
either by providing referrals to job openings or by training those work-
ers to use the tools to search for work themselves. Providing job search 
assistance can include assessment, testing, counseling, job search work-
shops or job clubs, and follow-up activities. 
One long-standing intervention to increase the exposure of claim-
ants to the labor market is an enhanced work test that generally includes 
a staff-assisted review of eligibility and efforts to search for work, as 
well as the referral to employment services. In the past this enhanced 
work test has been part of a department-funded Eligibility Review Pro-
gram (ERP). Most states ceased operating these programs in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
In a change of policy, the department once again recognized the 
importance of putting more resources into the UI work test. Starting 
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and Eligibility Assessment (REA) initiative,1 and in July 2009, 16 addi-
tional states received REA grants. REAs essentially are an enhanced 
UI work test. The effort to strengthen the work test continued in each 
succeeding year under the Bush administration, despite budget reduc-
tions for employment and training services. The REA initiative is a 
reinvigoration of the Eligibility Review Program (ERP), which was an 
important tool for enforcing the UI work test while providing refer-
rals for limited reemployment assistance.2 From a budgetary perspec-
tive, reviewing the continuing eligibility of UI claimants can be a cost-
effective treatment (Benus, Poe-Yamagata, et al. 2008). Unfortunately, 
however, REAs have not been provided in conjunction with reemploy-
ment services because the department deemphasized and tried to elimi-
nate the provision of reemployment services during the Bush years. 
An enhanced work test generally consists of an interview to ensure 
that UI claimants are able, available, and actively seeking work. In 
demonstration projects, it also included increasing the number of work 
searches that are required to be made each week or adding verification 
of some number of work searches. In the process of enhancing the UI 
work test, UI claimants frequently also receive information and reem-
ployment assistance that aids in their search for work.
RESEARCh ABOUT REEmPLOymENT SERVICES
Overview 
Research regarding reemployment services for adult unemployed 
workers has been of interest to the state workforce agencies, the depart-
ment, and private researchers. Most of the research conducted in this 
area has been funded by the department, but states and private research-
ers have also played an important role. This section reviews some of 
the more rigorous research that has been undertaken in the last three 
decades, with particular emphasis on more recent research. 
The department has been looking at the effectiveness of reemploy-
ment services for many decades. Researchers have searched for some 
combination of cost-effective services that would include referral to job 








tion projects searched for such a cost-effective service mix and will be 
discussed in this chapter. Some states also have had an interest in test-
ing what is effective in helping workers become reemployed and have 
been willing to commit their own resources and initiate programs based 
on the evaluation results. Those results will also be examined. 
Providing the basic components of job search assistance—orienta-
tion, testing, job search workshops, an individual assessment interview, 
and follow-up contacts—has been shown to be cost-effective when par-
ticipation in the package of services was made mandatory. Providing 
services through an individual service plan—tailoring job search assis-
tance to the individual—also can be cost-effective if it is rigorously 
administered. 
While it did provide job search assistance, the JSA Experiment 
revealed that more was happening than merely the provision of the 
demonstration services. In addition to the provision of services, the 
demonstration collected information that was used by local office 
staff to provide the UI system with information used to enforce the UI 
work test. Work test enforcement resulted in nonmonetary determina-
tions relating to claimants’ continuing eligibility, some of which in turn 
resulted in the denial of UI benefits. The more rigorous enforcement of 
the UI work test thus contributed to a reduction in compensated dura-
tion of UI benefits. Finally, some UI claimants who received JSA ser-
vices also received job referrals to employers with job openings, and 
these job referrals had a small but contributing effect of speeding the 
return to work of UI claimants. This section deals with other research 
that assesses the effectiveness of JSA, the UI work test, and efforts to 
place UI claimants. 
Reemployment Services: Job Search Assistance, the UI Work Test, 
and Referral to Jobs 
Previous chapters have looked at the results of evaluations of two 
UI Experiments that provided reemployment services—the New Jersey 
and JSA experiments. The analysis below divides reemployment ser-
vices into three components: 1) job search assistance, 2) public labor-
exchange referral of workers to jobs, and 3) administration of the UI 
work test (O’Leary and Wandner 2005; O’Leary 2006). Many of the 
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Service-to-Claimants Projects 
These projects were the first departmental effort to use social sci-
ence experimental methods to demonstrate the effects of employing a 
more systematic UI work test and adding job search assistance to the 
periodic interviews that preceded the Eligibility Review Program, ini-
tiated in December 1976. A Five Cities Service-to-Claimants Project 
operated during 1969–1970. The Service-to-Claimants Project in St. 
Louis, Missouri, followed in 1971–1973. Both projects refined the ap-
proach to applying the UI work test, but they also included a program 
of systematic job search assistance, working through the local Wagner-
Peyser Act Employment Service (ES) agency. While these projects 
were not able to demonstrate conclusively the effectiveness of either 
the UI work test or the provision of systematic job search assistance 
(Austermann, Crosslin, and Stevens 1975; Stevens 1974), they were 
pioneering studies that prompted further research in the 1980s. 
Nevada Claimant Employment Projects 
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, two different state-funded projects 
sought to find better ways to help return UI claimants to work. They 
were conducted under the guidance of the Nevada employment secu-
rity research director, James Hanna. The project treatments—includ-
ing referrals to job openings and training, eligibility reviews, and job 
search assistance— successfully reduced the length of workers’ periods 
of unemployment by having a UI and ES team provide more intensive 
reemployment services to UI claimants. 
In the second study, the Nevada employment security agency in 
1987 budgeted $400,000 from its UI penalty and interest fund to insti-
tute a pilot effort, the Claimant Employment Project (CEP). The proj-
ect used random assignment. During the 12 months of operation (July 
1988–June 1989), 1,424 treatment group members received services 
early in their spells of unemployment. Of the treatment group mem-
bers, 1,294 received a combination of concentrated ES and UI services. 
Nearly all treatment group members received ES job referrals, over half 
completed a UI eligibility review, and a small number participated in 
job search workshops. As an early intervention project, it stipulated 
that participating claimants could not enter the program more than four 
weeks into their UI benefit year, but project services were available 
 
158   
Table 5.1  Selected Reemployment Services Research, Demonstrations, and Evaluations 
Services provided 
Job search Public labor 
Project Dates Sponsor assistance exchange UI work test 
Reemployment Service and UI work test studies 
Service to Claimants Project 1969–73 USDOL Yes No Yes 
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test 1983 USDOL Yes Yes Yes 
Demonstration 
Washington Alternative Work Search Demonstration 1986–87 WA Yes No Yes 
Nevada Claimant Employment Project 1988–89 NV Yes Yes Yes 
Reemploy Minnesota 1988–89 MN Yes Yes Yes 
Maryland UI Work Search Demo 1994–95 USDOL No No Yes 
Vroman and Woodbury 2004 USDOL Yes Yes Yes 
Wisconsin Reemployment Connections Project 2004–06 USDOL Yes Yes Yes 
Kentucky WPRS Evaluation 1994–96 KY Yes No Yes 
National WPRS Evaluation 1996–97 USDOL Yes No Yes 
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessments 2005–06 USDOL Yes Yes Yes 
Restart Evaluation 1986 UK Yes No Yes 
Restart Experiment 1996 UK Yes No Yes 
U.S. Employment Service Evaluations 
Public Labor Exchange (PLX) Evaluation—1983 1980–82 USDOL No Yes No 
PLX Evaluation—Washington and Oregon 1997–98 USDOL No Yes No 
National PLX Evaluation 1998–2004 USDOL No Yes No 
NOTE: Dates refer to the times during which demonstration projects or studies were conducted or when evaluations were completed and 
published. 
SOURCE: Studies referred to in this chapter. 
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to a broad UI population and not restricted to permanently separated 
workers. 
For the 1,294 claimants receiving these concentrated services, their 
compensated unemployment duration was reduced by 2.1 weeks, and 
savings to the Nevada UI trust fund account was estimated at $409,500. 
Nevada research staff estimated that the benefit-cost ratio for these 
claimants was 2.39, indicating a $2.39 reduction in UI expenditures 
for every dollar expended on this activity (USDOL 1990, pp. 150–163; 
USDOL 1995b). 
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration 
This USDOL-funded study was conducted in South Carolina with 
approximately 6,000 UI claimants, who were randomly assigned to 
three treatment groups and a control group. During 1983, the services 
received by the treatment groups consisted of the following: a “tight-
ened and regularized” UI work test; special employment services con-
sisting of a placement interview, job referrals, and job development; and 
a job search workshop after four weeks of unemployment. Under the 
UI work test, treatment registration was delayed until one week after 
claimants had received a first payment, but then there was a computer 
check of UI claimants (whose records were stored in the South Carolina 
ES registration file) who had been called in to register for work. UI 
benefits were terminated for claimants who had not registered, with ben-
efits resumption depending on the outcome of a fact-finding interview 
regarding continuing, nonmonetary eligibility. The treatment resulted 
in reductions in UI-compensated durations of between 0.55 and 0.76 
weeks. 
All three treatments were found to be highly cost-effective, with 
treatment costs of less than $20 per participant and reductions in UI 
benefits paid of between $40 and $60. The overall conclusion was that 
the most effective service was the enhancement of the UI work test, 
although the offer of job placement activities also substantially increased 
the percentage of UI claimants placed. For the treatment receiving an 
enhanced work test and job placement services, long-term placements 
increased by nearly 75 percent compared to the control group: 11.2 per-
cent of that treatment group received long-term placements, as opposed 










Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment 
This experiment was sponsored by Washington State and conducted 
in Tacoma, Washington, in 1986 and 1987. Over 10,000 new UI claim-
ants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups. The experiment 
tested the effects of changing the required number of employer con-
tacts per week. The current services treatment required three employer 
contacts per week. The experiment’s three treatments did three things:
1) eliminated the requirement to report any employer contacts, 2) varied 
the number of contacts by claimant characteristics and increased the 
number of contacts over time, and 3) retained the number of employer 
contacts but added reemployment services early in claimants’ spells 
of unemployment. The first treatment was a dramatic departure from 
existing procedures: it eliminated the requirement to submit continued 
claims forms as well as to report employer contacts, and it authorized 
payments without claimants’ needing to submit these claims forms 
until they reported a change of status. This treatment created a substan-
tial moral hazard issue: workers might continue to receive UI benefits 
after they had returned to work or had stopped searching for work. It 
greatly increased the spell of compensated unemployment—by 3.34 
weeks (Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994). This treatment dramati-
cally showed the importance of the continued claims process and the 
enforcement of the UI work test for maintaining the integrity of the UI 
system. 
The Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment also evalu-
ated job search assistance. It found that unemployment duration was 
reduced for those referred to JSA. However, because in most cases UI 
benefit receipt ended just before JSA was scheduled, the authors con-
cluded that the shorter durations primarily resulted from an effort to 
avoid the hassle of job search assistance sessions rather than as a result 
of the content of its services (Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994). 
Reemploy minnesota Project (REm) 
This project tested the effectiveness of providing intensive job 
search assistance based substantially on the design of the job search 
assistance component of the New Jersey Experiment. The state employ-
ment security agency budgeted $780,000 from its UI penalty and inter-
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it again in 1989 because of the success of the first year of operation. 
REM assigned UI claimants to treatment and control groups, using 
random assignment methods. REM case managers worked one-on-one 
with a workload of 40 REM participants at a time. The REM partici-
pants accomplished the following: they developed a written employ-
ability plan, attended a video-based job-seeking skills seminar, were 
matched either with job orders from employers or with job orders that 
were developed for them based on their work history and requirements, 
and received follow-up services if they remained unemployed. 
For the first 12 months of operation, Minnesota research staff calcu-
lated that average claimant duration of unemployment had been reduced 
by 4.08 weeks, or by about 25 percent, and that savings generated by 
the reduction in claimant duration had yielded a benefit-cost ratio to the 
state of Minnesota of nearly 2.0. These large effects appear to be related 
to the personalized and intensive manner in which the reemployment 
services were provided (USDOL 1990, pp. 68–73; USDOL 1995b, p. 
49). 
Pennsylvania Dislocated Worker Study 
A study of dislocated workers in Pennsylvania examined the effec-
tiveness of providing job search assistance and referrals to job openings 
by the public employment service. It found that JSA was most effective 
if it was provided early in a spell of joblessness. It also found that job 
referrals to employers were more likely to result in placement after job 
seekers had exhausted other avenues of search (Katz 1991). This study 
supports the early provision of JSA to dislocated workers, an approach 
enacted into federal law two years after the study’s publication as the 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services program. 
maryland UI Work Search Demonstration 
This demonstration examined alternative approaches to assisting 
the worker search process for UI recipients. Over 27,000 UI claimants 
were referred to four treatment groups and a control group. Random 
assignment occurred between January 1994 and January 1995. Treat-
ments consisted of four approaches: 1) retaining the requirement of two 
work-search contacts per week and adding a job search workshop, 2) 




3) supplementing the normal work-search requirement with verifica-
tion of 10 percent of employer contacts, and 4) not requiring claimants 
to document their employer contacts. The demonstration was able to 
show that changing the work-search requirement alone produced a sig-
nificant effect, reducing the amount of UI benefits paid and the weeks 
compensated. 
The increase in required work-search contacts from two to four per 
week reduced UI benefits paid by $116 and weeks paid by 0.7 weeks— 
a reduction in each measure of about 6 percent (Table 5.2). Retaining 
two contacts per week but informing claimants about the introduction 
of employer contact verification resulted in the reduction of UI ben-
efits paid in the amount of $113 and weeks paid by a duration of 0.9 
weeks—an 8 percent reduction for each. Requiring participation in a 
four-day job search workshop was also found to be effective in reduc-
ing UI outlays: relative to the normal UI work-search policy, offering 
the job search workshop resulted in reduced weeks paid of 0.6 weeks, 
and in reduced UI payments per claimant of $75 (Klepinger et al. 1998). 
McVicar (2008) confirms the finding of the Maryland UI Work 
Search Demonstration regarding not requiring claimants to document 
their employer contacts. Between 2001 and 2008, local UI offices in 
Northern Ireland experienced interruptions in some of the usual bi-
weekly “job search monitoring interviews.” Because these interviews 
were halted for approximately eight months and resumed thereafter, 
they could be studied as a natural experiment. Whereas in Maryland 
halting monitoring of employer contacts increased UI claimant dura-
tions by 10 percent, in Northern Ireland average claimant duration 
Table 5.2  maryland Work Search Demonstration Treatment Impacts on 
UI Receipt, Full Benefit year 
No Job Control 
Additional reporting search Verify group 
Outcome measures contacts of contacts workshop contacts means 
Total UI benefits paid ($) −116** 34 −75** −113** 2,085 
No. of weeks of benefits −0.7** 0.4*** −0.6** −0.9** 11.9 
% exhausted benefits −2.6** 1.6*** −1.1 −3.0** 28.3 
NOTE: ** significantly different from control group at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); 
*** significantly different from control group at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
SOURCE: Klepinger et al. (1998). 
         
         





Reemployment Services Research 163 
increased 16 percent. Agreeing with Klepinger, Johnson, and Joesch 
(2002), McVicar concludes that “periods of suspension of job search 
monitoring led to significantly lower exit rates from registered unem-
ployment and increased average claim duration. In short . . . monitoring 
matters” (p. 24). 
United kingdom Restart Evaluation 
In the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1980s, UI was administered by 
that nation’s public employment service (PES) and had a uniform ini-
tial entitlement duration of 12 months. In 1987, a new program called 
Restart was introduced nationally. Under Restart, UI beneficiaries 
nearing six continuous months of benefit receipt were called in for an 
appointment at their local PES office and were provided an intensive 
package of job search assistance. A program evaluation by Dolton and 
O’Neill (1996) estimated the short-term effects of the UK’s Restart pro-
gram to be similar to those observed by Johnson and Klepinger (1994) 
in the Washington Alternative Work-Search Experiment. Both evalua-
tions suggested that there was a modest shortening in the duration of 
compensated unemployment and that the invitation for comprehensive 
job search assistance acted more as a spur to leave UI than as a support 
for reemployment. The Restart effort led to the introduction of further 
programs to increase the work focus of benefits, including the New 
Deal for Young People, the New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed, and 
the New Deal for the Disabled, each of which provides enhanced reem-
ployment interventions. 
United kingdom Restart Experiment 
Dolton and O’Neill (2002) conducted a subsequent random assign-
ment field experiment to determine what the effect would be of accel-
erating the offer of Restart services. In the experiment, the treatment 
group received the standard Restart comprehensive job search assis-
tance services when nearing six continuous months of claiming UI, 
while the randomly selected control group was given the Restart ser-
vices at the current services timing—when approaching 12 continuous 
months of receiving UI benefits. In the short run, their evaluation found 
that requiring participation in job search assistance spurred both groups 








up period, however, the treatment group getting job search assistance 
support earlier in their jobless spell had measurably higher earnings. 
The fact that this study—and others—found a long-term earnings effect 
indicates that providing job search assistance can have a positive and 
long-term impact for UI claimants, over and above the impact of better 
enforcement of the UI work test. 
National Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Services (WPRS) Evaluation 
This evaluation (Dickinson et al. 1999) assessed the effect of the 
nationwide implementation of a program of reemployment services 
for dislocated UI claimants that was mandated in 1993 legislation. The 
evaluation assessed the period 1996–1997, immediately following the 
program implementation deadline of mid-1996 for all states. The evalu-
ation included surveys of state agencies in both 1996 and 1997. A net 
impact analysis was conducted in six states: Connecticut, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Maine, New Jersey, and South Carolina, using a quasiexperi-
mental approach and selecting a comparison group from claimants who 
filed their initial claims in the same period and who were subject to 
referral to WPRS but who were not referred. The evaluation of WPRS 
indicated shorter jobless durations for program participants, with signif-
icant duration reductions of 0.2 to 1.0 weeks in five of the six states. The 
research found that state WPRS implementation was uneven, and that 
providing reemployment services was less comprehensive than under 
the New Jersey and Job Search Assistance experiments. Funding for 
reemployment services was limited. As the New Jersey and JSA experi-
ments showed, these modest results are not surprising for programs 
providing much weaker job search assistance treatments at much lower 
cost than the treatments provided by the two original experiments. 
kentucky Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Services Evaluation
This evaluation made use of an experimental design based on ran-
dom assignment methods that were built into the procedure by which 
UI claimants were referred to WPRS in the state of Kentucky. The eval-
uation examined a number of different WPRS impacts. It found that the 
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the control group. The treatment group members also received $143 
less in UI benefits and earned an average of $1,054 more in the year 
after the start of their UI claim. The evaluators asserted that the larger 
reductions in benefit receipt in Kentucky compared to the Dickinson et 
al. (1999) study discussed above were due to the more comprehensive 
employment and training services offered in Kentucky. They also con-
cluded that early increases in earnings by treatment group members are 
more closely related to the rigorous enforcement of the UI work test 
than to the provision of reemployment services (Black et al. 2003). 
They concluded that providing reemployment services in Kentucky 
had little impact, which is likely attributable in large part to the fact that 
Kentucky provided fewer reemployment services as a part of its WPRS 
system than most other states during the study period of 1994–1996, 
and that Kentucky was providing far fewer services than were provided 
in the New Jersey and JSA experiments. Kentucky was one of the par-
ticipating states in the national WPRS evaluation that was conducted 
for UI claimants filing for benefits in 1995 and 1996—the same time as 
the Black et al. (2003) study. The national WPRS evaluation found that 
Kentucky only provided five to nine hours of local services, consider-
ably less than most of the other participating states (Dickinson et al. 
1999, p. I-8). 
The Kentucky evaluation carried the title, “Is the Threat of Reem-
ployment Services More Effective than the Services Themselves?” 
The answer to that question is that the impact of an enhanced UI work 
test—i.e., the “threat of services”—indeed was probably greater than 
the reemployment services themselves, but this likely was due, in part, 
to Kentucky’s providing only a minimal set of services. 
Eight-State WIA Implementation Study
This study (Barnow and King 2005) was conducted by a Rock-
efeller Institute for Government team of researchers using field network 
techniques. The study found that in all eight states the state agencies 
responsible for Wagner-Peyser Act ES funds played a major role in the 
provision of core services. In addition, Barnow and King found that at 
most One-Stops some additional core services were provided either by 
the One-Stop operator or by a WIA Title I contractor. They observed 
that states with more “comprehensive workforce policy frameworks,” 





providing intensive services and training, leaving core services to be 
provided by the ES and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF)-funded employment services. The more traditional program-
based states, such as Maryland and Missouri, had their One-Stop cen-
ters place a greater emphasis on providing core services in the overall 
mix of reemployment services provided.3 
historical Analysis of UI and the Employment Service 
Earlier studies have shown that a stronger work test can be imposed 
either as part of the ongoing administration of the UI program or in 
conjunction with the mandatory participation in job search assistance, 
such as provided by the WPRS system. Historically, all states operated 
Eligibility Review Programs as part of their determination of continued 
eligibility of UI claimants, but use declined over time. Claimants have 
reported for eligibility reviews at specified intervals for an assessment 
of their continuing eligibility and efforts to search for work. Some state 
workforce agencies, mainly in the Southern states, continue to oper-
ate ERP programs, and the substance of the eligibility review effort 
has been resurrected as the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment 
(REA) initiative. 
The impact of enforcement of the UI work test is also revealed from 
analyzing the aggregate UI reporting data for the individual states. 
In their analysis of trends and cycles in UI and ES data, Vroman and 
Woodbury (2004) look into the factors that contribute to the duration 
of UI benefits. Comparing states, they find that states with established 
eligibility review programs have shorter durations of compensated 
employment.4 This analysis supports similar findings from experimen-
tal data that individual UI claimants subject to an enhanced work test 
also experience shorter UI durations than members of a control group 
that does not receive these services. 
Workforce Development Services in Rural Areas 
An important workforce development issue is the geographic avail-
ability of reemployment services throughout the United States. The 
emphasis of WIA policy on comprehensive One-Stops, which have 
many participating service providers, puts nonurban areas with low 
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services. A study by Dunham et al. (2005), completed in 2005 but not 
released until 2008, analyzes the historical changes that have occurred 
in access to services, the nature of the service delivery system, and the 
programmatic partnerships that were forged in workforce development 
programs during the 25 years between 1979 and 2004. The study was 
based on field research in five states (Georgia, Iowa, New Mexico, Ore-
gon, and Pennsylvania) and a quantitative geospatial analysis of the 
distribution of local offices in three years: 1979, 1999, and 2004. The 
study found that there are three types of permanent, staff-assisted access 
points to reemployment services under WIA and the Wagner-Peyser Act 
programs in rural areas: 1) comprehensive, 2) affiliates, and 3) satellite 
offices. Rural areas had all three types of offices, but to the extent that 
funds were available, rural areas concentrated more of their resources 
on replacing affiliate offices with comprehensive offices, both because 
of federal policy and because they appeared to be more efficient. 
Of the five field research states, only one experienced an increase 
in access points to reemployment services, and that was due to the 
introduction of nontraditional access points in the form of libraries and 
churches. In the rural areas of the other four states, the number of access 
points declined and largely consisted of renovated Employment Ser-
vice offices that served as affiliated One-Stop centers. To the extent that 
new One-Stop access points developed, they have tended to be compre-
hensive One-Stops, and they have resulted in a decline in the number 
of total access points. More recently, both comprehensive and affiliate 
One-Stop offices have declined in number as states have closed local 
offices in response to declining WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act program 
funding. 
Nationally the number of access points declined from 1979 to 1999 
and then increased by 2004, both for the country as a whole and in 
nonmetropolitan areas. The national decline between 1979 and 1999 
was by almost a thousand, or by 28 percent, but the number sharply 
increased in the next five years, more than compensating for the prior 
decline (Table 5.3). 
Despite the small increase in total access points between 1979 and 
2004, there were large shifts in the number in almost all states, with 
positive or negative changes of 10 percent or more in all but three states. 
Twenty-six states experienced gains of 10 percent or more, while 23 









Table 5.3  State Workforce Agency Access Points in 1979, 1999, 2004, and 
2008—Total, and by Rural and metro Areas 
1979 1999 2004 2008 
Change in number 
of access points from 
1979 to 2004 (%) 
National 3,454 2,505 3,542 2,950 2.5 
Rural 1,472 1,113 1,605 11.2 
Metro 1,982 1,392 1,937 −2.3 
SOURCE: Dunham et al. (2005); and America’s Service Locator (www.servicelocator
.org), December 31, 2008. 
tion growth—the South and the Mountain West—while the losses were 
highly concentrated in Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states. 
The national losses between 1979 and 1999 were attributed to the 
sharp decline in workforce development funds available per worker 
between the late 1970s and today, as well as the decline in UI-only 
access points because of telephone and Internet UI claims-taking. The 
increase in access points from 1999 to 2004 is attributable to devel-
opments under the WIA program, including the development of sat-
ellite offices and computer-only, unstaffed access points. Satellite and 
unstaffed access points can provide limited services that would not 
otherwise be available in many nonurban areas. Satellite offices were 
found to be very small (about 400 square feet) and located in the offices 
of a host entity, such as the local chamber of commerce; they tended to 
be open part-time, staffed by one person, and offered limited services. 
Computer-only access points frequently consist of one computer located
at a host entity. Host entities may include One-Stop partners, such as 
welfare (i.e., TANF) agencies, vocational rehabilitation offices, post-
secondary institutions, chambers of commerce, libraries, and churches. 
Rural areas experienced an increase in comprehensive One-Stops 
between 1999 and 2004 because of the WIA mandate that there be at 
least one comprehensive center in each local workforce area. Because 
of limited resources, each new comprehensive One-Stop has generally 
been offset by the closure of one or more smaller affiliate One-Stops. 
The affiliate One-Stops, however, perform an important function in rural 
areas. Affiliate access points are not stand-alone ES offices; they have 
either WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker staff or ES staff on-site full 
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provide either WIA or ES services, plus services from at least one other 
partner agency. In fact, since affiliates are generally ES-staffed and pro-
vide primarily ES services, access to WIA intensive and training services 
is generally available by referral. The Dunham et al. (2005) study finds 
that other partner agencies are limited in rural areas, whether hosted by 
public, religious, or community-based organizations. Even if partners 
exist, however, they usually are not colocated in the One-Stops, and they 
do not contribute financially to the running of the One-Stop centers. 
Despite a wide variety of access points, rural access to One-Stop 
services is very limited. The study finds that many poor rural resi-
dents—half or more—do not own cars and cannot travel to the work-
force development access points. Public transportation is scarce, trans-
portation assistance is not effective, and alternatives to travel such as 
Internet and telephone services are limited and less effective than in-
person services (Dunham et al. 2005, pp. III 24–32). 
While the Dunham et al. (2005) study was able to observe the 
changes that occurred over three time periods and the situation in 2004, 
it missed the downward trend in access points under WIA since 2004. 
The number declined steadily from 3,583 on December 29, 2004, to 
2,950 on December 31, 2008. Similarly, access to workforce develop-
ment services appears to have declined during the operation of the WIA
program, resulting in a large decline in rural access to services. 
Anatomy of a One-Stop and Anatomy of Two One-Stops 
A pair of studies, Anatomy of a One-Stop (Stack and Stevens 2006) 
and Anatomy of Two One-Stops (Mueser and Sharpe 2006), completed 
in 2006 and released in 2008, looked at the activities conducted by 
One-Stops around the United States, even though their field research 
was concentrated in three centers, in Baltimore, Maryland; Camdenton, 
Missouri; and Columbia, Missouri. 
The studies found that the type, number, and intensity of reemploy-
ment services received by job seekers varied greatly with their demo-
graphics. Comparing two One-Stops, one in the Eastside of Baltimore 
and the other in Columbia, the researchers found that the services 
offered varied with the needs of the job seekers. In the Eastside One-
Stop, the emphasis was on helping job seekers get job-ready because 
they had relatively lower levels of education and marketable skills. In 
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Columbia, clients generally were job-ready, but they still made use of a 
variety of staff-assisted and self-directed reemployment services. 
Some job seekers must rely heavily on programs and staff assis-
tance to negotiate entry into the labor force. Other job seekers have 
fewer employment barriers but still benefit from having staff coach 
them through skills assessment, job analysis, and job search as they 
seek a career change or reemployment after dislocation from previous 
employment. Still other job seekers quickly become self-directed after 
receiving instruction in use of a job search system. 
The One-Stops were diverse. Eastside Baltimore served a more dis-
advantaged population and experienced higher unemployment rates, 
while Columbia served a more advantaged population in a stable econ-
omy dominated by the educational, medical, and financial industries. 
Eastside placed emphasis on becoming job-ready through a six-hour, 
two-day group event and a computer-assisted lab used to help claimants 
work toward a GED. Columbia’s clients, by contrast, were interested 
in getting a job quickly. Their visits to the One-Stop were shorter, but 
they still needed assistance with job search and with job applications 
and received one-on-one assistance. The results in Table 5.4 reveal that
substantial amounts of reemployment services were provided, although 
visits to the Columbia One-Stop lasted about one-third the time of a 
visit to the Eastside One-Stop. 
As a result, the researchers concluded that the Bush administration’s 
proposal for Career Advancement Accounts (CAAs) “would appear to 
challenge the basic approach of the One-Stop Career Centers, as it implies 
a reallocation of resources directly to job seekers through a voucher sys-
tem” (Mueser and Sharpe 2006, p. 156; Stack and Stevens 2006, p. 90).5 
Wisconsin Reemployment Connections Project 
The advent of telephone and Internet UI claims in the 1990s has 
meant that most UI services are provided remotely. With little or no 
physical presence in the One-Stop centers, the interaction of UI and 
One-Stop staff has declined sharply. As a result, reemployment services 
to UI claimants have been reduced. At the same time, UI claimants have 
had less review than previously of their work search activities. 
To counteract these changes, the “Strengthening Connections 
between Unemployment Insurance and One-Stop Delivery Systems 
Demonstration” operated at three sites in Wisconsin between July 2004 
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Table 5.4  Average Time Spent in the Eastside of Baltimore, mD, and 
Columbia, mO, One-Stop Career Centers, by Destination, 
for Tracked Job Seekers 
Average number of 
One-Stop activities minutes in activity 
Eastside of Baltimore One-Stop center 
Attending workshops 
Early intervention workshop 337 
Job readiness workshop 45 
Adult education classes 69 
Using labs 
Digital learning lab 84 
High-tech lab 46 
Meeting with staff 
Group information session 29 
Meet with staff 26 
Talk to staff informally 23 
Assessments 40 
Job search 
Job interview/application 58 
Job search in career lab 45 
Phone bank 36 
Fax/copier 27 
Information exchange 
Collect One-Stop information 15 
Youth employment application 9 
Pick up/drop off materials 7 
Wait in reception area 50 
mean overall customer time in One-Stop 83 
Columbia, MO, One-Stop center 
Four-week UI check 12 




TANF and food stamp recipients 56 
Other 15 
Job search 26 
Job applications 23 
Waiting time 2½ 
mean overall customer time in One-Stop 29 
SOURCE: Mueser and Sharpe (2006); Stack and Stevens (2006). 
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and March 2006 (Almandsmith, Adams, and Bos 2006). It operated as 
a quasiexperiment using treatment and comparison sites, with 2,151 
claimants in the treatment group and 4,097 comparison group mem-
bers selected using a propensity score matching process. Treatment and 
comparison group members were referred to reemployment services 
using the profiling mechanism of the WPRS system. 
At the comparison group sites, claimants received services normally 
provided. Additional services were provided at the treatment sites, where 
UI and the One-Stop center staff—generally ES staff—worked together 
to provide enhanced services and eligibility reviews. Two treatments 
were provided, one more intensive and the other less so, with assign-
ment depending on an assessment of the preparedness of UI claimants 
to conduct job searches, their knowledge of the local labor market, and 
their job search skills. Both treatment groups received enhanced reem-
ployment services that included reemployment workshops, new job 
search classes (e.g., an introduction to computers), WPRS services, and 
at least one staff-assisted job referral (for participants who participated 
in the reemployment workshops). Job search workshops were much 
more extensive than those provided under the WPRS program in almost 
all sites, lasting up to four weeks. The UI work test also was enhanced 
through three ways: 1) increased communication between UI staff and 
One-Stop center staff; 2) UI staff participation in reemployment service 
orientations and reemployment planning sessions, both provided on-
site at the One-Stops; and 3) encouragement of participants to conduct 
five work searches per week instead of the usual two, and monitoring of 
whether they do (Almandsmith, Adams, and Bos 2006). 
The implementation evaluation showed that the One-Stop and UI 
staff established linkages and worked cooperatively according to the 
design of the project. The net impact evaluation was conducted for 
treatment group members selected in three different ways, relating to 
their WPRS profiling scores and whether they received services. The 
discussion below concentrates on Model 2’s Group B, the group need-
ing more services, whose members were assigned to services based on a 
profiling score of 0.47 or above, since they were WPRS participants and 
received reemployment services similar to those under the job search 
assistance treatment of the New Jersey and JSA experiments (Table 
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• The duration of UI benefits was reduced by 0.9 of a week rela-
tive to the comparison group. 
• The amount of UI benefits paid declined by $233 relative to 
the comparison group. (The entire demonstration at all of its 
sites was estimated to have saved the Wisconsin UI trust fund 
account about $385,000.) 
• The treatment group members drew 3.4 percent less of their 
maximum benefit entitlement than the comparison group.
 The change in average quarterly earnings was not statistically sig-
nificant. The rate at which UI claimants entered into employment was 
not affected. 
The evaluation was not able to distinguish the extent to which the 
reduction in the duration of UI benefits paid or the decrease in the pro-
portion of claimants’ maximum UI benefits paid was due to increased 
use of Reemployment Connection services as opposed to stronger 
enforcement of the UI work test, but the latter is likely to have been a 
component of these outcomes. For example, the in-person review of the 
reemployment plans of treatment group members enabled participat-
ing UI staff to identify continuing eligibility issues that they otherwise 
would not have known about. 
The demonstration also showed that, despite the conversion of the 
Table 5.5  Impact of the Wisconsin Demonstration Program on Participant 
Employment Outcomes, model 2, with WPRS Scores of 47 
Percent or higher 
Treatment Comparison Difference 
Sample size 1,824 3,333 
Entered employment (%) 77 77 0.3 
Entered employment 1st qtr. after 54 52 2.3 
new claim (%) 
Avg. quarterly earnings ($) 3,107 2,912 194 
Avg. benefit duration (wks.) 14.8 15.7 −0.9** 
% maximum benefits drawn 64 67 −3.4** 
Average UI benefits drawn ($) 3,690 3,923 −233** 
NOTE: ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test). Blank = not applicable. 









UI system to remote telephone claims taken in call centers outside the 
One-Stop centers, UI staff can participate with One-Stop staff to speed 
UI claimants’ return to work. Furthermore, the demonstration showed 
that requiring participation in extensive JSA services that are similar to 
the comprehensive JSA treatments of the New Jersey and JSA experi-
ments can yield similarly strong net impacts. 
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) Evaluation 
This began as a new departmental initiative in 2005 and contin-
ued throughout the Bush administration as a commitment to provide UI 
recipients with an enhanced work test. This test has generally included 
a staff-assisted review of eligibility, as well as referrals to job search 
assistance and job referral services. The Reemployment and Eligibility 
Assessment demonstrations have been evaluated, but for reasons pre-
sented below the results for REA are inconclusive. 
For a number of years, an Eligibility Review Program (ERP) 
received separate funding from the Unemployment Trust Fund, but when 
the separate funding was eliminated in the 1980s, many states ceased 
to operate ERP programs. Today fewer than a dozen states have ERP
programs (O’Leary 2006). Reemployment and Eligibility Assessments 
are demonstration projects that act as a revitalization of an enhanced 
UI work test with the restoration of separate departmental funding. In 
March 2005, grants totaling $18 million were given to 21 state work-
force agencies. Additional funding was provided in each succeeding 
year during the Bush administration, culminating with a request for $40 
million for REAs in President Bush’s FY 2009 budget, despite austerity 
throughout most of the proposed budget dealing with workforce devel-
opment services. An important attraction for funding eligibility reviews 
was their promise of reducing UI benefit payments by identifying UI 
beneficiaries who were not able, available, and actively searching for 
work. All eligibility review programs have been funded with the expec-
tation that the reduction in UI benefits will be greater than the cost of 
the programs, promising net savings to the Unemployment Trust Fund. 
States participating in the Reemployment and Eligibility Assess-
ment initiative require UI claimants to report in person to a One-Stop 
center within a specified time as a part of an eligibility assessment. Sep-
arately from the notice to report, claimants receive a call-in notice to 
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state REA services include four aspects: 1) a review of ongoing claim-
ant UI eligibility (including detection of eligibility issues and referral 
to adjudication when appropriate), 2) the provision of current labor 
market information, 3) the development and review of a work-search 
plan, and 4) referral to employment services or training when appropri-
ate. Because REA funding has been provided as state UI administrative 
grants, REA funds can only be used to fund activities authorized under 
UI law. Thus, REA direct funding is restricted to paying for determina-
tion of UI eligibility only, and not the other three REA services. Fund-
ing for the provision of job search assistance, public employment ser-
vices, or training must come from WIA, Wagner-Peyser Act, or other 
non-UI funds. 
Staff identified to administer the REA initiative were selected from 
the local One-Stop offices. As REA is part of the UI work test, and in 
many instances UI staff are located in call centers, local administra-
tion fell, in most cases, to the Employment Service. In the five states 
designated for analysis (Connecticut, North Dakota, Minnesota, South 
Carolina, and Washington), ES staff were cross-trained or had UI back-
grounds (Benus et al. 2008b, p. 8). 
As with most discretionary grant programs administered during the 
Bush administration, the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment 
grants were provided without requiring states to develop a consistent 
and rigorous program design and without rigorous federal guidance 
and oversight as to how to collect program data and construct com-
parison groups. An evaluation of the REA initiative was conducted in 
nine participating states that had the most promising programs and had 
collected data that might facilitate the evaluation (Benus et al. 2008b). 
Data collected by most of the states, however, proved to be inadequate. 
Ultimately, the evaluation concentrated on five states (again, Connecti-
cut, North Dakota, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Washington), and 
implementation analyses were conducted in each of the five. 
The net impact analysis was restricted to Minnesota and North 
Dakota—the only states amenable to evaluation because only they had 
constructed appropriate control groups and collected reasonably valid 
REA data in accordance with departmental reporting instructions. The 
North Dakota REA did not yield statistically significant results, and nei-
ther did the Minnesota approach that consisted of a single REA inter-









did have statistically significant impacts. The first interview typically 
came in the third week of a UI claim and was repeated up to three times 
for a total of four interviews, occurring at approximately one-month 
intervals. The Minnesota REA initiative was implemented with a rigor-
ous random assignment process, targeting the middle third of profiled 
claimants whose profiling scores were just below those of individuals 
selected into the WPRS program. 
The Minnesota REA treatment (T2) that had multiple interviews did 
speed the reemployment of participating UI claimants and reduce over-
payments. The number of weeks claimed was reduced by almost one 
week, while the number of weeks claimed and compensated for was 
reduced by more than one week (Table 5.6). The likelihood of exhaust-
ing UI benefits was reduced by nearly four weeks. The percentage of 
claimants with some overpayments in their benefit year was reduced by 
nearly 4 percent. 
The effectiveness of the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment 
initiative is uncertain. Even though state grants were provided to con-
duct demonstration projects, the rigor of implementation did not reach 
reasonable research standards. Weak program design and weak data 
systems make evaluations of REAs highly questionable, even in the 
case of the Minnesota REA. The REA initiative is more of an enhanced 
UI work test program than a reemployment services program. An REA
Table 5.6  minnesota Reemployment Eligibility Assessment Net Impacts 
per Claimant, Treatment T2, multivariate Analysis 
Claims and payments 
Number of weeks claimed −0.9* 
Number of weeks claimed and compensated −1.2** 
Total payments ($) 100 
Exhaustion 
Likelihood of exhausting UI benefits (%) −3.7* 
Overpayments 
% with some overpayment during benefit year −3.8** 
Amt. of overpayment among initial claims w/ overpayment ($) −82 
No. of overpayment wks. among initial claims w/ overpayment −0.9 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed test). 
SOURCE: Benus, Poe-Yamagata et al. (2008), p. 29. 
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interview that lasts for 20 minutes may be sufficient to complete a basic 
eligibility review process, but it cannot provide sufficient assessment 
and counseling to make individualized referrals to additional services, 
and it cannot provide a significant amount of reemployment services.6 
ThREE EVALUATIONS OF ThE U.S. EmPLOymENT
SERVICE: ImPACTS OF UI CLAImANT REFERRALS TO
JOB INTERVIEWS 
The review above shows that in the Charleston demonstration, sup-
plementing a more rigorous UI work test with enhanced referrals to 
employer job openings can substantially increase the percentage of UI 
claimants who receive long-term placements in new jobs. Several other 
demonstrations and program evaluations included an analysis of refer-
rals to job interviews, including Reemploy Minnesota, the Maryland UI 
Work Search Demonstration, and the Wisconsin Reemployment Con-
nections Project. This section looks at three department-funded evalua-
tions of the Employment Service that concentrated solely on the effec-
tiveness of the referral of UI claimants to job interviews. 
First National Evaluation of the U.S. Employment Service 
The effect of job placement services was explored in this early study, 
conducted in 30 local offices in 27 states between 1980 and 1982. This 
nonexperimental evaluation was based on administrative records and 
baseline and follow-up interviews. The outcomes of a group of appli-
cants who received job referrals were compared to those of a group who 
received no job referrals. The evaluation found that job referrals were 
effective for women: women receiving a referral went back to work 2.8 
weeks sooner and earned an additional $325 over a six-month period. 
Job referrals were not effective for men taken as a whole, but they were 
effective for men over 45 years of age and men in urban areas (Johnson 




The Two-State Evaluation of the Public Labor Exchange 
This evaluation (Jacobson and Petta 2000) was conducted for the 
USDOL in Washington and Oregon. It dealt with public labor exchange 
services provided between 1987 and 1998 and evaluated the effect of 
referring UI claimants to jobs. The evaluation used a quasiexperimental 
approach in which a treatment group was referred to available jobs and 
a comparison group was referred to jobs that One-Stop staff believed 
to be open. When the comparison group members applied for the jobs, 
they did not receive interviews, because the jobs were already filled 
(these are called “stale job openings”). In measuring the returns to 
direct placement of UI claimants, the study found that the treatment had 
an impact on the duration of unemployment, whether referrals to jobs 
resulted in a placement or not. In Washington, durations declined by 
7.7 weeks if referrals resulted in a placement and by 2.1 weeks if they 
did not. The comparable reductions for Oregon were 4.6 and 1.1 weeks, 
respectively. The study also found that job placements were most effec-
tive for those workers with a strong record of job attachment. The cost-
effectiveness of job referrals in Washington and Oregon was examined 
and was measured in a number of different ways. In all cases, job refer-
rals were found to be highly cost-effective, having benefit-cost ratios 
that varied between 1.2 and 4.5 (Jacobson and Petta 2000). 
Second National Evaluation of the Public Labor Exchange 
This Westat study (Jacobson et al. 2004) was a national evaluation 
covering six states—Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Caro-
lina, Oregon, and Washington. The study goal was to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the public labor exchange in three traditional employment 
service states (i.e., states that used merit-staffed state workforce agency 
staff) and compare these states to three nontraditional demonstration 
states (i.e., states that used other public or private staff). The intent of 
the evaluation was to assess the overall effectiveness of the public labor 
exchange (PLX) and to make a determination about whether tempo-
rary privatization demonstrations in the other three states should be 
continued or terminated. The evaluation was started in 1998 and was 
completed in February 2004, but, because its findings were so contrary 
to Bush administration policy, it was not released or published by the 
Employment and Training Administration until September 2008. 
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According to WIA regulations (Federal Register 2000), despite 
the Wagner-Peyser Act requirement that employment services under 
the act must be delivered by merit staff employees of a state employ-
ment security agency, “the Department authorized demonstrations of 
the effective delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act services utilizing non-State 
agency employees in Colorado, Massachusetts, and Michigan. These 
three demonstrations were permitted as exceptions to the long standing 
policy . . . in order to assess the effectiveness of alternative delivery 
systems” (p. 49386). 
Thus, the Westat PLX study was to determine the cost-effectiveness 
of alternative delivery systems. As a result, the evaluation was expected 
to guide the department’s decision on whether to continue, expand, or 
eliminate the demonstrations, depending on their cost-effectiveness 
compared to the traditional service delivery system. 
The Westat study determined, among other things, the cost-
effectiveness of the public labor exchange, the effect of the PLX admin-
istrative configuration—whether traditional or nontraditional—and the 
impact of increased automation on the PLX. The benefit-cost analysis 
was conducted in only five states because Michigan did not have the 
administrative data necessary to conduct the analysis. 
The study found a fundamental difference between the PLX ser-
vices provided in One-Stop centers in which the state workforce agency 
took the lead and those provided in One-Stop centers in which a dif-
ferent entity led. In the traditional sites, the One-Stop center tended 
to serve all potential clients, while in the demonstration sites attention 
tended to be limited to a smaller population of economically disadvan-
taged workers, and reemployment services provided were targeted to 
this population. 
The benefit-cost portion of the study used quasiexperimental meth-
ods. The comparison group was drawn from UI claimants who were 
job seekers but did not receive public labor exchange services and had 
strong labor force attachment. This evaluation showed that the PLX 
had a large and significant effect on reducing the weeks of unemploy-
ment (Table 5.7). The effect was greater for direct PLX placements to 
job openings, since workers received jobs shortly after referrals. The 
result was significant but smaller for referrals that did not result in 
placements—only about one-quarter as large as for placements—since 




Table 5.7  Public Labor Exchange Evaluation, 2004, Average Per-Claimant 
Effect of Placements and Referrals on Weeks of Joblessness, and 
Benefit-Cost Ratios 
Benefit-cost ratio 
Placement Referral Upper Lower 
effect (wks.) effect (wks.) bound bound 
Colorado −3.1 −0.7 4.8 2.6 
Massachusetts −8.6 −2.4 4.3 1.4 
North Carolina −7.3 2.1 8.8 6.3 
Oregon −5.7 −1.1 3.1 1.6 
Washington −7.7 −2.1 2.8 1.2 
NOTE: Upper-bound estimates include the value of placements and referrals, while 
lower-bound estimates only include the value of placements. 
SOURCE: Jacobson et al. (2004), p. 166. 
Table 5.7 shows that all of the PLXs had a substantial effect on 
reducing the duration of unemployment. The effect of a placement on 
weeks of joblessness varied between −3.1 and −8.6 weeks, while the 
effect of a referral to placement was between +2.1 and −2.4 weeks. 
Overall, the evaluation found that all six of the states had cost-
effective public labor exchanges—i.e., the benefits of providing a PLX 
were considerably greater than its cost. While the benefit-cost ratios 
varied considerably, in all cases benefits exceeded cost by at least 20 
percent. Specifically, the benefit-cost analysis was conducted with ben-
efits calculated using only the value of placements (the lower-bound 
estimates) and with benefits calculated using both the value of place-
ments and referrals to jobs (the upper-bound estimates). In all cases, the 
benefit-cost ratios were quite large, reflecting the fact that the numbers 
of placements and referrals were quite large, while costs were quite low 
per placement or per referral, generally below $350. The net benefits of 
the programs for UI claimants, however, varied significantly between 
traditional and nontraditional programs because the nontraditional pro-
grams targeted disadvantaged workers, who generally are not UI claim-
ants. Thus, Colorado had the smallest net benefits measured in dollars 
because only 5 percent of placements went to UI beneficiaries, while 
the percentages were much higher in Washington (35), Oregon (38), 
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Comparing the traditional and nontraditional One-Stops, the study 
found that the job-matching services were better in the traditional 
sites operated by state ES staff. Specifically, three of Westat’s findings 
included 1) a much higher percentage of job vacancies were listed in the 
traditional states, and these listings resulted in a greater ability to make 
placements; 2) the job-matching systems in the traditional sites had 
extra features that improved job matches, provided additional informa-
tion, and were easier to use; and 3) the nontraditional, devolved system 
resulted in lesser use of statewide job-matching systems and in greater 
use of job development systems that emphasized special populations, 
rather than a general PLX that served a wider population (Jacobson et 
al. 2004). 
With respect to automation of public labor exchange services, 
the evaluation found that the increased use of automated technology 
resulted in increased quality of job-matching services at lower cost. The 
study examined the national automated PLX system that the department 
developed in the mid-1990s—America’s Job Bank. It found that the 
pooling of resources among the states that was done through America’s
Job Bank resulted in “high quality, enormous capacity, and low cost 
of systems” (Jacobson et al. 2004, p. 3). The evaluation found that 
“America’s Job Bank (AJB) provides a high-quality nationwide sys-
tem for job-seekers to view job listings submitted by employers and for 
employers to review resumes submitted by job-seekers” (Jacobson et 
al. 2004, Appendix C, p. C-7). 
A key finding about America’s Job Bank related to how it provided 
job-matching to low-wage workers. The study found that “AJB’s suc-
cesses have engendered a degree of rivalry with state-run and private 
PLXs. Because AJB provides free services that encourage use by small 
employers and employers hiring low-wage workers, profit-making ser-
vice providers would have to be subsidized in some way to serve these 
groups. Given the low cost and high volume of AJB, it is doubtful that
. . . private firms could provide the services more efficiently” (Jacobson 
et al. 2004, Appendix C, p. C-8). When the department shut down Amer-
ica’s Job Bank in June 2006, there were no subsidies offered to private 
providers to serve low-wage workers. 
  




REEmPLOymENT SERVICES RESEARCh SyNThESES FOR
ThE UNITED STATES AND AROUND ThE WORLD 
Most studies of job search assistance and other reemployment ser-
vices have found that these services are cost-effective. The findings 
relate to three components of reemployment services—1) job search 
assistance, 2) the UI work test, and 3) claimant referral to job open-
ings—and they reveal several common findings. All of these studies 
of the effectiveness of these programs consistently report low cost per 
customer served—in the hundreds of dollars or even less. Low cost 
is one key to the cost-effectiveness of WIA core services and public 
employment service interventions. 
These reemployment services do not have a large impact on the 
human capital of participants. Generally, they do not have long-term 
impacts either. However, they do provide tools: incentives or sanctions 
that help to reduce the compensated duration of the UI program and 
speed the return to work. Even services resulting in a modest reduc-
tion in the duration of joblessness show a significant return on public 
investment when costs are low. Interventions that improve access of 
UI beneficiaries to job search assistance and to job referrals as well 
as strengthen the operation of the UI work test (such as with Reem-
ployment and Eligibility Assessments) have the potential to increase 
the efficiency of state workforce systems. These three types of inter-
ventions also seem to have a synergy that reinforces their individual 
effectiveness when they are provided together as a comprehensive set 
of reemployment services. 
Many researchers have synthesized the results of studies regarding 
job search assistance and have generally come to positive conclusions. 
LaLonde (1995) examines the effectiveness of training programs—job 
search assistance training, on-the-job training, and classroom training 
for youth, adults, and dislocated workers. He finds that job search assis-
tance is cost-effective for dislocated workers and adult women and that 
JSA compares very favorably to other forms of short-term training. 
The department’s Office of the Chief Economist summarized the 
research results regarding job search assistance experiments conducted 
in Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Washington. 










Reemployment Services Research 183 
more quickly, and receipt of UI benefits was reduced . . . The program 
was cost effective for the government . . . Job search participants did 
not end up in lower-wage jobs than non-participants” (USDOL 1995b, 
p. 48). Job search assistance raised earnings because it speeded reem-
ployment and thus increased the number of hours worked. Job search 
assistance did not adversely affect the workers, as was demonstrated 
by their not taking lower quality jobs—their new employment did not 
adversely affect wage rates. 
A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study (1993) also analyzed 
the growing importance of worker dislocation and assessed alterna-
tive methods for improving the labor market outcomes for dislocated 
workers. It, too, finds job search assistance to be effective: “Among 
the options that have been discussed for helping displaced workers . . . 
would be to tie eligibility for additional UI benefits to participation in 
some activity such as a job club or other program that helps participants 
find jobs faster. There is strong evidence that such assistance is effective 
in shortening the length of time that participants receive UI benefits.” 
Meyer (1995) similarly reviewed a number of state and federal exper-
iments. He finds that “the job search experiments . . . try several different 
combinations of services to improve job search and increase the enforce-
ment of work search rules. Nearly all combinations reduce UI receipt and
. . . increase earnings . . . The main treatments have benefits to the 
UI system that exceed cost in all cases, and societal level cost benefit 
analyses are favorable.” 
Meyer recommends that job search assistance be made routinely 
available: “On the services side we should consider making job search 
assistance universal,” he writes. “The exact combination of services we 
should include is not completely clear, but job search workshops and 
individual attention by the same personnel seem promising.”
International reviews of active labor market policies in indus-
trial nations have come to similar conclusions, finding that job search 
assistance is highly cost-effective. The International Labour Organiza-
tion conducted an analysis of the use of active labor market policies 
(ALMP) around the world in developed and developing countries (Auer,
Efendioğlu, and Leschke 2005). Examining the evidence on the effec-
tiveness of training and JSA programs in the industrial nations from 





These evaluation overview studies show that the effects of pro-
grammes on employment and wages are usually small and posi-
tive, but not always . . . In general ALMPs seem to be rather 
effective for women and labour market re-entrants, but seldom 
for youth . . . Wage subsidies to employers and employees seem 
to especially serve the needs of the long-term unemployed, while 
self-employment schemes and micro-enterprise development pro-
grammes often show more success among better qualified indi-
viduals and especially men. All in all, as job-search assistance is 
the most cost-effective measure, it should be intensively used over 
all phases of unemployment. (pp. 61–62) 
In addition, “carefully targeted measures achieve better results than 
broad measures applying to everyone or larger groups” but they tend 
to serve fewer unemployed workers (Auer, Efendioğlu, and Leschke 
2005, p. 65). 
The OECD also conducted an analysis of active labor market poli-
cies, but only in the industrial member nations (Martin and Grubb 
2001). The authors find the following: 
Job-search assistance is usually the least costly active labour mar-
ket programme . . . evaluations of social experiments from several 
countries (Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States) show positive outcomes for this form of active measure 
. . . investment in active placement efforts and raising the moti-
vation of the unemployed, as well as taking steps to encourage 
and monitor their job-search behaviour, pays dividends in terms 
of getting the unemployed back to work faster. While the optimal 
combination of additional job-placement services and increased 
monitoring of job seekers and enforcement of work test is unclear, 
the evidence suggests that both are required to produce benefits to 
unemployment insurance claimants and society. (p. 27) 
These research findings were strong and convincing enough to 
make them an important factor in the enactment of the Unemployment 
Compensation Amendments of 1993, which included the Worker Pro-
filing and Reemployment Services provisions. (See Chapter 4.) The 
effectiveness of providing job search assistance early won widespread 
congressional support for WPRS on its merits. These findings also sup-
ported federal budget requirements that new legislation should not have 
an adverse effect on the U.S. budget deficit. The research findings also 
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Grants, which were added to the Wagner-Peyser Act program budget 
for program years 2001 through 2005—and again in 2009 as part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROm JOB SEARCh 
ASSISTANCE RESEARCh 
A number of lessons have been learned from the research dealing 
with reemployment services. A good deal of confidence exists in these 
lessons, as they are almost all derived from rigorous experiments that 
were conducted by the state workforce agencies and the department. 
The lessons can be summed up as follows: 
• Workers who are permanently separated from their employ-
ers and who are likely to have difficulty becoming reemployed 
benefit from receiving help in returning to work. That help can 
come from a variety of reemployment services, whether it be a 
job referral, if a job is available, or providing separated work-
ers (through a package of job search assistance) with the tools 
to search for a job on their own. At the same time, stronger 
enforcement of the UI work test can also reduce the compen-
sated duration of unemployment and speed the return to work, 
and can be provided with or without accompanying mandatory 
referral to job search assistance. 
• Providing a package of job search assistance (e.g., orienta-
tion, assessment, testing, counseling, job search workshops/ 
job clubs, and follow-up services) can reduce the duration of 
unemployment. The cost of these services is low. Savings from 
reduced UI benefit payments and increased tax payments make 
providing these services cost-effective (Corson et al. 1989; 
Decker et al. 2000; USDOL 1990). 
• For job search assistance to be cost-effective, participation 
must be mandatory. Otherwise, most workers who are offered 
the services will not participate, and the impacts derived from 
the remaining workers will be small (Corson et al. 1989; Deck-












• Required participation in job search assistance can be based 
on a standardized, comprehensive set of services or a custom-
ized set of services based on the development of an individual 
employability plan. A comprehensive package has a greater 
impact on reducing UI durations, but a customized package 
can also have a substantial impact if participation is carefully 
monitored and enforced. Without participation in a number of 
substantive services, job search assistance will not be effective 
(Corson et al. 1989; Decker et al. 2000). 
• There is a synergy that results from calling dislocated UI claim-
ants into the One-Stop center for job search assistance. In addi-
tion to offering job search assistance services, local office staff 
can provide immediate referrals to jobs from available job 
openings. Also, UI staff can use information, particularly from 
nonreporting or nonparticipation in JSA services, to enforce the 
UI work test (Decker et al. 2000). 
• Cooperation between UI and One-Stop center staff can contrib-
ute to the effectiveness of providing reemployment services to 
UI claimants (Corson et al. 1989; Decker et al. 2000; USDOL
1990). 
• Local office staff can refer worker-profiled UI claimants and 
others to job openings. In conjunction with job search assis-
tance services, the referral to job openings can result in higher 
placement rates than are normally experienced (Corson et al. 
1985; Decker et al. 2000). 
• One indication of the positive longer-term effect of providing 
job search assistance is the fact, both in the United States and 
in the United Kingdom, that there have been positive effects 
on employment and earnings not only immediately after the 
services are received but in subsequent years (Corson and 
Haimson 1996; Dolton and O’Neill 2002). 
• Two careful examinations of the details of how One-Stops oper-
ate (Mueser and Sharpe 2006; Stack and Stevens 2006) reveal 
that individuals benefit from lots of assessment and counsel-
ing services, whether they are hard-to-employ or more skilled 
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seling may vary, but One-Stop centers still find that these reem-
ployment services are needed to assist workers in returning to 
work. 
• Stronger enforcement of the UI work test can reduce the dura-
tion of compensated unemployment, whether done separately 
or in conjunction with the provision of job search assistance. 
An enhanced UI work test can take the form of reporting to the 
One-Stop center and requiring UI claimants to demonstrate that 
they are able, available, and actively searching for work, as well 
as determining that they are still unemployed. It can also take 
the form of requiring a more intensive job search (Corson et al. 
1989; Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985; Decker et al. 2000; 
Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994; McVicar 2008). Such past 
research is an indication that treatments tested in the Reemploy-
ment and Eligibility Assessment pilots could prove to be cost-
effective if they are properly designed, properly implemented, 
and thoroughly evaluated. 
• Requiring UI claimants to report to a One-Stop center can 
reduce the duration of compensated unemployment. Enforcing 
the UI work test can be performed by One-Stop center staff or 
by UI staff if they perform eligibility reviews. Joint efforts by 
both One-Stop center and UI staff appear to be highly effective 
(Corson et al. 1989; Decker et al. 2000; USDOL 1990). 
• A specific way to effectively increase the enforcement of the UI 
work test is to enhance the work search requirement by increas-
ing the required number of job search contacts. Verifying a 
sample of those contacts can also reduce duration (Klepinger 
et al. 1998). 
• The implication for WPRS is that, whereas providing reemploy-
ment services (a comprehensive JSA set of services, referral to 
job openings, and an enhanced UI work test) separately can be 
cost-effective, bringing together the three separate components 
of reemployment services can be more cost-effective, as there 
can be reduced costs and synergy for a program that provides 
all three sets of services to UI claimants. 
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• Rural access to One-Stop services is limited and depends heav-
ily on the availability of affiliated One-Stops, which are mostly 
funded and staffed by the Employment Service. Satellite and 
unstaffed access points provide very limited services. Rural 
residents also have limited access to One-Stop services because 
of limited access to private and public transportation and the 
Internet (Dunham et al. 2005). 
• The Employment and Training Administration endured a period 
of research suppression during the Bush years. Studies whose 
release was delayed include Almandsmith, Adams, and Bos 2006; 
Dunham et al. 2005; Jacobson et al. 2004; Mueser and Sharpe 
2006; Stack and Stevens 2006; and many others. These studies’
findings—as will be seen later—directly contradicted major leg-
islative initiatives of the department that were proposed but not 
enacted during the Bush administration. 
Notes 
1. Nineteen states participated in the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment 
initiative in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 after Connecticut and Massachusetts 
dropped out of the program. 
2. An Eligibility Review Program (ERP) is an interview conducted during an 
active claims period to explore the eligibility of the claimant, the degree 
of the claimant’s attachment to the labor market, and the possibilities for 
reemployment. 
3. In February 2005, the WIA study had been completed for some months. ETA
approval to publish the study was suspended until after a Senate mark-up 
session dealing with WIA reauthorization. Both Republican and Democratic 
senators reacted sourly to the administration’s reauthorization proposal, and 
they were displeased about the lack of publicly available WIA evaluations. 
Just prior to the session, ETA staff was directed to formally submit the study 
for approval to Assistant Secretary DeRocco. The morning after the mark-
up, February 17, 2005, David Balducchi was tasked with contacting Rich-
ard Nathan and requesting that he promptly send the study summary to each 
member of the relevant House and Senate committees. Nathan did so, includ-
ing a cover letter, on the same day. Soon after, the study was posted on the 
ETA Web site and in hard copy. If not for the congressional discomfort with 
the WIA reauthorization proposal, it is unlikely that the study would have 
received a timely release. The study findings were conveyed to Congress 
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where a third-party evaluator sent an ETA-sponsored study directly to Con-
gress. (Richard P. Nathan, letter to Sen. Lamar Alexander [R-TN] and other 
congressmen, February 17, 2005; and David Balducchi, e-mail to the author, 
2010.) 
4. On the technical support Web site linked to the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
ETA Web site under the heading of “Best Practices,” links were provided to 
descriptions of Eligibility Review Programs in four states—Florida, Mich-
igan, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Several other states also operate ERP
programs. I accessed the site (http://www.itsc.org/info_tech/infotech.asp) in 
early 2006, but the Web page can no longer be found. 
5. During the period 2005–2007, the Bush administration supported consolida-
tion of WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act funding into a single funding stream for 
the state workforce agencies to provide CAAs from. The failed CAA pro-
posal would have provided selected individuals with self-managed accounts 
to pay for training services—up to $6,000 per eligible worker over a two-year 
period. 
6. The Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment interviews in Minnesota are 
considerably more intensive than those received by other UI claimants. While 
the typical REA interviews provided to WPRS-eligible claimants last 20 min-
utes, other WPRS participants who are not assigned to the REA program 
receive an average of three minutes of individual attention following group 
orientations (Benus et al. 2008b, p. 16). 
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Reemployment Services Policy 
with David E. Balducchi 
Incongruously, the demand for reemployment services across the 
United States grew a great deal over the decade and a half after 1993, 
at the same time that resources were declining. Clinton administration 
policies that implemented the Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Services (WPRS) system and One-Stop Career Centers, automated 
labor-exchange services, enhanced labor-market information services, 
and, later, amended the Wagner-Peyser Act and enacted the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA), all increased the scope of services provided. 
But these policies were not accompanied by a corresponding increase 
in the resources necessary to provide them, and the temporary funding 
increases for labor market information, One-Stop Career Centers, and 
WPRS disappeared. This chapter examines federal reemployment ser-
vice policy since the early 1990s, with special attention to how research 
findings have informed the policy process. 
OVERVIEW 
Classical economic theory assumes that perfect competition governs 
labor markets. Perfect competition as a theory, however, assumes perfect 
information for the players in these labor markets: workers have to be 
able to find job openings, and employers similarly must be able to find 
workers with the skills they need. In the real world of imperfect labor 
market knowledge, workers and employers require considerable assis-
tance in matching job openings with qualified workers. Since the 1930s, 
the Employment Service (ES) has acted as a public labor exchange to 
facilitate impartial job matching at no cost at the point of service to either 
job seekers or employers. Services are prepaid by employers through an 






The primary provider of reemployment services in the United States 
is the U.S. Employment Service. The goals of the ES as a public labor 
exchange program have varied over time. It was born during the Great 
Depression with the enactment of the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 and 
was established to help unemployed workers find needed jobs during 
that time of very high unemployment. After the Unemployment Insur-
ance (UI) Program was enacted in 1935, a policy decision was made 
that the ES should continue to refer the best-qualified workers to avail-
able jobs, rather than to first refer UI claimants. This policy continued 
after the federal UI and ES agencies were brought together within the 
U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) in 1949 (Altmeyer 1966; Haber 
and Kruger 1964).1 
In December 1941, the state ES programs were nationalized to sup-
port the war effort during a time of full employment and labor short-
ages. The goal was to ensure the full utilization of workers in the private 
sector for the duration of the war.2 The ES was administered by the War 
Manpower Commission. In 1945, the War Manpower Commission was 
abolished, and federal administration returned to the U.S. Employment 
Service in the Department of Labor. By congressional action, states 
resumed administration of the programs in late 1946 (Haber and Kruger 
1964). The ES returned to serving the state and local labor market needs 
and fulfilled the role of a universal public labor exchange that treated all 
workers and all areas of the country equally by referring the best appli-
cants for jobs to job openings submitted by employers (Altmeyer 1966). 
In 1961, President Kennedy redirected the Employment Service 
to deal with a number of special populations (e.g., older and younger 
workers) and special concerns (workers displaced by automation and 
technological change, and workers challenged by rural poverty and 
chronic unemployment). Provisions in the Area Redevelopment Act 
of 1961 emphasized serving depressed economic areas. Starting in the 
mid-1960s, the ES was called upon to put heavy emphasis on placing 
the disadvantaged, minorities, and women in jobs, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. As a result of 
rising job loss in the early 1970s, ES policy shifted to strengthen tradi-
tional labor exchange and employer services, which had eroded during 
the strong labor market of the late 1960s. At the same time, the ES 
expanded job placement services for welfare and food stamp recipients 
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In the 1980s, the manner of providing reemployment services 
began to change. The switch from staff-assisted services to self services 
began. The most important two factors in this switch were 1) the decline 
in funding, which meant that fewer staff were available to provide 
services, and 2) the rise of automation, which provided the computer 
technology to make the switch to self services. Automated job banks 
developed first. The department started the Interstate Job Bank in 1979, 
and states developed individual automated job banks by the mid-1980s. 
Later, both the states and the federal government would make a variety 
of tools available for use in resource centers and over the Internet (Rid-
ley and Tracy 2004). 
Since the early 1990s, there have been a number of major employ-
ment and training policy initiatives that have affected Wagner-Peyser 
Act programs. The ES was the platform for the ambitious One-Stop 
Career Center initiative starting in 1994 and was responsible for provid-
ing reemployment services under the WPRS initiative, which became 
operational in the mid-1990s. The role of the ES in the One-Stop cen-
ters was formalized with the enactment of the Workforce Investment 
Act of 1998. As a result, the ES became a principal component of most 
One-Stops, especially in areas that could not fund large comprehensive 
One-Stops. 
Section 1 of the Wagner-Peyser Act states that “the United States 
Employment Service shall be established and maintained within the 
Department of Labor.” However, in 2002, the USDOL eliminated the 
U.S. Employment Service as a separate organization within the depart-
ment. The USDOL contended that although the agency was eliminated, 
its functions were maintained. Beginning in 2003, the Bush administra-
tion proposed and worked to eliminate the Wagner-Peyser Act per se 
and replace it and WIA with block grants to states. Meanwhile, the states 
have mostly ignored the Bush consolidation policy proposals. Through 
the federal appropriations process, the states continued to receive WIA
and Wagner-Peyser Act grants, and they have continued to operate their 
own state Employment Services and provide reemployment services, 









ONE-STOP CAREER CENTERS 
One-Stop Career Centers Begin 
In September 1994, the Department of Labor initiated a grant pro-
gram to encourage states to adopt One-Stop Career Centers. Between 
1994 and 2000, every state received a grant of between $3 million and 
$24 million to launch its One-Stop centers (Ridley and Tracy 2004). 
The initiative came from the Clinton administration, arising directly 
from Vice President Al Gore’s national performance review, an initia-
tive that searched for more effective methods of operating the federal 
government. One-Stop centers were an attempt to bring many employ-
ment and social programs under one roof, providing easy access to all 
workers. For department-funded programs, the Job Training Partner-
ship Act (JTPA) program, the ES, veterans’ employment programs, and 
UI were all made mandatory partners in the One-Stop centers. There 
also were many voluntary partners for programs funded outside the 
department, such as welfare programs. 
The One-Stop Career Center initiative was a large-scale effort to 
deliver employment and support services to the American people. The 
initiative was based on four principles: 1) universality, 2) customer 
choice, 3) integration, and 4) performance-driven/outcome-based mea-
sures. The principle of universality meant that “all population groups 
will have access to a wide array of jobseeking and employment devel-
opment services, including the initial assessment of skills and abilities, 
self-help information relating to career exploration and skill require-
ments of various occupations, consumer report information on the per-
formance of local education and training providers, and quality labor 
market information” (USDOL 1995a).
The employment and training system thus was expanded to serve 
all persons—employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force—who 
would be able to come into any One-Stop in the country and receive 
basic reemployment services. 
While the goal of universal access might have been grand and noble, 
the funding of the state workforce development programs did not cor-
respondingly increase to adequately serve the large number of people 
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ity. When Secretary Reich initiated the One-Stop movement, he recog-
nized the need to increase funding to serve a larger, universal popula-
tion, and he succeeded in increasing funding in the first years of the 
Clinton administration. But with the loss of Democratic control of the 
Congress in 1994, the budget for organizations that staffed the One-
Stops began to decline.3 
One-Stop funding continued to decrease during the Bush admin-
istration years. Appropriations to fund WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act 
grants to states fell sharply in the 2000s. While some voluntary partner 
agencies put staff in the One-Stops, they were not willing—and not 
required—to contribute to One-Stop administrative costs. Among the 
mandatory partners, most state UI programs chose not to contribute to 
funding the One-Stops. In the early 1990s, with the advent of telephone 
claims taking, the UI program began to move local claims activities 
to telephone call centers. This left the funding of the One-Stops to the 
JTPA (later the WIA) and ES programs. 
Meanwhile, combined JTPA/WIA and ES program funding 
remained flat in nominal dollar terms from the mid-1980s to the early 
2000s and declined through 2008. JTPA/WIA grants to states peaked in 
the early 1990s at $3.4 billion and were well below $3 billion in 2008. 
JTPA/WIA plus Wagner-Peyser Act state grants reached a peak at $4.2 
billion in 1994 (Table 6.1). These nominal levels hide the sharp decline 
in real funding levels, which resulted in substantial staffing cuts. The 
ability to provide more (and more expensive) services declined, and self 
services increasingly replaced staff-assisted services. 
A more complicated story emerges when we look at the individual 
program funding levels. Wagner-Peyser Act grants reached a peak of 
$839 million in 1995 and have decreased since then despite the five 
budget years between 2001 and 2005, when approximately $35 million 
in funding for WPRS was added to the state Wagner-Peyser Act appro-
priations. The JTPA/WIA adult state grants have declined fairly steadily 
ever since 1984. By contrast, in response to the problem of worker dis-
placement that emerged in the 1970s, the JTPA/WIA dislocated worker 
state grants continued to increase for longer than the other programs, 
reaching a maximum of $1.3 billion in 2000; funding has decreased 
since then to $1.1 billion in program year 2008. The youth program 
reached a maximum of $1.5 billion in 1993 and then decreased sharply 
in 1995, in response to the release of an evaluation of the JTPA program 
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Table 6.1 grants to States That Are Available to One-Stop Career Centers from Funding of WIA, JTPA, and 
Wagner-Peyser Act Programs, 1984–2008 ($000) 
JTPA and WIA programs 
Program Wagner-Peyser Dislocated JTPA/WIA JTPA/WIA
year Act programs Adult Worker Youth total + W-P Act 
1984 740,398 1,886,151 223,000 724,549 2,833,700 3,574,098 
1985 777,398 1,886,151 222,500 824,549 2,933,200 3,710,598 
1986 758,135 1,783,085 95,702 635,976 2,514,763 3,272,898 
1987 755,200 1,840,000 200,000 750,000 2,790,000 3,545,200 
1988 738,029 1,809,486 215,415 718,050 2,742,951 3,480,980 
1989 763,752 1,787,772 227,018 709,433 2,724,223 3,487,975 
1990 779,039 1,744,808 370,882 699,777 2,815,467 3,594,506 
1991 805,107 1,778,484 421,589 1,182,880 3,382,953 4,188,060 
1992 821,608 1,773,484 423,788 661,712 2,858,984 3,680,592 
1993 810,960 1,015,021 413,637 1,535,056 2,963,714 3,774,674 
1994 832,856 988,021 894,400 1,496,964 3,379,385 4,212,241 
1995 838,912 996,813 982,840 311,460 2,291,113 3,130,025 
1996 761,735 850,000 878,000 776,672 2,504,672 3,266,407 
1997 761,735 895,000 1,034,400 997,672 2,927,072 3,688,807 
1998 761,735 955,000 1,080,408 1,000,965 3,036,373 3,798,108 
1999 761,735 954,000 1,124,408 1,000,965 3,079,373 3,841,108 
2000 761,735 950,000 1,271,220 1,000,965 3,222,185 3,983,920 
2001 796,735 950,000 1,162,032 1,127,965 3,239,997 4,036,732 
2002 796,735 945,272 1,233,688 1,127,965 3,306,925 4,103,660 
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2003 791,557 894,577 1,150,149 994,459 3,039,185 3,830,742 
2004 786,887 893,195 1,171,408 994,459 3,059,062 3,845,949 
2005 780,591 889,498 1,184,784 986,288 3,060,570 3,841,161 
2006 715,883 864,199 1,189,811 940,500 2,994,510 3,710,393 
2007 715,883 864,199 1,189,811 940,500 2,994,510 3,710,393 
2008 703,377 849,101 1,115,077 924,069 2,888,247 3,591,624 
NOTE: All grants are adjusted for rescissions. Wagner-Peyser Act programs include Reemployment Services grants for FY 2001–2005 (in 
$000) as follows: FY 2001, $35,000; FY 2002, $35,000; FY 2003, $34,773; FY 2004, $34,567; FY 2005, $34,290. A variety of training 
programs have been in place since 1963. The Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) was operational from 1963 to 1972. 
Both MDTA and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) were in effect for 1973; CETA was in effect from 1974 to 
1983; CETA/JTPA for 1984; JTPA from 1985 to 1998; JTPA/WIA for 1999; and WIA from 2000 to the present. 








that found the youth program to be ineffective. Through congressional 
appropriations, youth programs gradually recovered and were funded at 
$900 million in 2008. 
The One-Stop center initiative was ambitious but unsustainable, 
since funding was inadequate in 1994 and has become even more so in 
the years since it was initiated. The reality of inadequate funding was 
clear to some people in the department. In 1994, Mary Ann Wyrsch, 
administrator of the Unemployment Insurance Service, saw that there 
were insufficient resources to match the soaring ambitions of universal 
access. At that time, she would describe the new One-Stops as “One-
Stops for a dollar ninety-eight.” A dollar and ninety-eight cents did not 
look as if it was going to cover the bill for this new, large-scale under-
taking. The JTPA and ES programs were not able to cover the cost of 
their new One-Stop center responsibilities. The funds for UI adminis-
tration also would be needed, and even the supplementation with UI 
funding would not be enough. 
Because UI was a required partner of the One-Stops, UI was ex-
pected to provide some of the One-Stops’ administrative funding. From 
the 1990s to 2008, the UI program paid benefits to 7–10 million ben-
eficiaries per year, and its administrative funding remains considerable. 
Basic funding for UI administration amounts to $2–3 billion per year 
and could have been used to supplement the declining flow of One-
Stop funding as WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act grants to states declined 
(Table 6.1). Traditionally, the Wagner-Peyser Act programs and the UI 
programs were operated in the same local offices throughout the United 
States. The UI program and the ES jointly funded the operations of the 
local offices they shared, but that cooperative relationship began to fade 
in the mid-1990s. 
If the UI program had remained in the One-Stops, it would have 
been a major contributor to the One-Stop funding. However, it would 
have been difficult or impossible to administer the UI system effectively
if the program transferred large amounts of funds to the One-Stops. 
Not surprisingly, the UI administrator opted out of the One-Stops by 
supporting a policy of telephone claims-taking. The effect of opting out 
was to end, in large measure, the UI in-person claims-taking process in 
local offices and replace it with telephone claims-taking. 
Endorsing telephone claims was an about-face from prior federal 
policy. When Colorado became the first state to introduce telephone 
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claims-taking in April 1991, the USDOL was not supportive. It had 
reviewed the new procedures and questioned whether eligibility require-
ments could be adequately assessed remotely. Reluctance to endorse 
telephone claims-taking ended in June 1995 when Wyrsch recommended
that states implement telephone and other electronic claims-taking 
methods (O’Leary 2006; O’Leary and Wandner 2005).4 
By 1995, Wyrsch had decided that she had been wrong not to 
embrace the new technology—both telephone and Internet claims-
taking. She wanted to save administrative funds on claims-taking in 
order to devote more funding to the new Benefits Quality Control sys-
tem, which was a key part of maintaining the integrity of the UI system. 
Wyrsch also was concerned about the quality of employment services 
UI claimants would receive in the One-Stops. One-Stop staffing relied 
on generalists who knew a little about a lot of different programs, while 
UI claimants needed help from specialists who could provide them with 
labor market information, placement services, and job search assis-
tance.5 The Unemployment Insurance Service began funding grants 
for state agencies to convert to telephone claims-taking in 1996 and to 
Internet claims-taking in 1998. 
By 2005, the transition to telephone claims was nearly complete. Of 
the 50 states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands, 40 states were taking initial claims over the telephone, 10 had 
plans for doing so, and only three had no such plans. For continuing 
claims, 47 states used telephone systems, five were planning to do so 
or were implementing a phone system, and only one state had no plans 
to move in that direction. The UI program had moved basic claims-
taking out of the local office. UI claims-taking was often done from a 
“telephone on the wall” at the One-Stops—thus UI fulfilled its respon-
sibility under WIA to be a partner in the One-Stops—but because it did 
not have a staff presence in the One-Stops, the UI program could not 
be assessed to cover the costs of One-Stop operations (O’Leary 2006; 
O’Leary and Wandner 2005). 
However, even with UI financial support, the One-Stops would not 
have been sustainable unless they changed the way they were doing 
business. There would not have been enough staff to deal with the flood 
of job seekers. The One-Stops responded with increased automation 
of many core services—i.e., basic job-finding services. As part of the 
initiative to create the One-Stops, banks of personal computers were 
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placed in the One-Stop resource centers that were capable of providing 
a wide variety of automated services, such as a spectrum of electronic 
labor-exchange services including testing and assessment, resumé writ-
ing, and labor-market information services. More and more workers 
came to the One-Stops but received few if any staff-assisted services. 
They went into the resource rooms and worked on their own to search 
for and find work (Ridley and Tracy 2004). 
Reemployment Services in the One-Stop Centers 
Self-service job-finding activities are available to workers directly, 
without their using the One-Stop staff as intermediaries. They are made 
available cheaply at the One-Stop centers in resource rooms with elec-
tronic job-finding services. Alternatively, workers can receive self ser-
vices through the Internet on remotely accessed computers. Thus, the 
principle of universal access has required the One-Stops to provide core 
services for all who walk through their physical or virtual doors, but 
with most of those core services provided in a self-service rather than a 
staff-assisted manner. 
Nonetheless, the demand for staff-assisted reemployment service 
has remained high. Between three and five million UI claimants reg-
istered with the Employment Service have received a reportable (i.e., 
staff-assisted) service each year since 1995. One-and-a-half to four mil-
lion of these UI claimants have participated in a job-search activity in 
years since 1993, but these numbers declined sharply in 2005 and 2006 
(Table 4.6). Since 2001, the WPRS system has been referring over one 
million UI claimants to the One-Stops, and between 800,000 and 1 mil-
lion were reported to have received reemployment services between 
2004 and 2008. (See Table 4.4.) 
While the ES provides most of the core and intensive services to 
One-Stop customers, the WIA programs also provide such services. In 
the 1990s, under the JTPA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs, 
about 60 percent of program exiters participated in training, leaving 
about 40 percent who received reemployment services other than train-
ing. Since approximately 300,000 to 400,000 individuals exited these 
programs between 1993 and 1999, between 100,000 and 150,000 
exiters received reemployment services but no training services each 
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From 2001 through 2005, WIA exiters from the Adult and Dislo-
cated Worker programs numbered between 300,000 and 450,000. 
Approximately half of these exiters received training, so between 
150,000 and 200,000 received core services only or core and intensive 
services only. Clearly, the JTPA and WIA programs have been relative-
ly small providers of reemployment services compared to the Employ-
ment Service. 
In 2006, 2007, and 2008, the number of WIA Adult and Dislocated 
Worker exiters exploded. The change was due to new 2006 definitions 
of WIA exiters, who suddenly included ES participants who could be 
“coenrolled” in the WIA program, even if the WIA program provided 
them with no additional services. As a result, most of the increase in 
WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker exiters was from individuals who 
received core services only—i.e., Wagner-Peyser Act services—but 
were double-counted by the WIA programs. 
Job training has been a key program service provided under the 
Workforce Investment Act and its predecessor organizations. However, 
with the decline in WIA funding and the increased demands of funding 
core and intensive services in the One-Stops, the provision of job train-
ing services suffered. With training costs averaging between $3,000 and 
$5,000 per trainee, relatively few workers served by the WIA system 
actually receive training services (Mikelson and Nightingale 2006). 
Table 6.2 shows that fewer than 300,000 JTPA exiters received train-
ing between 1993 and 1999, while under WIA’s Adult and Dislocated 
Worker programs, trainees numbered no more than 200,000 per year. 
Even with a shift from staff-assisted to self-service reemployment 
services and the limited availability of funding for the most expensive 
service—job training—the decline in WIA and ES funding has reduced 
the ability of the One-Stop system to maintain itself. In the 2000s, the 
number of One-Stops declined sharply. The decline has been seen in 
both the comprehensive One-Stops, which are prevalent in urban areas, 
and the affiliate One-Stops, which are more concentrated in areas with 
low population densities. (Comprehensive One-Stops must have all of 
the WIA-required partners operating within the One-Stop, whereas the 
backbone of the affiliate One-Stops is the ES.)6 Between the end of 2003 
and the end of 2008, the number of One-Stops declined steadily from 
nearly 3,600 to less than 3,000—a decline of 18 percent. The number of 
One-Stops held steady during much of the Great Recession (Table 6.3). 
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Table 6.2  JTPA Program Exiters for 1993–1999; WIA Program Exiters for 2001–2008, by Adult and 
Dislocated Workers 
Job Training Partnership Act programs 
Year Program All exiters Traininga Training/all exiters 
1993 Adult 180,178 126,100 
Title III 164,826 80,800 
Total 345,004 206,900 0.60 
1994 Adult 175,647 126,500 
Title III 187,938 94,000 
Total 363,585 220,500 0.61 
1995 Adult 162,120 118,400 
Title III 266,401 130,500 
Total 428,521 248,900 0.58 
1996 Adult 151,155 113,400 
Title III 283,513 147,400 
Total 434,668 260,800 0.60 
1997 Adult 147,717 110,800 
Title III 266,112 143,700 
Total 413,829 254,500 0.61 
1998 Adult 151,580 112,200 
Title III 240,896 134,900 
Total 392,476 247,100 0.63 
1999 Adult 113,774 83,100 
Title III 189,794 110,100 
Total 303,568 193,200 0.64 
                      
 
 
Workforce Investment Act programs 
Core & intensive 
Year Program All exiters Core services onlyb services only Training Training/all exiters 
2001 Adult 172,366 36,918 59,485 75,963 
DW 129,969 17,777 46,000 66,192 
Total 302,335 54,695 105,485 142,155 0.47 
2002 Adult 239,252 42,533 89,048 107,671 
DW 178,493 20,262 59,691 98,540 
Total 417,745 62,795 148,739 206,211 0.49 
2003 Adult 219,979 43,787 73,242 102,950 
DW 187,664 23,626 61,623 102,415 
Total 407,643 67,413 134,865 205,365 0.50 
2004 Adult 225,683 48,403 68,788 109,492 
DW 178,446 25,544 57,789 95,113 
Total 404,129 73,947 126,577 204,605 0.51 
2005 Adult 230,446 51,481 73,508 105,457 
DW 210,117 42,402 84,016 83,699 
Total 440,563 93,883 157,524 189,156 0.43 
2006 Adultc 510,034 313,744 86,762 109,528 
DW 259,564 111,235 71,169 77,160 
Total 769,598 424,979 157,931 186,688 0.24 
2007 Adultc 765,483 542,147 113,660 109,676 
DW 261,354 128,783 65,909 66,662 
Total 1,026,837 670,930 179,569 176,338 0.17 
2008 Adultc 849,738 540,665 210,859 98,214 
DW 293,614 154,410 84,251 54,953 
Total 1,143,352 695,075 295,110 153,167 0.13 
NOTE: No WIASRD Data Book was prepared for PY 2000. DW = Dislocated Workers. Title III was the dislocated worker section of JTPA. 
a JTPA training includes occupational skills training and on-the-job training. 
b WIA staff-assisted core services only. 
c The effect of coenrollment on WIA adults and Wagner-Peyser Act registrants began to affect the WIA Adult Program statistics in 2006. 




	 	 	  
204 Wandner 
Table 6.3  Number of One-Stop Career Centers in the United States, 2003– 
2009, and Local Offices under CETA, 1974, and JTPA, 1999 
Comprehensive Affiliate 
Date OSCC OSCC Total 
1974 under CETA 3,454 
1999 under JTPA 2,505 
December 29, 2003 1,955 1,627 3,582 
December 29, 2004 1,945 1,638 3,583 
December 29, 2005 1,900 1,559 3,459 
December 29, 2006 1,864 1,401 3,265 
December 29, 2007 1,773 1,395 3,168 
June 30, 2008 1,783 1,332 3,115 
December 31, 2008 1,801 1,149 2,950 
February 4, 2009 1,789 1,126 2,915 
April 17, 2009 1,833 1,181 3,014 
July 2, 2009 1,850 1,184 3,034 
December 31, 2009 1,853 1,133 2,986 
SOURCE: CareerOneStop (2010) at http://www.servicelocator.org for selected dates 
since 1993. Numbers for 1974 and 1999 from Dunham et al. (2005). 
Mikelson and Nightingale (2006) examined the distribution of fund-
ing of employment and training programs between training and non-
training services. The study’s main goal was to determine the amount 
and percentage of funding that was spent on training for each of the 
department-funded programs. The study found that in 2002 “training” 
programs expended most of their funds for purposes other than training. 
Even among departmental workforce development programs in which 
a portion of the funds was spent on training, the training expenditures 
constituted an average of only 18 to 27 percent of all expenditures— 
between $1.1 and $1.7 billion of the $6.5 billion appropriated. (See 
Table 7.1.) Thus, these programs were spending three-quarters or more 
of all of their funds on nontraining activities. 
WIA and other departmental programs are called on to fund a large 
number of nontraining activities as a result of the wide variety of func-
tions performed by the One-Stops. Anatomy of a One-Stop, a study by 
Stack and Stevens (2006), describes the spectrum of reemployment ser-
vices that are provided to workers, whether they are relatively unskilled 






Reemployment Services Policy 205 
ers spent well over an hour at the Baltimore, Maryland, One-Stop office 
each time they came for assistance, the more skilled workers spent a 
half-hour during each visit to the Columbia, Missouri, office. (See Table 
5.3.) 
The department funded a study of the effectiveness of the imple-
mentation of WIA programs in eight states. The study (Barnow and 
King 2005) found that core services play a more prominent role in the 
One-Stop centers in states with traditional program-based systems than 
in states with more “comprehensive workforce policy” frameworks. In 
either case, however, core services play an important role, whether the 
workforce strategy is to make the provision of core services more or 
less central to the centers’ mission. 
A study of workforce services in rural areas (Dunham et al. 2005) 
shows that for much of the United States outside of the major met-
ropolitan areas, affiliate One-Stops dominate the landscape, and the 
Wagner-Peyser Act’s Employment Service is the centerpiece of these 
One-Stops. With reductions in funding, comprehensive One-Stops can 
be afforded mainly in large metropolitan areas, although the number of 
comprehensive One-Stops was declining through 2005. In other, less 
densely populated areas, affiliate One-Stops tend to have several par-
ticipating agencies, but the principal agency is usually the ES; they too 
are declining in number. 
America’s Labor market Information System (ALmIS) 
Technology drives many of the recent changes in the public labor 
exchange system. The department developed a number of automated 
labor-market information tools that made use of the Internet. These 
tools included an expanded automated labor exchange connected to the 
Internet called America’s Job Bank and a number of other automated 
labor-market information tools. 
The department updated all of its labor-market information tools in 
the mid-1990s. America’s Job Bank (AJB) was launched between 1993 
and 1995. It was an updated, Internet-based, automated national labor 
exchange with powerful capabilities. Job seekers could create resumés 
and search for job openings by location, occupation, job title, and key 
words. Employers could search for workers’ resumés by key words, 







important role in interstate job data sharing. In 2006, 39 states were 
submitting jobs to the site, and 33 states signed up to receive its job 
listings (Frauenheim 2007a). AJB was operated for over a decade by 
NaviSite, a for-profit firm under contract with the New York Depart-
ment of Labor. 
The USDOL funded an evaluation of America’s Job Bank, con-
ducted by Technical Assistance and Training Corporation (TATC 2001). 
The evaluation results showed that AJB was widely used. The TATC 
report found that 35 percent of employers who were tracked over a 
three-month period hired at least one person from AJB. Furthermore, 
the study estimated that over a one-year period approximately 345,000 
workers were directly placed in jobs by AJB (Frauenheim 2007b; 
Woods and Frugoli 2004). 
America’s Job Bank was also evaluated by the six-state public labor 
exchange evaluation (Jacobson et al. 2004), which found that AJB was 
cost-effective. (See Chapter 5.)
In addition to America’s Job Bank, the department developed 
and maintains other electronic labor-market information accessible at 
CareerOneStop.com (formerly America’s Career Kit). This resource 
includes the following: 
• Occupation Information Network (O*Net OnLine): contains 
information on the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for 
specific occupations. 
• America’s Career InfoNet: brings together state and federal 
data to provide information on occupations, trends in employ-
ment and wages, and state profiles. 
• America’s Career Locator: identifies the closest One-Stop local 
office for job seekers. 
The department developed America’s Job Bank and other labor 
market information tools believing that they were proper governmental 
functions, but this belief was challenged in the 2000s. Stiglitz, Orszag, 
and Orszag (2000) examined the role of government in a digital age. 
They viewed the role of government as being limited in this arena, but 
found that government has four roles: 1) determine the policies and 
regulatory structures, 2) deliver the programs and services of govern-
ment to the citizenry, 3) use the information infrastructures to enhance 
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the democratic process of government. They found that America’s Job 
Bank was one of the legitimate services the government could provide 
to its citizens, stating that “America’s Job Bank seems consistent with 
the principles for government action.” 
Privatization Demonstrations 
In the process of negotiating and implementing the One-Stop 
Career Centers in the mid-1990s, pressures to privatize the Employ-
ment Service developed in a number of states. While Texas and Florida 
were unsuccessful in more broadly privatizing their Wagner-Peyser Act 
programs statewide, three states were able to negotiate special dem-
onstration arrangements. In 1994, Massachusetts negotiated the ability 
to have its local Workforce Investment Boards deliver Wagner-Peyser 
Act and job training services, stipulating that both public and private 
agencies be permitted to deliver the services. This authority was nar-
rowed in 1998 to be applicable to only four local boards within the 
state—those in Boston, Brockton, Cambridge, and Springfield. Only in 
these local boards could Wagner-Peyser Act services be delivered by 
either for-profit or nonprofit private or public agencies. Colorado was 
given authority in 1997 to devolve the provision of Wagner-Peyser Act 
services down to the county level of government as long as local office 
staff were protected by public merit staffing. In 1998, the department 
permitted Michigan to deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services by a public 
agency other than the state workforce agency as long as that agency 
used public merit staffing (Balducchi and Pasternak 2004). 
In each of these three cases, the Department of Labor granted states 
the authority to provide Wagner-Peyser Act services by other than merit-
staffed state employment security agency personnel under Section 3(a) 
of the act. This alternative delivery approach was authorized as a provi-
sional demonstration project.7 Further demonstration authority was not 
granted in other states, and these demonstration projects were subject 
to evaluation and review. 
Determining the effectiveness of the demonstration sites required 
an evaluation of the three sites with a comparison to traditional state 
ES operations. In 1998, the Westat Corporation began an evaluation of 
Wagner-Peyser Act programs that concentrated mostly on the public 






provide labor exchange services through state merit-staffed employ-
ment security agencies in North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington,
as well as the three demonstration states. The purpose of the evalua-
tion was to compare service delivery in the traditional states to service 
delivery in the demonstration states to determine whether to continue 
the demonstrations or to terminate them. The study was completed in 
February 2004 but was not released by the department until September 
2008 (Jacobson et al. 2004). When the Office of Management and Bud-
get (OMB) finally forced the release of the report on the department’s 
Web site, it was accompanied by an unprecedented and awkward caveat 
impugning the findings and methodology of the study.8 
Chapter 5 discussed the evaluation findings—that the labor exchange 
services offered in the demonstration states did not perform as well as 
the services offered in the traditional, state merit-staffed Employment 
Service agencies. The logical response to the evaluation results would 
have been to cancel the demonstrations and declare that the services 
provided in the traditional ES performed better than those services in 
the demonstration sites. If policy had followed research, the traditional 
approach would have been declared the only approach the department 
would approve, in staying consistent with the Wagner-Peyser Act. 
The actual result was that the political leadership of the Employ-
ment and Training Administration suppressed the Westat study for four 
and a half years. In 2003, contrary to the evaluation findings, the depart-
ment called for the termination of traditional public labor exchange by 
eliminating the Wagner-Peyser Act. The reauthorization plan for WIA
called for the elimination of a 70-year-old New Deal program. The 
public policy recommendations were thus in direct contradiction to the 
research findings. 
WORkER PROFILINg AND REEmPLOymENT SERVICES 
The WPRS system was enacted in 1993, but the system only gradu-
ally became operational in states across the country. It was not fully 
operational until mid-1996, which was just as the One-Stops were 
becoming operational. Thus, two major changes to the workforce devel-
opment system were being implemented at the same time. 
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Chapter 4 reviewed the implementation of the WPRS system and 
discussed the fact that the provision of reemployment services primar-
ily fell to the Employment Service. The ES has been the usual provider 
of most core services and some intensive services in the One-Stops, 
and thus the ES has provided the majority of reemployment services 
under WPRS since it was first implemented. As a result, the ES’s work-
load in providing reemployment services has grown sharply. In 1993, 
before WPRS was implemented, the ES provided UI claimants with 1.6 
million reemployment services. During the 2001 recession period, the 
number of reemployment services provided increased to 3.9 million. 
With sharply declining funding and the decline in the unemployment 
rate, however, the number of claimants receiving reemployment services 
dropped sharply throughout the 2000s, hitting a low of 1.54 million in 
2006. (See Table 4.7.) 
In the mid-1990s, WPRS became a major focus of the ES staff. 
UI recipients who were profiled were sent to the One-Stops to receive 
reemployment services. In 1997, in two-thirds of the states, the ES was 
the major provider of reemployment services, delivering services to 
75 percent or more of WPRS-referred claimants. The JTPA Dislocated 
Worker program provided only a small portion of WPRS services. In 
the one-third of states where the JTPA Dislocated Worker program pro-
vided WPRS services, the ES also provided services. ES provided most 
or some of the services in all localities in the WPRS evaluation study 
states (Dickinson et al. 1999). 
In 2003, the National Association of State Workforce Agencies 
(NASWA) conducted a survey of all state UI programs that examined 
the job search rules and reemployment services provided to UI claim-
ants. The study found that state UI programs used two methods to pro-
mote reemployment and carry out the UI work test: WPRS and the Eli-
gibility Review Program. Since Eligibility Review Programs exist in 
fewer than a dozen states, it is WPRS that has been the main method 
of promoting reemployment by the UI programs in the states (O’Leary 
2006; O’Leary and Wandner 2005). 
The NASWA survey also found that WPRS was the most common 
method of providing reemployment services to UI claimants. A second-
ary source was WIA core services offered at the One-Stop centers. Ser-
vices received by UI claimants at the One-Stops included provision of 
labor market information, referral of claimants to jobs, assistance with 






resumé preparation, and delivery of workshops to improve interview-
ing skills (O’Leary 2006; O’Leary and Wandner 2005). In recent years, 
the provision of these reemployment services, both to UI claimants and 
to other workers, has declined sharply, which can be attributed to the 
decline in Wagner-Peyser Act funding as well as the lack of federal sup-
port for the WPRS system during the Bush administration. 
EmPLOymENT SERVICES DURINg ThE
BUSh ADmINISTRATION 
Under the Bush administration, policy toward the ES and the WIA
programs changed radically. The U.S. Employment Service was elimi-
nated as an agency within the department. America’s Job Bank also was 
eliminated. And legislative proposals to reauthorize the WIA program 
would have eliminated the Wagner-Peyser Act and created a single 
block grant to replace WIA programs and the ES. Furthermore, in its 
regulatory proposal published in December 2006, the department pro-
posed to eliminate merit staffing in state employment services. 
The Elimination of the United States Employment Service 
The Wagner-Peyser Act requires the U.S. Department of Labor to 
retain the U.S. Employment Service as an identifiable organizational 
unit within the department to guide the state ES agencies with respect 
to labor exchange and related programs and policies. Section 1 of the 
Wagner-Peyser Act states, “the United States Employment Service shall 
be maintained within the Department of Labor.” From its establishment 
in 1933 until 70 years later, the USES had always been a free-standing
agency within the U.S. Department of Labor, and it had retained the 
name “United States Employment Service”—in accordance with 
the federal Wagner-Peyser statute—through the end of the Clinton 
administration. 
The organizational status of the U.S. Employment Service changed 
abruptly under the Bush administration (Table 6.4): in 2002, it was 
downgraded from an office to a division. It temporarily disappeared as 
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Table 6.4  Organization of Wagner-Peyser Programs in the USDOL for
Select years, 1977–2008a 
Date Name of Wagner-Peyser Act organization 
Spring 1977 United States Employment Service 
September 1983 United States Employment Service, Office of 
Employment Security 
Winter 1991 United States Employment Service 
Summer 1996 United States Employment Service 
Fall 1998 United States Employment Service 
March 2002 Division of U.S. Employment Service/America’s Labor 
Market Information System (ALMIS), Office of Career 
Transition Assistance 
February 2003 Office of Adult Services, Office of Workforce 
Investment (OWI) 
February 2004 Division of Employment Service and ALMIS, Office of 
Adult Services, OWI 
April 2005 Division of Adult, Dislocated Worker, Employment 
Services, and Workforce Information, OWI 
April 2006 Office of Adult Services, OWI 
April 2007 Division of Adult Services, OWI 
April 2008 Division of Adult Services, OWI 
a The dates given depended on the availability of USDOL telephone directories in the 
USDOL library when the author searched the library in 2008. The point of the table is 
to show that the name remained unchanged (and met the requirements of the Wagner-
Peyser Act) from 1977 (and, before that, from 1933) until 2002, when the Bush 
administration first downgraded and then eliminated the USES. 
SOURCE: USDOL telephone directory, selected years since 1977. 
part of a division in 2004 and 2005. Informal and repeated renamings of 
the organization that housed the ES function were followed by a formal 
reorganization of the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) 
in the summer of 2005. The ETA staff was apprised of the reorganiza-
tion, which was negotiated with the union representing departmental 
employees. The reorganization formally eliminated the U.S. Employ-
ment Service. Beginning in 2006 it became an unidentified part of an 
office, and then a division of Adult Services. Its function was com-
bined with, and disappeared into, that of the WIA Adult and Dislocated




and no staff to deal solely with Wagner-Peyser Act matters. The United 
States Employment Service had disappeared. 
Eliminating America’s Job Bank 
The Department of Labor shut down America’s Job Bank (AJB) on 
June 30, 2007. AJB, however, was enormously useful to workers and 
employers. Both could search for work or offer job openings in states 
across the country or in multiple states without having to access indi-
vidual state job banks. AJB served all employers and all workers at no 
cost, while many of the private job banks serve only niche populations 
at a price. Both private job banks and AJB served the high-wage, high-
skilled workers. However, almost none of the private job banks were 
interested in serving the low-wage, relatively unskilled labor that AJB 
also served. 
America’s Job Bank was cheap to operate. Its funding had been as 
high as $27 million a year when it was fully operational. By early 2004, 
however, the department had put AJB on a “maintenance only” budget 
of $12 million per year, which was not sustainable and which weak-
ened it relative to its private competitors. Before AJB was terminated, 
it lagged behind other commercial job boards by a substantial margin. 
The Web information company Alexa found that in the first five months 
of 2006 AJB averaged 1.9 million unique visitors per month, compared 
to 21 million unique visitors per month for CareerBuilder. This dispar-
ity existed despite the fact that participation in AJB was very great. 
AJB had 2.2 million job openings posted, far more than CareerBuilder 
with 1.5 million job openings. AJB also had 600,000 resumés and about 
450,000 registered employers (Frauenheim 2007b). 
The decision to shut down America’s Job Bank was controver-
sial, and some of the controversy was over whether or not the program 
was cost-effective. Former Labor Secretary Reich, who had started 
AJB, said that “the social benefits of efficiently and quickly matching 
employers and job seekers far exceed the government costs of provid-
ing this service.” The department under Secretary Chao countered with 
a statement that “there is no evidence that AJB created an economic 
efficiency and quickly matched employers and job seekers. The private 
sector provides this service more efficiently, more effectively, and in a 
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There was no way to resolve this controversy publicly because the 
two studies—by TATC (2001) and Jacobson et al. (2004)—that the 
department had commissioned were embargoed and were not made 
publicly available. The Bush administration had good reason to keep 
the studies under wraps, because those studies did not support the 
administration’s argument. Both studies concluded that America’s Job 
Bank was cheap and cost-effective. 
The department justified the shutdown of AJB on the grounds that it 
duplicated the operations of job boards in the private sector. The depart-
ment also asserted that AJB had outmoded computer equipment and 
technology. That claim was disputed by Denis Martin, executive vice 
president of NaviStar, the company that operated AJB for the USDOL
(Frauenheim 2007c). Nonetheless, after being put on a starvation fund-
ing diet, AJB would have required substantial investment if it had been 
continued. 
Frauenheim (2007c), in the pages of Workforce Management, 
expressed dismay at the termination of America’s Job Bank: summariz-
ing his reporting on this issue, he wrote, “Businesses liked the free gov-
ernment Web site. So did the states. It served a wide range of workers 
with many listings for low-paid jobs. During its heyday around 2000, 
research found the site to be a cost-effective, appropriate government 
service . . . America’s Job Bank continued to win praise—including a 
2007 honor from the respected recruiting consulting firm Weddle’s.” 
One commentator speculated that the elimination of AJB was sim-
ply part of the Bush administration’s overall privatization effort, which 
was proceeding in the case of AJB regardless of how well the program 
worked (Frauenheim 2007c). 
However, the America’s Job Bank concept refused to die. By April 
2007, two private corporations announced that they wanted to continue 
the system. NaviStar announced its intention to continue AJB. It set 
up a new, private Internet site to continue the program, which would 
be called AJB2 and would be found at www.americasjobbank2.com. 
NaviStar, however, had competition. DirectEmployers Association, a 
nonprofit on-line recruiting company and an employer membership 
organization of large firms, also declared that it wanted to take over a 
successor AJB system (Electronic Recruiting News 2007). 
The department had ostensibly eliminated America’s Job Bank 








competed to become the successor operator of the system. Electronic 
Recruiting News (2007) said of the competition between the two firms 
that “there are major assets at stake in this transition.” Something did 
not compute. The private firms saw value where the administration saw 
none. 
Into this competition stepped the National Association of State 
Workforce Agencies (NASWA). NASWA is a nonprofit membership 
organization of all of the state workforce agencies. Its members are the 
state agencies that supplied the job openings that fed the AJB system. 
They also would have to feed any new system. 
The individual state workforce agencies agreed that NASWA should 
continue to organize an America’s Job Bank successor under a partner-
ship with the private sector, taking a portion of the profits from the new 
operation. NASWA held a competition and selected DirectEmployers to 
create the new national job bank, JobCentral National Labor Exchange, 
which began operations in July 2007. By October 2008 all but five state 
workforce agencies had joined JobCentral (NASWA 2008). 
A key function of AJB was that, by posting jobs to AJB, employ-
ers fulfilled Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) 
requirements. These requirements ensured that firms doing business 
with the federal government were in compliance with rules regarding 
nondiscrimination and affirmative action in employment. JobCentral 
includes a feature that also allows firms to meet their federal contact 
compliance obligations and veteran priority compliance requirements 
(NASWA 2008). 
It is ironic that despite the fact that Assistant Secretary of Employ-
ment and Training Emily DeRocco ended AJB as a federal program, 
the states nevertheless chose to continue it. Indeed, NASWA has made 
money for the state workforce agencies by taking it over, and DirectEm-
ployers pays a portion of its dues to NASWA. It is also ironic that two 
former ETA staff members who created AJB at the department have 
worked with DirectEmployers to resurrect it. James Vollman was an 
originator of America’s Labor Market Information System while work-
ing for the department as a political appointee in the Clinton adminis-
tration. David Mormon was a career department employee in charge of 
helping to design and implement AJB. In April 2004 Morman retired 
from the department, in part to protest the starvation and imminent 
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ing in the wings, ready to resurrect AJB in its next incarnation under 
another name and new ownership. 
The elimination of America’s Job Bank was only part of the Bush 
administration’s attempt to eliminate funding for state labor-market 
information systems. During the Bush years, increasing amounts of 
America’s Labor Market Information System funding that should have 
been provided to the states for state labor-market information uses were 
transferred to other uses, including the political initiative of the presi-
dent’s demand-driven workforce development system, which com-
prised three politically motivated programs that transmitted funding to 
organizations outside the workforce development system in the name of 
regional economic development.9 
Finally, in 2008, as part of the president’s budget request for fiscal 
year 2009, the Bush Administration unsuccessfully proposed ending all 
funding for labor market information. It proposed to incorporate labor 
market information into a new, more comprehensive block grant that 
would replace both the WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act programs. 
The Employment Service under WIA Reauthorization Proposals 
A steady stream of proposals to eliminate the Wagner-Peyser Act 
flowed out of the Bush administration during its two terms. The Work-
force Investment Act of 1998 authorized the WIA program for five 
years. When program authorization expired in 2003, the Bush admin-
istration unsuccessfully tried to reauthorize the program three times: in 
2003, 2005, and 2007, three different but related Bush administration 
proposals were introduced in the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses 
that would have reauthorized WIA but eliminated the Employment 
Service. 
WIA’s programs continued to operate through the federal appro-
priations process in the years after it expired. Through the same pro-
cess, the public employment service programs also were maintained. 
The Bush administration’s response to WIA’s expiration was to propose 
legislation to reauthorize it in a manner that would transform it into a 
block grant program for various combinations of WIA programs (e.g., 
programs for WIA Adults, Dislocated Workers, and Youth) as well as 
the Wagner-Peyser Act program. The desired result of this proposal was 









ment Service and the governor-controlled state employment services, 
with their merit-staffed state employees. But that didn’t happen. The 
House of Representatives passed bills that were similar to the Bush 
administration proposals in 2003 and 2005, but the Senate refused to 
support the House initiatives. Instead, the Senate passed legislation, 
with bipartisan support, that retained the basic structure of the current 
WIA system (Naughton and Lordeman 2007). Most senators viewed 
workforce development programs from a state’s perspective, and they 
wished to preserve statewide Wagner-Peyser Act programs. 
The common theme of all of the Bush administration proposals was 
to consolidate the services provided by the WIA and Wagner-Peyser 
Act programs and replace them with block grants to states. The asserted 
justification for this policy was that the Wagner-Peyser Act program 
and administrative structure were duplicative of those of WIA and, 
thus, were redundant. The justification for block grant funding was that 
the states could replace these two programs with a single, more cost-
effective program. According to the Bush administration’s reasoning, 
increased state flexibility in the use of funds would contribute to greater 
program efficiency. At the release of the President’s FY 2009 budget, 
Labor Secretary Elaine Chao denied that the block grant proposal was 
about spending cuts. Rather, she said, it is “a matter of effectiveness.” 
“By eliminating the mess and maze of duplicative bureaucratic pro-
grams, we can increase the number of workers who receive training,” 
she said. The current system, it was argued, confused clients and dupli-
cated services. It was “overly complicated” and needed to be changed 
because it “shouldn’t require a PhD to get help.”10 The theme through-
out the Bush administration was that there was no need for employment 
services, not even services that made sure that the right people got the 
right training that could help improve employment and earnings out-
comes. All that was needed was to put training vouchers on the stump 
and walk away. 
The federal government’s experience with block grants, however, 
did not support Chao’s argument. In 1995, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) reviewed the 15 block grants in place in 1989, of which 
nine had been established by the Reagan administration in 1981. On 
average the 1981 grants had experienced a funding reduction of 12 per-
cent. Initially the states were able to maintain the programs, supple-
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and increasing state flexibility in administration. But over time, pres-
sure to increase accountability resulted in new federal constraints that 
had the effect of “recategorizing” the programs and reducing flexibil-
ity—making them similar to the categorical programs they were before 
they became block grants, but with reduced funding (GAO 1995). 
As with the elimination of America’s Job Bank, the principal motive 
for the elimination of Wagner-Peyser Act programs appeared to be a 
strong Bush administration penchant for privatization of government 
services. That preference was made explicit in December 2006 when 
the Bush administration claimed that, based on the results of the three-
state Employment Service privatization demonstration, private employ-
ment services could be at least as cost-effective as public employment 
services. Interestingly, the only study of alternative ES delivery systems 
was conducted by Jacobson et al. (2004) at the demonstration sites in 
Massachusetts, Colorado, and Michigan. The conclusion by the Bush 
administration was at best a misreading of the Jacobson et al. study 
and was contrary to its findings that the public labor exchange is cost-
effective. The Bush administration’s claim was nevertheless used to 
support its proposal to eliminate traditional public employment services 
staffed by state employees (Federal Register 2006). 
Attempted Stealth Elimination of the Employment
Service—Federal Register Notice, December 20, 2006 
The Bush administration had eliminated the U.S. Employment Ser-
vice as the national office that provides guidance to the state Employ-
ment Service agencies across the country. However, starting in 2003, 
the administration had been unsuccessful at legislative efforts to elimi-
nate the Wagner-Peyser Act, which authorizes the U.S. Employment 
Service and a system of federal-state ES offices across the country. 
Therefore, the Bush administration tried to accomplish the same result 
through federal regulation. In December 2006, after the Democrats had 
won a majority in both houses but before the new Congress took office 
in January 2007, the department made one last, desperate attempt to kill 
the Employment Service. A Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) 
was published in the Federal Register on December 20, 2006, pages 
76558–76569, with comments due by February 20, 2007. The proposed 








Peyser Act programs, including banning all “stand-alone” local public 
ES offices, known as affiliated One-Stop Career Center offices. The 
affiliated offices numbered approximately 1,400 in late December 2006 
and represented over 40 percent of all One-Stops. The affiliated offices 
operate throughout the United States but are particularly heavily rep-
resented in less densely populated areas. They are distinguished from 
large comprehensive One-Stops, which operate primarily in large urban 
areas and which numbered over 1,800 in late December 2006. 
Specifically, the proposed regulation would have allowed for priva-
tization of the state Employment Service, enabled nonstate employees 
to administer employment services, and effectively amended without 
congressional authority the Wagner-Peyser Act, which mandates that 
merit-staffed state employees administer job placement services impar-
tially between competing employers and job seekers. Furthermore, the 
regulation would have closed rural One-Stop offices by centralizing 
labor exchange services and would have allowed disqualifying issues 
surrounding labor-market availability of UI claimants under the work 
test to go undetected. 
When the One-Stop delivery system was launched in the early 
1990s, the department left the decision to state governors on the devel-
opment—with Wagner-Peyser Act and WIA funds—of affiliated and 
comprehensive One-Stop centers. The proposed 2006 regulation would 
have reversed this New Federalism standard and reduced the author-
ity of state governors by taking away much of their discretion in using 
Wagner-Peyser Act funds. 
The department’s contention that so-called stand-alone employ-
ment service offices should be created outside of the states’ One-Stop 
delivery systems was crafted to support its policy proposals. Research 
has shown that affiliated One-Stop offices rarely provide only the labor 
exchange services funded under the Wagner-Peyser Act; more often, 
they provide services from two to five other workforce development 
programs (Dunham et al. 2005), including UI , veterans’ services, WIA, 
and other services. In rural areas, small and medium-sized employers 
as well as large firms often utilize affiliated One-Stops as their recruit-
ment centers. In every state, these affiliated One-Stops are part of the 
state’s One-Stop delivery systems, and they are connected electroni-
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The proposed regulations, which would have allowed states to ter-
minate the Wagner-Peyser Act requirement that its employees be merit-
staffed state employees, meant that states could have instead priva-
tized all employees through contracts with local Workforce Investment 
Boards. Privatizing state Wagner-Peyser Act functions raises the ques-
tion of whether private employees can carry out functions that are inher-
ently governmental. If Wagner-Peyser Act functions were privatized, 
private employees would determine who is referred to job openings 
and who is not. Private employees also could assist in determining who 
receives or is denied UI benefits under the UI work test. To qualify for 
UI benefits, each year 8 to 10 million UI beneficiaries must demonstrate 
to the Employment Service staff that they are able to work, available for 
work, and actively searching for work. 
The department’s asserted justification for eliminating the proposed 
merit staff requirement was that the “three demonstrations have showed 
that it is possible to deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services efficiently and 
effectively using non–State merit staff employees . . . While a formal 
evaluation of the three Wagner-Peyser demonstrations has not been 
completed, the department believes the three demonstration states are 
performing successfully” (Federal Register 2006, p. 76560). 
Ignored by this statement are two facts: 1) Jacobson et al. (2004) 
found that the provision of services by state merit–staffed Wagner-
Peyser Act employees was more effective and efficient than provision 
of these services by the demonstration sites, and 2) the formal evalu-
ation of the demonstrations relied on in the notice of proposed rule-
making had in fact been completed by Jacobson et al. and accepted by 
the department in early 2004—nearly three years before the notice of 
proposed rulemaking was published. 
These proposed regulations could have forced affiliated One-
Stop offices to close, leaving much of the country without any public 
employment services. Furthermore, under the proposed regulations, the 
Wagner-Peyser Act programs would only have existed as part of the 
remaining comprehensive One-Stop local offices. States would have 
been allowed to replace state merit employees with private employees 
funded under WIA, and the new staff would be indistinguishable from 
other local WIA employees. The goal of these regulations was to elimi-





Wagner-Peyser Act would have continued to exist as a matter of law but 
would have been stripped of its impact as a matter of fact. 
Eliminating the Employment Service: Congress Responds 
The Senate’s Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee 
was well aware of the regulatory maneuvers of the Bush administration. 
They saw the December 20, 2006, notice of proposed rulemaking as an 
attempt to circumvent their legislative failures. On January 17, 2007, 
Senators Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Patty Murray of 
Washington wrote to the leaders of the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee requesting that they restrict the ability of the administration to 
carry out the proposed regulations.11 Later that month, Congress acted 
on the request and used the budget appropriations process to prohibit 
the administration from implementing the proposed regulations during 
the remainder of fiscal year 2007 by barring the expenditure of funds 
to promulgate or implement the rule. The continuing resolution for the 
new appropriation stated in section 20601 that “none of the funds made 
available in this division or any other Act shall be available to final-
ize or implement any proposed regulation under the Workforce Invest-
ment Act of 1998, Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, or the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Reform Act of 2002 until such time as legislation reautho-
rizing the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 and the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Reform Act of 2002 is enacted” (U.S. Congress 2007, pp. 
21–22). 
Thus, Congress prevented the department from making any major 
policy changes with respect to these three workforce statutes. 
The prohibition on implementing regulations through the appro-
priations process, however, only lasts for one year. It would have to 
be renewed each year through the appropriations process. In Decem-
ber 2007, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which funded the 
USDOL for the remainder of fiscal year 2008, contained virtually the 
same language and again prohibited the Bush administration from final-
izing and implementing its proposed rule for another year. 
In 2008, the Congress took no action to reauthorize the Workforce 
Investment Act. Decisions about the structure and content of the WIA
programs and their relationship to the Employment Service awaited 
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that the department withdrew the proposed rule, published in December 
2006, stating that the withdrawal was based on a continuing congres-
sional prohibition against publishing a rule until WIA was reauthorized. 
Research and the Bush Policy Proposals 
Eliminating and privatizing the Employment Service 
The Bush administration’s determination to get rid of traditional 
public employment services with their state merit–staffed employ-
ees was not based on any research findings that the traditional public 
employment services were not cost-effective. In fact, the department-
funded evaluation of the public employment service showing they were 
cost-effective was ignored. 
When the administration first proposed to eliminate the public 
employment service system in 2003, the Jacobson and Petta (2000) eval-
uation of the public labor exchange in Oregon and Washington states 
had already been completed and published by the department. While 
the study only examined two traditional state public labor exchange 
systems in the states of Washington and Oregon, it found that these pub-
lic employment services yielded unusually high net benefits compared 
to most public expenditures. The benefit-cost ratios were greater than 
1.0 for all users of the state public labor exchanges, but for UI claimants 
the ratios ranged between 1.2 and 4.5 (pp. 7–9). If this study had been 
consulted in developing policy, it would have encouraged the retention 
of traditional public employment services. 
The key issue in making a policy decision should have been a deter-
mination of whether the nontraditional employment service offices 
available to all job seekers were more cost-effective than the traditional 
public employment service offices. The Clinton administration had set 
up a test in three states: Colorado, Massachusetts, and Michigan. In 
order to evaluate which approach worked better—the traditional model
or the nontraditional model—the Jacobson et al. (2004) evaluation of 
the public labor exchange function in the United States evaluated six 
states separately and then compared the three demonstration states 
to the three traditional states. The results showed that the traditional 
approach worked better. 
The administration’s response to the Jacobson et al. (2004) evalu-









suppress the research findings for four and a half years. The administra-
tion then undertook a policy that was directly contrary to the evaluation 
findings. During this period, several attempts to have the completed 
study released—from both inside and outside the department—were 
met with opposition from political leaders in the Employment and 
Training Administration. In March 2005, Congressman Ray LaHood 
(R-IL) requested a copy of the completed study. In May, DeRocco 
replied oddly that “the study was never completed,” although the report 
had been completed and accepted by the department in February 2004 
and the Westat research contract was closed out later that year.12 Indeed, 
when the evaluation results were cited in the December 2006 Federal 
Register notice, they were misrepresented as having found that private 
employment services were as effective as public employment services. 
Alan Krueger, former chief economist at the department, commented
on the suppression of the research results. He wrote in the Economix blog 
of the New York Times that “the Bush administration . . . buried a careful 
study that found that outsourcing job placement services for the unem-
ployed at the local level was less effective than traditional state public 
labor exchange services, and continued with its pursuit to contract-
out and devolve a cost-effective program” (Krueger 2008). 
He saw this effort as part of the larger privatization effort. “Just as 
it has tried to with other government functions such as Social Security, 
the Census, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and national 
defense, the Bush administration has been trying to outsource or elimi-
nate services for the unemployed” (Krueger 2008). 
Evaluating America’s Job Bank 
Until it was eliminated in June 2006, America’s Job Bank appeared 
to compete successfully with private employment services. Woods 
and Frugoli (2004) conducted a national search of AJB and private job 
banks and found that AJB had more job openings listed than the private 
job banks for a number of occupations. They listed three occupations— 
computer programmers, secretaries, and welders—for which AJB had 
substantially more openings than two other all-purpose job search sites, 
Monster.com and CareerBuilder.com. 
The department funded a study of the outcomes of America’s Job 
Bank (TATC 2001). It showed that AJB had a substantial impact on 
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and job seeker participants, it made a number of findings. Employer 
postings on AJB attracted the submission of resumés; employers then 
interviewed 13 percent of the job seekers whose resumés were received, 
and 8 percent of the AJB job orders led to at least one hire (Woods and 
Frugoli 2004). 
The America’s Job Bank study examined data for the program year 
ending on June 30, 2001. For that year, it found the following: 
New job orders posted: 6,962,692 
New job openings posted: 11,228,690 
New employers registered: 55,563 
Total employers registered: 226,274 
Resumé searches conducted: 8,234,049 
TATC estimated that 79,000 total employers hired at least one per-
son through AJB and that 345,000 workers were placed through AJB 
(Woods and Frugoli 2004). TATC concluded that AJB was an effective 
program. 
Disseminating research 
Little employment and training research was disseminated by the 
ETA after the first year of the Bush administration. A review process 
was established by which the deputy assistant secretary, Mason Bishop, 
received all completed research and evaluation reports for his personal 
review. The review process went very slowly, if it proceeded at all. In 
time, Bishop piled the reports high on the floor in a corner of his office. 
Inquiries about the status of the reports were met with replies that they 
were still under review. Eventually, the inquiries ceased. 
The Jacobson et al. (2004) public labor exchange evaluation was 
completed in December 2003 and submitted to the department. As 
director of research, I submitted it to ETA program administrators and 
staff for their review in December. I was immediately informed by an 
e-mail from Bishop that “this report is NOT to go to anyone in ETA
outside of the second floor”—the floor where the political leadership 
of the department was housed. Furthermore, I “should NOT be conven-
ing any meetings concerning this report.”13 The report did, however, go 
through a technical review by the ETA’s research and evaluation staff, 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	
 







and comments were provided to the researchers at Westat. Those com-
ments were incorporated into the final report, which was received by 
the department in February 2004. The final evaluation was accepted and 
determined to be adequate and completed, and the contract was closed 
out. That report was held by the assistant secretary’s office and was not 
shared with anyone inside or outside of the Employment and Training 
Administration. 
Shortly afterward, the book Labor Exchange Policy in the United 
States (Balducchi, Eberts, and O’Leary 2004) was completed in draft 
form and submitted to the department prior to its publication by the 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. This book and 
another, Job Training Policy in the United States (O’Leary, Straits, 
and Wandner 2004), were partially funded by the department under the 
Clinton administration, and departmental staff had been authorized by 
the USDOL to work on the book as authors and editors with other out-
side contributors. As is consistent with the rules of the federal Office 
of Government Ethics, they also were given permission to work on the 
publications during work time at the department, as long as this work 
did not interfere with completing their other work and they were not 
compensated for their work. 
On February 6, 2004, I received an e-mail about the labor exchange 
book. The sender, the career deputy assistant secretary,14 was “currently 
in discussion with the Solicitor’s Office to obtain clarification on the 
appropriate role of Department staff in development” of the book, to 
determine the “appropriate review and clearance process of the draft 
within the Department,” to “develop very clear guidance that would 
guide any ongoing and future efforts of Employment and Training 
Administration staff participating as authors or editors of outside pub-
lications . . . to clarify the authorization process to obtain approval to 
work on such activities in an official capacity.” Meanwhile the career 
deputy asked me to “provide . . . [him] a copy of the grant agreement 
under which the publication was produced.” I provided the grant agree-
ment, but the guidance and clarification were never forthcoming. 
The grant agreement revealed that the Upjohn Institute was legally
bound to publish the two books upon completion at no cost to the 
department. All of the chapters of the books already had been reviewed 
by outside reviewers and by the editors of the volumes. Discussions 
continued for many months between the ETA and the Upjohn Institute, 
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but, despite pressure placed on the Institute by the ETA political leader-
ship not to publish the books, both books eventually were published. 
The ETA’s leadership was able to delay publication, but they were not 
able to suppress the books. 
In the years that followed, further dissemination of publications 
was severely limited. By 2006, the number of unpublished studies had 
grown considerably. The list included the following: a Westat five-year 
study, Evaluation of Labor Exchange Services in a One-Stop Delivery 
System Environment (Jacobson et al. 2004); a report to Congress on the 
H-1B job training programs that had been required by the American 
Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act (P.L. 106-313); three 
five-year research plans for the periods 2002–2007, 2004–2009, and 
2006–2011, all required to be submitted to Congress under Section 171 
of the WIA; a study of the uses states had made of $8 billion in Reed 
Act unemployment insurance funds that had been distributed to them; 
at least eight miscellaneous studies, including evaluations of youth 
offender demonstration projects; two reports that were part of a large 
unemployment insurance research evaluation; and six studies that were 
part of the Administrative Data Research and Evaluation (ADARE) 
project. Many of these studies were initiated during the Clinton admin-
istration. The research findings frequently, but not always, were at odds 
with the Bush administration’s initiatives. As the studies were com-
pleted, they were sent to Deputy Assistant Secretary Mason Bishop for 
his review. The studies sat in his office. 
In November 2006, the Democrats won a majority in both houses 
of Congress. In January 2007, Senator Murray, the new chair of the 
Employment and Workplace Safety Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, which is respon-
sible for workforce development issues, became aware that a number 
of departmental studies that might be of use to the subcommittee as it 
carried out its legislative work had not been distributed or published. 
She had acquired a list of most of the unpublished ETA studies. Senator 
Murray wrote to the department and requested the studies. After discus-
sion with ETA political appointees, in February 2007 the administrator 
of ETA’s Office of Policy Development, Evaluation, and Research sent 
the studies to Murray. Senator Murray shared them (for review pur-
poses only) with a small number of researchers, but they were never 
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At the OMB, a number of senior career staff and political appoin-
tees supported basing labor policy on rigorous research, but had not 
received research products on the major employment and training pro-
grams. At the same time, OMB staff became aware that research had 
been completed but not released. They read references to the unpub-
lished research and spoke to some of the researchers who had conducted 
the research. In one case, they participated in a review of the research. 
Prior to becoming an OMB examiner, Joe Siedlecki had worked for 
Christopher King, director of the Ray Marshall Center for the Study 
of Human Resources at the University of Texas. Siedlecki was famil-
iar with one of the unpublished studies—a quasiexperimental impact 
evaluation of WIA training programs authored by King and Kevin Hol-
lenbeck of the Upjohn Institute. In 2006, Siedlecki, in his capacity as 
OMB examiner, requested but did not receive a copy of the King and 
Hollenbeck evaluation from the department.15 
On April 8, 2007, OMB staff went to the Hart Senate Office Build-
ing and held discussions with Murray’s staff. The OMB received the 
list of unpublished studies that had been completed and learned that 
the department had sent the studies to Senator Murray. OMB politi-
cal and career staff were concerned both that the studies had not been 
publicly released and that the studies had been shared with Congress 
before the OMB had seen them. OMB staff wanted to reach their own 
conclusions about the appropriateness of new department policy initia-
tives, and they wanted to use the latest research in making those deci-
sions. Later in April, OMB career and political staff met to decide what 
to do about the department’s stonewalling on research and evaluation. 
The OMB adopted a four-part process: 1) an independent review of the 
quality of the suppressed studies, and the publication of the suppressed 
studies that were found to have merit by the independent reviewer;
2) the development and publication of an overdue five-year ETA
research plan; 3) completion of three evaluation and demonstration 
projects; and 4) ETA collaboration with an independent organization to 
peer-review the design of all future evaluations. 
On May 16, 2007, Mason Bishop was called to the New Executive 
Office Building to discuss the OMB’s research and evaluation. Regard-
ing the unpublished studies, Bishop tried to explain what had happened. 
He sought to justify his actions and those of Assistant Secretary DeRocco 
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quality” and, therefore, not appropriate for dissemination. OMB staff, 
however, directed that the studies be disseminated. After the meeting, 
the department sent the OMB the studies. Some of the studies were then 
provided to researchers for external review. 
The OMB also raised a concern about the future use of research and 
evaluation funds. It proposed to take an active role in the ETA’s research 
planning process to assure that funds were used for their intended pur-
poses. OMB insisted that the department complete and publish a WIA
five-year research plan in 2007—the department had ignored congres-
sionally mandated deadlines to publish plans in 2002, 2004, and 2006. 
Finally, OMB also took the unusual step of directly intervening in 
the current research and evaluation process. OMB staff informed Bishop
that the ETA’s research, demonstration, and evaluation allotment for 
the new program year beginning in July 2007 would be held up unless 
the department agreed to undertake three research efforts and revise its 
peer review process. 
The proposed research projects consisted of 1) a long-term random 
assignment experimental evaluation of the Adult, Dislocated Worker, 
and Youth components of the Workforce Investment Act program that 
included a benefit-cost component; 2) a short-term, quasiexperimen-
tal evaluation of the WIA program (in addition to releasing the King-
Hollenbeck quasiexperimental impact study); and 3) completion of the 
WIA Individual Training Account (ITA) Demonstration by conducting 
a second round of telephone interviews and a longer-term evaluation. 
The OMB was concerned that billions of federal dollars had been spent 
on the WIA program since its inception, and yet the program had never
been rigorously evaluated. The OMB also thought that two quasi-
experimental impact analyses could be used by the next administration 
to inform WIA reauthorization and that the random assignment evalua-
tion, which would take at least five years to complete, could and should 
inform future policy decisions. The requirement that the ITA study be 
extended arose from staff concerns that the original follow-up survey 
to determine training outcomes had been conducted before some of the 
trainees had completed training, thereby limiting the usefulness of the 
research.16 
To ensure that future evaluation efforts be of the highest quality, 
the OMB required the ETA to work with the Coalition for Evidence-








development of rigorous evidence for program assessment. Thereafter, 
the department began to use the coalition to peer-review existing draft 
evaluations and participate in the review of designs of future evalua-
tions, in particular those deemed by the ETA to have the potential for 
significant policy impact. 
By 2005, Congress also had realized that something was wrong with 
the way the ETA was conducting research and evaluation. Congress had 
lost confidence in the department’s management of two WIA budget 
accounts: 1) Pilots, Demonstrations, and Research, and 2) Evaluation. 
As a result, Congress directed the ETA to report to it on how these 
research funds were being used. The fiscal year 2006 appropriation con-
ference report for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act contained 
the following: 
The conferees direct that the Department submit a quarterly report 
beginning in January 2006 to the House and Senate appropriation 
committees on the status of awards made for pilot, demonstration, 
multi-service, research and multi-state projects under section 171 
of the Workforce Investment Act. This quarterly report shall be 
submitted to the House and Senate committees on appropriations 
no later than 45 days after the end of each quarter and shall include 
the following information: a list of all awards made during the 
quarter, and for each award shall include the grantee or contractor, 
the amount of the award, the funding source of the award, whether 
the award was made competitively or by sole source and, if sole 
source, the justification, the purpose of the award, and expected 
outcomes. (U.S. House of Representatives 2005) 
While Congress could not direct the department to carry out a spe-
cific research agenda, it did what it could to force the department to 
develop and implement a legitimate research plan. 
In 2008, both Congress and the OMB put yet more pressure on 
the department to release the suppressed studies, but the department 
resisted. In July, the first study released was an analysis of the uses of 
the Reed Act distribution. A researcher at the Congressional Research 
Service had been asked by House Ways and Means staff to write the UI 
section of the “Green Book,” which describes the programs under the 
jurisdiction of the committee. The researcher was aware of the Reed 
Act study and wanted to include an analysis of it in the Green Book. 
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called congressional and OMB staff to ask for assistance. A PDF file of 
the study was posted on the ETA Web site on July 30, 2008. 
The department, however, did not want to acknowledge that the 
Reed Act report had been withheld for four years. The Reed Act study 
therefore was hidden in plain sight. At the ETA’s Web site, the study 
was not noted as a new release, did not appear in the chronological list-
ing of research studies, and could not easily be found during a search 
of the site. There was no listing of the report and no link to the URL, 
so analysts could not search for the report using the USDOL search 
engine. The only way to find the paper was to know the URL and enter 
it on the Web. No one was informed about how to find the URL, so I 
received many questions about whether and where the studies had been 
posted and how to find them. A colleague had quietly sent me the URLs 
for all of the reports that were posted in August and September of 2008. 
Without that tip even I would not have been able to find the papers or 
inform others of how to find them. It was in this sense that this and the 
other reports were “hidden in plain sight.” 
Indeed, the Reed Act study had been given a number as an ETA
occasional paper. Rather than giving it a 2008 release date, the ETA
backdated it and gave it the number ETA Occasional Paper 2004-11, 
suggesting that it had been released in 2004. 
Ryan Hess of the Employment and Training Reporter did not accept 
the 2004 release date. In an article titled “ETA Dusts Off Reed Act 
Paper,” Hess (2008) reported that the study was actually released in 
2008 and asked the department “why this was kept under wraps for so 
long.” He reported the department’s response as follows: 
“Over the years, there were a number of studies that ETA
commissioned, and it received reports that were either of 
poor quality or not relevant to the Employment and Train-
ing Administration’s direction,” an agency spokesman told 
MII [Publications, which publishes E&TR]. “After recent 
discussions with [the Office of Management and Budget], 
ETA decided to issue a number of these reports by posting 
them online.” (p. 14) 
Thus, even after DeRocco and Bishop had left the department—in 
late 2007 and the beginning of 2008, respectively—the department still 
claimed that the unreleased research was of “poor quality,” despite the 
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fact that the studies in question were the product of third-party research 
that the department had sponsored, reviewed, and approved. The depart-
ment correctly indicated that the USDOL’s policy “direction” was con-
trary to the research. And the statement failed to mention that in the 
ETA’s discussions with the OMB, it had been ordered to release all of 
the rest of the studies of which the OMB was aware. 
Ironically, the method that the OMB used to require the release of 
the suppressed studies was the Bush White House management tool, the 
President’s Management Agenda. The President’s Management Agenda 
sets quarterly targets for the Department of Labor—and other execu-
tive branch agencies—to reach. OMB set September 30, 2008, as the 
deadline for publication of the rest of the suppressed studies. The cited 
studies were all released—though hidden in cyberspace—in August 
and September of 2008 (Table 6.5). 
Dismantling the research process 
As part of the effort to ensure that there would be no more unwanted
research results, Assistant Secretary DeRocco removed most of the 
senior staff responsible for policy, research, and evaluation from the 
Office of Policy Development, Evaluation, and Research in the ETA. 
Gerri Fiala, administrator of the office, was “encouraged” to leave the 
department and did so after spending one year on an intergovernmen-
tal personnel assignment to a nonprofit agency. James Woods, director 
of evaluation, was reassigned to direct a strategic planning division in 
another office. I was removed from my position as director of research 
and demonstrations and transferred to another office. David Balduc-
chi, the manager of demonstration projects, was similarly transferred 
and made the manager of an administrative unit. The director of policy, 
Terry Finegan, retired. 
Much of the funding for research and evaluation was redirected to 
other areas that supported Bush administration initiatives. Funds for 
pilots, demonstrations, research, and evaluation were used less and less 
for research purposes and instead were diverted to nonresearch pur-
poses or to projects of interest to the administration. Thus, the Bush 
administration’s “war on science” scored a victory at the Employment 
and Training Administration (Mooney 2005). 
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Table 6.5  Selected Employment and Training Administration Research Studies Released in 2008           
ETA occasional 
Research study Release date Completion date paper number 
Unemployment Insurance: Assessment of the Impact of 7/30/08 12/04 2004-11 
the 2002 Reed Act Distribution 
Net Impact Estimates for Services Provided through the 8/15/08 10/05 2005-06 
Workforce Investment Act 
Anatomy of a One-Stop: Baltimore City Eastside Career 8/29/08 No date (2006)a 2006-07, -08 
Center; Anatomy of Two One-Stops: Camdenton, 
Missouri, and Columbia, Missouri (2 papers) 
Workforce Development in Rural Areas: Changes in 9/04/08 6/30/05 2005-07 
Access, Service Delivery, and Partnerships 
Youth Offender Demonstration Project Process 9/04/08 6/06 2006-06 
Evaluation. Final Report, Vol. 1. 
Youth Offender Demonstration Project Process 9/08/08 6/04 2004-10 
Evaluation. Final Report, Round Two 
Evaluation of Labor Exchange Services in a One-Stop 9/11/08 2/04 2004-09 
Delivery System Environment 
Unemployment Insurance and Reemployment among 9/11/08 2/04 2006-09 
Older Workers 
Five Year Research Plan, 2002–2007 (3 papers) 9/14–15/08 No date (2002)a 2003-09 to -11 
Five Year Research Plan, 2004–2009 (8 papers) 9/16/08 No date (2004)a 2005-08 to -15 
a “No date” means there was no date printed on the documents when they were released; however, the author knew the year in which they 
were completed (in parentheses). 










ABANDONINg PROgRAm OVERSIghT 
By its actions, the administration showed that it was not interested 
in the stewardship of the statutorily established programs for which the 
ETA was responsible. Instead, the focus of the ETA was on the presi-
dent’s “demand-driven” system, which provided funds outside of the 
traditional public workforce system. During the 2004 presidential cam-
paign, President Bush promoted the expansion of opportunities through 
the “ownership society,” which called for the federal government to 
allow Americans to have the option of managing their economic and 
retirement security. Within the department, under the demand-driven
banner, policy and discretionary funding efforts were launched to weaken 
workforce security protections that had been developed during the New 
Deal and Great Society eras. This new system was composed of three 
sets of discretionary grants that were more related to business develop-
ment than employment development. They consisted of 1) Workforce
Innovation and Regional Economic Development (WIRED) grants,
2) Community-Based Job Training Grants (CBJTG), and 3) High 
Growth Job Training Initiative (HGJTI) grants. “High growth” indus-
tries receiving funding included the retail industry, where funding went 
to a variety of mall developers such as Westfield, Glimcher, and Prime 
Properties. Community-based grants went to community colleges 
around the country that tended to be located in Republican-friendly 
areas, including Mesa Community College in Phoenix, Arizona. 
The vast majority of all ETA discretionary funds were channeled 
into the demand-driven system. In January 2007, the Congressional 
Research Service (Lordeman and Levine 2007) found that between 
May 2002 and December 2006, nearly $732 million in discretion-
ary ETA funding had been awarded through these grants. In essence, 
ETA—without congressional oversight—abandoned the federal-state 
workforce structure. The HGJTI ($287 million) and CBJTG ($250 mil-
lion) grants were made in 14 sectors that ETA had identified as “high 
growth” sectors. The WIRED grants ($195 million) were made to 13 
regions of the United States to “transform and rebuild their economies.” 
An audit by the department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), 
published in November of 2007, found that between July 1, 2001, and 
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tiative grants totaling $271 million. Only 23 grants were awarded com-
petitively, while the rest were awarded noncompetitively. Examining 
a sample of the noncompetitively awarded grants, the audit found that 
“ETA could not demonstrate that it followed proper procurement pro-
cedures in 35 of 39 tested noncompetitive awards (90 percent)” (OIG 
2007). 
At the department, many ETA staff members were assigned to 
work almost full-time on the WIRED grants. They were not working 
on the ongoing workforce development programs that the department 
was congressionally mandated to operate, oversee, and manage. In 
mid-February 2007, at an ETA managers’ retreat, Assistant Secretary 
DeRocco was asked by one staff member, “What should I do? I am 
spending so much time on my WIRED grant that I have no time for my 
regular work.” DeRocco responded: “WIRED is your regular work!” 
Work priorities at ETA were clear.17 
In effect, the demand-driven system became the real work of ETA
staff, leaving little time for anything else. Travel to oversee state and 
local workforce development programs virtually stopped. Attendance 
at regional and national meetings was limited to trips to market the 
demand-driven system. The statutorily mandated programs of the 
department were largely abandoned for a new economic develop-
ment initiative. The justification for this new initiative was a theory of 
trickle-down workforce development: if the department put money into 
regional economic development, new firms would become established, 
old firms would grow, and new jobs would flow from these firms. 
One indicator of the administration’s lack of interest in traditional 
workforce development programs was the reduction in the number of 
guidance letters sent out to regions and states concerning congressio-
nally authorized programs (Table 6.6). Technical assistance and guid-
ance sharply declined in all statutorily created programs. Between 2002 
and 2007, the department issued few guidance letters relating either to 
the ES or to the reporting and analysis systems. Guidance regarding the 
UI system also declined. Only the development and issuance of Train-
ing and Employment Guidance Letters continued to function at a steady 
level, but the focus of the guidance switched to areas of interest to the 










Table 6.6  guidance Letters Provided by the ETA, 1999–2007 
Unemployment Training and Employment Reports and 
Insurance Program Employment Service Program Analysis 
Year Letters Guidance Letters Letters Letters 
1999 49 15 11 1 
2000 33 22 2 0 
2001 47 31 8 1 
2002 30 27 0 0 
2003 32 26 0 0 
2004 31 36 0 0 
2005 31 35 0 0 
2006 30 30 0 0 
2007 27 32 0 0 
SOURCE: USDOL Web site http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives (accessed May 10, 2010); 
dissemination files from DOLETA’s Office of Policy Development and Research. 
ThE STATES CONTINUE TO PROVIDE
REEmPLOymENT SERVICES 
Despite the Bush administration’s attempt to privatize public 
employment services during its eight years in office, Congress contin-
ued to appropriate Wagner-Peyser Act grants to the states each year, 
and, as a result, the programs survived at the state and local level. Even 
with federal neglect of state ES programs and state WPRS systems, 
the states continued to provide employment services. The level of ser-
vices, however, declined with the drop in appropriated funds. The level 
of activity in the WPRS system is enumerated in Table 4.4. The ES’s 
provision of reemployment services—ES reportable services and job 
search services—is described in Table 4.6. 
The Bush administration had not succeeded in eliminating the 
Wagner-Peyser Act. In fact, no major federal workforce development 
legislation was enacted during the Bush years, and reauthorization of 
WIA and TAA remained for the Obama administration to tackle.19 
State workforce agencies continued their work individually and 
cooperatively, especially through their coordinating agency, the National
Association of State Workforce Agencies. Despite the lack of technical 
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states continued to operate their programs. Even America’s Job Bank 
survived under a new nonprofit structure through the efforts of the indi-
vidual states and NASWA. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
The lessons learned from the examination of reemployment services
policy in this chapter are as follows:20 
United States Employment Service. The USDOL should reestab-
lish the United States Employment Service within its department and 
reestablish an active partnership with the states to oversee the operation 
of the public workforce system. 
Privatization demonstration. The Jacobson et al. (2004) study 
found that 1) employment services provided by state workforce agency 
employees (“traditional employment services”) are more cost-effective 
than employment services provided by private agencies and govern-
ment agencies other than the state workforce agencies (“nontraditional” 
demonstration sites), and 2) traditional sites provide much greater ac-
cess to reemployment services to a much wider population. Thus, dem-
onstration authority granted in the mid-1990s to several states should 
be rescinded. Wagner-Peyser Act funds should be administered state-
wide under the control of the governors. All states should be required to 
administer their state employment services through their merit-staffed 
professional employees of state workforce agencies. 
National electronic job bank. The department should active-
ly support a national electronic job bank. It should either reestablish
America’s Job Bank as a departmental program or establish a partner-
ship role with the National Association of State Workforce Agencies in 
operating the JobCentral National Labor Exchange. 
Employment service funding. Funding of workforce development 
programs should reflect their relative cost-effectiveness. Funding for 











Reemployment Services grants. Annual grants to support the 
WPRS system should be reestablished. Funding should be set at a
higher level than the $35 million per year appropriated between 2001 
and 2005. The full cost of providing comprehensive reemployment ser-
vices to all workers currently being referred by the WPRS system is 
between $200 and $300 million per year. 
Research and evaluation. The research and evaluation program 
should be revitalized and receive adequate staffing and funding. In a 
time of burgeoning deficits and fiscal austerity, the department should 
help people get back to work in the most cost-effective way possible. 
Because it has been a decade since the last evaluation of the employ-
ment services under the Wagner-Peyser Act, the department should un-
dertake a new evaluation of the program. 
Notes 
This chapter was written with the assistance of David E. Balducchi, who made contri-
butions throughout the chapter. 
1. Initially, the federal UI program was the Bureau of Unemployment Compen-
sation within the Social Security Board, while the United States Employment 
Service was part of the U.S. Department of Labor. The two organizations 
had to negotiate the colocation of the two programs at the local level as well 
as the services that ES would provide to UI claimants. They also agreed to 
act “as if they were a single agency.” The federal UI and ES agencies were 
brought together by President Truman in a reorganization implemented under 
the Reorganization Act of 1949 (Altmeyer 1966, pp. 62–65, 175–178). 
2. In a telegram to the governors on December 18, 1941, President Roosevelt 
requested the transfer of local ES offices from state employment services to 
the federal government under the direction of the U.S. Employment Service 
to assure “that we utilize to the fullest possible extent” workers “to increase 
our production of war materials . . . by centralizing work recruiting into one 
agency.” The president was authorized to carry out this action through an 
appropriation measure that had been enacted earlier in 1941 (Altmeyer 1966, 
pp. 129–134). 
3. Lawrence Katz, interviews with the author, August 21 and September 25, 2008. 
4. Unemployment Insurance Policy Letter 35-95 stated, “The Department 
believes that SESAs [state employment security agencies] should move 
toward fully implementing telephone claims taking or other electronic meth-
ods of filing . . .” 
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6. The ES is permitted to operate affiliated One-Stop sites under the WIA. The 
WIA/Wagner-Peyser Act regulations state that “local Employment Service 
offices may operate as affiliated sites, or through electronically or technologi-
cally linked access points as part of the One-Stop delivery system (20 CFR 
652.202, Federal Register 65, 156: 49462, August 11, 2000). 
7. The Workforce Investment Act/Wagner-Peyser Act regulations state, “The 
Secretary has and has exercised the legal authority under section 3(a) of the 
Act to set additional staffing standards and requirements and to conduct dem-
onstrations to ensure the effective delivery of service provided under the Act. 
No additional demonstrations will be authorized” (20 CFR 652.216, Federal 
Register 65, 156: 49464, August 11, 2000). 
8. The caveat begins, “The evaluation is biased in favor of a conclusion that 
PLX [public labor exchange] services—particularly those offered in a tra-
ditional setting absent One-Stop Career Center integration—offer a more 
effective delivery mechanism than WIA service delivery provided in a One-
Stop Career Center environment.” The entire caveat can be found at http:// 
wdr.doleta.gov/research/keyword.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_resultDetails&pub_ 
id=2379&mp=y (accessed January 6, 2010).
9. See the section “Abandoning Program Oversight,” on p. 232, which discusses 
these three programs. 
10. Elaine Chao, statement at the release of the president’s 2009 budget, Febru-
ary 5, 2008. 
11. Edward M. Kennedy and Patty Murray, letter to Senators Tom Harkin and 
Arlen Specter, January 17, 2007. 
12. Emily DeRocco, letter to Rep. LaHood, in response to his written request for 
a copy of the Jacobson et al. (2004) study, May 13, 2005. 
13. Mason Bishop, e-mail to the author, December 22, 2003. 
14. Different from Bishop, who was the political DAS, not the career DAS. 
15. Joseph Siedlecki, interview with the author, December 29, 2008. Information 
in the next four paragraphs comes mainly from Siedlecki. 
16. Ibid. 
17. I attended this meeting. 
18. Since Table 6.6 is a list of guidance letters posted on the ETA’s Web site in 
October 2008, some guidance letters may have been issued and then removed 
from the Web site. 
19. The department succeeded in gaining reauthorization of the Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance in 2002, but not under the terms that were desired by the 
Bush administration. The TAA was not reauthorized after it expired in 2007. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 reauthorized TAA. 
20. These recommendations were developed at the end of 2008. By the end of 
2009, the Obama administration had addressed two of these recommenda-
tions with the February 2009 enactment of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act. First, the act provided additional funding for the ES in the 
amount of $400 million. Second, from the new ES funds, $250 million was 
reserved for Reemployment Services Grants. These funds were made avail-





Public Job Training 
and Training Vouchers 
As a result of post–World War II economic and trade policies, the 
U.S. Department of Labor has operated public job training programs 
for over five decades. The goal of national job training programs has 
been to improve the operation of labor markets by enhancing the skills 
of individuals facing barriers to employment. The programs have been 
unstable, with changing objectives, different target populations, vary-
ing program components, changing administration and operational 
methods, and fluctuating funding levels. 
Early programs reflected concern about the loss of jobs resulting 
from automation. The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 provided loans 
to businesses in depressed regions of the country as well as loans for job 
training. In 1962, the Manpower Development and Training Act program 
began and was administered as an intergovernmental partnership with 
the states. Initially funds were provided for dislocated workers, but after 
the enactment of the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964, the emphasis 
shifted to alleviating poverty by providing training to disadvantaged 
adults and youth. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA) was enacted in 1973 under President Nixon. Under the new act 
the administration and operation of training programs devolved to the 
states and local entities, consistent with that administration’s revenue 
sharing policy. CETA also provided work experience to unemployed 
workers in the form of public service employment. In 1982, the Rea-
gan administration shifted course, supporting the enactment of the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA). JTPA further decentralized training 
programs to the local level and eliminated public service employment. 
Program coordination between JTPA’s locally administered Private 
Industry Councils and its partner workforce development agencies— 
the state-administered Employment Service (ES) and Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) programs—became even more difficult. Under JTPA, 






located worker program was added, but funding levels for the programs 
were reduced (LaLonde 1995). 
Since the mid-1990s, two major factors have altered the nature 
of training programs in the United States: 1) the introduction of One-
Stop Career Centers, which further linked training programs with the 
ES and other partner agencies, and 2) the enactment of the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA), with its introduction of training vouchers. These 
developments have taken place in the context of stagnant nominal 
funding throughout the 1990s and funding declines during the Bush II 
administration. (See Table 6.1.) These two developments were accom-
panied by further sharp declines in real funding levels. As a result, both 
the concept of universal access to workforce services (a concept cen-
tral to the One-Stops) and the expectation of substantial availability of 
training services following core and intensive services have proven to 
be highly unrealistic. 
This chapter examines both of these developments, concentrating 
on research and policy relating to the One-Stop centers and training 
vouchers. The chapter begins with a brief overview of selected research 
and evaluation findings regarding training programs, and then summa-
rizes more recent research and evaluations. It then looks at recent train-
ing policy relating to the impact of One-Stops and training vouchers 
and assesses the extent to which policy has followed the lessons learned 
from research. 
Much of this chapter analyzes training vouchers, including the Indi-
vidual Training Accounts (ITAs) that were implemented under the WIA. 
Attention is also paid to new research findings from studies completed 
since WIA’s implementation in 2000. Particular emphasis is placed on 
studies completed between 2001 and 2008 that were withheld by the 
U.S. Department of Labor and not published until the end of the Bush 
administration. 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. TRAININg PROgRAmS: AN
OVERVIEW OF EVALUATION RESULTS 
Researchers have found a fundamental problem in the public provi-









Public Job Training and Training Vouchers  241 
is provided is not extensive enough to have an economic impact equiva-
lent to education and prolonged training. A comprehensive review of 
the evidence for government-sponsored training’s effectiveness for 
low-income and dislocated workers in the United States and in other 
countries concludes that it is unlikely that short-term training programs 
could significantly increase the skills of the American labor force, even 
if they were significantly better funded. Government-sponsored train-
ing programs fail because they consist of short-term, low-cost training. 
The authors point out that a 10 percent rate of return on training would 
be very high. Thus, if training has an average cost of $3,000, the high-
est increase in annual earnings would be $300. Even such an optimistic 
outcome will not raise low-wage workers out of poverty or result in 
much of an improvement in the well-being of dislocated workers. Thus, 
vastly larger investments would be needed to significantly raise earn-
ings and skills (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; Heckman, Rose-
lius, and Smith 1994). 
As LaLonde (1995) explains, small public training programs have 
small effects on earnings: “We got what we paid for. Public sector invest-
ments in training are exceedingly small compared to the magnitude of 
the skill deficiencies that policy-makers are trying to address,” he 
writes. “There also is evidence that existing services are ineffective for 
some groups. As a result, training dollars now going to those groups 
would be better spent by reallocating them toward other groups that 
benefit from these programs and also toward the development of new 
and probably more intensive high-cost services that can generate larger 
post-program earnings gains” (pp. 149–150). 
LaLonde points out that the expenditure per participant declined 
under JTPA—and continued to decline under WIA. Similarly, he notes 
that while a year of education is associated with approximately an 8 
percent increase in an average worker’s earnings, the duration of job 
training is much shorter. As a result, lower effects on employment and 
earnings should be expected for short-term job training programs as 
compared to an additional year of schooling. 
Surveying the evaluation literature for adults and youth, LaLonde 
finds that low-cost job search assistance (JSA) training—he considers 
JSA a form of training—for women can significantly raise their earn-
ings. The result for skill and occupational training is more mixed, with 








that provides job-specific skills, rather than basic training. On the other 
hand, training for adult men and youth has far less positive results. For 
men, the effects on earnings are generally modest or nonexistent, while 
youth tend to experience no positive effects. 
With respect to the services provided to dislocated workers, LaLonde 
reports three findings: 1) job search assistance is a cost-effective re-
employment service, 2) workers who participate in short-run job training 
get no further benefit compared to JSA, and 3) female participants gain 
more from these programs than males. He cites his own work to indicate 
that longer-term rigorous, academic training for dislocated workers at 
community colleges appears to produce long-term benefits. 
LaLonde concludes that, other than job search assistance, less inten-
sive training, including training provided under USDOL programs, does 
not raise workers’ earnings. He sees little reason to continue low-cost 
job training except for adult women, and recommends the development 
of new longer-term, more intensive training approaches, using dem-
onstration projects to identify which approaches work. Short-term job 
training is not likely to have a significant impact on workers’ earnings, 
even if the resources dedicated to training programs were to be sig-
nificantly increased. Finally, he writes that current knowledge indicates 
that if training funds are scarce, those funds should be shifted to JSA, 
as JSA is more cost-effective than low-cost training (LaLonde 1995). 
Summarizing what is known about the cost-effectiveness of training 
for dislocated workers, King (2004) finds that dislocated worker train-
ing has not been adequately evaluated. Only two experimental evalua-
tions have been conducted—the Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstra-
tion and the New Jersey Experiment. He finds the Texas effects modest 
(Bloom 1990) and the New Jersey effects negligible. King reviews the 
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2002) study showing that community 
college training can have a substantial impact on earnings that can last 
for several years, but he is concerned by the methodology, which does 
not even use quasiexperimental methods. He regrets that the depart-
ment did not complete the evaluation of dislocated worker training that 
it began toward the end of the JTPA program, and he would like to see 
a new comprehensive experimental evaluation of job training for dislo-
cated workers. 
Examining the industrialized nations, Martin and Grubb (2001) find 
that the experience of public training programs is mostly bleak: 
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Evaluations of public training programmes in OECD countries 
suggest a mixed track record. Some programmes in Canada, Ire-
land, Sweden and the United States have yielded low or even 
negative rates of return for participants when the estimated pro-
gramme effects on earnings or employment are compared with the 
cost of achieving these effects . . . However, the picture is not 
entirely black: some public training programmes work . . . The 
most consistently positive results were recorded for adult women. 
The findings were less optimistic with regard to adult men . . . The 
most dismal picture emerged with respect to out-of-school youths: 
almost no training programme worked for them. (p. 25) 
Thus, the weak training outcomes found in the U.S. evaluations are 
similar to the experience of other industrial nations. 
NET ImPACT EVALUATIONS OF JTPA AND WIA PROgRAmS 
The department has been operating training programs under JTPA
and WIA for nearly 30 years. It has conducted evaluations and rigorous 
demonstration projects to look for training programs that work for dis-
advantaged adults, dislocated workers, and youth. In general, the results 
have not been positive. 
The JTPA Program Evaluation (1996) and the Search for Effective 
youth Employment Programs 
The department funded an experimental evaluation of JTPA, cover-
ing the Adult and Youth programs (Bloom et al. 1997; Orr et al. 1996). 
The evaluation was based on a sample of 21,000 individuals drawn 
from participants in 16 JTPA service delivery areas. 
The findings for the JTPA Adult Program participants were mod-
est. Adult programs had a small but significantly positive effect on the 
earnings of men and women, but the effect on earnings as a percentage 
of prior earnings was twice as great for women as for men—about a 
10 percent gain for women and a 5 percent gain for men. The effect 
of youth programs was insignificant for both males and females. The 
benefit-cost analysis yielded small positive benefits to society for adult 
men and women, but negative results for both female and male youth. 













The JTPA Evaluation did not cover the JTPA Dislocated Worker 
Program. The department began work on a separate evaluation of the 
outcomes of dislocated workers, but these efforts were halted with the 
enactment of WIA. 
Coinciding with the Republican takeover of Congress in 1995, 
the findings for JTPA youth participants had a devastating short-term 
impact on the program. The budgetary response to the youth findings 
of the JTPA Evaluation was immediate. Congress reduced the funding 
of JTPA Youth Program grants to states from $1.5 billion in FY 1994 
to $0.3 billion in FY 1995. (See Table 6.1.) No department training 
programs had ever experienced such a precipitous decline. While fund-
ing of youth programs increased in succeeding years, approximating $1 
billion in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the program never reached 
the high funding levels of the early 1990s. Starting in the early 2000s, 
WIA Youth Program funding began to decline with the other compo-
nents of the WIA program. 
The dismal findings for JTPA-served youth resulted in a search for 
new youth options that might provide more cost-effective results. Two 
major demonstration projects were launched to test two program mod-
els based on local projects that appeared to be successful, in order to 
see if they could be replicated more widely and thus be models for new 
national programs. They were the Center for Employment and Train-
ing (CET) and Quantum Opportunity Project (QOP) models. Neither of 
these models, however, proved to be cost-effective. 
The CET in San Jose, California, provides training in a worklike 
setting to out-of-school youth. An early evaluation of youth served by 
CET found the San Jose program to be highly successful with respect to 
employment, earnings, and other outcomes. The department attempted 
to replicate the model at 12 sites, conducting an experimental demon-
stration between 1995 and 1999, with 1,400 youth assigned to treatment 
and control groups. The final report followed up on the participants 54 
months after random assignment. The evaluation found that replication 
was difficult and was only successfully completed in 4 of the 12 sites— 
the 4 sites operated by CET itself. While the structural model could be 
replicated, the staff could not. CET was found to be a unique organiza-
tion with highly motivated leadership and staff. The 54-month results 
showed no earnings gains for the treatment group in the replication sites 
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QOP was another departmental effort to serve disadvantaged 
youth, operating as a demonstration from 1995 to 2001. It was funded 
by the USDOL and the Ford Foundation. The demonstration provided 
after-school services to ninth grade students. Its primary goals were to 
increase high school graduation rates and enrollment in postsecondary 
education. Its secondary goals included improving high school course 
grades, improving achievement test scores, and decreasing risky behav-
ior, including teenage pregnancy, crime, and substance abuse. An evalu-
ation by Schirm, Stuart, and McKie (2006) found that the demonstra-
tion did not achieve any of its primary or secondary goals. 
In contrast to the Youth Program, the JTPA Adult model survived, 
and the evaluation had little adverse impact on the funding of the Adult 
Program. Although the overall evaluation results for the Adult Program 
were not very positive, the positive impact on adult women helped to 
maintain support for the program. The JTPA Dislocated Worker Pro-
gram, which had not been evaluated, was not affected by the release 
of the JTPA Evaluation. In fact, increasing concern about worker dis-
location resulted in the JTPA Dislocated Worker Program being the 
only JTPA program to experience continued funding growth in the late 
1990s. 
The JTPA Evaluation caused much consternation among the sup-
porters of youth employment programs. The loss of funding was devas-
tating to youth employment programs at the state and local level in the 
mid-1990s. While problems were observed in the selection of the par-
ticipating local sites, the evaluation appeared to be technically adequate 
and objective in its administration. Nonetheless, the JTPA Evaluation 
was blamed for the decline in the JTPA Youth Program.1 
The JTPA Evaluation showed that politicians pay attention to 
research and evaluation results, especially if the message is strongly 
negative. The JTPA Evaluation experience made department adminis-
trators much more careful about evaluations conducted during the rest 
of the Clinton administration. Before an evaluation would be approved, 
questions were asked about what the potential impacts of the evalua-
tions might be. Behind these questions lurked the implicit question of 
whether a new evaluation might have negative findings similar to those 












Evaluations of the WIA programs have followed an uneven, strange, 
and increasingly political path. While under the Clinton administration 
the initial evaluations followed a traditional path of making efforts to 
understand and improve the programs, during the Bush administration 
the conduct of the evaluations and the dissemination of their findings 
became increasing political. 
With the enactment of WIA in 1998, the department quickly initi-
ated a number of process evaluations to examine the program imple-
mentation. They were conducted by Social Policy Research Associates. 
The early implementation analyses studied how the programs were 
being adopted in the states and whether they were being implemented 
in accordance with the legislative intent. Individual studies were pro-
duced over several years, and the findings were summarized in a final 
evaluation report (SPRA 2004). 
A number of additional evaluations were conducted for the depart-
ment. A major eight-state field research evaluation was conducted by 
the Rockefeller Institute for Government. A net impact evaluation was 
conducted using administrative data as part of the Administrative Data 
Research and Evaluation (ADARE) project. Two states funded their own 
evaluations of federal and state training programs. In 2007, the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) mandated that the department con-
duct two evaluations of WIA programs: a quasiexperimental evalua-
tion and a random assignment evaluation. Ironically, a Republican-
controlled OMB belatedly compelled a resistant Republican-controlled 
Employment and Training Administration (ETA) to resume evaluation 
of the WIA program. Two antagonistic opponents on the role of evi-
dence-based policy faced each other, and the OMB prevailed. 
Rockefeller implementation study 
The Rockefeller Institute for Government conducted an eight-state 
process evaluation of the WIA program for the department (Barnow and 
King 2005). Ten researchers conducted field studies in each of the eight 
states. Under the direction of Richard P. Nathan, all of the researchers 
used the same field research methodology. 
The study was conducted in Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Michi-
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organized into five major topics: 1) leadership, including the roles of 
employers and the private sector; 2) system administration and fund-
ing; 3) organization and operation of the One-Stop Career Centers;
4) service orientation and service mix; and 5) the use of the market 
mechanism, including the Eligible Training Provider list, Consumer 
Reports, performance standards, and training vouchers—i.e., Individ-
ual Training Accounts. The study was highly useful, even though the 
selection of participating states was not based on achieving a represen-
tative sample. 
Seven-state net impact evaluation 
The Hollenbeck et al. (2005) quasiexperimental evaluation exam-
ined the net impact of the WIA program in seven states: Florida, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and Washington. The longi-
tudinal administrative data for the evaluation came from the ADARE 
project, which makes available (through data-sharing agreements with 
state partners) data drawn from UI wage records, state workforce devel-
opment programs, and other state and federal programs. 
WIA participants who received WIA core, intensive, or training ser-
vices were compared to a group who registered with the ES but did not 
receive WIA services. The treatment and comparison groups received 
employment services in either program year 2000 or 2001. Hollenbeck 
et al. (2005) conclude that “WIA services as currently provided in these 
states are effective and appear to be doing a good job of addressing 
WIA’s state objectives” (p. v). The impact of receiving any WIA ser-
vices, compared to the impact for those served by the ES, “increases 
employment rates by about 10 percentage points and average quarterly 
earnings by about $800.” The impact of receiving WIAtraining services,
compared to workers served by ES or WIA but not receiving training 
services, was “also positive, but generally smaller in magnitude than for 
the receipt of any WIA services.” 
Disaggregating the results, the impacts for WIA dislocated workers 
were consistently larger than for WIA adults. For both WIA adults and 
dislocated workers, impacts for women were greater than for men, “a 
finding largely consistent with the literature on training impacts.” 
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) completed their evaluation in October 
2005, but it was embargoed by the ETA’s political leadership, Emily
DeRocco and Mason Bishop. Under pressure from the OMB, it was 







released three years later, in August 2008. Even though DeRocco and 
Bishop had by then left the USDOL, the Internet release of the evalua-
tion on the department’s Web site was accompanied by an unprecedented, 
disavowing preface called “Summary and Caveats,” which sought to 
impugn the report and its conclusions by opining that the methodology 
of the researchers “may well have led to erroneous results.” 
State evaluations 
Washingon State Community College study. Jacobson, LaLonde, 
and Sullivan (2002) studied the impact on dislocated workers of enroll-
ing in community college courses. The study examined the universe of 
the 121,000 dislocated workers who filed valid claims for unemploy-
ment insurance in Washington State in the first half of the 1990s. A
group of approximately 25,000 of those workers enrolled in at least one 
course provided at one of 25 community colleges. 
The study identified “high return” classes—those that improved the 
annual earnings of participants. Participants experienced high economic
returns from taking and completing courses that provided more techni-
cal academic and vocational skills—including courses in the health and 
engineering fields—and math and science classes. 
The study findings suggest that substantial economic returns to 
training are concentrated in the high return classes. Thus, the depart-
ment and state workforce agencies should encourage training program 
operators to provide job training in these areas, and to provide informa-
tion to unemployed workers about the types of job training that can best 
increase their earning power. 
State Workforce Investment Act evaluations. A number of states 
have been interested enough in the effectiveness of their training pro-
grams to fund program evaluations conducted by third parties. Two of 
these evaluations have been conducted by Kevin Hollenbeck. Wash-
ington had a third-party evaluation conducted for its employment and 
training programs; Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) conducted a net 
impact and benefit-cost evaluation of 11 state and federal workforce 
development programs operating in Washington State, including the 
WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs. The study used quasiex-
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registered with the ES but did not participate in the programs. Find-
ings were generally positive, concluding that “the benefit-cost analyses 
show that virtually all of the programs have discounted future benefits 
that far exceed the costs for participants, and that society also receives 
a positive return on investment” (p. iii). Short-term net impact find-
ings were positive for the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs 
but not for the WIA Youth Program, while the long-term impacts were 
positive for all three programs. None of the three programs had a posi-
tive benefit-cost ratio from the perspective of the government sector, 
although the WIA Dislocated Worker and Youth programs had positive 
long-run ratios (pp. 7–9). 
Hollenbeck and Huang (2008) also conducted a study of workforce 
program performance indicators for Virginia. Their performance indi-
cators included gross and net impact indicators, and they recommended 
that Virginia use net impacts rather than gross impacts. Their net impact 
indicators flowed from a quasiexperimental evaluation for workers 
exiting programs between July 2004 and June 2005 using administra-
tive data. For department-funded programs, the study covered the WIA
Adult and Youth programs but not the WIA Dislocated Worker Pro-
gram. The comparison group was workers who participated in the ES. 
The net impact results—measured at two quarters after program 
exit—indicated the WIA Adult Program had a small positive impact 
of about 5 percent on earnings. These results were small compared to 
Vocational Rehabilitation programs, which resulted in nearly 20 per-
cent earnings increases. The WIAYouth Program, however, had a small 
negative, significant impact on employment. 
The longer-term net impact, measured at four quarters after pro-
gram exit, indicated that the WIA Adult Program had a smaller, 3 per-
cent positive impact on employment, while the WIA Youth program 
impact on employment was not significant. 
The positive net impact of each of the WIA programs on quarterly 
earnings was between $400 and $500 two quarters after program exit. 
By four quarters after program exit, the positive effects on quarterly 
earnings had declined to less than $200 for WIA adults and to less than 










how much Job Training Do Employment and Training 
Programs Provide? 
All department-funded employment and training programs provide 
more employment services than training services. Training services 
are limited for many reasons. One reason is the lack of demand from 
workers because most unemployed workers want to become employed 
immediately. Many workers do not want, and cannot afford, to wait to 
receive training before they go back to work. Second, the limited and 
declining budgets for programs with training components have meant 
that these programs only can afford to provide limited amounts of train-
ing. Training is considerably more expensive than other employment 
services. Accordingly, local agencies provide training services less fre-
quently than they do employment services. 
In addition, job training is frequently provided and funded by agen-
cies other than the USDOL. Department programs fund only a small 
portion of the training that is provided by federal, state, and local 
agencies. 
In 2003, Domestic Policy Council staff at the Bush White House 
asked Assistant Secretary DeRocco why ETA-funded training was so 
expensive. Naively, they were dividing the ETA’s entire WIA appro-
priation by the number of workers receiving job training annually, and 
they were outraged that short-term training appeared to cost more than 
$20,000 per trainee. The erroneous assumption made by Domestic Pol-
icy Council (DPC) staff was that the ETA programs were solely training 
programs, and that they provided no other valuable employment and 
reemployment assistance services. 
Since DeRocco could not explain the true cost per training partici-
pant, she asked Eric Johnson, the ETA’s director of performance mea-
surement, to prepare a response. Johnson knew that only a small per-
centage of ETA funds were being used to provide training and that WIA
core and intensive services absorbed the majority of WIA funds. How-
ever, he was unable to respond to the DPC’s concern directly, because 
the ETA cost accounting reports received from the states do not break 
down expenditures by the type of employment services provided. John-
son came and asked me, as ETA research director, to conduct a study 
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The resulting study (Mikelson and Nightingale 2006) estimated 
the amount and the portion of department employment and training 
program funds that are expended on job training. While it was widely 
known that U.S. “training programs” have always encompassed much 
more than training, the study estimated that in 2002, out of the $6.5 bil-
lion appropriated for employment and training programs, only between 
$1.1 and $1.7 billion (18 to 27 percent) actually was spent on training. 
Thus, approximately three-quarters (or more) of funding was spent on 
services other than training. The result is not surprising in a universal-
access, One-Stop environment in which the great majority of workers 
only need core and intensive services. It also is not surprising given the 
finding that workers go through a complex triage process before they 
are referred to training. Counseling workers to determine whether core 
and intensive services will suffice or whether they should be referred to 
receive scarce training vouchers takes time—it requires several hours 
of counseling prior to referral to training (Table 7.1). 
Not only are most ETA programs thought of as training programs, 
but among ETA programs the WIA programs are often thought of as 
“the” training programs of the department. In fact, other ETA-funded 
Table 7.1  Estimated Expenditures on Job Training and Number of 
Trainees in U.S. Department of Labor Programs, 2002 
Low estimate High estimate Approximate 
Program/funding source ($000) ($000) no. of trainees 
WIA—Dislocated Worker 280,215.0 467,025.0 93,400 
programs 
WIA—Adult activities 303,237.0 505,395.0 101,000 
WIA—Youth activities 47,801.4 159,338.0 63,700 
Job Corps 207,100.0 207,100.0 52,800 
Trade Adjustment 79,823.2 79,823.2 40,700 
Assistance 
H-1B Technical Skills 12,071.2 19,752.9 29,500 
Grants 
All other labor programs 217,141.7 308,823.9 113,900 
Total estimate for labor 1,147,389.5 1,747,258.0 495,000 
programs 







programs (e.g., Trade Adjustment Assistance, or TAA) also provide a 
great deal of job training services. In 2002, the job training programs 
funded by the ETA provided training to a half-million workers. Since 
the WIA programs trained an estimated 258,100 individuals, WIA sup-
plied only about half as much job training as was provided by ETA-
funded programs. 
While the Labor Department is a major provider of job training 
resources, other federal agencies provide a great deal of job training 
too. At the state level, referrals to job training are frequently provided 
by state agencies. Mikelson and Nightingale (2006) estimated that the 
USDOL accounts for approximately one-third of the federal expendi-
tures on training made by all civilian federal agencies. The Department 
of Education provides considerably more job training than the Depart-
ment of Labor, and a number of other domestic federal agencies also 
provide a significant amount of training (Table 7.2). 
O’Shea and King (2001) examined the issue of who funds public 
job training services from the state perspective. They looked at the dis-
tribution of state expenditures in three states—Tennessee, Texas, and 
Washington—during the early implementation of the WIA program. 
They found that WIA core and intensive services frequently “absorb 
the available training dollars under WIA,” so that states are left to fund 
much of the public job training using state training programs and advis-
Table 7.2  Federal Spending on Job Training, by Department, 2002 
(excluding administrative cost; $ millions) 
Low estimate High estimate 
Department $ % $ % 
Labor 1,147.0 36.0 1,747.3 33.2 
Education—Pell Grants 1,250.0 39.2 1,875.0 35.6 
Education—all others 628.8 19.7 1,318.6 25.1 
Health & Human Services 93.8 2.9 169.6 3.2 
Veterans Affairs 40.4 1.3 121.1 2.3 
Housing & Urban Development 26.9 0.1 26.9 0.1 
Interior 3.1 < 0.1 5.1 < 0.1 
Justicea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total federal 3,190.0 99.3 5,263.6 99.6 
NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding. 
a Justice’s Serious and Violent Offender Program was not yet in operation. 
SOURCE: Mikelson and Nightingale (2006), p. 40. 
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ing workers to apply for Pell Grants and direct loans, as well as other 
student loans. 
The job training that private firms provide to their workers is subject 
to widely varying estimates. Mikelson and Nightingale (2006) exam-
ined four different surveys of firms and found that they spent about $50 
billion per year on training. These expenditures included training costs 
and salary costs but not the cost of the administration of their training 
programs. 
Estimates also vary about the number of employees who receive 
private sector–provided training each year. The answer depends on 
whom you ask. Surveys of firms suggest that approximately 70 percent 
of their workers receive training. However, surveys of workers yield 
much lower numbers. Workers employed by firms with more than 100 
employees indicated that only 20 to 25 percent of workers received 
training. Training was also very unevenly distributed among work-
ers; its provision varied principally by education. The study found that 
workers with more education were much more likely to receive training 
than workers who are less educated (Mickelson and Nightingale 2006). 
Compared to all other sources of job training funding, department-
funded job training programs are small. Indeed, other federal agencies 
provide more job training than the department does. Many of the job 
training referrals by the One-Stops are made to training funded by state 
programs and by other federal government agencies. The department 
also spends a small amount on training compared to the private sector; 
in fact, it spends 3 percent or less of the annual spending on private sec-
tor training. The number of workers receiving department-funded train-
ing amounts to considerably less than 5 percent of those who receive 
private sector training. 
TRAININg VOUChERS AND INDIVIDUAL
TRAININg ACCOUNTS 
Vouchers in the Provision of Public Services 
A voucher is a “subsidy that grants limited purchasing power to 







(Steuerle 2000, pp. 4–5). Vouchers are one of the many ways that the 
government can provide services. Vouchers must compete with other 
delivery mechanisms: direct government delivery, contracting out of 
government services, use of competitive public suppliers, or provid-
ing loans or cash payments. While vouchers have been widely used 
elsewhere in government, until the WIA was implemented in 2000 they 
were relatively untested in the workforce development system. Prior to 
WIA implementation, the workforce development system did not pro-
vide training services; it contracted out training services to both public 
and private providers. With the implementation of WIA, widespread 
use of training vouchers was introduced to customers, who can use 
them to purchase training services from either private or public training 
providers. The expected effect was not greater privatization of training 
services but an increase in consumer choice. 
A number of characteristics are common to all voucher programs. 
The purpose of vouchers is to increase the supply of services from 
which consumers can choose. That is, vouchers are expected to cre-
ate competition among service providers. Whether this happens or not 
depends on the initial and long-term number of suppliers or providers 
(which is heavily affected by population density), on entry conditions 
in the market, and on the degree of regulation in the market (e.g., in 
health care). 
Vouchers also have an effect on the demand for the good or ser-
vice in question. In exercising consumer choice, recipients are expected 
to have enough information to make an educated choice. In a “Free 
Choice” voucher model, customers choose job finding and training ser-
vices on their own without the intervention of government officials.3 
But customers may not have the ability to make sound choices: they 
may lack either competence or resources. Problems might include lack 
of information as well as lack of interest or motivation. Information 
may be asymmetric in the sense that customers might have less infor-
mation than do the service providers. In some cases, the complexity 
of decision-making may make training vouchers problematic, as when 
recipients must determine the quality and effectiveness of training pro-
viders as well as whether the training will match their own skills and 
abilities (Barnow 2000). Similarly, recipients might face a complex 
of choices that suggest the need for “Informed Choice,” in which the 
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government worker providing information to the recipient. Informed 
Choice has been identified as a concern in connection with the “bun-
dling” of multiple services; it suggests that there might need to be an 
intermediate position between the freedom of providing cash without 
restraints and the restriction of providing in-kind services (Lerman and 
Steuerle 2000). 
The above discussion also suggests that the sharing of information 
between government agencies and recipients might act as a substitute 
for making information available directly to the recipient. In this regard, 
frontline government workers can provide two things: 1) an assessment 
of an individual customer’s abilities and skills regarding alternative 
occupations and 2) their personal knowledge about training providers 
in the local labor market. These mediated services may act, in part, as a 
substitute for the customer’s direct, self-service use of the informational 
tools, such as labor market information, information on the track record 
of the training providers (i.e., WIA Consumer Reports), and the list of 
training providers who are permitted to receive the training vouchers 
(i.e., WIA Eligible Training Provider lists). 
Vouchers may also increase prices if they increase the demand for a 
particular service. For example, there is evidence that the student loan 
program has had the effect of raising the price of higher education, and 
Section 8 housing vouchers have raised rents in areas of high usage. 
Furthermore, vouchers may raise prices if suppliers are allowed to dis-
criminate between purchasers who use vouchers and those who do not 
(Steuerle 2000, pp. 18–19). 
models for Training Vouchers 
Once WIA was enacted, the challenge for the workforce develop-
ment system was to determine the effectiveness of training vouchers, 
something that has been largely untested in the workforce develop-
ment context. A review of the use of vouchers for public training pro-
grams for disadvantaged and dislocated workers indicates that “there 
is little evidence that vouchers for these workers are effective and that 
they are a better alternative than other service delivery mechanisms” 
(Barnow 2000). Few precedents were found for the training voucher 
that became part of WIA. However, evaluations of two early voucher-













for low-wage workers of the 1970s and the TAA program of the late 
1980s—found that neither had positive impacts (Barnow 2000). 
Not only was the use of public job training vouchers largely un-
tested, but it was unclear what was meant by a training voucher. A num-
ber of different approaches to vouchers have been discussed and tried. 
Individuals receiving public training could be given more or less free-
dom to choose. Under past programs, frontline workers could provide 
more or less information and guidance about how to use these funds. 
As these precedents were analyzed along a continuum of the degree of 
freedom, information, and guidance they offered, three models emerged 
for providing public training vouchers. A number of studies have con-
sidered these models in reviews and evaluations of training programs 
and demonstrations (Table 7.3): early pre-WIA voucher programs; an 
early voucher demonstration under WIA; and the ITA Experiment, 
which tested alternative approaches to WIA training vouchers (Barnow 
and Trutko 1999; D’Amico et al. 2001; D’Amico et al. 2004; Public 
Policy Associates 1999). 
An Informed Choice model represents the middle of the continuum. 
Although this model was not specified in the development of WIA, it 
became the operational model that was chosen by the great majority of 
service delivery areas and local boards both before and after the imple-
mentation of WIA. The Informed Choice model, when applied to indi-
viduals who, it is determined, are in need of training, has four main 
characteristics: 
1) Assessment and counseling are provided to transmit labor mar-
ket information, and to determine whether the proposed train-
ing is both appropriate for the customer and also in a demand 
occupation. 
2) Training vendors are screened to determine the quality, out-
comes, and cost of training. 
3) Counselors and customers jointly make decisions, with front-
line staff acting in the roles of guides, facilitators, and informa-
tion brokers. 
4) The voucher is limited both in time and dollar value. 
In assisting customers, One-Stop centers provide information, 
assistance, and guidance with the goal of helping customers make the 
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ket information, conduct assessments to assure that customers have a 
realistic view of their abilities, and provide information about the train-
ing programs and vendors. Frontline staff members play a guiding or 
facilitating role, but the final choice is the customer’s. 
In contrast, a Free Choice model gives the training participant 
maximum choice and may restrict the role of frontline staff. Individu-
als deemed in need of training are offered training vouchers. They can 
make use of them, if they wish, with no further guidance from work-
force development counselors. They can make use of labor market 
information, vendor information, and assessment tools available at the 
One-Stop centers, but they can use the voucher for training in any occu-
pation that is not restricted by law. They also can use the voucher to pur-
chase training from any training provider on the state or local Eligible 
Training Provider list. This model is most like the policy concept that 
was considered in the early 1990s prior to enactment of WIA. 
Finally, under a Directed Choice model, frontline workers provide 
labor market information, assessment, and training and vendor infor-
mation as in the Informed Choice model, but they also play a stronger 
role. Rather than simply providing technical guidance from their own 
knowledge, frontline workers use their professional judgment about 
what program and which training provider to select for a customer. 
These staff members make use of their knowledge regarding training 
programs, demand for occupations and wages, customers’ skills and 
abilities, customers’ ability to successfully complete the training, and 
the best choices of training providers in the local labor market. Coun-
selors can guide customers to more cost-effective training choices or 
restrict choices that are likely to be less cost-effective. 
Development of Training Voucher Policy 
The introduction of training vouchers—called Individual Train-
ing Accounts (ITAs)—under WIA was a sharp departure from past 
workforce development system approaches. Training vouchers also 
represented a move into untested waters. Under previous training pro-
grams—the Manpower Development and Training Act, Comprehen-
sive Employment and Training Act, and Job Training Partnership Act 
programs—the USDOL, states, and localities contracted with private 









Ross (Barnow and Management ITA/ETP (D’Amico et ITA PRAs WRAs 
proposal Trutko 1999) Account Demo al. 2004) Experiment (H.R. 444) (H.R. 3976) 
Dates 1993 Pre-1999 1995–97 2002 2003–04 2002–04 2003 2005 
Type of choice Free 8 Informed Informed Nearly all Nearly all Free/ Free Free 
1 free informed informed informed/ 
directed 
Voucher amt. ($) 1,200 2,000– 2,500– 1,700– 1,200– 3,000 & 3,000 3,000 
10,000 8,500 10,000 10,000 8,000a or less or less 
Avg. voucher amt. ($) 
modal — — — — 5,000 3,133 — — 
median — — — — 5,000 3,116 — — 
mean — — 3,292 — — 4,764 — — 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable; — = not available. 
a Maximum voucher amount during the demonstration. After the demonstration, the eight demonstration sites had caps ranging from 
$3,000 to $6,000; the modal value was $3,000, and the median value was either $4,000 or $4,500. 
SOURCE: Barnow and Trutko (1999); D’Amico et al. (2004); D’Amico and Salzman (2005); Perez-Johnson et al. (2004); Public Policy 
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model for public training programs came as a result of a public policy 
movement to incorporate customer choice in the provision of govern-
ment services. The customer choice approach was expected to make the 
delivery of government services more effective and efficient by making 
use of the market mechanism—i.e., to compete with or substitute for 
the usual way of providing government services. Policy gurus recom-
mended vouchers for use at the local, state, and federal levels, citing 
successful implementation of voucher programs in a wide variety of 
contexts (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). 
Prior to his election, Bill Clinton was associated with the centrist 
New Democrats, who adopted this customer choice approach in the 
early 1990s as a method of providing government goods and services.
With respect to workforce development programs, the Progressive 
Policy Institute, also associated with the New Democrats, advocated a 
“market-based competitive system” under the emerging One-Stop cen-
ter system, in which service providers would compete for customers 
who could make their own choices without being subject to the “control 
of the government bureaucracy” (Plastrik 1994). 
Doug Ross, who became the first assistant secretary for employ-
ment and training in the Clinton administration, wrote a chapter in the 
Progressive Policy Institute’s book Mandate for Change (Marshall and 
Schram 1993) that became a policy guidepost to the administration. 
He advocated a more competitive American workforce system, one 
that recognized that individual jobs could not be protected but would 
assure displaced workers a return to work through retraining.4 Dislo-
cated workers would receive education and retraining through Career 
Opportunity Cards—vouchers in the form of “smart cards.” With the 
cards, workers could purchase job finding and training services that 
would “give Americans direct control of the education and career 
development resources that are the principal new source of economic 
security.” Workers experiencing “a threat . . . to economic security” 
would be eligible for a smart card with a value of up to $1,200, “the 
approximate cost of one year of community college training,” which 
could be used at any educational or training institution that provided 
performance information to state workforce agencies. These agen-
cies would put this information into “Consumer Reports–type infor-
mation regarding . . . completion rates, placement rates and starting 
wage rates” that would be available to individuals selecting training 








Thus, Ross embraced training vouchers as the preferred method of 
providing training and employment services, combining it with smart 
card technology. His concept of free choice allowed customers to assess 
the outcomes of service providers on their own. Ross would not have 
included a government role in the decision process; he did not pro-
pose assigning states and localities the task of assessing the quality of 
service providers and restricting training provider participation, as was 
done later through Eligible Training Provider lists under WIA. Ross 
supported giving workers free choice in selecting the kind of training 
they received and who provided it (Ross 1993, p. 68). Ross’s voucher 
would have been funded at less than the current cost of most short-term 
training and did not provide for income support while workers attended 
a year of community college. Ross set the maximum value of his train-
ing vouchers low because the voucher would be made broadly available 
to all dislocated workers, not just to the small number of workers most 
in need of training services. Ross’s free choice model did not prevail; 
in WIA, Congress adopted the informed choice model for its training 
vouchers. 
The market model approach to training services was initiated by 
transforming the infrastructure for workforce development service 
delivery. Flowing from the Clinton administration’s National Perfor-
mance Review, a policy decision was made in 1993 to create a “system 
of competitive, One-Stop, career development centers open to all Amer-
icans” (Gore 1993, p. 49). This was followed by a One-Stop implemen-
tation grant initiative that preceded the enactment of WIA. One-Stop 
centers would provide universal access to what would become WIA
core services. It was thought that training vouchers would eliminate 
the need to provide targeted training programs through three separate 
USDOL programs aimed at youth, disadvantaged adults, and dislocated 
workers. The Clinton administration hoped to create a more open pro-
cess of funding eligibility and selection that would be facilitated by 
providing vouchers to all workers (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001). 
The One-Stop centers were a budget initiative that began in the first 
year of the Clinton administration and ran from FY 1994 to FY 2000, 
during which time grants were awarded to develop One-Stop centers in 
all states. This initiative commenced under the JTPA, preceding WIA’s 
enactment by five years. Curiously, the first, but unsuccessful, proposal 
to replace JTPA was the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994, which 
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did not incorporate a provision permitting the use of vouchers (Balduc-
chi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997; Balducchi and Pasternak 2001). 
The use of training vouchers as a substitute for training assignment 
was first proposed by President Clinton as part of a policy proposal called 
the Middle Class Bill of Rights, after Congress failed to enact the 1994 
Reemployment Act. Vouchers were seen as a way to bring the market to 
bear on job training programs. Rather than having job counselors in local 
workforce agencies choose who would receive what kind of training from 
which providers, customers would make their own choices. It was thought 
that vouchers would empower these customers to make their own deci-
sions, resulting in improved training opportunities through the triumph of 
a newly created public training market (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001). 
Early in the policy discussion, it was assumed that the market 
mechanism would result in customers making better choices than those 
made by training counselors. Consumers would demand the best pos-
sible training services for themselves. It was expected, however, that 
consumers would have good information both about which occupations 
to train for and which training providers to select. Customers would 
require information on which occupations were in demand and what 
wages they could expect when they completed training. It was also 
anticipated that they would glean information on which occupations 
offered the best long-term career paths and would use the information 
wisely. These assumptions about training vouchers are embodied in the 
free choice model. The assumptions, however, were faulty. States found 
it difficult and expensive to develop and maintain WIA’s Consumer 
Reports and Eligible Training Provider lists, and the department lost 
interest in funding and supporting the labor market information pro-
grams that were the foundation of training vouchers. By the late 2000s, 
the information infrastructure essential to supporting training vouchers 
had collapsed. 
Training Vouchers before the Workforce Investment Act 
Implementation of training voucher programs began on a small 
scale even before the enactment of WIA. Some individual localities 
tried vouchers on their own. For example, the Atlanta Regional Com-
mission first used vouchers under JTPA in 1991 to provide training to 






went bankrupt. Given the size of the dislocation and the limited staff 
to serve Eastern’s workers, the commission could not make use of the 
JTPA classroom training approach. The experience of the commission 
was that many of the dislocated workers served by the vouchers made 
poor training choices: they selected training for occupations that pro-
vided low wages or for which there was little likelihood of career devel-
opment (e.g., cosmetology and bartending). In response to this experi-
ence, the commission began to build its own vendor list and monitor 
vendor performance (D’Amico et al. 2001, pp. II-2, II-3). 
Shortly before WIA implementation, the department funded a study 
of the use of vouchers under JTPA. The researchers found that the 
voucher system using the informed choice model was in effect in eight 
of nine sites, while one site used the free choice model. They found 
that all agencies limited the time that vouchers could be used (gener-
ally to two years or less) and that most agencies also limited the dollar 
amount (to between $2,000 and $10,000) that could be paid for training. 
While agency payment was not always contingent upon placement of 
the training participant, it was usually contingent upon training comple-
tion. Agencies usually had a screening process to assess which train-
ing providers could be approved to provide training, based on training 
courses offered, costs, and outcomes. They also usually developed a list 
of approved providers based on past performance (Barnow and Trutko 
1999). 
As policy interest grew, the USDOL began to look further into 
vouchers in the mid-1990s. In anticipation of the possible enactment of 
individual training accounts (ITAs), the department conducted a Career 
Management Account (CMA) demonstration. This project was carried 
out from 1995 to 1997 at 13 sites (Public Policy Associates 1999). The 
demonstration was designed to provide models for a new workforce 
development program that would provide training using vouchers. The 
vouchers, however, were only used to provide training services to a 
sample of dislocated workers at each site. Sites continued to operate 
their nonvoucher programs while designing and operating a voucher 
program for between 200 and 1,208 participants per site, at an aver-
age of 335 participants per site. Voucher design varied widely between 
sites and included as recipients those determined to be most in need, 
unemployment insurance claimants most likely to exhaust their ben-
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ested dislocated workers. The maximum amount of the grant varied 
from $2,500 to $8,500. The average cost per participant was $3,292. 
The CMA demonstration delivery system, however, largely failed to 
test the efficacy of nondirected customer choice. Sites continued to 
provide assessment, counseling, and labor market information. Partici-
pants were given the freedom to choose how to use their vouchers, but 
evaluation results indicated that a critical factor in customer satisfaction 
with the CMA demonstration was the strong role played by CMA case 
workers and the information provided to customers by frontline case 
workers to guide their training decisions. 
The CMA demonstration sites used an informed choice model, but 
with widely varying designs and specifications. The process analysis 
conducted by Public Policy Associates provided a sense of some of the 
issues involved in implementing an informed choice model. However, 
the evaluation design did not permit the measurement of net impacts of 
the demonstration. Thus, the demonstration provides limited insight for 
making policy choices on the design and use of vouchers. 
In response to the CMA demonstration, a number of demonstra-
tion sites continued to use the voucher approach after the 1995–1997 
demonstration ended. Metro Portland, for example, initiated an Indi-
vidual Learning Account approach under which customers made regu-
lar contributions to an account that could be used to pay for training or 
education, with contributions matched by employers and social service 
agencies. The Baltimore Office of Employment Development also con-
tinued the voucher approach after CMA ended, making case manag-
ers into coaches who helped customers make informed choices, and 
empowering those case managers to make decisions about customers 
with special needs (D’Amico et al. 2001, pp. II-2, II-3). 
The Career Management Account demonstration provided limited 
information about how to make the transition from JTPA assignment 
to training slots. Upon enactment, WIA programs abruptly made the 
transition to training vouchers. 
Vouchers under the Workforce Investment Act 
In 1998, when the bill that became WIA emerged from negotiations 
between the Democratic administration and the Republican-controlled 









tion. The question remained, however, as to whether the training vouch-
ers would follow the free or informed choice model. 
Section 134(d)(4)(F) of the WIA provides “consumer choice 
requirements” and states that “in general . . . training services . . . shall 
be provided in a manner that maximizes consumer choice in the selec-
tion of an eligible provider of such services.” For eligible providers, 
such information must include “a description of the programs through 
which the providers may offer the training services” and “performance 
information and performance cost information.” 
Section 134(d)(4)(G) of the WIA states that “training services . . . 
shall be provided through the use of individual training accounts . . . and 
shall be provided to eligible individuals through the one-stop delivery 
system,” with the following exceptions: on-the-job training, custom-
ized training, cases where there are insufficient numbers of eligible pro-
viders to allow for customer choice, and training services provided to 
special populations that face multiple barriers to employment. 
Congress, however, made clear that it favored an informed choice 
approach. Both the House and the Senate indicated that although they 
supported Individual Training Accounts, their support was conditional. 
Senate Report 105-109 went beyond the language in WIA and said with 
respect to ITAs that “case management, such as general guidance or rec-
ommendations . . . will be provided to varying degrees, based on case-
by-case judgment by the manager,” while, after consulting an Eligible 
Training Provider list and Consumer Reports, “the ultimate decision 
about what field to pursue and which provider to select is the partici-
pant’s.” Similarly, House Report 105-093 observed “that the success of 
the use of skills grants is contingent upon several supporting elements”
and went on to describe the reasons that Eligible Training Provider lists 
and Consumer Reports are needed. 
The department, however, did not take a position on how the new 
Individual Training Accounts should be administered but delegated 
decision-making authority to the states and local boards. In the sum-
mary and explanations to the WIA regulations—20 CFR 660-671— 
published on August 11, 2000, in the Federal Register, the department 
stated that “Section 660.410 provides a definition for an ITA that seeks 
to provide maximum flexibility to State and local program operators 
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making payments . . . rather they provide that authority to the State or 
Local Boards.” 
Thus, the federal government authorized states and localities to 
select the nature of Individual Training Accounts along a continuum 
from free to informed choice. By leaving the decision to the states and 
localities, the department effectively defaulted to the informed choice 
model, as that is what the pre-WIA experience suggested would be the 
states’ and localities’ choice. 
The informed choice model received supportive assistance. Imple-
mentation was aided by various tools available to frontline workers and 
customers. Most important among them were labor market informa-
tion tools developed in the 1990s that provided useful information, both 
for the selection of training that would result in good jobs and for the 
selection of training providers who could help workers get those jobs. 
The improved and more automated labor market information system— 
called America’s Labor Market Information System (ALMIS)—was 
specifically developed to support a market-oriented training system 
under WIA. It was available to help ITA recipients make choices about 
which high-demand, high-wage occupations to train for in their local 
labor markets (Woods and Frugoli 2004). 
Early Implementation Demonstration of WIA Training Vouchers 
Because the training vouchers authorized by WIA had not received 
much testing prior to WIA enactment, the ETA’s dislocated worker 
office was anxious to jump-start the process.5 The result was a training 
voucher demonstration that provided funding for those state and local 
areas that were willing to be early implementers of training vouchers. 
These sites would be studied and the lessons learned would be shared 
with states and local areas that adopted training vouchers more slowly. 
In March 2000, the USDOL selected 13 sites (six local workforce 
investment areas and seven states) to accelerate their participation in 
the ITA process through an Individual Training Account/Eligible Train-
ing Provider (ITA/ETP) Demonstration project. Twelve of these dem-
onstration sites used the Informed Choice model. Only one site pre-
dominantly used the Free Choice model. 
All sites had dollar caps on the Individual Training Account amounts, 














was to be measured, sites had an interest in having their ITA recipients 
complete training and find subsequent employment. They maintained 
contact with ITA recipients during their training and tried to help solve 
any problems. Although the sites varied in how proactive they were, all 
sites contacted recipients at least once a month. Among training provid-
ers, proprietary schools were the most proactive in helping trainees get 
through training and in assisting trainees in finding jobs after comple-
tion. Community colleges were less proactive, although they too pro-
vided counseling and placement services. 
The ITA/ETP Demonstration examined the implementation of ITAs 
in the demonstration sites through early 2002 (D’Amico and Salzman 
2005). By that time, WIA programs had developed and matured. Local 
areas were more comfortable authorizing training, and the number of 
workers receiving training had increased above the depressed 2000 lev-
els. Nearly all local areas were planning to primarily use ITAs rather 
than on-the-job, contract, or customized training. The ITA approach 
used by nearly all areas was the Informed Choice model, since local 
areas were concerned that individuals authorized to receive training 
should receive adequate information, guidance, and assistance from 
frontline staff. States increased the quantity of training they provided 
after the department informed the states that it was not advocating a 
work-first philosophy that deemphasized training. More training also 
could be provided as the costly WIA infrastructure for providing core, 
intensive, and training services was completed. Eligible Training Pro-
vider (ETP) lists were established and expanded. Many states found 
ways to make it easier for training providers to get on the list, including 
easing eligibility requirements and collecting most of the required data 
about training providers from unemployment insurance wage records. 
These ETP lists provided a substantial range of choices, although the 
range of choices increased in areas that were more urbanized. A system 
of WIA Consumer Reports was generally searchable on-line and pro-
vided information to support consumer choice, including basic infor-
mation on training programs. 
Implementation of Training Vouchers 
A study of WIA implementation in eight states (Barnow and King 
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WIA system. They were popular both with participants and with the 
local workforce investment boards (WIBs). Participants appreciated the 
ability to make their own choices about training. Local WIBs found that 
vouchers worked well as long as they were able to guide participants’
choices. 
Using the Informed Choice approach, states and localities set maxi-
mum dollar amounts of the vouchers, the time within which they had to 
be used, and guided the participants’ choices regarding training types 
and providers of training. Barnow and King noted that the USDOL
also was conducting a training voucher experiment testing alterna-
tive types of vouchers. The study suggested that the evaluation of the 
department’s experiment would provide evidence regarding how much 
guidance local workforce investment boards should provide to training 
participants. 
Barnow and King went on to note that WIA permits exceptions 
under which training can be provided without using vouchers. They 
sought to examine how these exceptions were used but found too few 
cases to draw any conclusions about their efficacy and recommended a 
special study of these exceptions.6 
Barnow and King also found a number of problems with the admin-
istration of vouchers. First, some states and localities had difficulty 
establishing the ETP lists reflecting training providers’ success in plac-
ing training participants. Some state workforce agencies had techni-
cal difficulty developing the lists. Some training providers objected to 
providing the detailed information used to develop the lists. The study 
suggested that states could develop more efficient methods of develop-
ing the lists, and less intrusive methods for providing data from training 
programs that have few WIA enrollees. 
Second, the maximum voucher amount was meant to be a ceiling, 
but some states found that training providers responded to the maxi-
mum by making it the floor for their training voucher charges. Third, 
the study also found that adults sometimes made inappropriate and 
overreaching choices in selecting training programs. 
The U.S. Department of Labor funded another Workforce Invest-
ment Act implementation study, this one of 38 local workforce areas 
in 21 states between the fall of 1999 and January 2004 (D’Amico et 
al. 2004). The study found that 10 of the 14 sites visited used ITAs 











Some rural areas used ITAs little or not at all. Local areas used custom-
ized training when they sought to align workforce development with 
economic development. And local areas used contract training to serve 
special groups such as the homeless and workers with disabilities. 
D’Amico et al. (2004) also found that most local areas placed simi-
lar time limits on the use of vouchers—between one and two years. 
The maximum voucher amount, however, varied widely among 29 
local areas—between $1,200 and $10,000. Among these areas both the 
median voucher and the mode were $5,000. 
With respect to the degree of customer choice, the study found that 
the informed choice approach was used at virtually every site research-
ers visited. The researchers did find, however, that consumer choice was 
constrained when one of four conditions was present: 1) the number of 
training providers was limited, particularly in rural areas; 2) sites were 
in the process of making the transition to the more stringent standards 
of WIA subsequent eligibility; 3) dollar caps on training vouchers lim-
ited access to certain types of training; and 4) training providers encour-
aged potentially WIA-eligible workers to seek training at the One-Stops 
(“reverse referrals”). 
Exploring Voucher Options: The ITA Experiment 
At the time the ITA/ETP Demonstration began, I encouraged the 
department to learn more about training vouchers and particularly about 
alternative designs for training vouchers. Since training vouchers were 
a given under WIA, the key policy question was which voucher design 
was most effective. The research unit chief, Jon Messenger, and I 
developed a design for an ITA experiment and presented it to the ETA’s 
career deputy assistant secretary, Ray Uhalde. Before approving the 
proposal, Uhalde wanted to be sure that the three treatments were dif-
ferent enough that the experiment would likely yield significant results. 
Interestingly, he also raised the issue of whether the experiment might 
reflect adversely on the new WIA programs, as the Job Training Part-
nership Act Evaluation had on the JTPA program. The sensitivity to the 
program and budgetary impacts of the JTPA Evaluation was still raw 
four years after the evaluation was published. 
The ITA Experiment reflected the WIA program requirement that 
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had to meet four qualifications: they must 1) be determined to be “in need 
of training,” 2) have the skills and qualifications to complete the training,
3) have received at least one core and one intensive service, and 4) be 
unable to obtain funding assistance to pay for training from some other 
source. To meet each of these requirements, customers had to interact 
with WIA staff. For example, customers might have to do the follow-
ing: demonstrate that they had unsuccessfully searched for work or had 
scored above a cutoff on an administered assessment form; take a basic 
skills test to determine their skills and qualifications; complete occupa-
tional counseling; and receive an intensive service such as a job search 
or career exploratory workshop, participate in a job club, or have their 
recent job searches reviewed (Perez-Johnson et al. 2004, pp. 32–35). 
Mathematica Policy Research conducted the ITA Experiment for 
the department, testing three approaches to vouchers: the free choice, 
informed choice, and directed choice models (Table 7.4).7 The goal of 
the experiment was to determine which model was most efficient by 
looking at participants’ employment and earnings outcomes after they 
completed training and returned to work. The three approaches were 
tested in eight study sites in Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, and North Carolina. Approximately 8,000 WIA customers 
enrolled in the program between December 2001 and February 2004. 
Truncating the process, Deputy Assistant Secretary Mason Bishop 
Table 7.4  The Three Approaches Tested for the Design of the ITA
Experiment 
Approach 1, Approach 2, Approach 3, 
Directed Choice Informed Choice Free Choice 
Award amount Customized Fixed Fixed 
Counseling Mandatory, Mandatory, Voluntary 
most intensive moderately 
intensive 
Could counselors Yes No No 
reject customers’
program choice? 
NOTE: Under the ITA Experiment, directed choice = “structured customer choice”; 
informed choice = “guided customer choice”; and free choice = “maximum customer 
choice.” 









ordered Mathematica to produce an evaluation report before all the par-
ticipants enrolled in the project had the opportunity to complete their 
training. As a result, Mathematica’s initial “final evaluation report,” 
completed in December 2006, produced no meaningful results. In the 
Spring of 2007, the Labor Branch of the Office of Management and 
Budget objected to the premature survey and ordered the department 
to contract for a second survey and a second final report. The contract 
was let, and the contractor proceeded with the second survey. A second 
final evaluation with longer survey follow-up was completed in 2009.8 
The voucher design for the ITA Experiment was based on three key 
choices: 1) whether counseling is mandatory or not, 2) the size of the 
bonus, and 3) the ability of local staff to restrict customers’ training 
choices. The informed choice model looks most like the approach par-
ticipating sites had used before the experiment. Counseling was manda-
tory but, although the training provider had to be on the local or state 
Eligible Training Provider list, local staff did not ultimately restrict cus-
tomer choice with respect to training type or provider. The maximum 
voucher amount was fixed for all customers, generally at a maximum of 
$3,000 at most sites. The free choice model differed from the informed 
choice model in that counseling—beyond what was provided under 
intensive services—was not mandatory. The directed choice model dif-
fered from the informed choice model in three respects: 1) local staff 
could restrict training by type and provider; 2) more intensive counsel-
ing was mandatory after assignment to WIA-funded training; and 3) the 
maximum voucher amount was customized for each customer, gener-
ally at a maximum of $8,000.
An interim report (Perez-Johnson et al. 2004) found that the free 
and informed choice approaches had been largely implemented as 
planned, but that the directed choice model had not. Local office staff 
found a number of reasons not to make counseling after training assign-
ment mandatory, as was called for in the experimental design. Because 
they had followed an informed choice approach before the implemen-
tation of the experiment, counselors were more comfortable with that 
approach and believed it worked well. Counselors also were not com-
fortable with evaluating training appropriateness or cost-effectiveness. 
At the same time, they were reluctant to leave customers free to pur-
sue training without any guidance, and in some cases did provide some 
unrequested counseling after assignment to training, but it was neither 












Public Job Training and Training Vouchers  271 
The results of the study were most noteworthy with respect to 
the free choice model. Participants in the free choice model received 
far less counseling. Only 4 percent received counseling after training 
assignment, compared to 59 and 66 percent of the participants in the 
informed and directed choice groups, respectively. Free choice partici-
pants, however, were more likely to participate in training; 66 percent 
of them participated, compared to 58 and 59 percent of those in the 
informed and directed choice groups (Table 7.5). Despite not receiving 
counseling after assignment to training, free choice participants were no 
more likely to take training in low-wage jobs such as cosmetology and 
massage therapy than were participants in the other treatment groups. 
ETA political and policy staff discussed the need for counseling 
as part of the operation of training vouchers during the life of the ITA
Experiment. The Personal Reemployment Account (PRA) initiative 
included some of the features that superficially looked like the free 
choice model. After being briefed on the interim report of the ITA
Experiment, ETA political officials seized upon the free choice model
as the justification for the Bush administration’s WIA reauthoriza-
tion proposals of 2003 and 2005. In 2006, the free choice model was 
again used by the Bush administration—this time to justify the Career 
Advancement Accounts (CAAs) proposal. 
The Bush administration’s argument for the Personal Reemploy-
ment Accounts and Career Advancement Accounts ignored the fact that 
the ITA Experiment design provided counseling twice—once before 
and then once after the assignment to WIA-funded training. The policy 
justification for the PRAs and the CAAs concentrated on the impact 
of providing counseling after assignment to training, including the 
early indication that providing additional counseling after the training 
voucher offer did not increase training effectiveness. What the argu-
ment ignored was the fact that all participants who were assigned to 
training had already received a good deal of counseling—an average 
of five hours—before they were ever assigned to any of the three treat-
ments. Counselors took time to determine who was in need of training 
and who was not. Since training is an expensive intervention and few 
training slots are available, counselors had to determine who would be 
most likely to benefit from training (McConnell et al. 2006, p. xxvi). 
In the ITAExperiment, the free choice approach was shown to assure 
high rates of participation in training without fear that training would be 
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Table 7.5  Summary of Impacts of the ITA Experiment 
Means Impacts 
A1, Directed A2, Informed A3, Free Between Between 
Choice Choice Choice A1 and A2 A3 and A2 
Customers’ experience obtaining an ITA 
Attended or was excused from an ITA orientation (%) 69 67 74 2 7*** 
Received counseling after an orientation (%) 66 59 4 7*** −55*** 
ITA take-up rate (%) 59 58 66 1 7*** 
Training outcomes 
In training any time during follow-up period (%) 64 64 66 1 3 
In training at time of survey (%) 17 14 14 3** 1 
Weeks in training 19 16 18 3*** 2** 
Employment outcomes 
Employed any time during follow-up period (%) 80 79 81 1 2 
Total weeks worked during follow-up 30.8 29.9 29.6 0.9 −0.2 
Total earnings in follow-up period ($) 17,032 16,464 15,724 568 −740 
Receipt of UI and public assistance 
Received UI benefits (%) 66 66 67 1 2 
Amount of UI benefits received ($) 3,412 3,266 3,483 146 217** 
Received food stamp benefits (%) 20 19 20 1 1 
NOTE: **statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** statistically significant at the 99 percent con-
fidence level for a two-tailed test. 
SOURCE: McConnell et al. (2006), p. xxii; 15-month follow-up survey and Study Tracking System, as of July 2004. 
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in low-demand, low-wage occupations. The 2006 report, however, does 
not reveal which of the three approaches is most effective, as measured 
by training completion, employment, earnings, and employment reten-
tion. The final report, with its net impact and cost-benefit analyses, was 
designed to provide useful information relevant to policymakers. 
The 2006 ITA Experiment report (McConnell et al. 2006) contained
an implementation analysis, a net impact analysis, and a benefit-cost
analysis for the demonstration, which were based on outcomes 15 months 
after individuals were found to be eligible for WIA-funded training. 
The 2006 report had substantial shortcomings, however, because it cut 
off data collection too early. At the time of the follow-up interview that 
was used to assess outcomes, 17 percent of Treatment 1 participants 
were still in training, while 14 percent of Treatment 2 and 3 participants 
were still in training. Clearly the results, presented below, will change 
with a longer-term follow-up of treatment group members. 
Furthermore, no control group could be constructed for this dem-
onstration because the use of training vouchers was required for most 
WIA training participants. As a result, the ITA Experiment net impacts 
and benefit-cost analysis compared the treatment groups to one another. 
Because Treatment 2 (informed choice) had been the most used model 
before the demonstration, it was used as a baseline for comparison to 
Treatments 1 and 3. 
Net impact analysis 
Table 7.5 reveals significant differences in the way that customers 
experienced the receipt of Individual Training Accounts and in their 
training outcomes, but no significant differences in employment out-
comes. Comparing the free choice option to the informed choice out-
come, researchers found that customers in the free choice option were 
significantly more likely to be excused from orientation, significantly 
less likely to receive counseling after orientation, and significantly 
more likely to experience increased ITA take-up rates. There was no 
significant difference in the amount of training they received through 
the follow-up period or in whether or not they were in training at the end 
of the follow-up period. However, since substantial numbers of custom-
ers were still in training when the follow-up interview was conducted, 
only limited information was available on the impact of training after 
training completion. The lack of significant differences in employment 
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outcomes remains true no matter which of the following three ways is 
used to measure the outcome of customers: 1) by their being employed 
at any time during the follow-up period, 2) by total weeks worked dur-
ing the follow-up period, or 3) by total earnings during the follow-up 
period. Free choice participants received a larger amount of UI benefits, 
but there was no difference in the percentage of individuals receiving 
UI or food stamp benefits. 
Benefit-cost analysis 
The early benefit-cost analysis is not conclusive. The best compara-
tor for the benefit-cost analysis is the benchmark estimates of net ben-
efits. The results when comparing the informed choice (Approach 2) 
to the directed choice (Approach 1) option reveal that net benefits for 
society are not statistically different from zero. Net benefits for cus-
tomers are not significant. The net benefits for the government sector 
(−$1,423) are negative and significant because the treatment is more 
costly (McConnell et al. 2006). 
Comparing the informed choice (Approach 2) to the free choice 
(Approach 3) yields statistically insignificant results for society. The net 
benefits to customers are also insignificant. For the government sector, 
net benefits are negative and significant (−$816) because the govern-
ment provides vouchers to a larger proportion of customers and pays 
out more in UI benefits and other transfer payments (Table 7.6). 
With the information available at the time of the 2006 report, the 
researchers conclude that their “best estimates suggest that switching 
from Approach 2 to either Approach 1 or 3 would neither be beneficial 
nor costly to society as a whole.” They also note that “Approach 1 costs 
the government about $1,400 more per customer eligible for training 
than Approach 2” and that “Approach 3 costs the government about $800 
more per customer eligible for training than Approach 2” (McConnell et 
al. 2006, p. 107). 
From a public policy perspective, a key issue for training vouchers 
is the comparative benefit-costs between informed choice (Approach 
2) and free choice (Approach 3). The evaluators found that although 
the switch from informed choice to free choice resulted in a negative 
net benefit, the effect was insignificant using the 15-month follow-up 
survey data. On the other hand, the result was negative and significant 
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Table 7.6  Summary of ITA Experiment Benefits and Costs 
Approach 1 vs. Approach 2 Approach 3 vs. Approach 2 
Customers Government Society Customers Government Society 
Total benefits ($) 920 −218 701 −387 −630** −1,018 
Total costs ($) −97 1,205*** 1,108*** −34 185* 151 
Net benefits ($) 1,017 −1,423*** −407 −353 −816***a −1,169 
NOTE: * statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; ** statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level for a two-tailed test; *** statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
a Total does not sum correctly because of rounding. 







           
          
        
      
           
        
       
         
           





	 	  
 
276 Wandner 
using administrative data. The evaluation results could be substantially 
different, however, once the data from the second survey with its much 
longer follow-up period are incorporated into the study. The final report 
would be critical to understanding the outcomes of the ITA Experiment. 
RESEARCh AND EVALUATION STUDIES
INITIATED IN 2007 
In June 2007, the OMB intervened in the ETA's research and evalu-
ation effort—something it had never done before. The Republican 
political leadership of the OMB put pressure on the Republican politi-
cal leadership of the ETA, insisting that the ETA conduct and release 
certain research. Indeed, the OMB withheld appropriated ETA research 
and evaluation funds from the department at the beginning of program 
year 2007, pending compliance. 
The OMB withheld the funds because it wanted the ETA to con-
duct three employment and training studies. Two of them were eval-
uations of the WIA program—a long-term “gold standard” experi-
mental evaluation and a short-term quasiexperimental evaluation. 
The third was the completion of the evaluation of the ITA Experiment 
after a second-round follow-up survey. With this longer follow-up, 
the evaluation could take into consideration longer-term outcomes 
following completion of job training and obtain more accurate net 
impact results. This would allow the ETA to better assess the rela-
tive strengths of the three training voucher models that were tested. 
Even after the department agreed to conduct these three projects, 
the OMB continuously monitored the projects during the quarterly per-
formance budgeting process. By means of this process, the OMB com-
pelled the department to report on its efforts to complete and publish 
the WIA short-run evaluation and to contract for and begin design of 
the longer-term experimental WIA evaluation. In November 2007, the 
department complied with the OMB requirement and reported on its 
planned 2008 accomplishments in its 2007 Performance and Account-
ability Report (USDOL 2007), in which it reported the following: “Rig-
orous Evaluation of Major Job Training Programs: DOL is contracting 
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trative data—to be completed by 2008. Also in 2008, a more rigorous, 
seven-year evaluation will begin to determine WIA services’ impact on 
employment and earnings outcomes for participants.” 
The department dutifully initiated the quasiexperimental WIA eval-
uation in late 2007, which was conducted by IMPAQ International. To 
meet the OMB deadline, the contractor raced to complete and publish 
the evaluation by December 2008, attempting to get administrative data 
from 25 states but ultimately collecting data from only 17. The evalu-
ation used two comparison groups: 1) UI claimants and 2) UI claim-
ants who received services from the ES; the comparison groups were 
selected using propensity score matching. The state workforce agencies 
were informed about the evaluation through Training and Employment 
Notice 22-07, issued on December 21, 2007. The draft final evaluation 
was completed (but not published) by the end of December 2008, and 
it was submitted to the OMB before the end of the year, at which time 
the department stated its intent to complete its review of the evaluation 
and publish it. 
From the OMB’s perspective, the quasiexperimental WIA evalua-
tion was a stopgap effort until the department could conduct a random 
assignment WIA evaluation. In early 2008, the department developed 
a statement of work for the experimental evaluation. Following a com-
petitive procurement, the contract was awarded to Mathematica Policy 
Research in June 2008. Mathematica also developed an evaluation plan 
and design to conduct the project in 30 randomly selected localities 
around the United States. 
The third OMB project was the completion of the Individual Train-
ing Account Experiment evaluation. The OMB learned that the follow-
up survey for the ITA experimental demonstration project had been 
conducted too early, at Bishop's direction. The department thus was 
forced to conduct a second follow-up survey and prepare a final evalu-
ation report by 2009. 
TRAININg PROgRAmS AND TRAININg PUBLIC POLICy 
JTPA operated from 1982 through June 2000. The Clinton admin-










1994 (H.R. 4040) and the later failed CAREERS Act of 1995–1996 
(H.R. 1617). In 1998, the Clinton administration and the Republican-
controlled Congress reached a compromise and enacted WIA. WIA
operated under its authorizing legislation until September 2003, when 
the statute expired, and it thereafter was extended through temporary 
continuing appropriations. Attempts to replace WIA persisted through-
out the Bush administration, as the administration proposed WIA reau-
thorization with each new Congress in 2003, 2005, and 2007. In each 
case, the separate WIA component programs were to be consolidated 
with the ES, but there were also significant differences among the bills, 
and these differences mostly reflected overall policy initiatives of the 
Bush administration. None of these efforts succeeded, and the task of 
replacing WIA awaited President Obama and the 111th Congress. 
The 2003 Proposals 
Workforce Investment Act reauthorization 
house consolidation bill. The Bush administration unveiled its 
first WIA reauthorization proposal on March 6, 2003. The House bill, 
H.R. 1261, was introduced on March 13, 2003, and closely reflected 
the administration proposal. The bill, sponsored by Rep. Howard P.
McKeon (R-CA), passed quickly in the House on May 8 as the Work-
force Reinvestment and Adult Education Act of 2003, with voting along 
party lines—220 to 204. 
The bill would have consolidated several formula-funded adult 
programs—the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs, the 
Employment Service, and Reemployment Services Grants. These pro-
grams would have been combined into one formula program to create 
a revised Adult Program. Ten percent of the funds appropriated for the 
new Adult Program would have been reserved by the secretary of labor 
for dislocated worker grants (currently called National Emergency 
Grants), demonstration projects, and technical assistance. Youth pro-
grams would have remained a separate funding stream. 
ITAs would have remained the primary method of providing train-
ing funds to individuals in the Adult Program. These funds could only 
be paid to Eligible Training Providers, as determined by the One-Stop 
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have been eliminated in some cases. Up to 10 percent of adult funding 
could have been used for incumbent worker training (Lordeman 2003). 
The WIA reauthorization bill included Personal Reemployment 
Accounts (PRAs) in section 113. PRAs were also proposed in the Back 
to Work Act (H.R. 444), which also failed to be enacted. 
Senate bill. The Senate bill, S. 1627, was introduced by Senators 
Michael Enzi (R-WY), Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Judd Gregg (R-NH), 
and Patty Murray (D-WA) on September 17, 2003. The bill retained the 
current structure of WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act programs. It included 
no consolidation or block granting provisions. The Senate bill had bi-
partisan support and reflected widespread state support for the current 
system, including by the governors of both parties. It passed the Senate. 
With diametrically opposed bills, the House and Senate were not able 
to reconcile the bills, and they died. The department had supported the 
House bill, had opposed the Senate bill, and was unwilling to support a 
compromise between the two. The Senate was strongly opposed to the 
department’s proposal, so WIA reauthorization went nowhere. 
Personal Reemployment Accounts 
H.R. 444, the Back to Work Act, was introduced by Jon C. Porter 
(R-NV) on January 29, 2003, as a separate bill from H.R. 1261, the 
WIA reauthorization bill. Porter introduced President Bush’s proposal 
to provide PRAs—“Back to Work Accounts” —in the amount of $3,000 
to UI beneficiaries who were found to be likely to exhaust their UI ben-
efits using WPRS’s profiling mechanism and who were eligible for at 
least 20 weeks of UI benefits. The accounts could be used for a broad 
number of purposes: job training, child care, transportation, relocation 
services, housing assistance, career counseling, and other expenses to 
help in finding a job. If the eligible workers found employment within 
13 weeks of becoming unemployed, they could retain the unspent por-
tion of the PRA as a reemployment bonus. (See Chapter 10 for further 
discussion of reemployment bonuses.) It was introduced as a small part 
of the president’s larger economic stimulus package; H.R. 444 autho-
rized $3.6 billion to establish PRAs, which would serve at least 1.2 mil-
lion unemployed workers. Individuals could only be eligible to receive 
a PRA once, and they would have to work with One-Stop staff, who 









them to develop a personal reemployment plan, and approve the draw-
ing down of the PRA funds. 
The PRAs would be available only to dislocated workers who were 
eligible for UI and were likely to exhaust their UI benefits. They would 
not be available to workers who had quit their previous jobs, who were 
new entrants or reentrants to the labor force, or who had lost their pre-
vious jobs but did not have a history of strong labor force attachment. 
They also would not be available to workers who qualified to receive 
UI benefits but who were not likely to exhaust their UI benefits as deter-
mined by the worker profiling mechanism. Thus, PRAs would not be 
available to many workers who would be eligible to participate in the 
WIA Adult or Youth programs. 
The 2005 Proposals 
In 2005, the Bush administration again supported WIA reauthoriza-
tion, this time in the 109th Congress, based on a proposal to consolidate 
adult programs. The administration’s bill was introduced in the House 
as H.R. 27 and was enacted on March 7. It was similar to H.R. 1261 
from the previous Congress. 
The House bill would have retained a separate WIA Youth Program 
but would have consolidated the WIAAdult and Dislocated Worker pro-
grams and the Employment Service, as well as Reemployment Services 
Grants. Ten percent of the funds for adult workers would have been 
retained by the secretary of labor for dislocated worker grants, dem-
onstration projects, and technical assistance. National programs, such 
as the Job Corps and programs for migrant and seasonal farm work-
ers, Native Americans, and veterans would have been retained. The bill 
would have modified the sequencing of core, intensive, and training 
services in some cases. It still would have provided training, primarily 
through ITAs. 
Along with the consolidation of the adult programs, the other major 
controversy regarding the House bill was that it would have allowed 
religious organizations to operate job training programs and to take 
applicants’ religious beliefs into consideration when hiring workers to
provide these job training services. 
The first Senate bill, S. 9, introduced by Senator Enzi, was nearly 
identical to the one passed in 2003, S. 1627. A new bill, S. 1021, was 
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based on S. 9. The Senate incorporated S. 1021, as amended, into H.R. 
27 and passed its version of H.R. 27 on June 29, 2006. 
The Senate bill would not have consolidated the adult programs, 
continuing separate programs for WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker 
programs, the ES, and Reemployment Service Grants. Like the House 
bill, it would have modified the sequencing of services and retained ITAs, 
although it would have renamed them Career Scholarship Accounts. 
The Senate bill, however, did not contain the provision that would have 
allowed religious organizations to consider religion in hiring workers to 
provide job training services for department-funded programs. 
The House and Senate took no further action after passing their sep-
arate versions of H.R. 27. Once again, they could not reconcile the dif-
ferences between their bills, and the legislation died (Lordeman 2005; 
Naughton and Lordeman 2007). Once again, the department supported 
the House bill and was unwilling to compromise to come to agreement 
with the Senate. 
The American Competitiveness Initiative and Career
Advancement Accounts 
Midway through the 109th Congress, the Bush administration 
changed course on workforce programs. In his 2006 State of the Union 
message, President Bush announced his American Competitiveness Ini-
tiative (ACI). Its purpose was to strengthen the U.S. economy in its 
ability to compete with other nations. It planned to commit $5.9 bil-
lion in FY 2007 and more than $136 billion over 10 years to invest 
in research and development, strengthen education and training, and 
encourage entrepreneurship and innovation. Training was one of six 
new initiatives. The workforce development system was expected to 
provide “job training that affords more workers and manufacturers the 
opportunity to improve their skills and better compete in the 21st cen-
tury” (State of the Union Letter 2006). More specifically, Bush pro-
posed in his initiative to “provide more flexible training to workers” 
by offering “training opportunities to some 800,000 workers annually, 
more than tripling the number trained under the current system” (State 
of the Union Press Release 2006). 
Because it had no funding to back it up, the ACI served a politi-









ing WIA funds, leaving little to maintain the current system, and thus 
starving the existing public workforce development system. The train-
ing component of the American Competitiveness Initiative was called 
Career Advancement Accounts (CAAs). CAAs were a recycled form 
of training voucher that differed from past vouchers in that there would 
be no assessment or counseling whatsoever before awarding the vouch-
ers. The CAA vouchers would consume 75 percent of the consolidated 
WIA-ES funds. Only an additional 3 percent of total funding would be 
available for administration. If ACI were enacted, state workforce agen-
cies would be encouraged to take Internet applications, assess the appli-
cations without collecting further information, and then allocate funds 
and issue voucher awards. Thus, 78 percent of the current workforce 
development system funding would be taken for CAAs, and the state 
workforce development system would have to survive on the remain-
ing 22 percent of its previous funding level, which would have proven 
catastrophic for the system. Fortunately for the workforce development 
system, ACI was not enacted. 
December 20, 2006, Regulatory Initiative 
On December 20, 2006, the department published a Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making in the Federal Register, which tried to alter WIA
and Wagner-Peyser Act programs, but the department was prevented 
from doing so by the new Democratic-controlled Congress. The depart-
ment initiated the rule-making after the Republican-controlled 109th 
Congress had failed to reauthorize the WIA and after the Republicans 
lost control of both houses of Congress in the November 2006 election. 
(See Chapter 6.) It was clear that the Bush administration had not been 
able to enact the type of WIA reauthorization bill it wanted in the 109th 
Congress. 
The 110th Congress 
If a Republican-controlled Congress had rejected the Bush 
administration’s WIA reauthorization proposals in 2003 and 2005, a
Democratic-controlled Congress certainly was not going to accept its 
2007 proposal. In April 2007, Secretary Chao sent a department bill 
directly to Congress without White House review, once again recom-
  
   
 
 
Public Job Training and Training Vouchers  283 
mending consolidation of job training and employment service pro-
grams and making CAAs the heart of her proposal. The Chao proposal 
went nowhere. No hearings were held on the proposal, either in the 
House of Representatives or in the Senate. 
After a considerable delay, on October 4, 2007, Rep. McKeon intro-
duced H.R. 3747, the Workforce Investment Improvement Act of 2007. 
It again proposed to consolidate WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker 
programs with the ES and repeal the Wagner-Peyser Act. Controver-
sially, it would again allow religious organizations providing workforce 
development services to hire workers exclusively from members of 
their own religious faith. On October 23, the bill was referred to the 
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections. No further action was taken 
on the bill. Thus, over a six-year period, under both Republican and 
Democratic Congresses, the Bush administration’s approach to reau-
thorizing WIA had proven to be a political failure. Congress and stake-
holders had rejected every attempt to consolidate, block-grant, or cash 
out the public workforce system. 
RELATIONShIP OF WIA REAUThORIzATION PROPOSALS
TO RESEARCh FINDINgS 
Bush administration training proposals were based on a misrepre-
sentation of the research findings. The Bush administration sought to 
justify CAAs based on the results of the ITA Experiment by misrepre-
senting its findings. Findings from the ITA Experiment were presented 
to departmental career and political staff (Perez-Johnson et al. 2004; 
McConnell et al. 2006). These results were used to justify the CAAs 
because the free choice model had resulted in more training than the 
other two models, and the report had not indicated that the benefit-cost 
results were any worse. These findings were interpreted as justification 
for not providing assessment and counseling before giving out training 
vouchers. 
But the interpretation of the free choice model findings was errone-
ous: the evaluation found that unemployed workers received a signifi-
cant amount of counseling and assessment (an average of five hours) 















a voucher, they were more likely to start training, if they were not 
required to receive further counseling (McConnell et al. 2006, p. 26). 
Thus, the report revealed that workers may have made similar training 
choices after they received the training voucher, whether they received 
additional counseling or not. 
The Bush administration made several claims in marketing its new 
proposals and in criticizing components of the existing public work-
force system. However, the evidence did not support these seven claims: 
Claim 1: most of the cost of One-Stops is from wasteful and 
excess administrative overhead. The declining budget for running 
the One-Stops resulted in state and local workforce agencies doing the 
only thing they could do to deal with more customers while employing
fewer staff: they substituted automated self-service for staff-assisted 
core and intensive services. The conversion of the public workforce 
system between the mid-1990s and the present to self-service tools does 
not represent excessive administrative overhead; it represents a substi-
tution of capital for labor at a time of declining nominal resources and 
huge losses of frontline staff. 
Claim 2: The Employment Service programs are duplicative of 
the Workforce Investment Act programs and should be eliminated.
In fact, the ES and WIA programs are complementary. The ES pro-
vides WIA-type core and intensive services in most states and locali-
ties, while the WIA provides intensive and training services (Barnow 
and King 2005). 
Claim 3: Only training is a worthwhile service. This claim ig-
nores the extensive research literature on the effectiveness of the One-
Stops and the ES in providing referrals to job openings, providing job 
search assistance, and administering the UI work test (O’Leary 2006). 
Claim 4: A Free Choice training voucher model can be imple-
mented without providing any counseling services. The Free Choice 
model contained in the Bush administration’s CAA proposals was a 
misrepresentation of the Free Choice model tested in the ITA Experi-
ment. In that experiment, individuals were not required to engage in 
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they received an average of five hours of counseling before they were 
offered a training voucher (McConnell et al. 2006, p. xxvi). 
Claim 5: Short-term training is the answer. The WIA reauthoriza-
tion proposals of the Bush administration would have provided vouch-
ers that were likely to have been used largely for short-term training. 
Short-term training has been found to be less effective than long-term 
training or education (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; LaLonde 
1995). 
Claim 6: Targeting is not necessary. The Bush administration’s 
training proposal did not target based on need or likely success of train-
ing. Career Advancement Accounts, for example, would have been 
awarded based on limited information received from Internet applica-
tions. Demand for training funds would have greatly exceeded fund 
availability. Each year’s funding would have soon been exhausted. 
Fund disbursement most likely would have been conducted on a first 
come, first served basis. CAAs would have ignored the fact that training 
as currently constituted is more cost-effective for some groups than for 
others (Barnow and King 2005; King 2004; LaLonde 1995). 
Claim 7: The type of training provided does not matter. The 
Bush administration would not have provided any guidance about what 
kind of training to take. Training voucher recipients could have chosen 
high-return or low-return training programs. However, research shows 
that training targeted to fields such as math, science, and health services 
is most cost-effective. Such targeting is needed to have training succeed 
(Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2002). 
CONCLUSIONS 
• Job search assistance appears to be more cost-effective than 
training, and, if WIA resources cannot be expanded signifi-
cantly, existing resources should be transferred from training to 
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• The conversion of local workforce offices to One-Stop Career 
Centers with universal access for all workers and the require-
ment and encouragement of having partners locate in these 
centers has put enormous demands and strains on these local 
offices. The One-Stop initiative was expected to have been ac-
companied by a substantial increase in the funding for employ-
ment and training programs. In the absence of funding increases,
the state workforce agencies cut costs to serve the large flow 
of participants. The result has been heavy investment in auto-
mated resource rooms and the provision of self-service tools, 
while training is infrequently provided to participants and tends 
to be low-cost and of short duration. 
• The Clinton administration briefly increased funding to accom-
pany the One-Stop initiative and the proposed Reemployment 
Act of 1994. When the Democrats lost control of Congress in 
1994, funding increases ended. Funding levels for WIA and ES 
programs were stable in nominal terms in the second half of the 
1990s but then declined between 2001 and 2008. 
• The decision to make job training vouchers a key component of 
the WIA training system was made based on little experience 
under the prior employment and training programs and with-
out much evaluation (Barnow 2000). Training vouchers were 
implemented as part of the WIA program more because of ide-
ology than evidence. It is not clear that training vouchers under 
WIA have been successful. On the other hand, ITAs using the 
Informed Choice model look very much like the training sys-
tem that was used during the JTPA years, and thus ITAs do not 
represent a substantial change from the past. 
• Effective job training should not be offered to workers with-
out providing considerable staff-assisted employment services. 
Workers need guidance in whether to take training, what kind of 
training to take, and where to take the training. In the ITA Experi-
ment, the procedures of the participating sites met this criterion. 
Counselors provided an average of five hours of counseling be-
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• The Career Advancement Account proposal was fundamen-
tally flawed. It would have offered training vouchers to work-
ers over the Internet with no counseling. No research evidence 
exists that supports providing training vouchers without career 
counseling. The Bush administration would have used CAAs 
to slash the funding of One-Stop centers while creating an inef-
fective block grant program. As justification for the CAA initia-
tive, advocates pointed to positive aspects of the Free Choice 
offer in the ITA Experiment that provided little or no counsel-
ing after the voucher was offered. The Bush administration’s 
explanation of the Free Choice model, however, ignored the 
need for counseling before participants received the training 
voucher offer (McConnell et al. 2006). 
• The department should pursue new program models for out-of-
school youth and conduct a series of demonstration projects to 
test their effectiveness. Among the interventions that should be 
explored is a program of employment bonuses paid to out-of-
school youth who remain employed for one year. Employment 
bonuses were successful when tested as part of the Youth Of-
fender Grants in St. Paul, Minnesota, and West Palm Beach, 
Florida, but they were not tested rigorously using experimental 
methods (Jenks, MacGillivray, and Needels 2006). 
• Policymakers should have more realistic expectations about the 
provision of training. Given the historic limitations on public 
funding for job training, it does not appear that both universal 
access to One-Stops and adequate funding for skill and occu-
pational training can be achieved solely under WIA. Greater 
financial support is needed if long-term training is to be provid-
ed. Greater funding needs to be made available, either through 
a reauthorized WIA program or through another agency such 
as the Department of Education, with considerable training au-
thority given to community colleges. 
• Long-term training cannot be provided to experienced workers 
without also providing support services. The key to increased 
participation is income support throughout the period of par-
ticipation in training. It may be valuable for policymakers to 
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disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged individuals completed 
training (Mangum 1973, p. 42), receiving a stipend in the form 
of UI-type weekly allowances. 
Notes 
1. I attended a small meeting of workforce researchers and practitioners at Johns 
Hopkins University several years after the publication of the JTPA Evaluation. 
During the meeting, an ardent supporter of youth programs accused Larry Orr, one 
of the principal authors of the evaluation, saying, “You killed the Youth Program!” 
Orr replied, “I prefer to think that I saved the Adult Program.” 
2. Eric Johnson, in a conversation with the author, 2003. 
3. In this chapter the terms “free choice” and “informed choice” have been used in 
the discussion of vouchers in accordance with the workforce development litera-
ture. In the volume Vouchers and the Provision of Public Services (Steuerle et al. 
2000), the terms “individual choice” and “structured choice” are used. 
4. This approach sounds a lot like the concept of “Flexicurity,” first advocated in 
Western Europe at about the same time. The difference is that when flexible labor 
market policy was implemented first in Denmark and later in other European 
countries, the policy was accompanied by much larger investments in employ-
ment and training programs—collectively called Active Labor Market Policy 
(ALMP)—than were provided in the United States. 
5. Doug Holl of the WIA Dislocated Office wanted to conduct the ITA/ETA Demon-
stration, while I wanted to conduct the ITA Experiment. The result was an agree-
ment on our parts to conduct both. 
6. In program year 2003, the WIASRD report found that training without ITAs 
occurred in a substantial minority of cases. For the WIA Adult program, ITAs 
represent 55.0 percent of all training services, with Pell Grant recipients at 9.9 per-
cent and non-ITA, non–Pell Grant recipients at 35.1 percent. For WIA dislocated 
workers, ITAs represented 65.9 percent; Pell Grants 4.8 percent; and non-ITA, 
non–Pell Grants 29.3 percent. 
7. The names of the three options in the ITA Experiment are: 1) Maximum Customer 
Choice, 2) Guided Customer Choice, and 3) Structured Customer Choice, and they 
correspond to Free, Informed, and Directed Choice, respectively. 












Experiments and the 
Self-Employment 
Assistance Program 
with Jon Messenger1 
The U.S. Department of Labor sponsored two self-employment 
assistance (SEA) experiments in Massachusetts and Washington states 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This chapter examines these two 
experiments and the policy lessons learned from them. It discusses how 
the experiments led to the enactment of the federal SEA legislation. It 
also reviews the development and operations of the SEA programs that 
today operate in seven states. 
Since the enactment of federal legislation in December 1993, states 
have been able to incorporate SEA programs into their unemployment 
insurance (UI) systems. SEA programs permit an exception to the UI 
work-search rule requiring UI claimants to search for a job in wage and 
salary employment each week, although other eligibility requirements 
for collecting regular UI benefits are maintained. Under the SEA pro-
gram, unemployed workers who are eligible for UI can start their own 
businesses instead of searching for wage and salary employment. While 
they are starting their small businesses, they can collect SEA benefits 
in lieu of UI benefits in the same amount and for the same duration as 
their regular UI benefits. They receive entrepreneurial counseling and 
training to help them establish successful microenterprises. 
The SEAexperiments began in 1987, at a time when microenterprise 
and microlending were not well known or well regarded as employ-
ment and economic development strategies. It was only in the 1990s 
that microenterprise development became more popular, and it was not 
until 2006 that Muhammad Yunus was recognized by the Nobel Com-





Bank, which he started in Bangladesh, shared the Nobel Peace Prize 
because the committee believed that lasting peace requires the reduc-
tion in poverty that can be facilitated through microcredit programs. In 
the United States, microenterprise is an alternative employment strat-
egy available to American workers. In addition to the availability of the 
SEA program, microenterprise training is provided through state WIA
programs. 
microenterprise Creation and Self-Employment Assistance 
Most dislocated workers want to return to wage and salary employ-
ment. Self-employment, however, is a way to promote the reemploy-
ment of a small percentage of UI recipients. Establishment of individu-
als in self-employment is also an important subset of business start-ups. 
The growing recognition of both the contribution of microenterprises 
to the creation of employment opportunities and the relatively modest 
financial and managerial requirements of self-employment have gen-
erated interest in using self-employment as a tool for assisting unem-
ployed workers to return to work. Unlike other services to assist the 
unemployed to obtain jobs, self-employment assistance is designed to 
promote direct job creation for unemployed workers—to empower the 
unemployed to create their own jobs by starting small business ven-
tures. These microenterprises are typically sole proprietorships with 
one or at most a few employees, including the owner/operator. 
While the primary goal of self-employment assistance is direct job 
creation for the unemployed worker, the microenterprises started by 
these individuals may also generate additional jobs that can be filled by 
other dislocated workers. Thus, a self-employment assistance program 
for dislocated workers provides an opportunity to integrate labor mar-
ket policy and economic development policy in a synergistic relation-
ship, helping dislocated workers to return to work while simultaneously 
providing a modest boost to economic growth and job creation in their 
communities. 
In addition, an increasing number of dislocated workers are now 
coming from professional, technical, and managerial occupations—occu-
pations that make them particularly well-suited for self-employment. In 
the Washington State demonstration, 37 percent of all participants came 
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sachusetts demonstration, 45 percent of participants came from these 
occupations. 
Encouraging self-employment is not a new workforce policy. It 
was a component of workforce development plans before SEA came 
on the scene. Indeed, self-employment programs were part of the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs. Entrepreneurial training 
was an authorized use of JTPA formula funds provided to the states 
for both disadvantaged and dislocated workers, and many states made 
use of that authority. Discretionary funding had also been provided for 
entrepreneurial training by the secretary of labor. For example, in 1986
8 of 90 dislocated worker projects funded from the JTPATitle III reserve 
account included an entrepreneurial training component (Wandner and 
Messenger 1992, p. 13). Similarly, today entrepreneurial training is 
one of nine types of training services that are allowable under section 
134(d)(4)(D) of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). 
European SEA Programs 
The impetus for the SEA program in the United States came from 
the development and adoption of self-employment programs for the 
unemployed in 17 other industrial nations. Self-employment programs 
began in 1979 in France, which adopted a lump-sum payment approach 
to provide capital to start a small business. In 1983, Great Britain started 
a program that provided periodic payments during the start-up period 
for workers starting their own businesses. Over the next decade, 15
other industrial countries adopted programs, following either the French 
or the British approach (Orr et al. 1994). These self-employment pro-
grams were designed to help unemployed workers "create their own 
jobs" by starting small businesses, usually microenterprises. Virtual-
ly all of the Western industrialized nations adopted self-employment 
assistance programs for the unemployed during the 1980s. 
The Western European self-employment programs for unemployed 
workers provided the inspiration and key design components for the 
U.S. self-employment experiments. The two U.S. experiments fol-
lowed the approaches of the French and British programs, which also 
were the models followed by other industrial nations. The French self-
employment program provided eligible individuals with a single, lump-






embourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden followed the French 
model. The British program provided eligible individuals with biweek-
ly payments to supplement their earnings during the first year of busi-
ness operations. Ten countries—Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany— 
followed the British model. Both of these programs also provided par-
ticipants with business services, such as business training and counsel-
ing advice—although the availability of these services varied greatly by 
locality (Scott 1992, pp. 244–252). 
U.S. policymakers gained an understanding of how these self-
employment programs work in three ways. First, the German Marshall 
Fund encouraged American consideration of self-employment assis-
tance programs by sponsoring three study tours for American visitors to 
observe microenterprises and microenterprise policy and programs in 
Western Europe. Second, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) studied microenterprise as an employment 
and economic development policy and disseminated its findings through 
its publications and through its sponsorship of meetings and briefings. 
Finally, the staff of the Corporation for Enterprise Development studied 
the European programs and promoted the adoption of self-employment 
programs in the United States (Orr et al. 1994). 
While designing the U.S. self-employment experiments in 1988, 
staff from the USDOL, state workforce agencies, and a research con-
tractor participated in the third German Marshall Fund–supported study 
tour and visited France, Great Britain, and Sweden to observe firsthand 
the self-employment programs in those countries.2 The French and Brit-
ish programs were examined as models of how unemployed workers 
could become self-employed business owners. The Swedish program 
was examined because of its efficient and effective administration. The 
designers of the demonstration projects drew on the experience of these 
countries in adapting the self-employment concept to the U.S. environ-
ment. Both the French and British models were tested in the United 
States. Administrative procedures used in the experiments made use of 
lessons learned in Britain and Sweden. 
Today SEA programs—called start-up incentives in Europe—are 
more prevalent and tend to be larger in the European Union than in the 
United States. Start-up incentives provide funds to individuals in the 
form of lump-sum grants, periodic payments, or loans, and may include 
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entrepreneurial counseling and training. For 2004, start-up programs 
were reported to exist in 20 of the 25 European Union member countries 
(European Commission 2006). Start-up programs remain particularly 
popular among the early European Union members of Western Europe. 
Fourteen of these countries report having such programs—Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The pro-
gram has also been adopted by six of the new European Union member 
countries in Eastern Europe—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Among the new members, these pro-
grams have been initiated, in part, as a policy to encourage the tran-
sition to a market economy. The great majority of the countries that 
participate in these programs have more participants than the United 
States. In 2003, the largest users in terms of numbers of participants 
were Germany (237,253), Spain (93,033), and France (51,146). Of the 
countries reporting program activity, participants in these programs 
range from 0.1 to 12.9 percent of the participants in their UI programs. 
Compared to the United States, European participants are a much larger 
proportion of UI participants in every country with a program, reaching 
12.9 percent in Germany, 9.5 percent in Ireland, and 4.9 percent in Italy. 
Nevertheless, most programs amounted to less than 2 percent of UI 
expenditures (Table 8.1). By contrast, there were only 1,342 individuals 
entering the U.S. Self-Employment Assistance program in 2003, repre-
senting a tiny fraction of 1 percent of all UI claimants. 
Germany has a strong commitment to promoting self-employment 
by unemployed workers. Programs associated with the German unem-
ployment compensation program have more participants than any other 
European country. One program—the “transition benefit” (“Überbrück-
ungsgeld”)—was introduced in 1986 to promote the transition from 
unemployment to self-employment. The program looked more like the 
U.S. Self-Employment Assistance program in that it made payments for 
six months in the amount of the monthly UI benefit amount, but it added 
to that amount a lump-sum social insurance contribution for new firms. 
The second program—the “business foundation grant” (“Existenz-
grundungszuschuss”)—was added in 2003. It was more needs-based 
and provided benefits for up to three years, but only to workers whose 
annual wage income was less than 25,000 euros. Benefits were a fixed 
amount for all beneficiaries, and they declined over time, from EUR 
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Table 8.1  Number of Participants in Unemployment Insurance and in 
Start-Up Incentives in European Union Countries, 2004 
Start-up 
Country UI participants participants Start-up/UI (%) 
Austria 591,498 3,952 0.67 
Belgium 575,093 517 0.09 
Bulgaria — — — 
Czech Republic 169,109 6,002 3.55 
Estonia 51,052 287 0.56 
Finland 126,098 2,643 2.10 
France 2,261,436 51,146 2.26 
Germany 1,842,405 237,253 12.88 
Greece — — — 
Hungary 109,654 5,203 4.74 
Ireland 71,884 6,855 9.54 
Italy 277,319 13,584 4.90 
Lithuania — — — 
Luxembourg 7,744 15 0.19 
Norway 112,918 262 0.23 
Portugal 184,859 1,686 0.91 
Slovakia 74,750 2,958 3.96 
Sweden 206,116 5,601 2.72 
Spain 2,358,392 93,033 3.94 
United Kingdom 2,458,030 3,492 0.14 
NOTE: — = not available. 
Participants. The measure of participants used above is dependent on the availability 
of data. The “stock” (S) was generally used since it is more frequently available; it is 
a measure of participants as an annual average stock. In some cases, the stock measure 
was not available (or unreasonably small), so the number of “entrants” (E) was used; 
“entrants are participants joining the measure during the year (inflow).” See below for 
usage by country. 
Unemployment insurance. This consists of “full unemployment benefits” (line 8.1 of 
the publication) that are considered to be unemployment insurance rather than unem-
ployment assistance programs (or other means-tested programs). 
Short-time compensation (STC). Called short-time work or partial unemployment 
benefits (line 8.2). Line 8.2 includes compensation for formal short-time working 
arrangements and/or intermittent work schedules, irrespective of their cause, and 
where the employer/employee relationship continues. 
Start-up incentives. Include loans or grants to individuals (line 7). Include only trans-
fers to individuals, not to employers. 
SOURCE: European Commission (2006). 
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600 per month the first year, to EUR 360 per month the second year, and 
finally to EUR 240 per month the last year. Together Germany spent 
EUR 2.7 billion on the two programs in 2004 (Table 8.2), $3.3 bil-
lion at the exchange rate in effect in the middle of that year (European 
Employment Observatory Review 2005).3 This compares to only $5.1 
billion spent in the United States on the WIA and Job Corps programs 
in FY 2004.4 
The primary goal of Germany’s two self-employment programs 
was employment rather than economic development. The programs 
sought to create jobs for the entrepreneurs, with some additional jobs 
created by the entrepreneurs’ new businesses. This new employment 
could either be higher income jobs or “marginal jobs with low-volume 
(low-income) self-employment . . . in the form of ‘mini-jobs’” (Euro-
pean Employment Observatory Review 2005). The German govern-
ment’s emphasis, thus, was on reducing high levels of unemployment, 
whether it be with jobs that fully employed workers or jobs that kept 
them underemployed. 
In July 2006, the two self-employment programs were combined 
into a start-up grant (“Grundungszuschuss”) to cover living expenses 
and social insurance contributions for the first few months of self-
employment. The start-up grant is available to unemployed workers 
who still have entitlement to at least 90 days of unemployment benefits. 
To qualify for the grant, applicants must show that they have the skills 
to carry out the businesses they plan to start. They also have to produce 
a letter to the employment agency from a knowledgeable body—such 
as a chamber of commerce, guild, industry association, or bank—that 
the proposed new business is potentially sustainable.5 
The start-up grant is paid in two phases. For the first nine months, 
UI claimants receive grants equal to their unemployment benefit levels 
(60 percent of claimants’ last net income for single claimants and 67 
percent for workers with families) to cover living expenses plus EUR 
300 a month for social insurance payments. The monthly EUR 300 for 
social insurance payments can be paid for an additional six months if 
the claimants can show that they are operating their businesses full time. 
Self-employment programs grew steadily from 2000 to 2004: the num-
ber of individuals receiving funding rose from 92,953 to 351,673. From 
2005 through 2007 the programs declined because of stricter require-
ments to qualify and because of lower unemployment rates.6 
 Table 8.2  Entrants, Participants, and Expenditures for german Self-Employment Programs, 2000–2007 
Entrants Expenditures 
Transition Business Expenditures Expenditures per 
Year benefits foundation grant Start-up grant Total entrants (millions of euros) participant (euros) 
2000 92,953 92,953 750.4 8,100 
2001 96,385 96,385 804.6 8,300 
2002 125,096 125,096 1,005.9 8,000 
2003 158,820 95,198 254,018 1,681.3 6,700 
2004 183,497 168,176 351,673 2,726.8 7,800 
2005 156,888 91,020 247,908 3,200.3 12,900 
2006 108,398 42,813 33,569 184,780 — — 
2007 176 125,919 126,095 — — 
296 
NOTE: Data fields are blank for the years before programs began or after ending, indicating “not applicable.” — = not available. Transition 
benefits were also known as the bridging allowance. The business foundation grant was also known as the start-up subsidy or “Me Inc.” 











The Self-Employment Experiments 297 
In Germany, a total of 850,000 individuals became self-employed in 
2007. Close to 20 percent of them moved from unemployment to self-
employment. Thus, the start-up grant plays a significant role in increas-
ing business start-ups. An evaluation of the German self-employment 
programs showed high rates of business survival. After two years, 70 to 
80 percent of the businesses were still active, while only 7 to 13 percent 
of participants were unemployed.7 
ThE SELF-EmPLOymENT ASSISTANCE ExPERImENTS 
The Self-Employment Assistance Experiments Begin 
In 1987, Congress appropriated an additional $5 million to the 
Employment and Training Administration’s (ETA) research budget to 
conduct a series of experiments to help reemploy dislocated workers. In 
January 1987 three ETA staff members met to discuss how best to allo-
cate these research funds. They were Ray Uhalde, the ETA’s policy and 
research deputy director; Carolyn Golding, director of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Service; and I, who was then director of UI research. 
We discussed whether to proceed with a self-employment demonstra-
tion project. Given the lack of precedent for such a program in the
United States, Uhalde and Golding doubted that SEA could work. 
Expecting a low take-up rate by UI claimants and noting the high fail-
ure rate of small businesses, Uhalde believed that prospects for suc-
cess of a self-employment experiment were low.8 I also was uncertain 
about the efficacy of SEA in the United States, but argued for testing 
the approach. 
Despite the ETA’s reservations, in February 1987 I received ap-
proval to test the effectiveness of self-employment programs for unem-
ployed workers. From nearly a dozen states that responded to an August 
1987 solicitation to test the French lump-sum-payment SEA model, 
Washington State was selected as the site in which to conduct the exper-
iment. A grant agreement between Washington and the USDOL was 
signed in September 1987.9 Designed to test the cost-effectiveness of 








to collect UI, the Washington project offered one-time lump-sum pay-
ments for initial start-up and capitalization of new business ventures. 
Before the Washington self-employment experiment began, how-
ever, Congress directed the USDOL to conduct a second SEA dem-
onstration. Then-congressman Ron Wyden (D-OR) proposed that the 
department conduct an experiment to test the feasibility of providing 
self-employment assistance in the form of periodic payments to unem-
ployed workers in three states. The UI program would be authorized to 
pay this periodic self-employment allowance in lieu of regular weekly 
or biweekly UI payments (Orr et al. 1994). 
In December 1987, Congress enacted Section 9152 of the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (“Demonstration Program to 
Provide Self-Employment Allowances to Eligible Individuals”), which 
authorized the Department of Labor to proceed with self-employment 
demonstration projects in three additional states. There were several 
notable aspects of this legislation. First, Congress mandated that the 
demonstration be conducted as a classical experiment in which work-
ers were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. Second, 
Congress specified that the demonstration use the British approach of 
providing periodic payments to UI claimants starting up small busi-
nesses. Third, Congress required that the self-employment allowances 
paid to treatment group members be funded from the state accounts in 
the federal Unemployment Trust Fund. Thus, the demonstration would 
be funded out of existing trust funds, rather than through new appro-
priations. Finally, the demonstrations had to have a neutral effect on the 
federal budget. If the operation of the demonstration project resulted in 
“excess cost” above the amount the state would have paid out in regu-
lar UI benefits, the state would have to pay that amount into its own 
account in the Unemployment Trust Fund (Orr et al. 1994; Wandner 
and Messenger 1992). 
Some members of Congress were skeptical about a self-employment
demonstration and did not want to dedicate any new funding to the 
project. Enactment of the demonstration project was conditioned on 
the “excess cost” provision. The provision was imposed on the Wyden 
amendment because, in its absence, the amendment would have 
imposed new federal budgetary costs, which would have had to be off-
set with equal cost reductions under existing federal budget rules. How-
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demonstration design. It also had an adverse effect on state participa-
tion because of the risk of repayment costs. On the other hand, it made it 
more likely that permanent SEA legislation would be enacted if it could 
be shown that an SEA program would either be cost-neutral or have a 
positive impact on the federal budget (Orr et al. 1994). 
Although Congress did not appropriate funds to carry out the 
design, administration, and evaluation of the Wyden demonstration, 
the department—with some reluctance—proceeded with this second 
self-employment demonstration project. The department competitively
selected three states (Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Oregon)10 to par-
ticipate in this project as well as a research contractor (Abt Associates, 
with Battelle Institute as a subcontractor) to design, monitor, and evalu-
ate the projects in these three states and in Washington State. The proj-
ects were designed through the cooperative efforts of the participating 
states, the ETA, and the research contractors. The project designs and 
the operational procedures were informed by the study tour of self-
employment assistance programs in Great Britain, France, and Swe-
den.11 When it was time to implement the project, however, Minnesota 
and Oregon dropped out after reviewing the project design and facing 
the possibility of having to pay excess costs from their own state funds. 
Design of the U.S. Self-Employment Assistance Experiments 
Ultimately the department sponsored experimental demonstra-
tion projects in Washington and Massachusetts. These projects, called 
the Unemployment Insurance (UI) Self-Employment Demonstra-
tion Projects, were designed to assist UI recipients interested in self-
employment in creating their own jobs by starting a business venture. In 
both Washington and Massachusetts, the projects were jointly operated 
by the state employment security and economic development agencies. 
The self-employment experiments tested packages of self-
employment assistance for UI recipients on permanent layoff; these 
packages comprised a combination of “self-employment allowances” 
and business development services consisting of business training, coun-
seling, technical assistance, and peer support. The Massachusetts exper-
iment also added an additional targeting process designed to identify 
those UI recipients considered likely to exhaust their UI benefits. The 
employment security agencies offered and paid the self-employment 
300 Wandner 
allowances, while the economic development agencies and local service 
providers delivered the business development services. The Washing-
ton demonstration tested financial assistance in the form of lump-sum 
payments, while the Massachusetts demonstration tested biweekly pay-
ments equal to an individual’s regular UI benefits. 
All costs of the Washington demonstration project were funded by 
department research resources. The Massachusetts demonstration proj-
ect allowance payments, however, were funded from the Massachu-
setts state account in the federal Unemployment Trust Fund, while state 
funds were used to provide business development services for project 
participants. Project operations in Washington State took place between 
1989 and 1991. Operations in the Massachusetts demonstration took 
place during three distinct enrollment periods, the first of which began 
in 1990; the third and final enrollment period was completed in early 
1993. 
Both of the self-employment experiments included a sequence of 
intake activities that served to screen out those UI recipients with insuf-
ficient interest in or motivation for self-employment. For example, UI 
claimants interested in self-employment were required to attend an ini-
tial orientation session, which provided them with information about 
the demonstration and a reality check about the pros and cons of self-
employment. Individuals who attended this session then had to submit 
a timely, complete, and acceptable application to be eligible for selec-
tion into the projects. Thus, out of a large number of UI beneficiaries 
eligible to participate in the self-employment demonstrations, only a 
small percentage—3.5 percent in Washington State and 1.9 percent in 
Massachusetts—actually completed the intake activities and qualified 
for selection into the projects (Benus et al. 1995). 
Implementation Process Results of the SEA Experiments 
Table 8.3 shows basic implementation process results of the Mas-
sachusetts and Washington Self-Employment Demonstration Projects. 
The top line of the table indicates the total number of UI claimants 
who were identified as being in the target population in the Wash-
ington and Massachusetts demonstrations. All of these individuals 
received an invitation to attend an orientation session about the project 
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Table 8.3  Participation in UI Self-Employment Demonstration Activities 
Massachusetts Washington 
Invited to orientation (target population) 63,921 42,350 
Attended orientation 2,658 3,167 
% of invitees 4.2 7.5 
Submitted application 1,515 1,932 
% of attendees 57 61 
% of invitees 2.4 4.5 
Randomly assigned 1,222 1,507 
% of applicants 80 78 
% of invitees 1.9 3.5 
Treatment group 614 755 
Control group 608 752 
Attended initial training session 573 640 
% of treatment group 93 85 
Attended all training modules (WA) or 305 630 
all biweekly training workshops (MA) 
% of treatment group 50 83 
Attended one or more business 569 529 
counseling sessions 
% of treatment group 93 70 
Mean hours of business counseling 7.5 1.5 
received, per person 
Received lump sum payment 451 
% of treatment group 60 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable. 
SOURCE: Benus et al. (1995). 
decline at the very first step in the process of self-screening based on 
individuals’ interest in and motivation for self-employment. Of those 
individuals invited to attend a project orientation, only 4.2 percent in 
Massachusetts, and 7.5 percent in Washington, actually attended an ori-
entation session to learn about the demonstration. This suggests that 
self-employment only appeals to a relatively small percentage of the 
unemployed. 
The orientation session and application process provided another 
significant screen for winnowing the target population. Of those indi-
viduals who attended an orientation session, only 57 percent in Mas-
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sachusetts, and 61 percent in Washington, actually submitted an appli-
cation to participate in the demonstration. It is reasonable to attribute 
this result to the design of these two self-screening steps. The orienta-
tion session included a strong reality check for interested individuals 
by emphasizing the very real risks—as well as the potential rewards— 
associated with self-employment. The application was, in essence, a 
self-assessment tool designed to force individuals to think through 
some of the difficult issues involved in starting a business (e.g., who the 
likely customers would be for the business) and thus make them think 
hard about whether self-employment was a realistic option for them. 
As a result of this self-screening process, the vast majority of claim-
ants who submitted an application were accepted for random assign-
ment into the demonstration or a control group—80 percent in Mas-
sachusetts and 78 percent in Washington. The remainder of applicants 
were screened out of the demonstration because they submitted unac-
ceptable applications. The reasons for rejection of applications included 
submitting late or incomplete applications, and business ideas that were 
either too vague or of a prohibited type (e.g., pyramid schemes, politi-
cal organizations). However, applications were not evaluated based on 
the likelihood of success of the business. This was considered to be the 
individual’s responsibility. In total, 614 individuals in Massachusetts 
and 755 individuals in Washington were randomly selected into the 
treatment group for their respective demonstrations, and an equivalent 
number were assigned to control groups. 
Both the Massachusetts and Washington self-employment experi-
ments provided selected individuals with a series of business training 
seminars, as well as unlimited individual business counseling and tech-
nical assistance for the duration of their participation in the demonstra-
tion. Both projects also offered participants some form of peer sup-
port, through regular Entrepreneur Club meetings in Washington and 
less formal networking opportunities in Massachusetts. Attendance at 
all the business training seminars plus at least one counseling session 
was mandatory (unless specifically waived by the business counselor 
because of one’s previous experience). Development of a business 
plan was also mandatory, although this process was more formalized 
in Washington than in Massachusetts because a formal business plan 
was a requirement for receipt of a lump-sum payment. The peer support 
activities were entirely voluntary in both projects. 
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The Washington demonstration provided UI recipients selected 
for the treatment group with lump-sum self-employment allowances 
to serve as business start-up capital. These payments were equal to 
the remainder of their entitlement for UI benefits. To obtain the pay-
ment, Washington participants were required to complete a series of 
five milestones: 1) complete four business training modules, 2) develop 
an acceptable business plan, 3) open a business bank account, 4) sat-
isfy all licensing requirements applicable to the business, and 5) obtain 
adequate financing (the amount of start-up funding identified as neces-
sary in the business plan, taking into account funds available from the 
lump-sum payment). 
The Massachusetts demonstration provided treatment group mem-
bers with biweekly payments, termed self-employment allowance pay-
ments, equal to their regular UI benefits, to supplement their earnings 
while they were planning and establishing their new businesses. To con-
tinue receiving these biweekly payments, Massachusetts participants 
had to participate in a total of seven required training seminars—an 
initial one-day training session on starting a business (the “Enterprise 
Seminar”) and a series of six half-day workshops on specific business-
related topics (e.g., marketing)—plus at least one business counseling 
session. Massachusetts participants also were required to work full-time 
on activities related to starting their businesses and to submit a written 
self-certification to that effect. 
As Table 8.3 indicates, the majority of treatment group members 
attended the required business training sessions. Eighty-five percent 
of project participants in Washington completed the first training mod-
ule, and 93 percent of Massachusetts participants completed an initial 
training session (the Enterprise Seminar). A much higher percentage of 
individuals attended all training sessions in Washington (83 percent) 
than in Massachusetts (50 percent). Higher attendance likely was due 
to the fact that training was front-loaded in Washington, with all four 
modules provided over a one-week time period, while in Massachusetts 
the remaining six biweekly training workshops were provided over a 
12-week period, over which time many participants opted to drop out 
of the demonstration and returned to searching for wage and salary 
jobs. Thus, the self-screening process continued throughout the period 






There also was a substantial difference in the business counseling 
and technical assistance services received by project participants in 
Massachusetts and Washington. While most participants in both proj-
ects received at least one counseling session (93 percent in Massachu-
setts and 70 percent in Washington), the mean number of hours of busi-
ness counseling received in Massachusetts was five times greater than 
in Washington—7.5 hours per treatment-group member versus only 1.5 
hours. There are two explanations for this large difference. The stron-
gest explanation is that the strong monetary incentive of obtaining the 
lump-sum payment—which is equal to the individuals’ remaining UI 
benefit entitlement—caused individuals to move as quickly as possible 
through the business planning process so as to obtain the maximum pay-
ment amount. In addition, front-loading the business training services 
in Washington might have resulted in less opportunity for interaction 
between project participants and counselors than the more extended
period of training workshops provided in Massachusetts. 
Of those 755 individuals selected for the Washington project, 451 
completed the five milestones required to qualify for the lump-sum pay-
ment. These individuals received payments averaging $4,225 each to 
start their own microenterprises. Project participants in Massachusetts 
received average biweekly self-employment allowance payments of 
$530 to $540 per person while they were working full-time on plan-
ning and operating their businesses. In addition, Massachusetts also 
offered project participants needing substantial start-up capital special 
assistance in obtaining bank loans from private institutions, although in 
practice this help was rarely needed (because of the relatively low start-
up costs of the home-based service businesses that dominated business 
start-up by Massachusetts participants) and even more rarely used. 
Net Impacts of the U.S. Self-Employment Assistance Experiments 
Evaluation results from the self-employment experiments clearly 
indicate that self-employment is a viable reemployment option for 
some unemployed workers. As indicated above, the potential target 
population for a self-employment assistance program for unemployed 
workers is relatively small: only 2 to 4 percent of UI recipients are 
interested in pursuing self-employment. However, of those individuals 
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about half—actually do start a business. These results are consistent 
with the experiences of self-employment programs for the unemployed 
in other industrialized nations. For example, participation rates in the 
national self-employment programs for the unemployed in France and 
Great Britain have averaged approximately 2 percent a year, and pro-
grams in Germany and Australia have averaged 1 percent participation 
or less (OECD 1995, p. 9). 
A final report on the SEA Experiments in Massachusetts and Wash-
ington was completed and published by the department (Benus et al. 
1995). The findings in the report were based on telephone follow-up 
surveys with the treatment and control groups, which were conducted 
an average of 31 months after random assignment in Massachusetts and 
an average of 33 months after random assignment in Washington.12 Sur-
vey data was supplemented by data from state UI wage records, from an 
automated management information system for each project, and from 
on-site observations. The report also included a benefit-cost analysis 
from three different perspectives: project participants, the government, 
and society as a whole. A summary of the net impacts of the Massachu-
setts and Washington demonstrations is presented in Table 8.4. 
Self-employment assistance significantly increased the number 
of business starts by treatment group members compared to the con-
trol group. In Washington, 63 percent of participants entered self-
employment at some point following their enrollment in the demonstra-
tion, versus 41 percent of control group members. In Massachusetts, 
58 percent of project participants entered self-employment, compared 
to 47 percent of controls. Business starts in Washington were primarily 
in the services and in retail trade, although they included some small-
scale manufacturing businesses. In Massachusetts, the great majority 
of business starts were in the services industry, but there were some in 
wholesale and retail trade. 
Contrary to the widely held belief that most new businesses fail 
within three years of start-up, most of the new microenterprises started 
by demonstration participants survived: 61 percent of Washington par-
ticipants and 74 percent of Massachusetts participants who were self-
employed at some point since random assignment were operating their 
businesses at the time of the follow-up survey nearly three years later. 
However, based on the survey data, business survival rates for the con-
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Table 8.4  Summary of UI Self-Employment Demonstration Net Impacts 
Massachusetts Washington 
Treatments Controls Impact Treatments Controls Impact 
% self-employed since random 58 47 12** 66 44 22*** 
assignment 
Length of first UI spell (weeks) 26.5 24.5 −1.8*** 19.3 11.6 −7.6*** 
Total benefit payments in dollars since 7,400 6,567 −876*** 6,750 5,442 −1,300*** 
random assignment (UI + lump sum 
payments in Washington) 
Annual time in self-employment (months) 2.6 1.7 0.8* 3.4 1.1 2.3*** 
Annual self-employment earnings ($) 2,627 1,439 1,219 3,029 703 2,157** 
Annual time in wage and salary 4.4 4.1 0.6 5.2 4.5 −0.7** 
employment (months) 
Annual wage and salary earnings ($) 10,119 7,797 3,053** 9,920 8,414 −1,744** 
Total time in employment since random 7.4 5.8 1.9*** 7.8 6.7 1.1*** 
assignment (months per year) 
Total annual earnings since random 14,664 10,056 5,940*** 14,259 13,173 205 
assignment ($) 
NOTE: All impact estimates presented in this table are regression-adjusted impacts derived using ordinary least squares (OLS). * coef-
ficient significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed test); *** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
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members noted above.13 Thus, while the self-employment assistance 
provided by the demonstration increased the total number of businesses,
the demonstration did not improve the chances of survival of those 
businesses that were started by treatment group members vis-à-vis busi-
nesses started by control group members. 
Both the Washington and Massachusetts demonstrations promoted 
rapid reemployment—and reduced the duration of unemployment and 
the receipt of UI benefits—among project participants. The Washing-
ton demonstration reduced participants’ duration of unemployment by 
an enormous 7.6 weeks. Clearly, this result was driven by the strong 
monetary incentive of the lump-sum payment, which declined rapidly 
over time (since the payment was essentially a “cash out” of the indi-
vidual’s remaining UI benefit entitlement). While weekly UI benefit 
payments were thus reduced, this reduction was more than offset by the 
substantial cost of the lump-sum payments to Washington participants 
who started a business. When lump-sum payments are factored into 
the equation, total benefit payments to participants were significantly 
higher ($1,300) than UI benefits paid to the control group. In contrast, 
the Massachusetts demonstration—which provided participants with 
biweekly SEA payments but no lump-sum payments—reduced partici-
pants’ unemployment by 1.8 weeks compared with the control group, 
resulting in a net savings in combined UI and SEA payments of $876 
per participant. 
In terms of employment and earnings, self-employment assistance, 
as expected, increased participants’ annual time in self-employment 
and annual earnings from self-employment compared with the control 
group (although the earnings increase was not statistically significant in 
Massachusetts, possibly because of the relatively small size of the sam-
ple). In Washington, the demonstration also reduced total time in wage 
and salary employment. This was also an expected outcome, since the 
demonstration was promoting self-employment and it is reasonable to 
expect that at least some of the participants would have obtained wage 
and salary jobs in the absence of the demonstration. 
An unexpected finding, however, was that the Massachusetts dem-
onstration also increased wage and salary employment among project 
participants. Although apparently counterintuitive, this finding seems 
more reasonable when one considers the differences in the program 








sequence of self-employment assistance services in Massachusetts 
was more spread out compared to the front-loaded sequence of ser-
vices in Washington (designed to allow participants to expedite receipt 
of the lump-sum payment). This difference resulted in a much longer 
period of interaction between participants and their business counsel-
ors in Massachusetts than in Washington, and five times greater use of 
business counseling services in Massachusetts, as noted earlier. With 
this additional one-on-one assistance plus more time to carefully work 
through their options, Massachusetts participants may have been better 
equipped to target a niche for themselves in an existing firm than par-
ticipants in the Washington demonstration. 
Overall, then, the self-employment assistance provided in the dem-
onstration significantly increased participants’ total time in employ-
ment (i.e., the combination of self-employment and wage and salary 
employment) after they were randomly assigned to the project. On an 
annual basis, demonstration participants were employed 1.1 months 
longer than the control group in Washington and 1.9 months longer 
than the control group in Massachusetts. This result is due to the fact 
that positive self-employment and negative wage and salary employ-
ment impacts somewhat offset each other in Washington, while both 
of these effects are positive and additive in Massachusetts. This phe-
nomenon is even more pronounced in terms of total earnings. In Wash-
ington, demonstration participants’ total annual earnings after random 
assignment were only $205 higher than the controls’ earnings—not a 
statistically significant increase. In contrast, the additive effect in Mas-
sachusetts resulted in a dramatic increase in the total annual earnings of 
project participants, compared to the control group—a net annual earn-
ings increase of $5,940 per treatment group member over the three-year 
follow-up period. 
In summary, then, the results of the UI Self-Employment Demon-
stration in Massachusetts and Washington indicate the following: 
• The self-employment assistance programs provided in the dem-
onstrations increased business starts among project participants, 
reduced the length of their unemployment, and increased their 
total time in employment—which includes self-employment
plus wage and salary jobs. In addition, the Massachusetts dem-
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• When placed into a benefit-cost framework, both self-
employment assistance program models proved to be cost-
effective for project participants and society as a whole.14 The 
program model tested in Massachusetts proved cost-effective 
to the government sector as well, while the Washington pro-
gram model produced substantial net costs to the government. 
The final report finds that SEA for the Massachusetts model is a 
viable reemployment option for unemployed workers and that the ben-
efits of such a program exceed its costs. The report concludes, “These 
results indicate that SEA is a cost-effective approach to promote the 
rapid reemployment of unemployed workers and should be perma-
nently incorporated into the U.S. employment security and economic 
development system” (Benus et al. 1995, pp. x–xi). 
SELF-EmPLOymENT ASSISTANCE LEgISLATION 
Policy and Research Environment 
Interest in self-employment increased over the life of the SEAexper-
iments. This interest, both inside and outside of government, made for 
a much more favorable public policy environment for implementing an 
American SEA program, especially after rigorously evaluated demon-
strations showed that they could be cost-effective in the United States. 
Private foundations, including the Charles Stewart Mott and Ford 
foundations, encouraged microenterprise programs, especially for 
disadvantaged workers and for women. Foundation support funded 
a demonstration attempting to help welfare recipients start their own 
small businesses. Although the SEA experiments did not serve a disad-
vantaged population, the foundations became more interested in self-
employment assistance as evaluation results became available. 
The Corporation for Enterprise Development is a nonprofit organiza-
tion that promotes microenterprise. It had been a key player in organizing 
the first two German Marshall Fund trips to look at European microen-
terprises and government-sponsored microenterprise programs. Its presi-
dent, Robert Friedman, was central to this effort and continued to push 





Interest in microenterprise programs was also increasing within the 
federal government. A number of federal agencies began implement-
ing small microenterprise programs and projects, but these efforts were 
small and uncoordinated. Constance R. Dunham, a staff economist at 
the Council of Economic Advisers, had a strong interest in microenter-
prise policy. From her position in the Executive Office of the President, 
she called monthly meetings of executive-branch cabinet agencies that 
dealt with microenterprise to inform and coordinate microenterprise 
policy across the federal government. As an economist, she was partic-
ularly interested in the SEA experiments, since their use of experimen-
tal methods would yield results that would show decisively whether 
self-employment programs worked for a UI population. 
In the early 1990s, worldwide interest in self-employment as an 
employment option became apparent. Evidence from developing coun-
tries about the importance of microenterprise—such as the widespread 
availability of microloans from the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh—was 
broadly recognized. In 1990, at its seventy-seventh annual meeting, the 
International Labour Organization recognized and discussed microen-
terprise as an employment strategy. International Labour Organization 
staff prepared a monograph on this issue (ILO 1990). Carolyn Golding, 
who by that time had become deputy assistant secretary for employ-
ment and training, attended the meeting as a U.S. representative and 
spoke about the SEA experiments. The experiments had seemed mar-
ginal when they began, but a few years later they became part of the 
broader policy debate. 
The early 1990s were a time of change for self-employment in the 
United States and around the world. During the 1990–1991 recession 
in the United States, establishing a microenterprise became a legitimate 
alternative to seeking wage and salary employment. Progressive firms 
like General Electric were paying for transition services that included 
helping laid-off workers set up their own businesses. Following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, the department, working with the World 
Bank, had a hand in helping Eastern European nations make the transi-
tion to market economies. Golding played an important role in setting 
up comprehensive programs, first in Poland and Hungary (where the 
programs included SEA programs), then in Russia and Albania.15 
By 1991, the interim reports for the Massachusetts and Washing-
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lished the next year (Benus et al. 1992; Johnson and Leonard 1992). 
The interim reports consisted of analysis of the implementation of the 
projects, but they did not include net impact and cost-benefit analyses. 
The reports showed that the Massachusetts model held promise as a 
cost-effective employment creation approach. 
When Larry Katz reviewed the Massachusetts interim report he 
found it to be encouraging and believed that self-employment assis-
tance might be a sound new policy initiative if it was narrowly targeted 
using the worker profiling mechanism. Robert Reich was the main pro-
ponent of SEA. He liked the idea, and he found the research to be sup-
portive. When SEA was enacted in 1993, it was based on a combination 
of research and intuition.16 
When Alan Krueger came to the department as the new chief econo-
mist, he thought that SEA had been oversold. He correctly thought it 
would be small—attracting no more than 2 percent of the UI claim-
ants who received a participation offer—and he was afraid that most 
participants would fail in their attempts to set up a microenterprise.17 It 
was not until the final report was released in 1995 that the SEA’s cost-
effectiveness was demonstrated; thus the final report was not available 
when the temporary program was enacted (Benus et al. 1995). When 
SEA was made permanent in 1998, however, the legislation had a solid 
research base. 
Enacting Federal Legislation Authorizing the SEA Program 
By 1991, the department had completed the operational phase of 
the two congressionally authorized SEA experiments and the interim 
evaluations. The Massachusetts study was sent as an interim report 
to Congress. In April 1992, Sen. Harris Wofford (D-PA) introduced 
amendments to reform the federal-state UI program (S. 2614). These 
amendments were principally drafted by David Balducchi, a USDOL
employee then working for Wofford as a Congressional Fellow. The 
amendments included a provision to allow all states to participate in 
SEA programs. In June 1992, Rep. Wyden introduced a single-purpose 
SEA House bill (H.R. 5306). The SEA provision was incorporated into 
a large tax bill (H.R. 11) that was passed by the House and the Senate, 
















Soon after the beginning of the 103rd Congress on February 4, 
1993, Senator Wofford introduced a new bill (S. 320) that contained 
several features of the previous bill, including Self-Employment Assis-
tance. Then, on March 27, Wofford and four cosponsors (Senators Bill
Bradley [D-NJ], John Kerry [D-MA], Ted Kennedy [D-MA], and 
George Mitchell [D-ME]) introduced a single-purpose bill (S. 1045) to 
make SEA available in all states. According to Wofford, the bill “would 
make self-employment a reemployment option under our unemploy-
ment compensation system.” A companion House bill (H.R. 1154) was 
introduced by Rep. Wyden and five cosponsors (Representatives Rob 
Andrews [D-NJ], Ralph Hall [R-TX], Tom Ridge [R-PA], Olympia 
Snowe [R-ME], and Jolene Unsoeld [D-WA]). Later, Senate and House 
sponsors received support from the Clinton administration, and the SEA
provision was incorporated as an amendment to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),19 signed into law by President Clinton 
on December 8, 1993, with a five-year sunset clause.20 
Secretary Reich was supportive of, but not active in, the SEA legis-
lative effort. He had been introduced to the program during roundtable 
discussions in his office with Larry Katz, Darla Letourneau, me, and 
others. He was actively interested in the evidence behind the proposal 
and whether an SEA program would work. The research evidence con-
vinced him, and he became an advocate for the program.21 
The SEA initiative had broad support in the department. Carolyn 
Golding had raised SEA during a policy meeting with Reich. She was 
surprised when Kitty Higgins responded, “What about the Massachu-
setts experiment?” Golding realized then that Higgins would be a key 
player in getting SEA enacted, and she was. Higgins was active through-
out 1993 in moving many policy initiatives forward, including SEA.22 
The department had initially included the SEA program option as 
part of the administration’s proposal in September 1993 to provide a 
final extension of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) 
program for long-term unemployed workers. However, this provision 
was not included in the bill reported out of the House Ways and Means 
Committee for the EUC extension legislation: SEA was too controver-
sial to add to an extension of UI benefits. In a single-purpose bill, it 
stuck out and could not gain support.23 
Reich was actively involved in the legislative effort to enact
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NAFTA by promising that the administration would push for passage 
of the legislation that provided additional funding for employment and 
training programs. However, most Democrats were unwilling to sup-
port NAFTA, and they would not trade their support for more employ-
ment and training funds.24 
The environment for enactment of SEA quickly changed. The
NAFTA treaty was signed by President George H.W. Bush in December 
1992 before he left office. President Clinton adopted and championed 
the agreement and urged Congress to ratify it. NAFTA was supported 
by most Republicans but opposed by most Democrats. The Clinton 
White House needed Democratic votes, and several Democrats came 
to the White House to get something for their vote for NAFTA. Rep. 
Wyden was one of them. He had first proposed the SEA experiments 
in 1987. In 1993, he came to the staff of the “NAFTA war room” in 
the White House and asked for support for SEA legislation. The White 
House was supportive and referred Wyden to the Department of Labor. 
Since the department had already (unsuccessfully) proposed SEA pro-
visions, it readily added its support to the Wyden proposal. The NAFTA
bill containing the SEA provision received sufficient numbers of Demo-
cratic votes in the House and Senate and was enacted into law. The 
SEA provision was able to prevail because the NAFTA bill was laden 
with many extra provisions and did not face strong opposition, although 
some members of Congress questioned whether SEA should be a part 
of the UI program. Wyden and the USDOL proposed the SEA as a per-
manent provision, but it was enacted as a temporary bill, sunsetting in 
five years.25 
Reich was pleased to gain Wyden’s support for NAFTA, and he was 
pleased to get SEA enacted. He wanted to make SEA permanent, but 
because of budgetary constraints, all the administration could get was 
a five-year program.26 Congress mandated that the department conduct 
an evaluation of the SEA program. Making SEA permanent would be 
considered after the evaluation was completed. 
Federal Self-Employment Assistance Legislation 
With enactment in 1993, Self-Employment Assistance became 
part of federal UI law. The federal SEA legislation amends the Federal 












SEA a permitted use for incurring expenditures from the Unemploy-
ment Trust Fund under section 303(a)(5) of the Social Security Act. The 
statute authorizes but does not require states to offer self-employment 
assistance as an additional tool to help speed the transition of dislocated 
workers into new employment. To establish SEA programs, states must 
enact legislation that conforms to the federal legislation. 
Under the act, states that operate SEA programs select those UI 
beneficiaries who are eligible for the program by identifying those 
claimants who are most likely to exhaust their entitlement to UI ben-
efits, using the worker profiling mechanism to identify unemployed 
workers likely to become long-term unemployed. Self-employment 
program participants are required to work full-time on starting a busi-
ness. They are also required to participate in self-employment activities 
(such as entrepreneurial training, business counseling, and other activi-
ties) to ensure that they have the skills necessary to successfully operate 
a business. 
In February 1994, the department issued federal guidelines regard-
ing temporary self-employment programs that would expire in five 
years.27 States had the flexibility to establish their own programs within 
those guidelines. To do so, each state first had to do three things: 1) enact
conforming state legislation to establish its self-employment program; 
2) develop a plan describing how the SEA program in that state would 
operate, including assurances that entrepreneurial training would not be 
paid for out of the Unemployment Trust Fund; and 3) then submit the 
state plan to the department for review and approval (Wandner 1994a). 
The SEA-authorizing legislation called for the department to con-
duct an evaluation of SEA and submit the results to Congress. The eval-
uation was completed in December 1997 and transmitted to Congress 
(Vroman 1997). 
On October 28, 1998, section 3 of the Noncitizen Benefit Clari-
fication and Other Technical Amendments Act of 1998 repealed the 
Self-Employment Assistance termination date, thus making permanent 
the authorization of the SEA program. States with SEA programs, and 
particularly the new SEA state of Pennsylvania, had been pressing Con-
gress to make the program permanent. 
In December 1998, the department issued revised guidelines to 
reflect that the Self-Employment Assistance program had recently 
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ance remained in force, the new guidance eliminated the requirement 
that states submit plans and get approval for their SEA programs prior 
to implementing them. States would still have to submit their proposed 
SEA legislation to the department for review to assure that it was in 
conformity with federal legislation. The guidance stated that after five 
years of SEA state experience, states could best learn how to implement 
programs from other states (USDOL 1998). 
ImPLEmENTATION AND OPERATION OF ThE
SELF-EmPLOymENT ASSISTANCE PROgRAm 
State Implementation of Self-Employment Assistance Programs: 
Early Results and Evaluation 
Among the department subagencies, implementing Self-Employment 
Assistance was primarily the responsibility of the Unemployment Insur-
ance Service. From a federal perspective the SEA provisions amended 
the federal unemployment insurance law to allow UI payments to indi-
viduals who were not actively seeking wage and salary employment, 
but the other major employment and training programs were not greatly 
involved. The JTPA program provided entrepreneurial training, but such 
training was very limited and picked up little of the SEA training costs. 
At the state level, participation in SEA was optional. States had to amend 
their state UI laws to permit UI claimants to participate in the program. 
The state UI staff would also have to find funding for entrepreneurial 
training, although the training funds could come from the JTPA/WIA
program. 
After enactment of Self-Employment Assistance, the department 
had to develop guidance for the states. Mary Ann Wyrsch, the UI Ser-
vice’s administrator, delegated implementation to the UI Experiments 
group and the UI legislative division. Since SEA was a voluntary state 
program, she did not get involved either in the legislation or its imple-
mentation. Her concern was that as a nontraditional use of UI tax dol-
lars, the program should be crafted to avoid moral hazard and that it be 
implemented carefully.28 During 1994, when most of the implementa-






















Unemployment remained high, and the Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation (EUC) program continued to operate. Many new policy 
initiatives were being launched, including the UI flexibility provisions 
of the Reemployment Act of 1994. 
Much of the knowledge about the SEA program resided with Jon 
Messenger, the project manager for the SEA experiments. As a result, 
he and I worked on the design of the new SEA program. Messenger 
was the main author of the SEA procedures and guidance to the states, 
assisted by other members of the Unemployment Insurance Service. 
The department moved quickly in the two months after the SEA leg-
islation was enacted. It issued program guidance to the states about how 
to implement SEA programs on February 16, 1994, as Unemployment 
Insurance Program Letter No. 14-94 (Wandner 1994b, pp. 72–94). The 
guidance advised the states about the enactment of the SEA provision. 
It described the Massachusetts SEA experiment and the availability of 
the interim report on its demonstration project. It described the new fed-
eral legislation in detail, interpreted it, and explained how states could 
voluntarily adopt the SEA program as part of their state UI programs. 
Furthermore, it described the plans that states would have to submit to 
the department after enacting state legislation and before implementing 
their SEA programs. Finally, it included appendices that provided three 
additional things: 1) the language from section 504 of the NAFTA law 
dealing with SEA, 2) draft language for states to include in their state 
UI laws to implement SEA programs, and 3) a commentary on the draft 
language to explain the department’s interpretation of the proposed 
state legislative provisions as well as how states might implement SEA. 
Two key issues in the SEA guidance to the states for implementing 
the state SEA legislation were 1) assuring that there were no “excess 
costs” and 2) funding business development services—including entre-
preneurial training, counseling, and technical assistance—that needed 
to be provided to SEA participants. The lesser of the issues was excess 
cost. It was nearly impossible to estimate excess costs in an ongoing 
SEA program without a control or comparison group, so the issue grad-
ually disappeared for operating state SEA programs. More troubling 
was the provision of business development services, which required 
new funding, something that was not easy to find.29 To the extent that 
the state UI programs are the main stewards of the SEA program, UI 
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Unemployment Trust Fund is prohibited from providing training funds. 
The UI program has to partner either with the WIA programs or with 
the Small Business Administration, neither of which has proven easy to 
partner with. 
After the issuance of the 1994 guidance, states began enacting 
SEA legislation and sending implementation plans to the department. 
The department set up a small group within the UI Service to consider 
implementation issues. Each state SEA plan was reviewed to ensure 
that it met the federal requirements, including actuarial and technical 
design standards, such as maintaining cost neutrality and targeting the 
program using worker profiling methods. 
After the SEA program was made permanent in 1998, SEA began 
settling down into one more component of the UI program. In 1999, the 
department issued new guidance that relaxed the requirements for state 
implementation of SEA programs (Messenger, Peterson-Vaccaro, and 
Vroman 2002, pp. 149–150; USDOL 1998). The USDOL’s oversight of 
the establishment of SEA programs was lessened. States were no longer 
required to submit SEA implementation plans and have them approved 
before they could initiate new state SEA programs. 
States began to establish SEA programs in 1995 and 1996. In April 
1995, New York was the first state in the nation to implement an SEA
program under the NAFTA-authorizing legislation. Three other states 
implemented SEA programs by the end of 1996: Maine, Oregon, and 
Delaware (in order of implementation). These four states each submit-
ted an SEA annual report on program activities and outcomes for the 
year ending June 1996. Although the data in these reports were prelimi-
nary, describing the very beginning of four state SEA programs, they 
provided a glimpse of the early use of self-employment assistance as a 
reemployment tool for the unemployed. 
Between July 1995 and June 1996, nearly 2,000 individuals par-
ticipated in the Self-Employment Assistance program in the above four 
states. Most participants, about 1,800, were in the New York SEA pro-
gram. The other SEA states served substantially smaller populations 
than New York, and the New York program operated more than a year 
longer than those of other SEA states. 
The results in New York are particularly interesting. New York had 
the only Self-Employment Assistance program in 1995 that was opera-














York conducted a survey of SEA participants in early 1996 based on a 
survey developed by the department for the SEA annual report.30 The 
survey results indicated that 84 percent of all New York SEA partici-
pants were reemployed at the time—either in self-employment (58 per-
cent), wage and salary jobs (14 percent), or both (12 percent). 
Since the Self-Employment Assistance program was enacted as 
a temporary five-year program, the 1993 legislation required that the 
department conduct an early evaluation of the SEA program (Vroman 
1997) to determine whether to make the program permanent before it 
expired in December 1998. The study concluded that the SEA program 
would likely remain a small program, with a take-up rate of perhaps 1 
to 2 percent of UI claimants. Nevertheless, it also concluded that SEA
was a useful tool for workforce development policy, and that public 
policy would do well to have a wide array of tools to deal with worker 
dislocation issues. Because of the limited scale of the program as well 
as data and funding constraints, the study did not conduct a benefit-cost 
analysis but found that SEA was too small a program to pose a threat to 
the UI trust fund. 
Vroman described the political, administrative, and technical 
barriers that states would face in enacting and implementing Self-
Employment Assistance (Vroman 1997). He found that, as of 1996, 
only 7 of the 10 states that enacted legislation had completed the com-
plex process of implementing the program. At that time, SEA was an 
innovation that was largely confined to the coastal states; among states 
with programs, only Minnesota was in the interior. Of the coastal states, 
the programs in New York, New Jersey, Oregon, Maine, and Delaware 
operated statewide; in California the program was only implemented 
in six local areas. As required by law, states used their worker profiling 
mechanisms to select potential participants. States, however, set their 
profiling thresholds to make access to their SEA program either expan-
sive or restrictive. Thus, the profiling threshold varied from a more 
accessible 0.40 probability of exhausting UI to a more restrictive 0.70 
probability. All the states provided counseling, technical assistance, 
and entrepreneurial training. These services were mostly funded by the 
JTPA’s Dislocated Worker program and the Small Business Develop-
ment Centers (SBDCs), but some funding also came from the gover-
nors’ JTPA discretionary funds, in-kind services, UI penalty and interest 
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how small the SEA program was and how small it continues to be. The 
results can be seen in Table 8.5. Payments to SEA enrollees were less 
than 1 percent of UI regular-program first payments in all states except 
Maine, where they approximated 4 percent. 
Implementation from 1995 to the Present 
By 2008, 12 states had enacted SEA programs: California, Connect-
icut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. However, since 
1995, SEA has been largely an East Coast phenomenon; of the 12 states 
that have adopted SEA, only 4—Louisiana, Minnesota, California, and 
Oregon—lie beyond the eastern seaboard (Table 8.6). 
In 2008, seven states had active state SEA programs: Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. 
These states report data on the SEA programs to the department. The 
Louisiana program became operational in January 2005, but the program 
received no applications and did not become effective.31 Washington 
State has a program called “Self-Employment Assistance,” but it is a 
form of commissioner-approved training, and it was not enacted under 
the federal SEA provisions.32 
Since 1995, SEA program data have been reported by participating 
states along with other data about benefit receipt and payment for the 
regular UI program. Table 8.7 presents the reported data on the num-
Table 8.5  Flow of Participants into the Self-Employment Assistance 
Program in Five States, 1996 
New New 
York Jersey Oregon Maine Delaware 
Regular UI program 541,784 312,370 145,835 47,439 26,755 
first payments 
No. attending SEA 3,902 513 141 240 — 
orientation 
No. SEA applications 2,241 252 — 177 — 
No. enrolled in SEA 2,195 156 111 134 17 
No. completing SEA 1,751 — 76 — 14 
NOTE: — = data not available. 










Table 8.6  Self-Employment Assistance: Legislation and Program 
Implementation, 1995–2008 
State Effective dates of legislation Implementation 
Californiaa Not implemented 
Connecticutb (See below) (See below) 
Delaware 1996 1996–present 
Louisianac 1/1/2005 2005–present 
Maine 1995 1995–present 
Maryland 2000 2000–present 
Minnesotad 4/19/1995–1/1/1999 Not implemented 
2003–2008 (for Project GATE) 2003–2004 
New Jersey 1998 1998–present 
New York 1995 1995–present 
Oregon 1996 1996–present 
Pennsylvania 1997 1997–present 
Rhode Islande (See below) (See below) 
NOTE: blank = not applicable. 
a California developed an SEA plan that was approved by the department, but it never 
implemented a statewide program; California has legal authority for a program, but it 
is not operational (USDOL 2008b). 
b Connecticut no longer has an SEA provision in its state UI law (USDOL 2008b). 
c Louisiana has SEA legislation but has never implemented it, according to David 
Fitzgerald. 
d Minnesota also never implemented its SEA legislation, according to Charles Hartfiel. 
e Rhode Island never implemented its SEA program, but it does operate a state self-
employment program that is separate from its UI program, according to Ray Fillipone. 
Washington State enacted SEA in 2006, but the program is a form of commissioner-
approved training and is not an SEA program under federal law; it is set to expire on 
July 1, 2012 (USDOL 2008b). Washington has never submitted reports to the depart-
ment on its program. 
SOURCE: Legislative dates from state legislation and interviews with state and fed-
eral staff. Implementation dates from data reported by states to USDOL in federally 
required report, the ETA 5159 report. 
ber of individuals entering SEA. The program is very small; it only 
reached 3,170 participants in 2002 and has declined sharply since then. 
Even among SEA states, the program is highly concentrated: only seven
states have active programs. Four state programs serve more than 
100 participants a year, but none of the programs serve as many as 
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few states: New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. New Jersey entrants 
have remained fairly level over time, while reported participants have 
declined in New York and temporarily ended in Pennsylvania.33 Maine 
has also contributed to the flow. Delaware and Maryland have had few
entrants. 
For individual states with SEA programs, new participants repre-
sent less than 1 percent of UI first payments in all cases except Maine in 
2004 and 2005. Maine’s SEA participants reached a high of 1.5 percent 
of regular UI first payments in 2004. In other states, the maximum has 
been below 1 percent—0.3 percent in Maryland, 0.3 percent in New 
Jersey, 0.6 percent in New York, 0.2 percent in Oregon, and 0.1 per-
cent in Pennsylvania. For the United States as a whole, SEA has only 
reached 0.0007—or less than one-tenth of one percent—of regular UI 
first payments. 
The small size of the Self-Employment Assistance program can be 
measured in a number of ways. The number of workers entering SEA
has only reached as high as 3,200 per year, and annual payments have 
amounted to less than 70,000 weeks compensated and $17 million in 
benefits paid (Table 8.8). These are very small numbers compared the 
regular UI program, which paid $43.1 billion to 10.1 million beneficia-
ries in 2008. 
A number of states, however, have active microenterprise programs 
that are not tied to the UI program. States sometimes find that their 
own state programs are more flexible and easier to implement. States 
have a particularly difficult time finding funding for microenterprise 
counseling and training, which states must fund themselves. Since the 
Unemployment Trust Fund cannot be used to fund training, neither UI 
nor ES administrative funds can be used to provide SEA training. Thus, 
since funding of entrepreneurial training through the WIA programs 
has been minimal, it sometimes has proven easier to conduct microen-
terprise programs outside the umbrella of USDOL-funded programs. 
While the WPRS program provides reemployment services to dis-
located UI beneficiaries, in states without SEA programs workers only 
receive assistance to return to wage and salary employment. If these 
reemployment services are not effective, workers may be referred to 
training. In states with SEA programs, the WPRS system offers two 
options: 1) provision of reemployment services to aid the return to 






















Table 8.7  Self-Employment Assistance: Number of Individuals Entering 
Program by State, 1995–2008 
States 
Year DE MD ME MN NJ NY OR PA Total 
1995 44 — 608 652 
1996 17 127 —  2,041 32 2,217 
1997 5 120 — 2,839 49 786 3,799 
1998 — 90 — 321 1,270 66 541 2,288 
1999 — 59 569 1,837 18 416 2,899 
2000 1 26 98 491 1,654 18 229 2,517 
2001 — 125 109 834 1,480 278 301 3,127 
2002 17 22 118 524 1,634 305 550 3,170 
2003 43 11 202 45 486 70 338 147 1,342 
2004 56 10 481 235 557 475 166 9 1,989 
2005 31 21 351 102 626 309 204 0 1,644 
2006 21 21 252 632 177 226 0 1,329 
2007 22 21 201 496 369 295 152 1,556 
2008 35 15 130 477 219 507 86 1,469 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable, as the program was not in operation in that year in that 
state. — = not available, meaning either there were zero referrals or data were not 
reported. Data are for the eight states that have enacted SEA legislation and imple-
mented state programs. California enacted an SEA program but never implemented 
it. Minnesota did not implement its original SEA program; it became effective on 
April 19, 1995, and was repealed effective January 1, 1999. Minnesota then imple-
mented a temporary SEA law allowing the state to participate in the federal self-
employment demonstration project, Project GATE, which operated between 2003 and 
2005, according to Charles Hartfiel. A Louisiana SEA law became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 2005, but the state has not reported on its inactive program, according to David 
Fitzgerald. Maryland SEA data is in error; according to Susan Bass, Maryland’s SEA
director at the time, the Maryland SEA program served 571 participants during the 
period 2003–2007, but the reported data shows fewer than 100 total participants. Bass 
also indicates that the Maryland program has always served between 100 and 200 
participants. As a result, I have replaced the number of reported 2001 Maryland par-
ticipants—4,227—with an estimate of 125 for that year. SEA data for Puerto Rico for 
2001 appeared in the ETA 5159 report; it has been removed since Puerto Rico has not 
enacted an SEA program. 
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claimants can begin setting up their own small businesses (Messenger, 
Peterson-Vaccaro, and Vroman 2002, pp. 142–143). 
Under federal law, both WPRS and SEA use the worker profiling 
mechanism to identify UI claimants who are likely to exhaust their enti-
tlement to UI benefits. When profiled UI claimants report to One-Stop 
Career Centers, a small proportion of them are interested in setting up 
their own small businesses. These claimants can choose to be referred 
to the SEA program. Although it is mandated that referrals to SEA be 
made through the WPRS system, few SEA states report that they make 
these referrals, and those that do appear to refer very few workers. The 
number of reported referrals has not been more than a few thousand. A
substantial amount of nonreporting and underreporting has occurred. 
Table 8.8  Self-Employment Assistance Program Data, 1995–2008 
Number of 
SEA referrals individuals SEA weeks SEA benefits 
Year from WPRS entering SEA compensated paid ($) 
1995 660 652 5,591 1,364,676 
1996 2,649 2,217 26,603 6,507,709 
1997 2,356 3,799 42,111 10,968,804 
1998 831 2,288 37,740 9,587,764 
1999 1,434 2,910 32,726 9,718,240 
2000 2,735 2,517 38,913 13,209,451 
2001 2,552 3,127 37,787 12,501,211 
2002 4,950 3,170 50,057 17,159,098 
2003 874 1,342 25,228 8,966,567 
2004 1,293 1,989 41,978 14,603,948 
2005 1,468 1,623 38,983 13,928,325 
2006 1,292 1,329 32,370 14,599,974 
2007 1,522 1,556 35,139 13,645,131 
2008 1,489 1,469 67,360 10,307,763 
NOTE: Data has been adjusted to remove reported data for three states that submitted 
SEA report data without having SEA programs: Puerto Rico, reporting the number 
entering SEA for 2001; Oklahoma, reporting SEA weeks compensated for 2005; and 
Kentucky, reporting SEA benefits paid for 2003. 
SOURCE: Unemployment Insurance Data Base (UIDB). For “Number of individuals 
entering SEA,” “SEA weeks compensated,” and “SEA benefits paid,” data are from 















All states with SEA programs are expected to make use of the 
WPRS program to refer workers to the SEA program, since both pro-
grams must consider the likelihood of exhausting UI benefits as a condi-
tion of participation. Of the seven states with SEA programs, however,
only four—Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon—report that 
they use the WPRS system to identify individuals to refer to the SEA
programs (Table 8.9). In those states, referrals reached nearly 5,000 
in 2002 but have remained at fewer than 1,500 since then. Only New 
Jersey has reported that referrals to SEA regularly occur before work-
ers are enrolled in the SEA program. Maine, New York, and Oregon 
report using the referral mechanism to some extent, while Delaware, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania do not report using 
worker profiling referrals. 
All or most workers entering the SEA program should be referred 
by the WPRS system, since SEA participants are required to be pro-
filed. Comparing the data in Tables 8.6 and 8.8 suggests that is not the 
case. New Jersey reports that all individuals entering the SEA program 
have been referred. New York and Oregon have been reporting that a 
substantial portion of SEA entrants are referred from WPRS, but the 
percentage has been declining sharply in New York. Maine reports a 
small number of referrals, while the other states report no referrals. Low 
referral rates appear to reflect a lack of reporting or an underreporting 
rather than a lack of use of worker profiling as the referral mechanism 
to the SEA program. 
States found the process of implementing the SEA program bur-
densome. They were not accustomed to setting up a plan for a new 
program, as was required under SEA. Until 1999, they were required to 
establish such a plan and submit it to the department. After the enact-
ment of a permanent SEA program in late 1998, however, the USDOL
removed this requirement. 
Self-Employment Assistance programs appear to be effective at 
starting businesses with reasonably high survival rates. The Washing-
ton State experiment fostered businesses that experienced a 63 percent 
survival rate after 15 months, while the Massachusetts experiment had 
a 77 percent survival rate after 13 months. By comparison, the surviv-
al rates of firms participating in European self-employment programs 
were not as high (OECD 1995). All SEA programs in Europe and the 
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Table 8.9  Number of Individuals Referred to SEA from WPRS by State, 
1995–2008 
State 
Year DE LA MD ME MN NJ NY OR PA Total 
1995 29 — 583 48 660 
1996 17 38 — 308 2,102 184 2,649 
1997 6 11 — 677 1,512 50 — 2,256 
1998 — 9 — 313 494 15 — 831 
1999 2 6 545 859 24 — 1,436 
2000 — — 11 492 2,203 29 — 2,735 
2001 — — 5 834 1,552 161 — 2,552 
2002 — — 10 2,990 1,677 273 — 4,950 
2003 — — 42 — 486 73 273 — 874 
2004 — — 64 — 557 552 120 — 1,293 
2005 — — — 87 — 626 446 307 — 1,466 
2006 — — — 54 632 206 401 — 1,293 
2007 — — — 136 496 412 478 — 1,522 
2008 — — — 24 477 275 713 — 1,489 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable, as the program was not in operation in that year in that 
state. — = not available, meaning either there were zero referrals or data were not 
reported. Data are for the nine states that have enacted SEA legislation and imple-
mented state programs. Erroneously reported data have been removed for states that 
have not enacted SEA programs: Connecticut for 1999–2003, Georgia for 1997, Iowa 
for 1995, Nebraska for 1996 and 1998–2004, New Hampshire for 1996, and Wash-
ington for 2002. 
SOURCE: Unemployment Insurance Data Base; ETA 9048 report. 
12 months or more after businesses left the program (Table 8.10). In 
comparison, for all new firms that opened a single establishment in the 
United States in 1998, 66 percent were still in existence two years after 
their birth and 44 percent were still in existence four years after (Knaup 
2005). Self-employment programs for the unemployed appear to do 
quite well compared to all new establishments in the United States and 
compared to similar programs in Europe. 
While the SEA program is very small today, it could have a much 
larger effect on the U.S. economy if the program were implemented 
nationwide. If participation in a national SEA program reached 1 or 2 
percent of regular UI beneficiaries and if the participants had 50 percent 
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Table 8.10  Survival Rates of Businesses for Participants in 
Self-Employment Programs 
Intake Months since Survival 
year leaving program rate (%) 
Australia 1990 12 54 
Denmark 1989 12 40 
France 1986 54 51 
Netherlands 1985 36 52 
United Kingdom 1991 7 71 
United States 
Washington 1990 15 63 
Massachusetts 1990–92 13 77 
SOURCE: OECD (1995); Benus et al. (1995). 
business starts. At that level, SEA would contribute an additional 8 to 
16 percent to the estimated 637,100 U.S. business starts in 2006 (SBA
2008)—a significant increase. 
Selected State Case Studies 
Of the 13 states with SEA legislation, six do not have active pro-
grams. California has legal authority for a program, but it is not opera-
tional. Connecticut no longer has an SEA provision in its state UI law 
(USDOL 2008b). Louisiana has SEA legislation but has never imple-
mented it. Minnesota also never implemented its SEA legislation. 
Rhode Island never implemented its SEA program, but it does operate 
a state self-employment program that is separate from its UI program.34 
In 2006 Washington State enacted a program called Self-Employment 
Assistance, but it is a form of commissioner-approved training and is 
not subject to the USDOL’s reporting rules for SEA. The Washington 
State SEA provisions expire on July 1, 2012.35 
Louisiana 
Louisiana enacted SEA legislation in 2004, and its program became 
operational on January 1, 2005, yet Louisiana has not reported any 
SEA activity. Workers were not interested in the program, and the state 
received no applications. The lack of interest resulted from the require-
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neurial training. Interest was lacking despite the fact that free training 
was available through Louisiana’s technical schools. After Hurricane 
Katrina struck Louisiana, the program became inactive. As of 2008, no 
state staff members were dedicated to the program, and it was not being 
promoted by the state workforce agency.36 
maryland 
Maryland enacted its SEA program and implemented it in 2000. 
The Maryland UI program searches for UI beneficiaries to participate as 
part of the WPRS profiling process. Each Sunday night, WPRS partici-
pation notices are sent out to new UI claimants. Claimants with worker 
profiling exhaustion probabilities of 0.4 or greater are sent a WPRS 
notice that also includes an invitation to compete for a spot participating 
in SEA. SEA applications are received from approximately 2 percent 
of those who are invited to compete. Participants must be ready to start 
their own business after receiving training, provided by the organiza-
tion Women Entrepreneurs of Baltimore. The rigorous entrepreneurial 
training course lasts eight weeks. Training fund limitations restrict the 
number of training courses to only four each year; about 30 students are 
in each class, and about 115 have participated each year in recent years. 
Recently, annual training costs have been approximately $300,000, or 
$2,600 per trainee. In the past five years, 571 workers have participated 
in the program. Since the Maryland SEA program began in 2000, staff 
members estimate that participants have numbered between 100 and 
200 each year.37 
The SEA program is considered to be very successful by Maryland, 
but the program is constrained by limited and unstable training fund 
availability. Local Workforce Investment Boards have been unwilling 
to provide entrepreneurial training because of the adverse effect on 
WIA performance outcomes. Since participant income following train-
ing is generally not in wages and salaries, WIA program operators get 
no credit when the standard outcome measures of entered employment, 
earnings, or retention are used. As a result, training funds generally 
come from the governor’s WIA reserve funds and occasionally from 
the state’s UI penalty and interest account. 
The Maryland agency collects only limited SEA data. A work-
search exemption for SEA participants is the only item in Maryland’s 
automated UI reporting system—the rest of the SEA system is run off 













the mainframe, and the SEA program does not transmit the SEA data to 
the reporting staff in the labor market information unit. As a result, the 
SEA data reported to the department does not reflect the true size of the 
Maryland SEA program. Rather than the actual figure of 571 partici-
pants over the past five years, a federal report (Table 8.6) counts fewer 
than 100 participants. Table 8.8 does not capture the fact that between 
50,000 and 75,000 UI claimants are invited to apply for SEA each year 
through the worker profiling process.38 
minnesota 
Minnesota enacted a program, effective on April 19, 1995; however, 
the Minnesota program was not implemented. The state workforce agency
prepared to implement the program, but then staff members looked at 
the complexity of program operation (e.g., the data collection and analy-
sis required by the department to determine the cost-effectiveness of the 
program) and the expectation of limited net return to Minnesota (i.e., the 
small number of jobs created relative to the effort to set up the program). 
As a result, the state agency decided not to implement the program and 
asked the state legislature to repeal the authorizing legislation. In 1998 
the SEA statute was repealed, effective January 1, 1999.39 
In 2002, Minnesota applied to participate in Project GATE, a
department-funded microenterprise demonstration project. Since the 
presence of an SEA program was a condition of participation, Min-
nesota enacted a temporary SEA program for the duration of the pro-
ject, from 2003 to 2005. The Minnesota SEA program ended with the 
completion of the Project GATE demonstration project.40 
New york 
New York was the first state to enact SEA legislation, in mid-1994. 
Implementation of the SEA provisions began in January 1995. The pro-
gram had bipartisan support: it was enacted in the final year of Gov-
ernor Mario Cuomo’s Democratic administration and implemented at 
the beginning of Governor George Pataki’s Republican administration. 
John E. Sweeney, commissioner of the New York State Department of 
Labor when the program was implemented, saw the SEA program as an 
opportunity for his agency to change its policy response to unemploy-
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on the abilities of people to create their own businesses.” The SEA pro-
gram also fit with the “overall economic development strategy for the 
state of New York,” which was centered on the “growth of small and 
medium sized enterprises.” As a result, the SEA program became an 
integral part of that process (OECD 1995; Sweeney 1995). 
As the program commenced, Carolyn Peterson-Vaccaro, the first 
director of the New York SEA program, emphasized that the key to its 
success was to have the USDOL and the state labor departments edu-
cate and train state and local staff about the SEA program and include 
as many staff members as possible in the process. She also emphasized 
the need to establish good working relationships with the private sector. 
She believed that the success of the New York program was dependent 
on existing businesses that volunteered to assist the program and on the 
Small Business Development Centers, which provided counseling and 
training to SEA participants in New York (OECD 1995). 
The early political support was crucial, but equally important was 
the program’s careful design and planning. Shortly after enactment of 
SEA, a New York project team of field and central office staff began 
meeting in September 1994 to plan program implementation. The team 
studied the evaluation results of the Massachusetts and Washington 
experiments, took what could be applied to New York, and adapted 
other aspects of the program to New York’s needs. A crucial aspect of 
the New York law and its implementation was that, while the New York 
Department of Labor would run and manage the program, two other 
agencies—the State University of New York’s SBDCs and the New 
York State Department of Economic Development—were given the 
critical role of providing entrepreneurial training. The problem other 
state SEA programs encountered—lack of resources for SEA training— 
was avoided in New York by giving this responsibility to the agencies 
that specialized in providing entrepreneurial training. Strong politi-
cal support for the SEA program ensured that the other state agencies 
would provide funding for SEA training (Sweeney 1995). 
The resources per participant needed for the training component 
of the early New York SEA program were modest in comparison to 
the eight-week training course provided by the Maryland SEA pro-
gram: New York SEA participants were only required to take 20 hours 
of training that included topics such as starting a business, develop-















taxes and regulations. The program was initially designed to serve up 
to 1,000 entrepreneurs at a time and to serve up to 2,500 entrepreneurs 
per year (Sweeney 1995). 
Table 8.7 shows that the New York program provided self-
employment assistance to more than 2,000 UI claimants a year in 
1996 and 1997. It continued to serve more than 1,000 claimants a year 
between 1998 and 2003. Beginning in 2004, however, the annual num-
ber of participants dropped sharply and has not reached 500 participants 
per year since then. 
Self-Employment Assistance programs are small programs. They 
depend a great deal on who runs the program. Carolyn Peterson-Vaccaro 
ran the New York SEA program from 1995 until the end of 1998. Dur-
ing her tenure, enrollment surged. She actively promoted the program
among UI and ES staff. Because of the lack of training funds, Peterson-
Vacarro and her deputy director aggressively looked for entrepreneurial 
training funds, and the largest sources of entrepreneurial training funds 
were two organizations funded in part by the Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA)—the SBDCs and the Service Corps of Retired Execu-
tives. She worked with the regional SBA director, who was willing to 
support SEA with significant amounts of training resources at no cost 
to the SEA program.41 
After Peterson-Vaccaro left for another job in the New York Labor 
Department in 1998, support for SEA ebbed. Peterson-Vaccaro contin-
ued to encourage the program until the spring of 1999, when she trans-
ferred to the New York governor’s office. Once she left the New York 
Department of Labor she had little to do with the SEA program.42 
Since 2002, New York has experienced a decline in applications 
and approvals for the SEA program. In 2002, 1,670 applications were 
received, and 1,625 were approved. In 2008, between January and Sep-
tember, 164 of 326 applications were approved.43 The decline in SEA
participation can be attributed to a number of factors. 
First, New York no longer has an SEA director who coordinates 
the efforts of the UI program and the One-Stops. The New York UI 
program has the lead role in operating the SEA program: it pays the 
SEA allowance, but it does not provide any services. As in almost all 
states, UI no longer has an active presence in the One-Stops. It pays all 
UI benefits from two telephone call centers. Job Service staff members 
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a priority for them. No one brings these two organizations together and 
ensures that they are working cooperatively on the SEA program. 
Second, while 20 hours of entrepreneurial training continues to be 
required, the New York Department of Labor does not pay for the train-
ing and no longer has an outside source of funding. In general, SEA par-
ticipants pay for their own training. The One-Stop staff guides partici-
pants to privately provided entrepreneurial training courses and training 
providers. The SEA program ended its statewide relationship with the 
SBDCs and with the Service Corps of Retired Executives, which had 
provided counseling and training. UI claimants interested in SEA get 
limited support. 
Third, while all UI claimants with a profiling score of 0.7 or greater 
are invited to apply, SEA applications are down greatly. Marketing of 
and support for the SEA program by the One-Stop staffs is minimal, 
and the UI staff members have a limited working relationship with One-
Stop staff members, who operate the program in the One-Stop local 
offices. Many UI staff members are ambivalent about the program. 
From a UI benefit payment perspective, they see an inequity between 
the SEA participants who can work full time on setting up their own 
businesses and draw SEA allowances, and other claimants who cannot 
receive UI benefits if they work at all in wage and salary employment 
or in self-employment.44 
Pennsylvania 
The Pennsylvania SEA program began in 1997. It continues to oper-
ate, and the program impacts are being monitored by the Pennsylvania 
UI staff with follow-up surveys. For the period January through Sep-
tember 2006, the SEA program had 201 participants, who started 113 
new businesses. Those businesses reported income totaling $228,239 
and employed 19 workers earning $260,373 in wages during this pe-
riod.45 While Pennsylvania failed to report any participation in the SEA
program to the USDOL for 2006, it would appear that the Pennsylvania 
program has operated continuously since 1997, but that the reporting 












PROJECT gATE ExPERImENT 
When the World Trade Center buildings fell on September 11, 2001, 
Lower Manhattan below Houston Street was temporarily closed, and 
most business in the area came to a halt, including those in Chinatown. 
In an effort to help Chinatown recover, Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao 
asked the Employment and Training Administration to develop a one-
time effort to help rejuvenate the area. Initially, ETA research staff pro-
posed conducting a microenterprise development demonstration, which 
Secretary Chao strongly supported. Consultation by ETA staff with the 
SBA, however, revealed that the SBA had already initiated a demonstra-
tion program in Chinatown in conjunction with Pace University. With 
that information, ETA research staff recommended a multistate micro-
enterprise demonstration outside of New York City using experimental 
methods. Secretary Chao approved both the project and its funding, 
and personally awarded grants to the participating states and requested 
project briefings. “Project GATE” had begun. 
Project GATE (Growing America Through Entrepreneurship) was 
funded in 2002 and began operation in late 2003; operations ended in 
2005. Its goal was to assist people to create or expand their own small 
businesses in three states—Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania. These 
states were chosen in part because they were all believed to have SEA
legislation and SEA programs that were in operation.46 The local sites 
in which the project operated were: Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania; Minneapolis/St. Paul and northeast Minnesota; and Portland, 
Lewiston, and Bangor, Maine. 
A large-scale outreach was conducted in each site to make people 
aware of the program. The outreach was conducted by five means:
1) providing information in the One-Stop Career Centers, 2) inserting 
fliers in envelopes with UI benefit checks, 3) creating a GATE Web site, 
4) conducting a grassroots campaign, and 5) marketing through mass 
media. Individuals were not randomly assigned into treatment and con-
trol groups until they had expressed a strong interest in participating, as 
indicated by registering with the program, attending an orientation, and 
completing a project application. Altogether, 4,201 interested individu-
als were assigned to either a treatment group or a control group; the two 
groups contained equal numbers. Members of the treatment group were 
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offered an assessment, classroom training in entrepreneurial skills, and 
individual and ongoing technical assistance (Benus et al. 2008a). 
Almost every local-area resident in the project sites was eligible to 
participate in Project GATE. Individuals were required to be 18 years 
of age or older, and they had to be a state resident who could lawfully 
work in the state. They had to want to start or improve a small business. 
Unlike participants in the SEA demonstrations, participating individu-
als could be employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force, and they 
did not have to be collecting UI. Project GATE was designed, however, 
to be part of the workforce development system and its institutions. The 
gateway to entering the demonstration was the One-Stop Career Cen-
ters. The One-Stops conducted the outreach for the project, and they 
provided the orientation session that potential members of the treatment 
and control groups attended. During its operation, Project GATE was an 
additional employment service that the One-Stops could offer to those 
who were interested in starting or expanding a small business. 
Although Project GATE was funded by the department, it was a 
partnership with the Small Business Administration. The SBA assisted 
in linking participants to business loans. Its SBDCs played an important 
role at the local level, providing assessments, training, and technical 
assistance at all sites except Philadelphia. These services also were pro-
vided by community-based organizations and universities in some sites. 
The demographics of the 4,201 applicants for Project GATE were 
diverse and differed widely by site. Across all sites, applicants were, 
on average, 54 percent male, 42 years of age, 54 percent white and not 
Hispanic/Latino, and had 14 years of education. Ninety percent were 
born in the United States, 96 percent were U.S. citizens, 35 percent had 
household incomes of less than $25,000, and 68 percent had household 
incomes of less than $50,000 (Benus et al. 2008a, p. 53). 
Individuals who attended the assessment received an estimated 15 
hours of services, consisting of 1 hour in assessment, 12 hours in train-
ing, and 1 to 2 hours in technical assistance. However, a significant 
percentage of participants dropped out of the program after the assess-
ment, with one-quarter of participants receiving no training or technical 
assistance. Forty-two percent of participants received both training and 
















Although it served a much wider population, Project GATE was 
designed by making use of lessons learned from the earlier UI self-
employment assistance experiments, including these design and imple-
mentation procedures. The close relationship between these experi-
ments was facilitated by the fact that the principal investigator for Proj-
ect GATE, Jacob Benus, was also the principal investigator for the SEA
experiments. 
The interim report concluded that Project GATE was largely imple-
mented as planned and that it could be replicated successfully on a
wider scale. The final evaluation would include a net impact analysis 
and a benefit-cost analysis (Benus et al. 2008a). 
The implementation of Project GATE has had a confounding effect 
on the SEA entrant data for the three participating states: Maine, Min-
nesota, and Pennsylvania. For the period in which the project ran, from 
2003 to 2005, Maine and Minnesota reported Project GATE participants 
as SEA entrants, while Pennsylvania did not. The inclusion of Project 
GATE participants increased Maine’s count of entrants in SEA in all 
three years. Minnesota reported its SEA program activity only during 
those years, since the state does not operate an ongoing SEA program. 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Cost-effective. Results from the UI Self-Employment Demonstra-
tion project in Massachusetts showed that self-employment assistance 
is a cost-effective strategy for helping some unemployed workers to be-
come reemployed. SEA gets those workers back to work faster by help-
ing them to create their own jobs. A small number of states developed, 
implemented, and are operating SEA programs to assist unemployed 
workers to move from unemployment into self-employment. 
Small program size. Few states have adopted the program: only 
seven states have active programs. Few individuals use Self-Employment
Assistance programs in the states that have programs. Self-employment 
assistance is likely to be appropriate only for a small number of work-
ers in the United States—up to 2 percent of the unemployed—based on 
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Foreign experience. Twenty European Union countries have start-
up programs. Participation in some of these programs has been larger 
than in the United States. In three EU countries, Germany, Ireland, 
and Italy, self-employment programs are a great deal larger than in the 
United States, and these programs are part of a broad policy to expand 
employment and encourage entrepreneurship. 
Lack of entrepreneurial training. A key reason for the small 
size of the SEA program is the lack of permanent, reliable sources of 
entrepreneurial training. In Program Year 2005, only 359 WIA Adult 
and Dislocated Worker program exiters in the entire nation received 
entrepreneurial training—approximately seven entrepreneurial trainees 
per state. Similarly, in CY 2005, only 1,623 individuals participated in 
the SEA program, mostly because of the lack of entrepreneurial train-
ing resources. The incentives to providing this training clearly need to 
change. 
Federal indifference. The USDOL has not promoted the SEA pro-
gram in recent years. Without encouragement or technical assistance 
and guidance, the program lost its policy momentum. The few states 
that have implemented this program either have seen participation de-
clines or steady participation at very low levels. 
Sustainability. Small employment and training programs like SEA
are difficult to implement and sustain. Few staff in the local offices 
know about them or have the ability to help them flourish. There is little 
coordination between the UI program, which pays for self-employment 
allowances, and the One-Stops, which both administer the program and 
either provide participants with entrepreneurial training and other re-
employment services or refer them to such training and services. 
Reporting problems. Reporting for the program is frequently inac-
curate. Because the program is a stepchild within the UI program, the 
SEA program frequently has weak links to the rest of UI, including to 
the state workforce agency reporting unit. 
Potential impact on new business formation. Although the Self-



















it could have a modest but significant impact on the U.S. economy if the 
program were implemented nationwide and encouraged by the USDOL
and the state agencies. If participation in the national SEA program 
reached 1 or 2 percent of regular UI beneficiaries and if the participants 
had 50 percent business start-up rates, the SEA program could yield 
50,000 to 100,000 business start-ups per year. At that level, SEA would 
have contributed an additional 8 to 16 percent to the 637,100 U.S. busi-
ness start-ups in 2007 (SBA 2008). 
Recommendations 
The federal government could do a great deal more to encourage 
states to adopt and use the Self-Employment Assistance program. The 
Department of Labor should do three things: 
1) Provide states with information, guidance, and technical 
assistance; 
2) Encourage states to enact SEA programs; 
3) Encourage states to provide entrepreneurial counseling and 
training through their Workforce Investment Act programs. 
Disincentives to providing entrepreneurial training that stem 
from the WIA performance measures should be removed by 
developing new performance measures for the outcomes of the 
SEA program. 
The department should work with the Small Business Administra-
tion and encourage it to provide entrepreneurial training and counseling 
services to SEA and WIA participants. The SBA should be encouraged 
to become a partner in the SEA program and in the provision of entre-
preneurial services to the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs. 
Funding of entrepreneurial training is a key problem that must be 
addressed if the SEA program is going to work well and expand in 
the future. In most states with SEA programs, the program is consid-
ered to be a UI program, and thus support from other agencies is weak. 
SEA allowances can be funded from the Unemployment Trust Fund, 
but entrepreneurial training and other business development services 
cannot. Other funding sources such as the governor’s WIA discretion-
ary funds or the UI penalty and interest fund are currently being used 
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be reasonable ongoing sources of funding. State and local WIA entities 
cannot be expected to provide WIA funds for entrepreneurial training 
when self-employment income is not reflected in the WIA common per-
formance measures, which use UI wage records to determine whether 
workers entered wage and salary employment. Participation in the WIA
entrepreneurial training program is punished by the WIA performance 
measurement system, which is based on UI wage records. Funding of 
entrepreneurial training could be encouraged in three ways: 
1) A separate entrepreneurial training account could be created 
within the WIA Dislocated Worker Program to encourage the 
provision of entrepreneurial training services. The account 
would be available to all states with SEA programs. This new 
account would encourage states with existing SEA programs 
to expand them, and other states to enact these programs. The 
initial funding level would not have to be large—$10 million 
would allow training for more than 3,000 workers—a sharp 
increase from the less than 2,000 UI beneficiaries participating 
in SEA in 2007. As SEA participation increases over time, the 
account funding level also should increase. 
2) States should be encouraged to have their SBDCs, Service 
Corps of Retired Executives, and state departments of com-
merce participate in the SEA program and provide counseling 
and training. 
3) The Department should work with the Small Business Admin-
istration to have the SBA encourage state SBDCs and the Ser-
vice Corps of Retired Executives to provide counseling and 
training to both SEA and WIA participants. 
Congress should encourage state use of the SEA program. One 
incentive would be to have SEA benefits paid out of the Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act (FUTA) account in the Unemployment Trust Fund 
rather than from the state accounts, as is currently the case. 
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Work Sharing 
with David E. Balducchi 
INTRODUCTION 
Work sharing—also called short-time compensation (STC)—was 
the experiment that did not happen.1 As work sharing emerged as a U.S. 
public policy issue in the 1970s, the Carter administration announced 
a 1977 plan to have the federal government take a leadership role by 
launching a rigorous demonstration project using experimental meth-
ods. Soon after it was launched the plan fizzled. The demonstration was 
canceled, and it was left to the states to pursue and lead this program. 
Since then, both the states and the federal government have wielded 
leadership at different times in work sharing policy, and while the 
USDOL conducted two program evaluations, it has not pursued a rigor-
ously evaluated demonstration. 
Work sharing attempts to reduce layoffs by compensating a larger 
number of workers with partial unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in 
place of a total layoff for a smaller number of workers. For example, an 
employer can place 50 workers on a 20 percent hours reduction—to a four-
day week—instead of achieving the same hourly reduction by temporarily 
laying off 10 workers. In 17 states, individual firms, with the support of 
their employees, can file work sharing plans with a state UI agency. If the 
state agency approves the plan, work sharing can be used for a period of 
time, generally up to one year. During that time, workers can receive work 
sharing benefits for weekly work reductions of 10 percent or more, usu-
ally a one-day reduction. Work sharing benefits are calculated as a prorated 
share of a worker’s weekly UI benefit amount. Work sharing benefits are 
deducted from the total normal entitlement workers have for UI benefits, 
and work sharing plus UI benefits cannot exceed that entitlement during a 
one-year period. The benefits paid are charged to the employer in accor-





Work sharing has been advocated by some policy analysts as a pro-
gram that could improve the behavioral impact on workers in relation 
to the UI program. The American UI program has been found by some 
analysts to have a pro-layoff bias. Factors mentioned as contributing to 
this bias include incomplete UI experience rating, which encourages 
additional layoffs once firms reach maximum tax levels, and a UI partial 
benefit formula that permits only very limited hours of work per week. 
The effect of these disincentives sits heavily with the UI program, so it 
is not surprising that reforming the UI program has been seen as part of 
the solution. One proposal has been for greater adoption and utilization 
of work sharing (Abraham and Houseman 1993, pp. 132–147). 
For a state to adopt a work sharing program, the state legislature 
must enact work sharing provisions as part of the state UI statute. In the 
absence of special legislation, workers who experience a modest reduc-
tion in their weekly hours of work would not receive UI benefits under 
regular state UI partial benefit formulas. These normal partial benefit 
formulas are designed to pay benefits to workers whose hours are so 
sharply reduced that they are in need of income support, so they are 
usually only available to workers who work no more than one or two 
days a week. Work sharing has the effect of suspending and superseding 
these normal UI partial-benefit payment provisions. 
Work sharing is available in a number of European countries and in 
Canada. It was first implemented in the United States in 1978 in Cali-
fornia. Today, it is an optional UI program that states can adopt as part 
of their UI system. The program was authorized by Congress through 
legislation enacted in 1982 and again in 1992. Nationally the program 
is small and infrequently used, but it is more important in a small num-
ber of states, and it represents an additional, targeted program used by 
employers to ease the problems associated with unemployment. 
WORk ShARINg IN OThER COUNTRIES 
Work sharing was first developed in Germany in 1927, and it oper-
ated briefly under the Weimar Republic. After World War II, Germany 
reestablished work sharing, and work sharing spread throughout West-
ern Europe and to Canada. It was a popular program in Europe for 
 
 
         
          
          
             
          
           
             
            
             
            
           
          
          
         
Work Sharing  343 
several decades, but prior to the Great Recession of 2007–2009 it had 
declined in usage as Europe became more concerned with labor market 
flexibility and less concerned with job security. Given work sharing’s 
long history in Europe, European work sharing programs can shed light 
on work sharing policy options for the United States. 
Work Sharing in germany since World War II 
Work sharing in Germany has been modified and adapted in the 
post–World War II period. Its procedures were adopted as part of the 
Employment Promotion Act of 1969. It has been supported by the tri-
partite employment policy participants: government, labor, and man-
agement, working as partners. Work sharing attempted to support the 
stabilization of employment, labor-management relations, and society 
in general (Jensen 1995, pp. 7–10) 
Work sharing (“short-term working allowance”) is popular in Ger-
many, particularly in times of economic downturn. When the economy 
weakens and employers have reduced orders, as a first step employers 
generally lay off temporary or contract workers. If that reduction is not 
sufficient, employers’ second step frequently is to apply to participate 
in work sharing with the Federal Employment Agency. As part of the 
request, a firm must demonstrate that it faces a cyclical problem and that 
the prospects for recovery are good. If the request is approved, working 
hours may be reduced substantially, even by up to 100 percent.2 
The German work sharing program is generous and highly flexible. 
For employees, work sharing replaces a larger share of lost income—60 
percent for single workers and 67 percent for workers with families—than 
in the United States. At the same time, work sharing benefits do not reduce 
workers’entitlement to regular UI benefits. Workers who face a subsequent 
layoff can receive full entitlement to their UI benefits. Work sharing is 
attractive to employers because it reduces the cost of wages in a time of 
crisis. Work sharing benefits are not an additional cost to the employer: UI 
taxes are funded by a flat payroll tax on employers and employees, and the 
benefits are not experience-rated, as they are in the United States. Thus, use 
of work sharing by employers reduces wage and salary costs but imposes 
no additional UI contribution. On the other hand, employers must maintain 
their contributions to pension and national health insurance funds at the 
same rate as if the workers were working full time.3 
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As laws restricting worker dismissals tightened over time in Germany, 
the rules for work sharing were loosened. Work sharing plans were lim-
ited to six months before 1969. Since then, the normal six-month plan 
has been subject to extension, first to 12 and later to 24 months. Today, 
work sharing can be drawn for six months, but can be extended for up 
to 24. Work sharing program oversight attempts to assure that layoffs 
would have occurred if an employer’s work sharing plans had not gone 
into effect (MaCoy and Morand 1984, pp. 53–58; Vroman 1992).4 
Use of the German program has been highly cyclical. Use has been 
greatest early in a recession and then has declined as the recession 
advances. During past major recessionary years, work sharing recip-
ients have numbered half or more of the workers receiving UI ben-
efits. Although there was a downtrend in the utilization rate through 
the 1980s, the percentage reduction in the work week for participating 
workers increased (Vroman 1992, pp. 22–27). 
Work sharing use increased to more than 200,000 participants in 
2002, in response to the 2001 recession, but declined sharply thereafter. 
The cost of the program reached almost 700 million euros. The aver-
age cost per participant has been 3,000 to 4,000 euros. In late 2008, the 
financial and economic crisis in Germany led to a sharp increase in the 
number of applications to the Federal Employment Agency, particu-
larly in the auto industry. The number of applications for work shar-
ing is viewed by Germans as one indicator of the economic situation 
in the country, and the 2008 economic downturn was reflected in the 
increased use of the work sharing program (Table 9.1).5 
Several critical differences exist between the German and U.S. work 
sharing programs. U.S. employees are less inclined to use a program 
that provides less wage replacement and reduces future eligibility for 
regular UI benefits. U.S. employers are less likely to use a program that 
is experience-rated and results in increased direct cost to themselves. 
By contrast, work sharing is particularly attractive to German employ-
ers facing stringently enforced advance notice provisions, because it 
provides greater short-run flexibility and wage bill reductions. The U.S. 
work-sharing program suffers lower participation from being more 
closely tied to this country’s UI program, which has less generous UI 
benefit payment levels and a financing system that assigns employers 
direct responsibility for the benefit costs of their former employees. 
  345 
Table 9.1  Expenditures for Participating Workers and Employers in Short-Time Work in germany, 2000–2007 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Participants 86,052 122,942 206,767 195,371 150,593 114,607 66,482 68,317 
Employers — — — — — 10,718 6,561 8,333 
Expenditures (euros, — — 607 687 637 416 150 — 
in millions) 
Expenditures per par- — — 2,900 3,500 4,200 3,600 2,300 — 
ticipant (euros) 
NOTE: — = not available. 
SOURCE: Eichhorst and Zimmermann (2007) for expenditures and for participants 2000–2004; e-mail message from Markus Franz on 
November 22, 2008, for participants and employers 2005–2007. 
       
         
           
         
          
          
        
       
 




The U.S. institutional structure encourages adjustments of employ-
ment, while the German system encourages adjustment of hours. Accord-
ing to Abraham and Houseman (1994a, p. 32), the difference in “labor 
adjustment lies not in the adjustment of total labor input, but rather in its 
division between adjustments to the number of workers employed and 
adjustment to hours per worker. German companies rely much more on 
adjustment of average hours, including the use of short-time work, to 
reduce labor input during downturns; American companies make greater 
use of employment adjustment, and by implication layoffs.” 
Much of this difference in employment adjustment is in timing. In 
a recession, U.S. employment adjusts downward very quickly, while in 
Germany adjustment takes place with a lag. In Germany, work sharing 
tends to be used during the first year of a cyclical downturn, as employ-
ers substitute a decline in hours for a decline in employment. German 
employment declines tend to take place after this delay of about one 
year. Thus, work sharing acts to stabilize employment in the short run, 
although it does not prevent long-term downward adjustments (Abra-
ham and Houseman 1994b, pp. 86–94; Vroman 1992, pp. 27–30). 
Work Sharing in Europe 
By the mid-1990s, work sharing programs had been adopted by a 
dozen nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
Canada (Cook, Brinsko, and Tan 1995). All had the same goal: that of 
retaining jobs during a cyclical downturn by substituting hours reduc-
tions for reductions in employment. But the programs varied among 
themselves as well as differing in some critical ways from the U.S. 
program. 
A comparison of programs in Belgium, Canada, France, and Ger-
many as they existed in the mid-1990s shows a variety of program 
designs. For most programs, the government required both employer 
and worker approval of submitted work-sharing plans. Plans could stay 
in effect for widely varying periods, with the maximum program length 
ranging from 6 to 24 months. Canada had minimum and maximum 
weekly reductions in hours, but Belgium and Germany had no such 
limits: the reductions could run from 0 to 100 percent. Replacement 
rates generally varied between 50 and 60 percent in Belgium, Canada, 
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and France, but could be as much as 68 percent in Germany. Work shar-
ing benefits were generally paid at the same level as regular UI benefits. 
Employers needed to retain full fringe benefits. Benefits did not count 
against UI eligibility. Funding was either from a nonexperience-rated, 
flat payroll tax or from general revenue (Cook, Brinsko, and Tan 1995). 
The European Union (EU) collects data on work sharing pro-
grams through its statistical agency, Eurostat. Its 2004 data (European 
Commission 2006) shows short-time working allowances and partial 
unemployment benefits programs operating in six countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain (Table 9.2). The 
programs in Austria, Germany, Portugal, and Spain were listed as short-
time working allowances. Work sharing participants varied from being 
less than 1 percent of the country’s basic UI program participants up 
to nearly 15 percent. The programs in Finland and Germany were big-
ger than those in participating U.S. states, but the programs in Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, and Spain were roughly similar in size. 
In the six countries that have short-time work or partial unemployment 
benefit programs, half have short-time work programs that are smaller 
than business start-up incentive (self-employment assistance) programs. 
The pre–Great Recession decline in European use of work sharing 
was related to a shift in the overall labor market policy toward “flexicu-
rity.” Beginning in the mid-1990s, Denmark became one of the innova-
tors of the flexicurity movement. Flexicurity tries to balance flexibility 
in the labor market with high levels of workforce security. Employers 
are more free to lay off workers. Employees are not guaranteed job 
security in their current jobs (labor contracts become flexible), but a 
combination of active labor market policies, lifelong learning strate-
gies, and “modern social security systems” (including broad coverage 
of UI, pensions, and health care) is designed to create greater workforce 
security as workers move between jobs. Adoption of flexicurity spread 
throughout Europe, and by 2005 the European Union had adopted 
flexicurity as a central principle of its European Employment Strategy 
(European Commission 2005, 2007). 
The movement toward flexicurity has had a negative impact on 
work sharing in Europe. Flexicurity is the antithesis of contractual 
labor arrangements, “which discourage or delay transfers” (European 
Commission 2007). Work sharing in Europe came to be seen as a tool 
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Table 9.2  Participants in UI, Short-Time Compensation (work sharing), 
and Start-Up Incentives in European Countries, 2004 
Unemployment Start-up/ 
Country Insurance STC STC/UI % Start-up UI % 
Austria 591,498 480 0.08 3,952 0.67 
Belgium 575,093 34,158 5.94 517 0.09 
Bulgaria  — — — 
Czech Rep. 169,109 6,002 3.55 
Estonia 51,052 287 0.56 
Finland 126,098 18,837 14.94 2,643 2.10 
France 2,261,436 51,146 2.26 
Germany 1,842,405 150,593 8.17 237,253 12.88 
Greece — — — 
Hungary 109,654 5,203 4.74 
Ireland 71,884 6,855 9.54 
Italy 277,319 13,584 4.90 
Lithuania — — — 
Luxembourg 7,744 484 6.25 15 0.19 
Norway 112,918 262 0.23 
Portugal 184,859 1,686 0.91 
Romania — — 
Slovakia 74,750 2,958 3.96 
Sweden 206,116 5,601 2.72 
Spain 2,358,392 48,385 2.05 93,033 3.94 
United Kingdom 2,458,030 3,492 0.14 
NOTE: blank = data not applicable; — = data not available. 
Participants. The measure of participants’ use above is dependent on the availability 
of data. The “stock” (S) was generally used since it is more frequently available; it is 
a measure of participants as an annual average stock. In some cases, the stock measure 
was not available (or unreasonably small) so the number of “entrants” (E) was used; 
“entrants are participants joining the measure during the year (inflow).” 
Unemployment insurance. This consists of “Full unemployment benefits” that are 
considered to be unemployment insurance rather than unemployment assistance pro-
grams or other means-tested programs. 
Short-time compensation (STC). Called short-time work or partial unemployment 
benefits. Includes compensation for formal short-time working arrangements and/or 
intermittent work schedules, irrespective of their cause, where the employer/employee
relationship continues. 
Start-up incentives. Include loans or grants to individuals. 
Work sharing and start-up incentives. Include only transfers to individuals, not to 
employers. 
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where it was used on a large scale to address the problem of structural 
unemployment in East Germany after reunification. Flexicurity encour-
aged greater use of active labor market policies (ALMPs) and less use 
of UI-related programs such as work sharing. 
By contrast, the self-employment assistance (SEA) programs are 
seen as a key component of European active labor market policies. 
Eighteen EU countries have “start-up incentive” programs, far more 
than the number that have work sharing programs. None of the newer 
members of the EU have a work sharing program, whereas five of the 
new countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, and 
Slovakia) have start-up incentive programs. Thus, work sharing is a 
program for a small number of Western European countries with higher 
per capita incomes. 
Despite the retreat from work sharing during much of the 2000s in 
Europe, work sharing returned as a preferred public policy during the 
Great Recession in many European Union countries. Germany was the 
greatest user of work sharing. Assessing the European response to the 
Great Recession, the European Commission considered work sharing 
to be one of the key public policy responses to weakening demand for 
labor (European Commission 2009). 
DEVELOPmENT OF ShORT-TImE COmPENSATION
PROgRAmS IN ThE UNITED STATES 
Origins of Work Sharing in the United States 
Work sharing is not new to the United States. It was used somewhat 
as a voluntary, private, uncompensated program during both the Hoover 
and Roosevelt administrations without government involvement.6 How-
ever, it declined and largely disappeared when three things happened: 
1) economic conditions worsened as the Depression dragged on, 2) a 
federal-state UI program was enacted that compensated total layoffs 
but did not compensate work sharing arrangements, and 3) large-scale 
reemployment occurred at the end of the 1930s as production increased 
for national defense. During the 1950s and 1960s, the availability of 
UI benefits made layoffs more acceptable to employers (Abraham and 
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Houseman 1993, p. 134; MaCoy and Morand 1984, pp. 158–164; Platt 
1956). 
As restructuring of the U.S. economy began in the 1970s, the con-
cept of government-based work sharing was first introduced in New York 
in response to employment problems and civil rights concerns. It was 
considered by the New York state legislature in 1975 but not enacted. 
In 1978, California was the first state to enact a work sharing program. 
Enactment was prompted by concerns about potential state government 
layoffs that might result from adoption of Proposition 13, a tax-cutting 
referendum that imposed state spending limits. Without work sharing, 
state budget cuts were expected to result in permanent layoffs of state 
employees. The work sharing program was enacted but never used for 
this purpose. Instead it was used by the private sector and became a small 
but popular program. The California state government strongly supported 
and promoted the program in its first few years of operation. In May 
1981, California sponsored a national work sharing conference in San 
Francisco to promote the adoption and use of work sharing (Best 1981, 
pp. 87–89). Fourteen other states followed California’s lead between 
1982 and 1988, but the pace of expansion since then has slowed: only 
four states have adopted work sharing since 1988 (Table 9.3). 
Six Phases of Work Sharing Policy 
In the United States, work sharing policy has gone through six dis-
tinct phases. In the first phase, states developed work sharing policy 
with little federal policy or involvement. This phase lasted until 1982. 
The second phase overlapped with the first phase and began in 1980 
when Congress seized upon the state policy innovations, resulting in 
the enactment of a temporary federal work sharing law in 1982. The 
third phase—the single period of active federal stewardship—lasted 
from 1982 until expiration of the temporary federal law in 1985, during 
which time eight states enacted work sharing laws. The fourth phase 
was a seven-year period of federal laissez-faire. State work sharing pro-
grams continued to operate, and the prior period of federal activism 
helped encourage seven additional states to enact work sharing laws. In 
the fifth phase, the recession of 1990–1991 prompted renewed congres-
sional attention, resulting in enactment in 1992 of the permanent federal 
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Table 9.3  Summary of State Work Sharing/Short-Time Compensation 
Laws, 2008 
Special 
Initial Limit on Reduction Require full or STC tax, 
year of number of in hours health fringe maximum 
State program weeks worked (%) benefits rate (%) 
Arizona 1982 26 10 to 40 Optional Yesa 
Arkansas 1985 26 10 to 40 Full No 
California 1978 b 10 or more Optional No 
Connecticut 1992 26 20 to 40 Full No 
Florida 1984 26 10 to 40 Optional Yes, 1.0 
Iowa 1991 26 20 to 50 Optional No 
cKansas 1988 26 20 to 40 Optional 
Louisiana 1986 26 20 to 40 Full No 
Maryland 1984 26 10 to 50 Optional No 
Massachusetts 1986 26 10 to 60 Health d 
Minnesota 1994 52 20 to 40 Full No 
Missouri 1987 26 20 to 40 Optional No 
New York 1986 20 20 to 60 Full No 
eOregon 1982 26 20 to 40 Optional 
Rhode Island 1991 26 10 to 50 Optional f 
Texas 1986 52 10 to 40 Optional No 
Vermont 1986 26 20 to 50 Optional No 
Washington 1983 26 10 to 50 Health No 
NOTE: Illinois enacted work sharing in 1983, but the law expired in 1988. Louisiana 
enacted work sharing in 1986 but no longer operates the program. 
a 1.0% if negative reserve ratio is less than 15%; 2% if 15% or more. 
b California: no limit, but total paid cannot exceed 26 times the weekly benefit 
amount (WBA). 
c Excludes negative-balance employers. 
d Negative-balance employers are treated as reimbursers. 
e If benefit ratio is greater than tax rate, reimburse excess at end of quarter. 
fAll short-time compensation (STC) benefits are charged to STC employer regardless of 
base-period charging rule. 




U.S. Department of Labor has failed to implement most aspects of the 
federal work sharing law and policy, while 17 states continue to oper-
ate existing work sharing programs, and one additional state enacted a 
work sharing law. 
Phase I—State initiation of work sharing (1975–1982) 
Prior to 1982, states were on their own in developing compensated 
work sharing policies. Early in this period, coalitions of labor and busi-
ness began promoting work sharing schemes as an outgrowth of the 
severe recession of 1974–1975. Until the “Great Recession,” the 1974– 
1975 recession caused the greatest job loss since the Great Depression. 
The federal government enacted, and states implemented, a string of 
UI benefit extensions that allowed claimants to draw up to 65 weeks of 
benefits. Twenty-four states had to borrow from the federal UI trust fund 
to be able to afford to pay UI benefits and then qualified for generous 
repayment schedules. These activities made state government officials 
and business and labor organizations familiar with the UI programs and 
may have made states more amenable to trying modifications to their 
state UI programs—one such approach being work sharing. 
New York State was the first to consider enacting state work sharing 
legislation. Initially the program was thought of as a social program to 
protect employment gains of minorities and women. Support for work 
sharing initially arose from the New York City Commission on Human 
Rights. Subsequently, Lillian Poses, a member of the Governor’s Task 
Force on Unemployment for the state of New York, became the chief 
sponsor of a work sharing proposal that bore her name. The Poses 
Plan became part of a broader bill designed to improve the employ-
ment situation in general and the labor market position of women and 
minorities in particular. The legislation was introduced in the New York 
State Assembly in June 1975 but died in committee (Ittner 1984, pp. 
121–122). 
In 1978, when California became the first state to enact a work 
sharing program, State Senator Bill Greene of East Los Angeles, chair 
of the senate labor committee, championed the program and secured 
its passage. Business and organized labor were initially skeptical of 
the program but soon came to support and promote it (Lammers and 
Lockwood 1984, p. 62). While anticipated state employee layoffs never 
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private sector, and it soon became a small but popular program, sup-
ported by Governor Jerry Brown and the state’s Employment Develop-
ment Department (EDD). The program grew rapidly, as yearly enroll-
ment of employers increased from 474 in 1979—the first full year of 
program operation—to 2,567 in 1982.7 In May 1981, the EDD hosted a 
national work sharing conference in San Francisco. Business and labor 
groups, as well as the Council of State Governments, the National Gov-
ernors Association, and state officials from New York and Pennsylva-
nia, cosponsored the conference.8 Featuring Congressman Pete Stark 
(D-CA), who supported federal work sharing, the conference provided 
national exposure for California’s policy, and it stimulated other states 
to adopt programs (Best 1981, pp. 87–89; Ittner 1984, p. 128). 
California’s implementation was followed by legislation in Arizona 
in 1981 and Oregon in 1982. Importantly, the champion of the Arizona 
program was the Motorola Corporation. In the 1970s, Motorola was try-
ing to implement a no-layoff policy for its employees, and at the time 
believed that the best way to achieve this goal was to utilize a UI-based 
work sharing program.9 Motorola, whose largest production facility was 
in Phoenix, first approached the Arizona Department of Employment 
Security in 1977, asking for that department’s support for an Arizona 
work sharing program. The Arizona workforce agency was initially skep-
tical, but it was won over to the program (St. Louis 1984). Motorola con-
tinued to support work sharing for a number of years and was instrumen-
tal in gaining enactment of work sharing programs in other states where 
it had operations—Florida, Illinois, and Texas. Motorola also encouraged 
work sharing by supporting a detailed case study of the implementation 
of the Arizona program (Morand 1990, pp. 314–315). 
Interest in work sharing by the federal government stirred in 1977. 
The impetus for action came from civil rights concerns and studies of 
the work sharing program experience in Europe. Policy analysts were 
considering the possibility of adapting the program to the U.S. envi-
ronment (Henle 1976; Levitan and Belous 1977). One of those ana-
lysts, Peter Henle, became the assistant secretary for policy, evalua-
tion, and research at the department in 1977. Under his leadership, the 
USDOL conducted research and analysis, followed the progress of the 
California program, and decided to conduct an experiment that would 
test the efficacy of work sharing in major metropolitan labor markets. 







research contractor, and began the design for the demonstration and 
its evaluation.10 Sites were considered and visited, and preparations for 
the experiment began. The AFL-CIO, however, expressed strong disap-
proval of work sharing and of the experiment, and the business com-
munity did not support the program. The Carter administration canceled 
plans for the experiment (MaCoy and Morand 1984, pp. 120–134). 
The period 1975–1982 was one of work sharing innovation in New 
York, California, Arizona, and Oregon. Those states developed policy 
and programs without the guidance of the federal government. The 
USDOL became interested in the program, but ultimately it did little 
during this period. The department was more noteworthy for what it 
failed to do: it did not challenge state work sharing programs as contrary 
to federal UI law, although federal law provided no explicit authority to 
implement work sharing programs. 
Phase II—Enacting temporary federal legislation (1980–1982) 
That states led the way in initially implementing work sharing is 
not surprising, considering the history of social legislation in the United 
States. As compared to other industrial nations, the United States came 
late to the social-insurance policy table. For example, the United States 
enacted public old age pensions and UI as part of the Social Security 
Act of 1935. Germany had led the way with a national old age pension 
in 1889, and it was followed by 28 other, mostly industrial, nations 
through 1929. The United States only enacted social insurance pro-
grams after the concepts and operational details of such programs had 
been worked out by other nations, and after the economic collapse of 
the Great Depression had revealed the exposure of its workers to un-
employment and poverty (Sass and Munnell 2006). In a similar man-
ner, the United States ignored the development of work sharing among 
industrial nations until the 1970s. 
In 1982, the federal government enacted a temporary work sharing 
law, following the lead of California, Arizona, and Oregon. The AFL-
CIO had opposed work sharing for many years, but it reversed its policy 
in August 1981, when its executive council issued a resolution sup-
porting compensated work sharing, provided that employee safeguards 
were incorporated into any legislation. Work sharing had strong support 
from the Committee on Economic Development and Motorola’s Wash-
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backing ultimately was sufficient to gain political support to enact a 
federal work sharing law (Ittner 1984, p. 128). 
Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) introduced work sharing legisla-
tion in June 1980, a recession year. Her purpose was to ease recession-
ary job losses (Schroeder 1984, pp. ix–xi). The Reagan administration 
initially opposed federal work sharing, asserting that a federal law was 
not needed, since three states had already implemented work sharing 
provisions without federal work sharing authority. Two years later, 
when the United States faced another recession, federal work sharing 
legislation was enacted as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 (P.L. 97–248). The law passed with sup-
port from business, organized labor, and state employment security 
agencies.11 Before enactment, the legislation was amended to address 
concerns held by employers and organized labor regarding potential 
abuses of the program. The concerns included three points of worry: 
1) initiation of work sharing without the permission of the other party; 
2) employers conducting layoffs first and then instituting work sharing 
later, instead of using work sharing as a substitute for layoffs; and 3) 
excessive use or duration of work sharing programs (Ittner 1984, pp. 
129–134). TEFRA provided for a three-year experimental work sharing 
program and required the department to develop a model for state work 
sharing legislation, establish deadlines, and conduct research. 
The federal law was complex; it consisted of three components 
with a total of 11 different elements. The three components were 1) a
statutory definition of work sharing, 2) provisions for employer work 
sharing plans that would be developed prior to program implementa-
tion, and 3) the method of taxation to pay for work sharing benefits. 
Four elements defined what an authorized work sharing program would 
be and how it could operate as part of the regular UI program. The 
definition described the nature of a work sharing program. Six other 
elements enumerated the requirements of a qualified employer plan. 
These elements mostly reflected the concerns of business and organized 
labor about potential program misuse. One final element specified that 
the tax provisions for work sharing had to be charged to employers in 
a manner similar to the way they are charged under state UI laws—as a 
safeguard to ensure that the cost of work sharing would be borne by the 
participating employer and not passed on to other employers. Thus, the 
final bill fulfilled Schroeder’s basic interest in offering a simple, volun-
           
           




tary approach to work sharing, while allaying the fears of business and 
organized labor about what might go wrong in a largely untested program 
(Ittner 1984, pp. 126–132). 
During this second phase, state work sharing policy and programs 
got the attention of Congress. Congress considered temporary work 
sharing legislation and, with the impetus of a recession, enacted it. 
Phase III—Policy under the temporary federal legislation 
(1982–1985) 
While the temporary law was in effect, the department developed 
model state legislative language and administrative guidelines. The lan-
guage was published and distributed to the states in July 1983. The 
department’s model legislation authorized states to enact companion 
laws, as long as they addressed the three components of the federal law. 
Thus, the model state laws contained 1) definitional elements, 2) quali-
fied employer plan requirements (i.e., administrative components and 
eligibility provisions, including maintenance of health and retirement 
benefits), and 3) UI tax-charging provisions for employers participating 
in work sharing. In addition, the model legislation contained admin-
istrative provisions relating to the scope and identification of affected 
employer units and participants, as well as a requirement that participat-
ing employers report their work sharing activities to the state workforce 
agencies (USDOL 1983, pp. 5–21). 
With enactment of a temporary work sharing law and the distribu-
tion of federal guidance, states began to consider whether to adopt work 
sharing as part of their employment policy strategy. The authority for 
states to operate work sharing programs under federal law commenced 
on September 4, 1982, and lasted until September 3, 1985, although 
states would continue to operate their work sharing programs without 
express legislative authority until that authority resumed with new fed-
eral work sharing legislation, enacted in 1992. During this phase, the 
states of Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New York, Texas, Ver-
mont, and Washington enacted work sharing laws.12 
The majority of state work sharing programs were implemented 
during the 1980s. The states that initiated programs back then envi-
sioned work sharing as a component of their active labor market policy. 
Efforts to enact work sharing legislation generally began with discus-
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state employment security agency administrators. The USDOL pro-
vided technical assistance to the states. For example, in 1984, then–
Arkansas governor Bill Clinton developed an economic initiative in 
response to continuing high levels of unemployment. Clinton’s goal 
was “to accelerate job and income growth,” and work sharing was con-
ceived as a small human-capital component of a broader initiative.13 
Clinton’s staff contacted the USDOL, requesting information about 
work sharing, which staff members then used to develop the work shar-
ing portion of the state legislative package.14 Clinton’s economic pack-
age was presented to the state legislature in 1985 and enacted the same 
year (Clinton 2004, pp. 317–318). 
Congress, however, wanted further information about the effects 
of work sharing before making the program permanent. Section 194 of 
TEFRA therefore required the department to report to Congress on state 
work sharing programs. Between 1982 and 1983, Mathematica Policy 
Research, under a contract with the USDOL, evaluated the work shar-
ing experience of California, Arizona, and Oregon (Kerachsky et al. 
1986). The evaluation found the following: 
• Work sharing participation reduced the number of layoff events; 
• Although total hours of regular UI collection were lower for em-
ployers participating in work sharing, the average total compen-
sated unemployment (including both regular UI and work shar-
ing benefits) was more expensive for those firms; 
• Work sharing participation helped firms save on the hiring and 
training costs that would have been associated with layoffs; and 
• The administration of work sharing benefit payment activities 
on a per-layoff equivalent basis was more expensive to the state 
than the administration of regular UI. 
The evaluation failed to find the administrative and behavioral 
problems feared by interest groups. For example, organized labor had 
been concerned that work sharing would negatively impact the receipt 
of fringe benefits, particularly private and public pensions and health 
insurance, as well as provoke other potential employer program misuse. 
Also, the Labor Department and business were concerned that adminis-
trative costs might be excessive and might shift the tax burden to non-
participating employers. The evaluation report minimized concerns about 
these potential adverse impacts.15 At the same time, the study did not find 
           







that work sharing provided net benefits to the government because of the 
associated higher total costs to the Unemployment Trust Fund. 
The 1982 legislation called for the appointment of an advisory com-
mittee composed of business, labor, and public members to oversee the 
work sharing evaluation. The department selected the members of this 
committee from groups and individuals who were interested in and sup-
portive of the program.16 The advisory group reviewed the plan for the 
evaluation and supported the comparison group methodology for the 
study. When the final evaluation was completed, however, the group 
objected to the results, which they believed inaccurately portrayed the 
work sharing programs. They requested an outside review of the evalu-
ation by a Congressional Research Service economist, who challenged 
the selection method of the comparison group.17 The Mathematica eval-
uation was completed and submitted to the department in late 1985 and 
published in 1986. The report was submitted to Congress along with 
comments from the advisory committee. In its comments, the commit-
tee was highly supportive of work sharing, criticized the Mathematica 
evaluation, expressed its conviction that there were no barriers to mak-
ing work sharing permanent, and endorsed making the program perma-
nent (Morand 1990, pp. 317–320). 
Phase IV—Federal laissez-faire (1985–1992) 
From September 1985 to July 1992, federal work sharing legislative 
authority lapsed. Yet state work sharing programs continued, and seven 
new states—Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, and Rhode Island—enacted and implemented programs. As 
in Phase I, during Phase IV states enacted and operated work sharing 
programs without express federal authority. 
The policy distinction between Phases I and IV is that, while in both 
phases states were left to themselves, in Phase IV state actions were 
informed by expired 1983 guidance to develop state legislation. At the 
same time, the department continued to collect and publish legislative 
and reporting data on state work sharing programs, and it conspicuously 
raised no issues of conformity with federal UI law, which no longer 
included a federal work sharing provision. 
With the end of the temporary federal law, the department did not 
actively pursue work sharing policy or promote and support work shar-
ing programs. The states with existing programs continued to operate 
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them as if the federal law were still in place, and new states adopted 
work sharing using the expired guidelines. Stakeholder groups closely 
followed state work sharing programs, and the work sharing evalua-
tion required under the temporary federal law produced mixed results. 
Congress, however, neither reacted to these findings nor reconsidered 
work sharing policy until unemployment rose substantially in the final 
two years of this phase. 
Phase V—Enacting permanent federal legislation (1990–1992) 
The 1990–1991 recession provoked further legislative efforts to 
help the long-term unemployed. In the fall of 1991, Rep. Stark, an early 
supporter of work sharing, developed a bill to revive a federal work 
sharing law. In November 1991, President George H.W. Bush signed 
the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act (P.L. 102–164) to 
provide emergency unemployment benefits to long-term unemployed 
workers who ran out of regular unemployment benefits. 
In January 1992, Stark introduced H.R. 4115 to make work sharing 
a permanent part of the UI program. During this period, Senator Har-
ris Wofford (D-PA) developed a similar bill for Senate consideration. 
Wofford introduced S. 2614 in April 1992.18 That bill sought to make 
work sharing permanent and provide for other UI reforms. Both bills 
included the detailed work sharing elements contained in the temporary 
work sharing law. In addition, Wofford’s bill added a new provision to 
allow workers to receive employer-sponsored training to enhance job 
skills on their nonwork days while receiving work sharing benefits. 
The Emergency Unemployment Benefits program was to expire in 
June 1992. Unemployed workers and interest groups seeking to con-
tinue the program deluged Congress with phone calls and letters. On 
June 9 the House passed H.R. 5260 to extend the emergency benefits 
program. A section of H.R. 5260 contained a limited version of the Stark 
bill, which allowed states to pay work sharing benefits. On June 19 the 
Senate passed its version of H.R. 5260, which contained similar work 
sharing language. Wofford urged the House and Senate conference 
committee to expand the work sharing program elements to include the 
maintenance of health and pension benefits and employer-sponsored 
training. On July 2, the conference committee adopted the stripped-
down House bill, adding the Wofford provision to permit employees to 






Congress enacted this bill. There is no legislative history as to 
why the House and Senate conference committee did not incorporate 
the more detailed work sharing elements contained in the 1982 tem-
porary federal law (U.S. Congress 1992). One possible explanation is 
that, after a decade of work-sharing experience in the United States, 
any impetus for added benefit, tax, and administrative requirements had 
dissipated, especially as work sharing evaluation results had not borne 
out the initial fears of either employers or organized labor. Another is 
that Congress did not think the more detailed protections were neces-
sary, as the secretary of labor retained general authority to promulgate 
regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of the act. In any case, 
Congress was anxious to complete action on an extension of unemploy-
ment benefits before departing for the July 4 recess. 
On July 3, 1992, the first President Bush signed H.R. 5260 as the 
Unemployment Compensation Amendments (P.L. 102–318), which 
extended the benefits program and made work sharing a permanent part 
of the federal UI program. Similar to the temporary law, the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Amendments of 1992 required the department to 
develop model state work-sharing legislative language, establish guide-
lines and provide technical assistance to states, and conduct research. 
Dissimilar, however, was the elimination of the safeguards and restric-
tions on states, employers, workers, and unions. Section 401(d) of the 
act simply authorizes the use of the UI trust fund to pay work sharing 
benefits and provides a definition of work sharing that contains five 
elements: 
1) Individuals whose work weeks are reduced by at least 10 per-
cent are eligible for work sharing unemployment compensa-
tion; 
2) The amount of unemployment compensation payable to any in-
dividual is calculated as a pro rata portion of the unemployment 
compensation that is payable to the individual if the individual 
is totally unemployed; 
3) Eligible employees are not required to meet the availability for 
work or work search requirements while collecting work shar-
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4) Eligible employees may participate in an employer-sponsored 
training program to enhance job skills if such program is ap-
proved by the state workforce agency; and 
5) The employer reduces the number of hours worked by employ-
ees in lieu of imposing temporary layoffs. 
The elements are straightforward and are essentially definitional. 
The first three items repeat the definitional elements contained in the 
1982 legislation. Item Five—requiring that work sharing be used when 
reducing the number of hours in lieu of layoffs—became part of the 
definition, whereas in the temporary legislation it was a requirement of 
a temporary employer plan. The fourth item was new and is not defi-
nitional; it embodies the Wofford provision to permit but not require 
employees to receive employer-sponsored training while engaging in 
work sharing. All earlier safeguards for business and organized labor 
that had been added to the temporary law were eliminated, reflecting 
the lack of political pressure to retain them. With the substance of the 
qualified employer plan removed, all references to such a plan—and to 
the requirement that work sharing benefits be taxed to employers like 
other UI benefits—were eliminated. 
The effect of the federal work sharing legislation was to authorize 
the payment of work sharing benefits from the Unemployment Trust 
Fund under section 303(a)(5) of the Social Security Act and section 
3304(4)(E) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Each state 
has an account within the Unemployment Trust Fund from which it 
pays UI benefits, and over the history of the UI program the fund has 
been carefully protected by federal policymakers to prevent its use for 
any purpose other than the payment of UI benefits. Under the permanent 
legislation, work sharing was defined as a UI program, and states were 
authorized to use funds in their Unemployment Trust Fund accounts to 
pay for work sharing benefits. 
Phase VI—Work sharing policy under permanent legislation 
(1992–present) 
Since the enactment of the permanent work sharing law, the depart-
ment has neither distributed model state language nor provided guidance 
to states for implementing and operating work sharing programs. This 







the new federal law was potentially defective. The crux of the dispute 
was whether the narrow provisions of the permanent law preclude the 
secretary from interpreting the law and exercising his or her discre-
tion in administering it. While officials at the department were sorting 
through their policy options, the 1992 presidential election ceded the 
issue to the new Clinton administration. 
Clinton political officials determined that the 1992 legislation 
required corrective action. They concluded that it limited the enforce-
able work sharing provisions to the five that were contained in section 
401(d) of P.L. 02–318. Because the section did not include expansive 
language, such as that “the program meets such other requirements as 
the Secretary of Labor determines are appropriate,” they opined that 
the secretary was constrained by the provisions as enumerated. If true, 
the secretary could not, for example, permit a state provision relating to 
maintenance of health and retirement benefits. Departmental officials 
also questioned whether states that had work sharing laws with greater 
protections than the federal permanent law (e.g., a requirement that 
labor agree to a work sharing plan) would be out of conformity with 
federal law. The department proposed corrective language in the House 
(H.R. 4040) and Senate (S. 1964) versions of the new administration’s 
omnibus bill to update and restructure the nation’s workforce develop-
ment system—the Reemployment Act (REA) of 1994. 
Section 251 of the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 included 
language to correct the apparent technical deficiencies in the federal 
work sharing law by “clarify(ing) certain provisions of current law” 
and by adding several additional elements (USDOL 1994a).19 The work 
sharing definition included in the REA bill contained nine elements, 
retaining the five elements of the 1992 Act and adding four additional 
elements. Two elements were adopted from the 1982 temporary law 
requiring the employer to produce a plan and permitting the mainte-
nance of health and pension benefits. The state could require such a plan 
or the retention of such benefits, but only if it expressly chose to do so. 
The eighth element made employer participation voluntary—as it was 
under the 1982 act for organized labor and state workforce agencies. 
Finally, the ninth element gave the secretary discretion to impose “such 
other requirements as the Secretary of Labor determines are appropri-
ate.” It was this last provision that was considered key to allowing the 
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secretary to provide guidelines and flexibility to the state work sharing 
programs. 
The proposed Reemployment Act did not pass in 1994, and it was 
not reintroduced in 1995, when the Republicans had gained control of 
both houses of Congress. With the bill’s demise, hope of resolving the 
work sharing policy dispute also faded. Further efforts at workforce 
development reform during the rest of the Clinton administration did 
not include revisions to federal work sharing policy. 
In 1995, Representatives Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Amo Houghton 
Jr. (R-NY) introduced H.R. 1789 to make permanent the SEA programs 
and make technical changes to federal work sharing law. Subsequently, 
Rep. Sander Levin (D-MI) introduced technical amendments to work 
sharing in the 105th Congress (H.R. 3597) and in the 106th Congress 
(H.R. 1830). Representative Jim McClery (R-LA) introduced similar 
legislation in both sessions of the 107th Congress. Again, the work shar-
ing provisions were not enacted. During this period, Congress did enact 
other workforce development bills, including the Workforce Invest-
ment Act (WIA) of 1998 and the Temporary Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 2002, without fixing the work sharing program. In 
the absence of congressional action, the department has remained silent 
about whether the state work sharing laws are consistent with federal 
UI law. The department has not issued work sharing guidance, encour-
aged state participation in the program, or provided any technical assis-
tance. Nevertheless, states have continued to use the program, and the 
department recognizes work sharing as an integral part of some state UI 
programs. Indeed, the department collects and publishes statistics on 
state work sharing programs and summarizes work sharing legislative 
provisions in its annual report comparing state UI laws. 
Between 1985 and 2007, the number of beneficiaries under the pro-
gram grew by more than a factor of 10, from 4,387 to 48,924. Similarly, 
work sharing beneficiaries as a percentage of regular UI program ben-
eficiaries also grew by more than a factor of 10, from an insignificant 
0.05 percent to 0.64 percent (Table 9.4). 
In 2008, with unemployment increasing, interest in work sharing 
increased as well. Participation increased sharply in 2008 and exploded 
in 2009. Articles began appearing in newspapers about the increasing 
use of work sharing in some work sharing states, and policy interest 
increased.20 On August 28, 2008, Barack Obama spoke approvingly of 
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Table 9.4  Work Sharing/Short-Time Compensation (STC) and Regular UI 
First Payments, 1982–2009 
Regular UI first STC/regular UI first 
Date STC first payments payments payments (%) 
1982 2,649 11,648,448 0.02 
1983 1,593 8,907,190 0.02 
1984 3,189 7,742,547 0.04 
1985 4,387 8,363,411 0.05 
1986 12,956 8,360,752 0.15 
1987 23,019 7,203,357 0.32 
1988 25,588 6,860,662 0.37 
1989 32,474 7,368,766 0.44 
1990 44,922 8,628,557 0.52 
1991 94,813 10,074,550 0.94 
1992 97,619 9,243,338 1.06 
1993 65,557 7,884,326 0.83 
1994 53,410 7,959,281 0.67 
1995 45,942 8,035,229 0.57 
1996 41,567 7,995,135 0.52 
1997 32,498 7,325,093 0.44 
1998 47,728 7,341,903 0.65 
1999 36,666 6,967,840 0.53 
2000 32,916 7,035,783 0.47 
2001 111,202 9,868,193 1.13 
2002 93,797 10,092,569 0.93 
2003 83,783 9,935,108 0.84 
2004 42,209 8,368,623 0.50 
2005 40,238 7,917,294 0.51 
2006 39,854 7,350,734 0.54 
2007 48,924 7,652,634 0.64 
2008 96,388 10,052,694 0.96 
2009 288,618 13,986,381 2.06 
NOTE: The data for work sharing is incomplete: Connecticut and Maryland report other 
work sharing activity, but they generally do not report first payments; Arkansas has a 
work sharing program but has stopped reporting on it. 
SOURCE: USDOL, Office of Workforce Security, required reports relating to the 
Unemployment Insurance Program, ETA 5159 reports for the regular UI program and 
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work sharing in his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention in 
Denver. Talking about what he believed are positive changes in behav-
ior by Americans, the soon-to-be-elected president said, “I’ve seen it in 
the workers who would rather cut their hours back a day than see their 
friends lose their jobs.” On a national stage, the Democratic candidate 
for president appeared to support work sharing in its most common 
form—a 20 percent reduction in the work week. 
OPERATION OF U.S. WORk ShARINg PROgRAmS 
Program Provisions of the States 
As experience has revealed few employer or labor abuses of the 
programs, states adopting work sharing have frequently, like California, 
relaxed their statutory provisions. California, for example, has an open-
ended limit on the duration of work sharing plans and on the range of 
hours reduction, no requirement for maintenance of fringe benefits, and 
no special tax over and above its normal UI tax schedule (Table 9.2). 
Other states limit the duration of work sharing plans; all but two have 
durations of 26 weeks. All states allow a reduction of hours of between 
20 and 40 percent during use of work sharing, but some states reduce 
the minimum percentage of hours to 10 percent. One state (Massachu-
setts) allows a maximum hours reduction of up to 50 percent. The hours 
reduction limits are prompted out of a concern that reductions should 
be modest and appropriate to the goals of work sharing. Thus, it has 
become accepted that reductions should be at least one-half day per 
week (10 percent), but generally should not be the majority of the week. 
Operationally, however, there has been no need for this concern. Work 
sharing has effectively become a program that reduces the work week 
from five days to four days—a 20 percent reduction.21 
Even though employers tended to maintain fringe benefits during 
the use of work sharing, unions remained concerned about the potential 
reduction that could be imposed by employers. As a result, seven states 
have mandated that employers continue to provide either full fringe bene-
fits or at least health insurance benefits. In most states, work sharing ben-
efits, like other UI benefits, are charged to the employers. The first states 
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that enacted work sharing programs—California, Arizona, and Oregon 
—were concerned about large-scale misuse of the program, particularly 
by firms that experienced great layoff activity, e.g., firms with negative 
balances in reserve ratio states. Over time this concern has diminished, 
and protective provisions are used less. Today seven states—including 
Arizona and Oregon, but no longer California—impose supplemental 
taxes or reimbursable provisions on some employers using work sharing. 
Without these additional tax charges, some employers could make use of 
work sharing at no additional cost if they already paid the maximum state 
UI tax rate. Some employer interest groups, thus, have been concerned 
that their members would end up picking up the tab for the negative-
balance firms using work sharing. Nonetheless, 12 of the work sharing 
states have no special tax provisions. 
Other work sharing provisions are not controversial. Work sharing ben-
efits are calculated in several different ways, but all approaches tend to pay 
a percentage share of the weekly UI benefit amount, relating to the percent-
age reduction in the work week. State laws determine how many weeks of 
work sharing can be collected and what the total payment amount can be for 
individual participants. Each employer plan must be submitted to the state 
workforce agency for approval. 
Many states with work sharing programs have been satisfied with them. 
In fact, in many cases state workforce agency officials have been the pro-
grams’champions. For example, the Kansas work sharing program received 
enthusiastic support from the Kansas officials, one of whom perceived it as 
an employer service, stating, “Now I’ve got something to offer employers 
rather than talking to them only about their taxes.”22 Other state adminis-
trators have been less enthusiastic. Some see work sharing as diluting the 
insurance features of the UI program, often increasing UI employer taxes and 
sometimes merely delaying instead of averting layoffs (Walsh et al. 1997). 
One indication of satisfaction with existing work sharing programs 
is that the work sharing provisions, other than those dealing with taxes, 
have remained unchanged for over a decade. Since 1996, only three 
changes to work sharing laws have been made. Two states, Kansas 
and Rhode Island, have added a special tax provision, while Missouri 
removed its special tax. 
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States without Work Sharing Programs 
Of the 53 state UI programs in the United States—the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are “states” under fed-
eral UI law—only 18 have work-sharing laws. Louisiana adopted work 
sharing in 1986 but does not operate the program. The other 35 have not 
enacted such programs. A 1997 survey of all states (Walsh et al. 1997) 
revealed that the three main reasons for not adopting work sharing have 
been 1) lack of understanding about the program, 2) lack of support by 
key stakeholders, and 3) perceived disadvantages of the program. Lack 
of understanding included simple lack of information, but it also included 
a lack of understanding of the difference between work sharing and the 
basic UI partial benefit formula. Not only UI claimants but also some 
UI directors and state agency administrators lack this information. The 
current work sharing program has not been publicized by the department 
since the early 1980s, and there have been no recent private or public 
policy efforts to provide information or encourage its adoption. 
The lack of support by stakeholders reflects a wide variety of 
groups who either have not provided active support or who have ac-
tively opposed the work sharing program. These groups might include 
the state workforce agency or its advisory council, state legislators, 
business, and labor. From the analysis of the reasons for the adoption of 
work sharing by 18 states (Walsh et al. 1997), it is clear that adoption 
requires strong support and initiative from one or more key stakehold-
ers, with other stakeholders acquiescing. Work sharing is not a program 
that supporters can push through over active resistance. 
According to the survey results, nonparticipating states perceived 
the disadvantages of work sharing to include an additional burden on 
the Unemployment Trust Fund (eight states) and additional administra-
tive burdens and costs (six states). Some of these states also thought 
that the program was inappropriate because of the state’s industrial 
composition—i.e., not enough manufacturing firms, not enough large 
firms, or too many agricultural and seasonal firms. Behind this percep-
tion seemed to be the belief that work sharing is best suited to large manu-
facturing firms. Thirteen states also believed that their existing UI pro-
grams were sufficient without work sharing, but some of the respondents 






In 2006, North Dakota enacted a one-year work sharing demonstra-
tion project but did not implement it. Thus, there has been no expansion 
of the work sharing program since Minnesota enacted the program in 
1994.23 The Walsh et al. (1997) survey found that 27 of the 34 non-
work-sharing states either definitely or probably would not adopt work 
sharing. Only five states said they would consider adoption. 
Scope and Operation of the U.S. Program 
Work sharing programs are small, but states and employers have 
experienced wide variations in their use of the program. State goals for 
their work sharing have also varied, but it has worked best when the 
programs have been used to bridge temporary declines in the demand 
for the services of workers. 
Size of the program
There is a separate work sharing report (the ETA 5159 work sharing 
report) that participating states submit to the department. These reports 
show that work sharing is a small program (Table 9.4). Between 1990 
and 2008, work sharing benefits have been paid annually to between 
32,000 and 111,000 U.S. workers who are covered by the UI system. 
These beneficiaries are a very small percentage of the 8–10 million 
workers who have been beneficiaries of the regular UI program in 
recent years. In fact, these beneficiaries have represented between 0.4 
and 1.1 percent of regular UI beneficiaries through 2008. 
While the work sharing program is very small nationally, it is highly 
countercyclical. In recessions, overall work sharing first payments have 
risen sharply as a percentage of regular UI first payments. From a norm 
of between 0.4 and 0.7 percent in the late 1980s, the percentage rose 
to 0.9 percent in 1991 and 1.1 percent in 1992. It returned to the norm, 
but again rose to 1.1 percent in 2001, declining to 0.9 percent in 2002 
and 0.8 percent in 2003. Nationally, these figures are small compared to 
those of some European nations with work sharing programs.24 
Work sharing, however, has been a much more important compo-
nent of the UI program in the few states that keep the program fully 
operational. Table 9.5 shows that while work sharing claims were 1.1 
percent of all beneficiaries in the United States in the recessionary year 
2001, most states did not have work sharing programs. For the seven 
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states that made greatest use of the program in that year, work sharing 
was much more important, amounting to over 3.0 percent of all ben-
eficiaries. These states and their percentages are Rhode Island (6.2), 
Kansas (6.0), Missouri (6.0), Vermont (5.0), Arizona (4.9), New York 
(3.6), and California (3.2). 
Coming out of the 2001 recession, six of the above seven states 
(Arizona being the exception) continued to have work sharing first pay-
ments at better than 1.5 percent of regular UI first payments. Thus, work 
sharing is popular among employers and employees alike in a small 
number of states. Today there is more persistent use of work sharing 
by employers in periods of both low and high unemployment in a half-
dozen states with work sharing programs. The other work sharing states 
make only limited use of the program. 
The first two work sharing states, California and Arizona, reached 
their highest levels of participation during the 1990–1991 recession. 
It should be noted, however, that Arizona’s participation was heavily 
influenced in the 1980s and 1990s by the large-scale participation of 
one establishment, the Phoenix plant of Motorola (Kerachsky et al. 
1986; Vroman 1992). Motorola was instrumental in getting work shar-
ing enacted in Arizona, then made great use of the program for a num-
ber of years, but subsequently abandoned the program.25 
Other states still have work sharing programs on their books, but 
they are either not supported or they are inactive. Louisiana’s program 
is inactive. The Louisiana agency was initially interested in the pro-
gram but then found that program administration was labor intensive 
for state government and for workers. The Louisiana program required 
that information be provided on a weekly basis about hours worked and 
whether workers were on vacation or not. The result was limited use, 
after initial interest. Louisiana firms now use temporary layoffs or a 
“skip week” option, whereby workers work for a week or two and then 
are laid off for a week or two, so that they collect full UI benefits on an 
intermittent basis. Louisiana no longer dedicates any staff to the work 
sharing program and does not encourage participation.26 
The work sharing program in the United States has significant bar-
riers to participation in states with work sharing programs. As the state 
survey indicates, the most immediate barrier is a lack of information. 
State UI central offices administer the program, but few of them pro-
vide much information or outreach. Local UI call centers and One-Stop 
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Table 9.5  Work Sharing First Payments as a Percentage of Regular First Payments, 1982–2008 
State 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
ARa — 0.3 0.2 0.4 1.5 0.6 8.2 0.1 — — 
AZ 2.5 0.3 0.6 — 6.7 2.4 2.7 0.7 2.4 2.4 4.1 2.6 1.6 1.7 
CA — 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.4 1.9 0.3 2.2 3.5 3.3 3.4 2.5 1.9 
CTb 0.1 0.6 — — 
FL — — — 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.6 1.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 
IA 0.8 — 0.1 — 0.1 
KS 0.8 1.4 5.0 3.9 2.5 1.8 3.9 
LAc 0.0 0.1 
MA — — — 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 
MDb — — 0.3 0.3 0.1 — — 0.5 — — — 
MN 0.1 0.5 
MO 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.2 2.6 2.1 1.7 3.0 2.1 
NY 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 2.1 2.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 
OR — — — — 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.4 1.7 0.5 
RI 0.0 2.9 1.4 1.9 1.4 
TX — 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 
VT — 0.0 — — — — 0.6 1.1 0.7 1.3 
WA — — — 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.6 





State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ARa — — — — — — — — — — — 0.2 1.3 
AZ 2.9 1.7 3.1 2.2 1.1 4.9 2.4 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.9 1.7 
CA 1.8 1.6 2.6 1.7 1.2 3.2 2.6 2.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.8 2.2 
CTb — 0.0 — — — — — — — — — — — 
FL 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
IA 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 — — 
KS 3.7 3.8 2.9 3.7 3.0 6.0 4.0 3.2 1.8 2.1 2.4 3.2 — 
LAc 
MA 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.1 2.8 2.3 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.9 1.1 
MDb — — 0.1 — — — — — — — — — — 
MN 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 3.0 2.1 2.3 2.1 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.2 
MO 1.4 2.5 3.9 2.2 3.5 6.0 4.1 4.3 3.5 3.8 5.3 4.9 6.2 
NY 1.2 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 3.6 2.5 2.2 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 
OR 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.5 1.3 1.5 0.6 1.3 2.0 0.9 1.6 
RI 1.6 1.0 2.3 2.7 1.3 6.2 3.7 5.6 3.6 3.9 4.4 4.5 8.1 
TX 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.7 2.2 
VT 1.9 0.9 2.3 4.9 1.6 5.5 5.5 4.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.9 5.0 
WA 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.2 2.0 1.7 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 1.0 2.8 
US 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 
NOTE: Required reports submitted to USDOL as the ETA 5159 (work share) report, for the years 1982 through 2005. Data erroneously submitted by Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands have been removed; they have never enacted work sharing programs. — = no data is available for years after state work shar-
ing legislation was enacted. Blank = not applicable. 
aArkansas has a work sharing program but stopped reporting on it. 
bConnecticut and Maryland report other work sharing activity but generally not first payments. 
cLouisiana’s program expired in 1986. Illinois enacted a program in 1983 but allowed it to expire in 1988; no benefits were ever paid under the program. 








centers have little information about the program because they do not 
have an operational role to play. As a result, most employers indicate 
that they learn about the program by word of mouth. In the states where 
work sharing usage is highest, publicity appears to be the most impor-
tant reason for its high usage. In the last U.S. evaluation, the five states 
with the greatest work sharing participation rates were found to have 
used publicity and outreach campaigns, and some of them also had 
involved local offices to provide information about the program (Best 
1988, p. 62, cited in Jensen 1995, p. 27; Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 4, pp. 
1–45). Such publicity, however, could only be expected to raise state 
participation modestly. 
Countercyclical versus structural unemployment 
Work sharing is a highly countercyclical program. Since it is pri-
marily designed to deal with temporary downturns in the demand for 
labor, it is expected to be little used during periods of economic ex-
pansion, when employers’ demand for labor is increasing. Employer 
interest and use in it is generated by the onset of recessions. As a result, 
the work sharing program can be thought of as a work stabilization 
program used by employers during recessions when they expect to have 
only temporary declines in their need for labor. 
Work sharing also has been used to address structural unemploy-
ment. Such use was much greater in Germany than in the United States. 
Germany has used work sharing extensively for structural adjustment; 
this occurred first in the coal and steel industries, allowing more time 
for adjustments to be made by natural turnover and retirements. Later it 
was used to assist in the absorption of East German workers in the 1990s. 
In the United States, work sharing has only been considered as a 
method to ease structural adjustments for particular firms or industries. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the USDOL’s Bureau 
of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs advocated 
work sharing as a tool to be used by labor management committees 
in individual firms to deal with impending structural unemployment.27 
Work sharing was one of a number of tools that the department recom-
mended to employers and employees dealing with structural unemploy-
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the early 1980s, the department recommended the use of work sharing 
to deal with structural problems in the steel industry (USDOL 1985). 
The increasing importance of structural unemployment in the
United States, however, has also reduced interest in work sharing. Firms 
are frequently more desirous of downsizing than they are concerned 
about retaining their current workforce. The early champion of work 
sharing, Motorola, abandoned that concept as it began its own struc-
tural adjustments. Its competitor, Hewlett-Packard, began using tem-
porary workers, not work sharing, to address variations in the demand 
for labor, and Motorola determined that if it wanted to remain competi-
tive in its industry, it could no longer engage in work sharing. Unions 
still support work sharing, but they also have responded to employ-
ers’ changing employment policies. John Zalusky of the AFL-CIO said, 
“Since it is not very high on employers’ agenda, it isn’t very high on 
ours either” (Jensen 1995, p. 6).28 
Employer and worker use of work sharing in the United States
Work sharing was expected to be used by a wide variety of firms, 
varying by industry, size, and financial status. However, in practice, pro-
gram use in the United States has been limited. To the extent that firms 
use work sharing, those firms have been concentrated among large firms 
in the durable manufacturing industry. These firms tend to experience 
high levels of unemployment. Rather than simply substituting work shar-
ing for layoffs, they have tended to continue to use layoffs as their pri-
mary means of reducing their labor force, while using work sharing as 
an additional reduction tool (Walsh et al. 1997). Work sharing primarily 
has been used by firms to retain their most highly skilled workers. Thus, 
rather than being a general-purpose, countercyclical work sharing pro-
gram, the U.S. program seems to be a narrow-niche program. 
Although interest in work sharing declined during the late 1990s, 
it increased again with the recession of 2001. As unemployment rose, 
some economists became concerned about the shortcomings of Ameri-
ca’s UI system, in which large numbers of workers were ineligible for or 
had exhausted unemployment benefits. The National Employment Law 
Project, the Economic Policy Institute, and the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities issued a report, Failing the Unemployed (Emsellem et 
al. 2002), that characterized state UI systems as beset with inequities and 
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strict requirements, which shut too many workers out of benefits. The 
report urged state lawmakers to enact UI reforms, including work sharing 
in states where the programs were not up and running (Cadrain 2002). 
An analysis of the program as it existed in California in 2002
(MaCurdy, Pearce, and Kihlthau 2004) is quite revealing. It shows that 
work sharing was used by a small number of employers (0.9 percent of 
firms that paid UI benefits), and that their use was limited; e.g., work 
sharing weeks compensated generally have been less than 1.5 percent of 
UI weeks compensated except in periods of recession. Employers who 
used work sharing in California in 2002 were usually larger, higher-wage, 
more likely unionized, and more likely to be in the manufacturing sector 
than non–work sharing, UI-paying firms. Work sharing firms had an aver-
age employment of 239 workers, compared to 40 workers for non–work 
sharing firms. They paid average wages of $39,200 per year, compared to 
$34,400 for non–work sharing firms. Seventy-three percent of work shar-
ing firms had been paying UI taxes for 11 years or more, compared to 48 
percent for non–work sharing firms. Nineteen percent of the work sharing 
firms were unionized, compared to 9 percent of the non–work sharing 
firms. Whereas manufacturing accounted for 11 percent of the firms pay-
ing UI benefits, such firms constituted 62 percent of firms that used work 
sharing. While only 0.9 percent of UI-paying firms used work sharing, for 
manufacturing firms the figure rose to 5.5 percent. Among manufactur-
ing firms, work sharing was concentrated in firms in two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification codes; in these categories, the firms wanted to 
retain high-skilled workers who tended to be trained on the job: electron-
ics producers, industrial machinery producers, fabricated metal produc-
ers, instrument manufacturers, and furniture manufacturers (MaCurdy, 
Pearce, and Kihlthau 2004). 
Employees using work sharing in California in 2002 tended to be 
older and better paid than workers collecting regular UI, indicating 
that they were more skilled than other workers. Seventy-one percent of 
work sharing participants were 35 years of age or older, compared to 63 
percent for non–work sharing claimants, and their 2002 earnings were 
40 percent higher than those of non–work sharing claimants. They were 
mostly in the manufacturing sector. They also collected fewer weeks of 
benefits (MaCurdy, Pearce, and Kihlthau 2004). 
Rhode Island is one of the largest users of work sharing. The state 
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reducing unemployment. Agency staff members believe that the pro-
gram benefits greatly from extensive agency marketing of the program 
to employer and worker organizations, resulting in statewide support for 
the program. The state promotes work sharing in many ways: directly
contacting employers after layoffs, placing stories in newspapers, prom-
inently offering work sharing as part of the Rhode Island employer ser-
vices package, describing it in the monthly bulletin sent to employers, 
making presentations to employer groups and labor unions, and market-
ing it on the agency Web site. The result of all of these efforts is strong 
support from the governor and labor unions, and awareness of the pro-
gram by the state chamber of commerce. Support from employers has 
spread by communication among employers. Employers learn about the 
program from employers who have used the program. Employers and 
workers have responded strongly, with a very high rate of use since 
2001 (Table 9.5) and a doubling of use in the two years ending in Octo-
ber 2008.29 
Rhode Island’s administrative costs for work sharing are greater 
than those for regular UI and greater than the UI administrators would 
like. Rhode Island would like to emulate its neighbor Massachusetts, 
which has completely automated the work sharing payment process, 
including employers’ weekly reporting of claims through the Internet. 
By contrast, while Rhode Island has automated the application process 
for employers, work sharing payments are still made manually. If the 
Rhode Island agency had the funding it would fully automate the work 
sharing payment process, using the Massachusetts approach. Nonethe-
less, the agency is strongly in favor of work sharing, and it believes that 
it is good for the Rhode Island economy as well as for employers and 
workers.30 
In 2001 and 2002, Massachusetts automated its work sharing 
program during the surge in work sharing activity in response to the 
2001 recession. Massachusetts had to administer between 200 and 300 
employer plans during 2003. It went from a fully manual to a fully 
automated system. Deloitte and Touche built the Massachusetts system, 
using USDOL administrative funds. Internet-based, the three-step sys-
tem allows employers to 1) apply to participate, 2) submit their work 
sharing plans and have them approved, and 3) submit their weekly work 
sharing payment transactions. As a result, the process is fully automated 








Massachusetts is happy with the software, which it has made available 
to other states such as Vermont, since it is in the public domain. The 
Massachusetts UI director has also sent the program and its documenta-
tion to the USDOL and to the National Association of State Workforce 
Agencies for use by all state workforce agencies.31 
The level of work sharing participation is lower in Massachusetts 
than in Rhode Island. This is due in part to Massachusetts’s lower unem-
ployment rate, but it is also because Massachusetts has done consider-
ably less outreach than Rhode Island. Information about work sharing 
is available on the agency Web site and was promoted in a 2008 mailing 
to employers, but agency staff have not met with employer and labor 
groups to promote the program. With sharply increasing unemployment 
in 2008, the news media became more interested in work sharing, and 
the Massachusetts program received increased media coverage. How-
ever, only 88 employers were participating in the program in October 
2008.32 In January 2009, as the recession worsened, Massachusetts had 
92 businesses enrolled in the program, with 1,300 workers receiving 
work sharing benefits. By that time applications had surged, with anoth-
er 100 firms and another 1,700 workers waiting to participate (Crimaldi 
2009). 
During the Great Recession of 2008–2009, state work sharing pro-
grams experienced the highest usage by employers in the history of 
the federal-state UI system. In January 2008, as the recession began, a 
study on the stalemate in federal work sharing policy was published in 
Publius (Balducchi and Wandner 2008). As stakeholders, policymak-
ers, and the press looked for public policy options to counter the reces-
sion, the article was widely read. 
During 2009, a number of organizations began to advocate legis-
lative action and increased use of work sharing during the recession. 
Neil Ridley (2009) of the Center for Law and Social Policy and Jon 
Messenger (2009) of the International Labour Organization provoked 
additional stakeholder interest in separate policy briefs describing the 
attributes of work sharing as an alternative to layoffs. In October, the 
National Association of State Workforce Agencies approved a new pol-
icy urging Congress and the U.S. Department of Labor to support enact-
ment of work sharing in all states. In December, Sara Rix of the AARP
hosted a national forum on work sharing policy to educate members 
and stakeholders in how to create successful work sharing initiatives 
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(AARP 2009). During the same period, work sharing received praise 
from economists such as Katharine Abraham, Susan Houseman, Mark 
Zandi, and Dean Baker. 
The Congressional Research Service issued a report on work shar-
ing to Congress by Alison Shelton (2009), and several bills were intro-
duced in the House and Senate to correct the deficiency in the federal 
work sharing law and expand state participation through incentive 
grants. Given the unprecedented usage of work sharing during the Great 
Recession in the 17 states that operate programs, favorable testimoni-
als from employers and workers contained in news stories from Steven 
Greenhouse (2009) of the New York Times and others, and endorse-
ments from opinion makers and interest groups, it appeared possible 
that national work sharing policy might be revisited. 
WORk ShARINg ImPACTS AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
Evaluations of work sharing programs in the United States and 
abroad have revealed mixed results. California conducted an early eval-
uation to determine whether to make permanent its initial, temporary 
program (Best 1988). The U.S. government conducted two evaluations, 
both mandated by the 1982 and 1992 federal work sharing legislation 
(Kerachsky et al. 1986; Walsh et al. 1997). The 1986 study was con-
ducted in three states: Arizona, California, and Oregon. The 1997 study 
was conducted in five states: California, Florida, Kansas, New York, 
and Washington. There have been two large-scale evaluations of the 
Canadian program (Employment and Immigration Canada 1984; Ekos 
Research Associates 1993) and many smaller analyses of the program. 
Because of the small size of the work sharing program and the high 
cost of running random assignment experiments, U.S. work sharing 
evaluations made use of comparison group methodologies. While anal-
ysis of the program evaluations that used random assignment experi-
ments and comparison group methodology indicates that comparison 
groups cannot replicate experimental results (LaLonde 1986), com-
parison group studies are the best available guide to how work sharing 
programs work.33 Nonetheless, the U.S. evaluations (Kerachsky et al. 
1986; Walsh et al. 1997) have been limited in scope—in part because 
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of a lack of data and limited funding for the evaluations. There were no 
benefit-cost analyses in the two national evaluations. 
The Canadian evaluations, conducted in 1984, 1993, and 2005, are 
more comprehensive. They estimate program costs and benefits to soci-
ety, even though sometimes the sources of data have been indirect. The 
Ekos 1993 study determined that work sharing is highly cost-effective, 
estimating the benefit-cost ratio of work sharing to be 2.6 to 1. The esti-
mated cost of the program was incurred by the government in the form 
of increased total (UI plus work sharing) benefit costs of $52 million. 
This sum was composed of the costs of deferral of the UI waiting period, 
of filing for work sharing by those who would not file for regular UI 
benefits, and of paying UI benefits for post–work sharing layoffs. The 
estimated benefits ($137 million), however, were far less rigorously cal-
culated. The benefits included $92 million in reduced stress from layoff 
avoidance (i.e., improved health and reduction in the use of social work 
and counseling services, police, and courts), $27 million in improved atti-
tudes toward work (i.e., reduced future unemployment and UI costs), and 
$18 million in reduced hiring and training costs. The first two benefits 
were deemed to accrue to society, while the third accrued to employers. 
The study notes, but does not estimate, the cost of delayed adjustment to 
structural economic change in the form of labor hoarding. 
The Canadian evaluations may provide some guidance about pro-
vision of training to workers while they are collecting work sharing. 
U.S. federal work sharing legislation permits states to allow workers 
to engage in training during the hours they are receiving work sharing 
so that they can increase their work skills. The three Canadian evalua-
tions found that the offer of training resulted in low levels of take-up. 
In fact, in the evaluation of “Work Sharing while Learning,” a program 
that was part of a larger initiative to support workers and communities 
in regions of high unemployment and operated between 2002 and 2004, 
Canadian researchers found no take-up of the program—no one partici-
pated. Firms did not participate in WSWL because of three factors: 1) 
the high cost of formal training, 2) heavy reliance on cheaper on-the-job 
training, and 3) difficulty in scheduling formal training on specific days 
of the week, since firms needed flexibility in production. The study also 
found that employees, particularly senior employees, were willing to 
participate in work sharing only if they could engage in leisure activi-
ties during their days off (HRSDC 2005). 
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Impacts on Employees 
When surveyed, employees taking part in work sharing believe they 
are better off, and they support its use. Work sharing helps workers 
retain more of their prior earnings than layoffs do. There are also a num-
ber of nonpecuniary gains that worker surveys have consistently identi-
fied. Finally, the main distributional effect of work sharing appears to 
be a sharing of wage loss between more and less senior workers, so that 
less senior workers are better off with work sharing. 
The California and Canadian studies found that between their earn-
ings and their work sharing payments, participating workers maintained 
between 81 and 94 percent of their prior compensation. The studies 
found that workers on layoff received between 45 and 60 percent of 
their previous compensation.34 These wide differences in income reten-
tion are reflected in workers’ financial satisfaction during their work 
sharing and layoff experience. In the 1993 Canadian study, 15 percent 
of workers on work sharing were dissatisfied with their financial situa-
tion, while 41 percent of California workers on layoff were dissatisfied 
(EDD 1982; Ekos Research Associates 1993). Fringe benefits appeared 
to be nearly universally retained by workers during periods of reduced 
hours, whether states had rules requiring retention or not. In the U.S. 
evaluation, over 90 percent of employers in each state maintained full 
benefits, including the two states that did not have a fringe benefit reten-
tion provision in their work sharing law (Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 5, p. 6). 
The California and Canadian studies attempted to estimate some 
nonpecuniary effects of work sharing as well. Workplace improve-
ments that were cited included skill maintenance, labor-management 
relations, and worker morale. Other personal factors included increased 
leisure, psychological and physical well-being, and quality of life (EDD 
1982; Ekos Research Associates 1993). 
The main distributional effects of work sharing relate to workers by 
level of seniority and demographics. Less senior workers were found to 
experience financial gains from the program since they avoided expe-
riencing layoffs. The avoidance of layoffs and the improved financial 
position of these workers are paid for by the more senior workers who, 
in the absence of work sharing, would have experienced no wage loss. 
Thus, all of the U.S. and Canadian evaluations have found that there is 
a transfer of earnings from more senior to less senior workers. 
          
             
         
        
         
            
          




Since the participants in work sharing consist largely of more senior 
employees who would have experienced no reduction in hours in the 
absence of work sharing, some resistance to work sharing might be 
expected from them. However, it appears that there was a good deal of 
solidarity among workers. In the California evaluation, only 6 percent 
of workers opposed the initial decision to use work sharing (Best 1988). 
When work sharing was considered for adoption in the United States 
in the 1970s, it was expected that it would have a significant effect on 
helping women and minorities retain their jobs. Women and minorities 
were expected to be overrepresented among program participants. The 
California and first Canadian evaluations, however, did not find benefits 
to women and minorities, but they did find benefits to younger adults. The 
first U.S. study found that the demographic characteristics of workers on 
layoff were similar for the work sharing group and the comparison group. 
The latest U.S. work sharing study (Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 6, 
pp. 16–21) compares new work sharing claimants with new UI claim-
ants and finds no statistically significant results. It does not show that 
women, youth, or minorities gain significantly from retaining their jobs 
because of work sharing. According to Walsh et al., women and youth 
made somewhat larger usage of work sharing, but these results were not 
significant. Older workers tended to use work sharing less than other 
age groups. This underrepresentation could be because of either firm-
level decisions or worker preferences. No statistical difference was 
found among race and ethnic groups. 
Impacts on Employers 
Reducing layoffs 
The 1997 U.S. study tried to estimate the number of layoffs work 
sharing firms would have had in the absence of work sharing, using a 
comparison group. The researchers found that they could not answer 
this question because the comparison group was not comparable. Work 
sharing–user firms were dissimilar to nonusers in a number of dimen-
sions. Work sharing firms’ total charges (UI plus work sharing) were 
much larger than those of the comparison group, and these results were 
significant for all states. Compared to non–work sharing users, work 
sharing–user firms’ charges for the regular UI program were signifi-
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the same in two more states (New York and Washington). The Florida 
and Kansas charges were so much larger that they could not be reason-
ably attributed to the use of work sharing. The study also examined the 
states’mass layoff use. It found that a higher percentage of work sharing 
users also experience mass layoffs than in the comparison group.
Using work sharing instead of layoffs 
The 1986 U.S. work sharing evaluation found that on average work 
sharing–user firms were approximately eight times as likely to use lay-
offs as work sharing, in terms of the hours their employees spent on 
work sharing and UI (Kerachsky et al. 1986, pp. 186–190). This high 
use of layoff utilization calls into question work sharing’s role as an 
employment stabilization tool (Cook, Brinsko, and Tan 1995; Vroman 
1992). The 1986 findings also call into question the comparability of 
the treatment and comparison groups. 
The findings from the 1997 evaluation (Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 6, 
pp. 4–5) are similar, although more modest. Expenditures on UI for lay-
offs varied between 1.6 and 3.6 times as much as expenditures on work 
sharing among the five states studied. The evaluation confirms the find-
ing of the 1986 U.S. study that work sharing–user firms had high levels 
of UI charges, both in general and compared to work sharing charges. 
For the study year 1992, the average percentage of total charges to UI 
(UI plus work sharing) varied from 62 percent in Florida to 78 percent 
in Washington. At the same time firms were using work sharing, they 
also were making heavy use of the UI program. This suggests that work 
sharing was not so much a layoff reduction program for these firms as a 
part of their overall labor force reduction strategy. 
Repeat use of work sharing
Some firms use work sharing repeatedly. The 1997 U.S. study 
found that some work sharing firms made use of work sharing in more 
than one year. For the five states that the study examined in 1991–1993, 
work sharing–user firms’ use of the program was split into use in 1–4 
quarters, 5–8 quarters, or 9–12 quarters. The range of use was from 
New York, where nearly half (45 percent) of firms used the program 
in 9–12 quarters, to Florida, where only 5 percent of firms did. The 
other states varied between 12 and 16 percent. High rates of repeaters 
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resulted in enactment of a limitation on work sharing use in Washington 
State, where firms are required to be off work sharing for 12 months 
following three years of usage before they can renew a work sharing 
plan. California considered enacting such legislation in 1995 but took 
no action (Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 6, pp. 1–34). 
Repeat user firms were examined to see if they had also experienced 
high UI costs, since firms at the maximum UI tax rate had an incen-
tive to use work sharing at no additional cost. High UI-cost firms were 
strongly represented in New York and Kansas, but not in California, 
Washington, or Florida (Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 6). As noted above, 
Kansas was one of two states that later added special tax provisions to 
its work sharing law. 
A key issue is whether usage of work sharing has an impact on 
firm productivity. To date, the U.S. studies have not made estimates of 
the effects on productivity for firms using work sharing. Analysis of 
the early effects of the Canadian program found no measurable effects 
(MaCoy and Morand 1984, p. 111). The later Ekos Research Associates 
(1993) study also did not find any increase in productivity for Canadian 
work sharing firms, but it found a tendency for work sharing firms to 
retain employees even in the face of structural problems. Such a delay 
of an adjustment by layoff is likely to decrease productivity. Work shar-
ing firms were found to be more profitable in the short run, but with no 
long-term improvement in profitability. 
Impacts on the government 
Effect on the UI trust fund 
Analysis of the cost of work sharing to the UI trust fund is an issue 
that is unique to the United States, because work sharing in this country 
is funded by the UI program and both work sharing and UI costs are 
experience-rated. The work sharing evaluations that have considered 
the cost to the UI trust fund are the California evaluation (EDD 1982) 
and the two national evaluations. All three studies have found that the 
total cost to the UI trust fund of work sharing and UI costs is greater 
for work sharing–user firms than for a comparison group of firms. The 
California study found that total cost for work sharing–user firms was 
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The 1986 national study found that employer participation in work 
sharing increased the total benefit charges paid to the firms’ employees 
as well as the firms’ UI payroll taxes. The net effect on the UI trust fund 
was less clear. The study made qualitative estimates showing that there 
would be significant negative impacts on the trust fund in the short run, 
as work sharing charges increase rapidly with the onset of a recession 
but the response by UI tax rates is much slower. In the long run, how-
ever, the study concluded that work sharing should not affect the UI 
trust fund adversely, because work sharing benefits are subject to both 
stronger experience rating and reduced noncharging (Kerachsky et al. 
1986, pp. 169–184). 
To determine the effect of work sharing on the Unemployment Trust 
Fund, the 1997 work sharing evaluation analyzed the UI tax charges of 
work sharing–user firms that had 9–12 quarters of use in a three-year 
period. In 1992, California and Washington high-use firms did not have 
higher levels of charges than low-use firms. However, in New York and 
Kansas UI charges for high users were more than double those of low 
users, indicating an adverse impact on the Unemployment Trust Fund 
in these states (Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 6, pp. 11–13). 
Administrative costs 
Automation has a big impact on work sharing administrative costs. 
The California and 1986 national evaluations examined administrative 
costs to the UI program before the increased automation of UI benefit 
payments in the 1990s. Kerachsky et al. (1986, pp. 217–220) found that 
work sharing costs were much greater for regular benefits—more than 
twice as great—because of the expectation that there would be approxi-
mately five times as many claimants receiving benefits compared to the 
regular program, assuming a 20 percent work-week reduction. These 
costs do not include the costs associated with approving the plan and 
responding to inquiries about the program. 
After a decade of increased UI automation in the 1990s, Walsh et 
al. (1997, Chap. 4, pp. 17–19) found that costs continued to be high 
for states that did not automate the work sharing component of their 
UI programs. States reduced their administrative costs by reducing the 
layers of approval for work sharing plan submissions. Texas automated




plans. For the claims-taking process, similar streamlining took place, 
as over half of the states switched to employer-filed claims, and five of 
these states allowed employers to submit ongoing claims forms with-
out claimant signatures. Of the other states, four states automated the 
claims-taking process and three states were building work sharing into 
their voice response systems for UI claims taking. As a result, all work 
sharing states reduced the administrative burden through employer fil-
ing and automated claimant filing. Even though the automation of work 
sharing claims was nearing completion by 1997, a state survey found 
that concern about administrative cost was nevertheless a reason that 
six states gave for not adopting work sharing (Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 
4, p. 8). 
The cost of work sharing administration was a study in contrasts. 
The three work sharing states that were fully automated responded that 
their costs of administration were actually less per claim than the cost of 
regular UI, because work sharing claimants do not come into the local 
offices and are not subject to work search requirements. The other states 
found the program more expensive because its administration is labor 
intensive. The lesson to be learned was to automate the work sharing 
program, and states responded. In 1997, only three states were fully 
automated, one was partially automated, and four more were building 
work sharing into their new, automated telephone claims-taking pro-
cesses (Walsh et al. 1997, Chap. 6, Table 4.9). Today, the UI program is 
highly automated, using telephone and Internet claims-taking. There is 
no reason to expect that administrative cost would be a barrier to work 
sharing adoption, especially if states adopt the most automated work 
sharing software available, as in Massachusetts. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Small size and employer usage. Work sharing in the United States 
is a small program and is likely to remain small, but it could be a great 
deal larger than it is today. Only a third of the states have work sharing 
programs, and state participation could be increased. Moreover, within 
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of the program. That could increase if state agencies provided more 
information about the program, and if business and labor supported the 
programs the way Rhode Island does. 
Unemployment reduction. Work sharing reduces unemployment 
in cases where layoffs are temporary. Workers share the reduction in 
hours and are cushioned in their earnings loss by the receipt of work 
sharing benefits. However, work sharing does not necessarily eliminate 
unemployment in work sharing firms. When employers use the work 
sharing program, it frequently supplements rather than substitutes for 
layoffs. Over time, these firms use both employment reductions and 
hours reductions to achieve the labor force reductions they seek to 
achieve. 
Skilled worker retention. Employers who use work sharing tend 
to be large employers, concentrated in durable manufacturing, with per-
sistent unemployment problems. They tend to engage in large and per-
sistent layoffs, making heavy use of the UI program. Similarly, work-
ers who use the work sharing program tend to be skilled, experienced, 
high-wage manufacturing workers. Employers put these workers on 
work sharing so they have the opportunity to call them back to full-time 
work and reduce their risk of losing key workers (MaCurdy, Pearce, and 
Kihlthau 2004). Used in this manner, work sharing is a tool to retain 
skilled workers who are needed to maintain a productive U.S. manu-
facturing sector. 
Federal policy. The USDOL has not actively supported the work 
sharing program. A more active public policy would require either a 
broader interpretation of the 1992 permanent work sharing federal law 
or enactment of a technical amendment to the law. 
• Interpretation. The department could interpret the 1992 work 
sharing amendments to the Social Security Act and FUTA as 
permitting the provisions of the 1982 work sharing amend-
ments and any other requirements that the department deems 
appropriate. This interpretation would be issued under the ex-
isting authority of the secretary of labor to interpret the UI pro-
visions of the Social Security Act and FUTA – of which work 
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expressing this interpretation. A subsequent regulation could 
codify this interpretation, if needed. 
• Legislation. Following a legislative route, a work sharing 
amendment could adopt the language proposed in Section 251 
of the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994. The key item in 
that language gives the department explicit authority to guide 
and interpret the program so that the “program meets such 
other requirements as the Secretary of Labor determines are 
appropriate.” 
Increasing state adoption and usage. Work sharing will not 
achieve its potential as a workforce development tool unless more 
states adopt work sharing. States that have adopted it would have to use 
it more extensively. 
• The department should adopt a positive policy toward work 
sharing. It then needs to provide guidance and technical assis-
tance regarding state enactment of work sharing legislation. 
The department also should promote the use of the program 
and provide forums for state-to-state exchange of information. 
States such as Rhode Island would be eager to provide sup-
port to other states.35 In addition, the department should pro-
vide financial support for states that wish to fully automate 
their work sharing administration, reducing the cost of program 
administration.36 
• For states, the barriers to participation are lack of knowledge, 
lack of interest, and political opposition. Furthermore, some 
states are concerned about the fact that introducing a work shar-
ing program is likely to lead to a small increase in expenditures 
from their state UI trust fund accounts. Promotion of the pro-
gram by the department and the work sharing states is likely to 
encourage adoption, especially in times of high unemployment. 
Increasing employer and worker usage. Analysts have recog-
nized a variety of barriers and disincentives to expansion of work shar-
ing that affect employers and employees. 
• For employers, barriers include lack of information, experience 
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least for smaller firms—and a preference for reducing employ-
ment rather than hours. 
• For employees, the main barriers are charging work sharing 
benefits against UI benefit entitlement and the low work sharing 
rate of replacement of lost wages compared to other countries. 
It appears that the state workforce agencies could overcome the 
concerns of employers and workers and increase participation if they 
actively supported and marketed the work sharing program in a manner 
similar to Rhode Island’s approach. 
Work sharing and labor market flexibility. Work sharing should 
not interfere with labor market flexibility. Use should be encouraged 
to retain jobs during temporary layoffs, especially during cyclical eco-
nomic downturns. It should not be encouraged for use to stop or slow 
structural adjustments. 
Training and work sharing. Training during receipt of work shar-
ing is not likely to have widespread use in the United States: the Cana-
dian inability to encourage training use is apt to be repeated here. The 
inflexibility of production and workforce scheduling and the preference 
for on-the-job training is likely to have a negative effect on use of for-
mal training during work sharing usage. The next work sharing evalua-
tion in the United States should examine the use of training during work 
sharing periods. 
Work sharing evaluations. The United States should conduct an-
other national work sharing evaluation that includes a benefit-cost anal-
ysis. The evaluation would likely be a quasiexperimental impact analy-
sis, despite problems of setting up valid comparison groups. While it 
would be preferable to conduct a rigorous work sharing evaluation us-
ing an experimental design, the small size of the program and the high 





















1. This chapter uses the terms work sharing or short-time compensation (STC) for 
this program. Work sharing is a generic name and should more properly be called 
compensated work sharing, because of a history of uncompensated work sharing 
that was incorporated into some labor-management agreements. Some states (e.g., 
New York) have used the term “shared work” to describe the program. In Europe 
the program is most frequently called short-time work, and payments are called 
short-time working allowances. 
2. Markus Franz, e-mail message to the author, November 22, 2008. Franz at the time 





6. This section draws and expands upon Balducchi and Wandner (2008). 
7. Similarly, the number of employees enrolled in the program also grew rapidly, 
from 8,245 in 1979 to 99,332 in 1982. 
8. While the USDOL did not sponsor this event, I attended on behalf of the depart-
ment and made a presentation at the conference. 
9. Robert Galvin, CEO and chairman of Motorola, took a personal interest in work 
sharing and encouraged its adoption in all states in which Motorola had production 
facilities. He wanted the USDOL to take an active role in promoting work sharing, 
as he made very clear in a meeting with me and another department staff member, 
Robert Crosslin, at Motorola’s headquarters in Schaumberg, Illinois. 
10. I worked with the office of the assistant secretary for policy, evaluation, and 
research to design the experimental evaluation and visited states that were poten-
tial sites for study. 
11. Business support was led by the Motorola Corporation and the Committee for 
Economic Development. At the national level, the AFL-CIO executive council 
supported work sharing, while California unions provided state support among 
organized labor. For the state workforce agencies, Therman Kaldahl, president-
elect of the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (now called 
the National Association of State Workforce Agencies), testified in favor of work 
sharing legislation in 1980 (Ittner 1984). 
12. Illinois enacted temporary work sharing legislation in 1983, and the state legisla-
ture allowed the program to expire in 1988. 
13. Work sharing does not create human capital, but it may retard the depreciation of 
human capital for workers. It also may ensure access to human capital by employ-
ers when they decide to expand production. 
14. I was one of the department staff providing technical assistance to Arkansas, New 
York, and other states. 
15. Massachusetts eliminated the issue of higher administrative cost by completely 
automating the work sharing administrative process. Massachusetts is making its 
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16. The advisory committee included Frank W. Schiff, vice president and chief econo-
mist of the Committee for Economic Development; Casey F. Koziol, vice presi-
dent and director of personnel administration for Motorola; and John Zalusky, an 
economist with the AFL-CIO. They were all strong advocates of the work sharing 
program. 
17. As the organizer of the advisory group and project officer for the evaluation, I 
found the experience to be a difficult one. Trying to set up an objective and rigor-
ous evaluation with a highly respected evaluator, Mathematica Policy Research, 
resulted in a quasiexperimental evaluation design that was challenged and was 
difficult to defend. An unrelated problem resulted from the insistence of one of 
the participating states, California, that it be allowed to draw samples of partici-
pants itself, assembling the evaluation database and then removing the personal 
identifiers. The result was a data set that appeared to be highly flawed. The final 
product yielded ambiguous results and sparked contention about how to assess the 
evaluation. The difficulty of coming to agreement about the design and results of 
a quasiexperimental evaluation won me over to the use of experimental methodol-
ogy. The year after the completion of the work sharing evaluation, I proposed the 
initiation of the UI Experiments. 
18. David Balducchi worked on Senator Wofford’s staff and assisted in the drafting 
of S. 2614. 
19. In developing specifications for the REA legislation, the department issued a series 
of consultation papers (see USDOL 1994a), each of which endorsed work sharing 
and proposed revisions to its definition through a technical amendment. 
20. See Smith (2008); Nickisch (2008). Nancy Dunphy, deputy commissioner of 
the New York State Department of Labor, told a Washington, D.C., audience in 
November 2008 that New York was again experiencing an increase in work shar-
ing and that, while only 18 states have this job-saving provision in their UI laws, 
other states should consider adopting it. 
21. As the recession worsened in late 2008 and early 2009, greater work reductions 
occurred, with 40 percent reductions—to a three-day work week—becoming more 
prevalent. 
22. William Clawson, UI chief, Kansas Department of Human Resources, interviewed 
by David E. Balducchi, March 22, 1993. 
23. In early 2010, seven states introduced work sharing bills in their state legislatures, 
reflecting concern about high unemployment during the Great Recession. 
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Experiments and Public Policy 
INTRODUCTION
The idea of reemployment bonuses originated in 1974 in Japan, 
where unemployed workers can receive a cash bonus for accepting 
a new job, but they cannot receive reemployment bonuses more fre-
quently than once every three years. Reemployment bonuses also have 
been used in South Korea since 1995 (Martin and Grubb 2001; Wandner 
2002). 
Between 1984 and 1989, four reemployment bonus experiments 
were conducted in the United States. They provided varying levels of 
lump sum payments to permanently separated workers who took new, 
full-time jobs within six to 12 weeks after becoming unemployed and 
held those jobs for at least three to four months. These experiments were 
conducted to learn about the behavioral response of unemployment 
insurance (UI) recipients to the availability of UI benefits. Researchers 
designed a reemployment bonus system intended to speed the return to 
work of dislocated workers in a manner that would benefit employees 
and might be cost-effective. The concept behind these experiments was 
that UI claimants would be better off if they went back to work sooner 
and took similar jobs that paid similar wages to the jobs they would 
have taken in the absence of their bonus offers. Bonus offers were
tested to see if the government sector could be better off financially, 
which would be true if the cost of offering bonuses was offset by a 
decrease in UI payments to unemployed workers and an increase in tax 
receipts during their longer periods of employment. 
The reemployment bonus experiments were completed in the early 
1990s, but as of today reemployment bonuses have not been imple-
mented as part of U.S. labor market policy. The Clinton administration 
proposed federal reemployment bonuses in 1994, but the legislation 







Reemployment Accounts (PRAs), which included a reemployment 
bonus component targeted to dislocated workers. While that legisla-
tion was not enacted, PRA demonstration projects began in 2005. The 
Bush administration proposed PRAs as part of the Workforce Invest-
ment Act (WIA) reauthorization later that year. Because of a new 
administration initiative, the PRA initiative was abandoned in 2006 and 
was replaced with a proposal for training vouchers—Career Advance-
ment Accounts—which became a component of President Bush’s new 
emphasis on an “ownership society.” 
Reemployment Experiments 
Some job-ready dislocated workers might delay searching for or 
taking a new job. The reemployment bonuses tested in the experiments 
provided an incentive to speed the return to work. The treatments con-
sisted of the bonus offer by itself or the bonus in conjunction with the 
provision of job search assistance (JSA). Reemployment bonuses pro-
vide incentives to motivate workers to return to work and to encour-
age adjustments to structural economic change. These demonstrations 
encouraged dislocated workers to recognize and act upon the likely 
reality that their old jobs were gone forever and that there were steps 
that they could take to prepare for new employment. The bonuses pro-
vide incentive payments to individuals for successful early reemploy-
ment in suitable jobs. The purpose of these payments is to encourage 
dislocated workers to intensify their job search efforts and accept suit-
able new employment within a specified time period. 
The intent in providing bonuses is not to encourage workers to take 
short-term jobs or jobs below their earnings potential. Rather, reem-
ployment bonuses are offered as lump-sum payments, with the amount 
of the payment equal to some portion of the individual’s entitlement to 
UI benefits. Tying the reemployment bonus to UI benefits can equalize 
the bonus incentive across claimants, since each person’s bonus would 
be the same proportion of their UI benefit entitlement and would also be 
related to their usual wage level. To encourage participants to consider 
a longer time horizon and accept only suitable jobs, those individu-
als who qualify for reemployment bonuses can only receive a bonus 
payment after they maintain employment for some minimum specified 
period of time. 
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While the reemployment bonus experiments attempted to encour-
age permanently separated workers to find new jobs quickly, the bo-
nuses might have had an adverse effect on employers, if workers sub-
ject to recall had responded to the bonus offers. More specifically, the 
reemployment bonus experiments answered two questions related to 
this concern: 1) What effect does a reemployment bonus have on work-
ers subject to recall? 2) Can the effect be large enough that it would 
induce some workers to seek new employment? The answer is that no 
such impact was found (O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995, pp. 
267–268). 
hISTORy OF ExPERImENTS 
The Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment was conducted 
in 1984–1985, sponsored by the Illinois Department of Employment 
Security and funded by state reserves for the Employment Service (ES) 
program. These reserves are monies held centrally by each state to sup-
plement funding allocated to operate local ES offices (Woodbury and 
Spiegelman 1987). The experiment was designed, overseen, and evalu-
ated by staff of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
The Upjohn team was interested both in the theoretical and empirical 
economic implications of a bonus and in the potential for developing a 
cost-effective program. The state of Illinois was hoping to identify and 
implement a cost-effective program that would increase incentives to 
return to work. 
The apparent success of the Illinois Experiment encouraged further 
experimentation. The experiment reduced UI durations by just over one 
week without any reduction in postunemployment wages for the treat-
ment group. It was also cost-effective for the UI trust fund: for each 
dollar spent on the reemployment bonus payment, UI regular benefits 
were reduced by more than two dollars. Reemployment bonuses looked 
like an ideal program to implement. But before reemployment bonuses 
could be considered for policy purposes, the research and policy com-
munity had some remaining questions. Could the results of the experi-
ment be replicated? If replication was successful, what would be the 
best bonus offer level and time limit (qualification period) for designing 




Independent of the Illinois Experiment, the USDOL sponsored the 
New Jersey Experiment, which included a reemployment bonus treat-
ment group (Corson et al. 1989). This project was designed and became 
operational in 1985 and 1986, before the results of the Illinois Experi-
ment became available. The New Jersey Experiment was not designed 
to replicate or validate the Illinois Experiment. 
In 1987, with the evaluation of the Illinois Experiment completed 
and the New Jersey Experiment operations over, the department spon-
sored two additional reemployment bonus experiments. These exper-
iments used the Illinois model rather than the New Jersey model as 
their starting point for design and replication. The projects were funded 
using a portion of the $5 million that had been specifically added to the 
department’s fiscal year 1987 budget to fund additional UI Experiments. 
Two reemployment bonus demonstrations were conducted in 1988 
and 1989—one in Pennsylvania and one in Washington State (Corson et 
al. 1991; Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline 1992). In contrast to the Illi-
nois demonstration, these experiments had much more modest results. 
While half of the 10 treatments tested by the two experiments provided 
net benefits to claimants, society, and the government sector as a whole, 
only two of the treatments provided net benefits to one particular com-
ponent of the government sector—the UI trust fund. 
To better understand the results of the reemployment bonus experi-
ments, a pooled analysis was conducted of the Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington State data (Decker and O’Leary 1992, 1995). The analysis con-
trolled for differences between the two experiments and resulted in 
added precision to the estimate of impacts. The increased precision, 
however, did not improve the outcomes; reemployment bonuses were 
found to be cost-effective only to claimants. 
In most cases, research and policy reviews of reemployment bo-
nuses have been with regard to a broad, untargeted program, rather than 
more narrowly targeted programs like Worker Profiling and Reemploy-
ment Services (WPRS) and Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) that 
make use of a worker profiling mechanism. These reviews created 
modest expectations for reemployment bonus programs. These expec-
tations have been further dampened by external validity concerns about 
an ongoing program. More recently, however, O’Leary, Decker, and 
Wandner (2005) found reemployment bonuses to be more promising 
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DESIgN OF ThE REEmPLOymENT BONUS ExPERImENTS 
Overview 
All of the reemployment bonus experiments had eligibility require-
ments that had to be met before unemployed workers could partici-
pate in the projects as members of the treatment or control groups. The 
requirements were selected to do three things: 1) assure that workers 
filed for or drew UI benefits, 2) deal with UI administrative concerns, 
and 3) select workers who had experienced some degree of work dis-
placement. Treatment design dealt mostly with the determination of 
the potential bonus amount, the period of time during which workers 
could qualify for the bonus, and the conditions under which they could 
receive the bonus. 
All four experiments took place in single states. Selection of partici-
pating local offices was conducted with varying concern about how rep-
resentative the participating local offices were of the state as a whole. 
Sampling of claimants within each local office was conducted using 
random assignment methods. The sample size was selected considering 
the need for precision for individual treatments and any subgroups that 
would be analyzed. 
Eligibility Requirements 
Eligibility requirements varied greatly 
All the reemployment bonus experiments had requirements relating 
to the filing and eligibility for UI benefits. For the New Jersey Experi-
ment a project participant had to be a recipient (monetarily and non-
monetarily eligible); for the other experiments the participants had to be 
monetarily eligible at the time of the offer (Table 10.1). It was desirable 
to make the offer early, and in some cases prior to the receipt of a UI 
first payment, to speed the early intervention nature of the reemploy-
ment incentive. Nonetheless, in all of the experiments, bonuses could 
only be received by a participant who had become a UI recipient. The 
purpose of making an offer before a final determination of UI eligibil-
ity was to speed the intervention and to seek a cost-effective outcome. 
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Table 10.1  Eligibility Requirements for the Reemployment Bonus Experiments 
Illinois New Jersey Pennsylvania Washington 
Unemployment Initial claims only. First payments only. Initial claims only. Initial claims only. 
Insurance Regular UI claims. Eligible to receive 
eligibility Initially satisfy monetary benefits from the state 
criteria eligibility conditions. UI trust fund. 
Not separated from job Monetarily valid claims 
due to a labor dispute. at the time of filing. 
Sign for a waiting week 
or first payment within 
six weeks of benefit 
application date. 
Dislocated Eligible for full 26 Age 25 or greater. Union hiring hall 
worker weeks of potential Three years’ tenure exclusion. 
criteria duration. Register with on prior job. Exclude Exclude employer 
Job Service. (Excludes temporary layoffs: attached: must not have 
workers on temporary expect recall on a a specific recall date 
layoff and in union specific recall date. within 60 days after 
hiring hall.) Age at least Union hiring hall benefit application. 
20 and not older than 54. exclusion. 
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The extent of dislocated worker screening criteria varied greatly. 
Screening was extensive in New Jersey, while it was nonexistent in 
Washington. The Illinois and Pennsylvania experiments fell in between. 
Although the experiments were focused on permanently separated 
employees, the degree of screening varied, largely because of analytical 
differences in the evaluations of the experiments. Evaluation analysis 
of subgroups was expected to make the experiments more comparable 
and to focus on subgroups in need of services, including groups having 
greater difficulty returning to work. 
Serving dislocated workers 
The policy goal of the experiments was to serve permanently sep-
arated unemployed workers, who might also share other characteris-
tics of dislocated workers. The dislocated worker screens used in the 
experiments were not necessarily the same as those that would be used 
in an operational program. At the time of initiation of the experiment, 
no consensus had emerged about what those screens might be, and, as 
long as sample sizes were large enough, the screens could be simulated 
by imposing more restrictive screens on the experimental participants 
after the fact. 
The experiments also represented different philosophies. The New 
Jersey and Illinois experiments were conducted earlier and imposed 
screens restricting the age and tenure of participants. By the time the 
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments were conducted, there was 
greater understanding that screening on the basis of age might not be 
permissible in an ongoing, federally sponsored program and that a 
strong tenure screen might need to be relaxed in an operational system. 
In addition, the Washington design was explicitly based on the expecta-
tion that any more restrictive screens would be imposed analytically on 
the experimental data after the fact. 
Developed in 1993, profiling was required for use with reemploy-
ment bonuses in the “UI flexibility” provisions of the proposed Reem-
ployment Act of 1994 and again as part of Personal Reemployment 
Accounts (PRAs) in 2003. As a result, any future reemployment bonus 
program proposal likely will use the same worker profiling targeting 
process. Thus, designs of the reemployment bonus operating systems 
should incorporate a worker profiling mechanism, and the profiling 
mechanism should be used to adjust the estimated impacts when applied 
to the reemployment bonus experimental data. 
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Design of the Experiments 
The goal of the early experiments was to have a significant impact 
on worker behavior. The level of the bonus amount had to be sufficient 
to motivate unemployed workers to seek the bonus. The duration of the 
bonus offer had to be long enough to allow for success in seeking new 
employment. In Illinois, policymakers wanted the bonus design to be 
cost-effective to the government sector as well as to the UI trust fund. 
By contrast, in New Jersey the bonus amount was intentionally set high 
to assure that there would be a large response to the offer. In this sense, 
the New Jersey Experiment was a “first pass” at a reemployment bonus, 
with the expectation that fine tuning would have to be done in the future 
if the experiment had its expected impact. 
The Illinois design provided a fixed $500 bonus amount, about 
four times the UI weekly benefit amount (WBA) at the time. Treatment 
group members had to become reemployed within 11 weeks of initially 
filing their UI claims. Since the bonuses were offered soon after filing 
for UI benefits—when claimants registered with the local Employment 
Service—and the claimants were eligible for up to 26 weeks of UI ben-
efits (not including extended benefits), researchers believed the experi-
ment could yield cost-effective results. 
In New Jersey, the bonus offer was one-half of the remaining UI 
benefit entitlement at the time a new job was taken. It was designed as 
a UI benefit cash-out program, so that claimants could receive a portion 
of their remaining UI entitlement as a reward for not exhausting their 
entitlement. The offer generally was made in the eighth week of UI 
benefit receipt, when claimants would have about 18 weeks of potential 
duration remaining, if they qualified for the maximum duration of ben-
efits. As a result, the initial offer averaged $1,644—about nine times the 
UI weekly benefit amount. By its value declining over time, the New 
Jersey offer was designed to encourage rapid search for and taking of a 
job. The declining offer also tended to encourage a cost-effective out-
come, since it encouraged reemployment at the beginning of the qualifi-
cation period. This offer could result in large declines in unemployment 
durations. In New Jersey, unlike Illinois, however, there was no assur-
ance that the treatment group members would be eligible for a full 26 
weeks of benefits. 
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The Pennsylvania and Washington design reflected what had been 
learned in Illinois, and reflected that experiment’s promise of appar-
ent success. (The New Jersey design was set aside.) The bonus offers 
were multiples of the worker’s weekly benefit level. This approach was 
appropriate given the finding that claimants in the Washington Experi-
ment who received less than the UI maximum weekly benefit responded 
more strongly to bonus offers than those constrained by the UI maxi-
mum benefit amount (O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995, p. 267). 
From the Illinois experience, a bonus equivalent to approximately four 
weeks of UI benefits offered each week for approximately 11 weeks 
seemed adequate. (The offer of half of the remaining entitlement used 
in the New Jersey Experiment was clearly too much.) The new experi-
ments tested benefit levels that bracketed the Illinois bonus amount 
(four times the WBA) and tested some qualifications that were similar 
to the earlier offers as well as others that were about half as much. 
The resulting design provided for four treatment groups in Penn-
sylvania and six in Washington (Table 10.2). The dimensions of each 
design were the level of the bonus (high and low in Pennsylvania; high, 
medium, and low in Washington) and the qualification period or dura-
tion of the bonus offer (short and long). 
The Pennsylvania and Washington experimental designs were 
developed at the same time and were coordinated. The Washington 
Experiment had an offer of four times the weekly benefit amount and a 
qualification period that tended to be about 10 ½ weeks. The Pennsyl-
vania long-qualification-period (12-week) treatments paid either three 
or six times the UI weekly benefit amount, thus bracketing Illinois’s 
offer of four times the weekly benefit amount. Some of the bonus offers 
were similar. The short qualification/high bonus offer and long quali-
fication/high bonus offer treatments were nearly identical between the 
two experiments (Decker and O’Leary 1995, p. 536). As a result, it was 
hoped that the evaluation findings of the two experiments would be 
complementary and reinforcing. 
In all of the experiments, participants had to work a minimum pe-
riod of time, the “reemployment period,” before they were eligible for 
a reemployment bonus. In Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington, the 
reemployment period was four months—defined as 16 weeks in Penn-
sylvania. This parameter was not considered to be sensitive to variation, 

































Half of remaining UI 12 weeks 2 4 weeks;
entitlement; initial offer (60% after 4-wk. 12 weeks 
good for two weeks, then reempl. period; 
declines by 10% per week 40% after 12-wk. 
in each successive week. reempl. period.) 
Pennsylvania
 Qualification period 
Bonus Reemployment 
Bonus offer 6 weeks 12 weeks payment period 
3 × WBA Low bonus, short Low bonus, long 1 16 weeks 
qualification qualification period 
period 
6 × WBA High bonus, short High bonus, long 




(0.2 × potential (0.4 × potential
UI duration) UI duration) Bonus Reemployment 
Bonus offer + 1 week + 1 week payment period 
2 × WBA Low bonus, short Low bonus, long 1 4 months 
qualification qualification
period period 
4 × WBA Medium bonus, Medium bonus, 
short qualification long qualification 
period period 
6 × WBA High bonus, short High bonus, long 
qualification qualification
period period 
NOTE: WBA = weekly benefit amount. 
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(Robins and Spiegelman 2001). New Jersey was an outlier, with a four-
week reemployment period to receive the first reemployment bonus 
payment and 12 weeks to receive the second payment. 
Qualifying for Bonus 
To be eligible to receive a reemployment bonus, treatment group 
members in Illinois had to take new jobs, earning at least $30 per week, 
and hold them for four months. The New Jersey Experiment required 
workers to take a new job, which could not be temporary, seasonal, part-
time (under 32 hours per week), and could not be provided by a relative 
or by the immediately preceding employer. As a tenure requirement, the 
worker had to hold that job for four weeks to get 60 percent of the bonus 
and for 12 weeks to get the remaining 40 percent (Corson et al. 1989, 
pp. 121–123). In Pennsylvania, workers had to start working in a new 
job, which could not be part-time (under 32 hours per week). Workers 
had to continuously hold the new job for 16 weeks. In Washington, 
workers had to take a new job, which could not be part-time (under 34 
hours per week). The tenure requirement was continuous employment 
for a period of four months. 
Thus, the common qualification requirement was to start a full-time 
job—defined three different ways—with a new employer and hold it for 
a three- to four-month period. 
Site Selection 
In all cases except in Illinois, the site selection process attempted 
to make the sites reasonably representative of the state as a whole. In 
Illinois, however, 22 local ES offices were selected, but they were all 
located in northern and central Illinois. Site selection ensured that a 
variety of rural and urban sites would be represented, but the selection 
process was largely for administrative convenience. 
In New Jersey and Pennsylvania, site selection was based on sur-
vey sampling methodology. In New Jersey, 10 sites were chosen from 
a total of 38 local UI offices. Fourteen local offices were excluded as 
being too small to support the experiment. Local offices were then 
stratified geographically to assure that they were representative of the 





acteristics. Finally, 10 local offices were randomly selected, with the 
probability of selection based on local office size, as measured by their 
claimant population. 
In Pennsylvania, 12 local UI-ES offices were randomly selected 
from 12 clusters selected based on UI–Job Service geographic regions 
within the state and the average duration of UI receipt. In Washington, 
21 of 31 ES offices were selected. Of the 10 offices excluded, seven 
were the smallest offices in the state and were found not to be able to 
support the experiment, two were participating in another experiment, 
and one was excluded because of its integration with the Portland, Ore-
gon, metropolitan area. 
DEmONSTRATION FINDINgS AND ANALySIS 
Demonstration Findings 
The demonstration findings derive from two outcome measures— 
the impacts on 1) UI receipt and 2) postunemployment earnings—and 
the benefit-cost analysis. 
Impact on receipt of UI 
The UI receipt impacts of the experiments are summarized in Table 
10.3. The Pennsylvania and Washington data are regression-adjusted 
estimates from a pooled sample (Decker and O’Leary 1995). The results 
of the reemployment bonus experiments generally show a significant 
decline in benefits received in the benefit year. The results are largest in 
the Illinois Experiment, with a reduction in benefits of over one week. 
The results for Pennsylvania and Washington are uneven and much 
smaller. The most generous bonuses—high bonus/long eligibility— 
had the greatest impact, but the results are not consistent for the other 
treatments. These results are disappointing in that they do not show a 
graduated impact, increasing from low bonus to high, and the size of 
the impacts is smaller than for the Illinois Experiment. The pooled data 
analysis for the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments confirm the 
smaller UI impacts of the two new experiments, yielding an estimate of 
half a week, which is less than half the result in Illinois. 
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Table 10.3  Estimated Impacts of the Reemployment Bonus Treatments on 
UI Outcomes and Earnings 
Weeks of benefits Earnings
Treatment in benefit year ($ per claimant) 
Illinois −1.15*** 8 (Qtr. 1) 
New Jersey −0.97*** 176** (Qtr. 1) 
(benefit year) 
−0.44** 79 (Qtr. 2) 
(2nd year) 
−1.72*** 46 (Qtr. 3) 
(over 6 years) 
79 (Qtr. 4) 
Pennsylvania 
PT 1 low-short −0.63* 19 (Qtr. 1) 
PT 2 low-long −0.39 87 (Qtr. 1) 
PT 3 high-short −0.46 116 (Qtr. 1) 
PT 4 high-long −0.84*** 70 (Qtr. 1) 
Washington 
WT 1 low-short −0.04 −178** (Qtr. 1) 
WT 2 med.-short −0.25 −54 (Qtr. 1) 
WT 3 high-short −0.71** 63 (Qtr. 1) 
WT 4 low-long −0.59** 36 (Qtr. 1) 
WT 5 med.-long −0.31 −42 (Qtr. 1) 
WT 6 high-long −0.80** 102 (Qtr. 1) 
Combined 
PA-WA treatments −0.51*** 26 (Qtr. 1) 
NOTE: New Jersey earnings are based on interview data. * significantly different from 
zero at the 90 percent confidence level (two-tailed test); ** significantly different from 
zero at the 95 percent confidence level (two-tailed test); *** significantly different 
from zero at the 99 percent confidence level (two-tailed test). 
SOURCE: Illinois: Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987); New Jersey: Corson and 





The New Jersey data are not comparable because that treatment 
included mandatory participation in job search assistance. Nonetheless, 
the combined impact of the offer of both JSA and the reemployment 
bonus is less than that for the reemployment bonus alone in Illinois dur-
ing the first benefit year (Corson et al. 1989). The New Jersey Experi-
ment, however, included a six-year follow-up study, and the total six-
year result yielded an effect nearly double the first-year effect. It also 
exceeded the Illinois one-year impact. In the New Jersey Experiment, 
both the JSA-only and the JSA-plus-reemployment-bonus treatments 
had long-term effects on UI receipt, indicating that these two treatments 
led to jobs that were more stable, and the reemployment bonus contrib-
uted to this stabilization (Corson and Haimson 1996).1 
Impact on postunemployment earnings 
The postunemployment earnings of participants in the reemploy-
ment bonus experiments answered the question, “Did the experiments 
produce a less favorable job match, resulting in lower earnings in the 
new jobs?” The reemployment bonus offer might have induced unem-
ployed workers to take a less suitable job at a lower wage, in order 
to take advantage of the bonus offer. The results from all four experi-
ments, however, show that this did not happen. 
Table 10.3 presents the earnings impacts for the experiments. There 
is no significant change in earnings for the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington participants in the first quarter of employment following 
UI claims status, with one exception—that of a negative and significant 
impact for one Washington treatment. These findings are confirmed by 
the pooled data analysis for the Pennsylvania and Washington experi-
ments, which also find no significant impact. The New Jersey Experi-
ment shows positive results for the first quarter after the UI claim, but 
these results reflect, in part, the presence of the offer of job search assis-
tance.2 The conclusion is that reemployment bonuses result in more 
rapid reemployment because of more intense job search, and not from 
a willingness to take less favorable jobs or jobs with lower earnings. 
Benefit-cost analysis 
From the benefit-cost analysis of the Illinois Experiment, the net 
benefits from the perspective of the UI trust fund were both dramatic 
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and promising when the analysis was published as the lead article in the 
September 1987 issue of the American Economic Review. The evalu-
ation estimated that the net benefits per claimant were $90. The bonus 
offer was found to have reduced benefit payments by $2.32 for each 
$1.00 in reemployment bonuses paid, for a benefit-cost ratio of 2.32. 
These strong positive results spurred the replication and extension 
of the experiment in Pennsylvania and Washington. The Illinois results, 
however, were not confirmed. Only 2 of the 10 treatments in these two 
states produced net benefits to the Unemployment Trust Fund. The 
results for the pooled sample were negative for the government sector 
and for society but positive for claimants. 
The first goal of the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments 
was to replicate the Illinois Experiment. In Washington, the medium/ 
long treatment (WT5) duplicated Illinois. No treatment in Pennsyl-
vania duplicated the Illinois design, but the low/long (PT2) and high/ 
long (PT4) treatments effectively bracketed the Illinois design. None of 
these three treatments produced net benefits for the UI trust fund. Three 
Pennsylvania treatments provided net benefits to the government sector 
as a whole. 
The second goal of the new experiments was to fine-tune the design 
of the Illinois Experiment to find the most cost-effective combination 
of bonus amount and qualification period. Since there was no graduated 
and increasing impact on UI receipt as the bonus amount increased and 
the qualification period lengthened, this goal was not achieved either. 
The conclusions from these new studies were that 1) the basic find-
ings of Illinois could not be duplicated, and 2) no reemployment bonus 
design would pay for itself. The new experiments were not cost-
effective to the UI trust fund. They also did not appear to result in net 
benefits for the government sector. Meanwhile, the New Jersey results 
were positive to all sectors, but these results were not comparable to the 
other studies (Table 10.4). 
Explaining the Results 
Failure to confirm the results of the Illinois Experiment led research-
ers to search for the reasons for the observed results. One response 





above. It was hoped that pooling data would provide more insight into 
the effects of the new experiments by improving the precision of the 
individual state estimates. The results of this analysis, however, only 
confirmed the results of the two separate evaluations (Decker and 
O’Leary 1995). 
Further analysis of the Illinois results was conducted, looking for 
explanations for its stronger findings compared to the other three exper-
iments. Davidson and Woodbury (1991) found that the favorable results 
of the Illinois Experiment may have been due to the availability of tem-
porary emergency-extended UI benefits, known as Federal Supplemen-
Table 10.4  Estimated Net Benefits of the Reemployment Bonus 
Experiments ($ per claimant) 
Government 
Treatment Claimant UI trust fund Gov’t total Society 
Illinois — 90 — — 
New Jersey 400 45 165 565 
Pennsylvania 
PT1 low-short −312 41 −53 −365 
PT2 low-long 142 −1 42 184 
PT3 high-short 127 −10 28 155 
PT4 high-long 171 −31 20 191 
Washington 
WT1 low-short −168 −71 −122 −289 
WT2 med.-short −87 −65 −91 −178 
WT3 high-short 198 −37 23 222 
WT4 low-long −224 51 −16 −241 
WT5 med.-long −124 −79 −117 −241 
WT6 high-long 328 −80 19 347 
Pennsylvania and 14 −25 −21 −7 
Washington 
combined 
NOTE: For New Jersey, results estimates were broader than the UI Trust Fund and 
include the entire U.S. Department of Labor. — = not available. 
SOURCE: Illinois: Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987); New Jersey: Corson and Haim-
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tal Compensation (FSC), during the first half of the period of operation 
of the project. These benefits continued to be available after initially 
being enacted to ease the impact of the 1980–1982 recession. Thus, they 
provided up to 26 additional weeks of extended benefits to UI recipients 
who had exhausted their entitlement to regular UI benefits. The poten-
tial savings to the UI trust fund for FSC-eligible UI claimants was much 
greater because of their much greater total UI entitlement, i.e., up to 52 
weeks. Workers eligible for FSC were found to be much more respon-
sive to the reemployment bonus than those not FSC-eligible. While the 
benefit-cost ratio for all claimants was found to be 2.32, the ratio for 
those not eligible for FSC was about 1.4, which is closer to that for 
the average for Pennsylvania (Davidson and Woodbury 1991; O’Leary, 
Spiegelman, and Kline 1995, p. 267). The much more favorable impact 
of the reemployment bonus offer for FSC-eligible claimants provides 
a partial explanation for the much greater cost-effectiveness of the Illi-
nois Experiment. 
Comparisons have also been made between the individual experi-
mental results. The stronger results of the Pennsylvania Experiment 
relative to Washington have been examined. One conclusion was that 
the tighter labor market in Pennsylvania during the 1988–1989 experi-
mental period may have made it easier to find a job (O’Leary, Spiegel-
man, and Kline 1995, p. 267). 
For individual experiments, subgroup analysis has been conducted. 
One subgroup that has been analyzed is dislocated workers. This target 
group was reflected to some extent in the selection of the eligible pop-
ulation to varying degrees in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois, 
but not in Washington. In the Washington evaluation (Spiegelman and 
Woodbury 1987, pp. 116–120, 193, 202–203), the impacts and cost-
effectiveness of the experiment for dislocated workers are analyzed, 
but this analysis is restricted to a subgroup of participants having only 
one dislocated worker characteristic (long tenure). A benefit-cost analy-
sis for such long-tenure workers results in a conclusion that from “the 
perspective of the UI system, or the government as a whole, none of 
the alternative bonus offer programs look particularly attractive as a 
dislocated worker program” (Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline 1992, p. 
202). A more recent analysis of worker dislocation described below, 
however, examined a much wider range of factors that are associated 





Another explanation for the larger impact on UI receipt of the Illi-
nois Experiment compared to that of New Jersey was in the design 
of the bonus offer—a constant $500 reemployment bonus in Illinois, 
which might have had a different effect on UI spells of unemployment 
than the New Jersey declining bonus (Decker 1994). Despite differ-
ences in the size and structure of the two bonuses, their offer had a 
similar impact on exit rates from UI receipt during the bonus qualifica-
tion period. It was only after the end of the bonus qualification period 
that UI exit rates began to differ. For the Illinois Experiment, there was 
no impact on exit rates after the qualification period, while in the New 
Jersey Experiment there was a significant decline in exit rates. Thus, the 
New Jersey Experiment reduced UI receipt more among short-duration 
claimants than among long-duration claimants, who are more likely to 
exhaust their benefits. By contrast, the Illinois model had a substantial 
impact on long-duration claimants, reducing UI exhaustions. This find-
ing provides part of the answer to why the Illinois model had a greater 
impact on UI receipt than the New Jersey Experiment. It does not, how-
ever, explain why Illinois’ constant bonus had a greater impact than the 
Pennsylvania and Washington bonuses. 
Reemployment Bonuses with Worker Profiling 
Generally, the evaluation of the four reemployment bonus experi-
ments was conducted and reviewed with the assumption that a perma-
nent program would have the same eligibility conditions as the indi-
vidual experiments. As we have seen, however, the experiments had 
greatly different eligibility criteria, from simple UI eligibility criteria in 
Washington State to the addition of more rigorous screening for char-
acteristics associated with permanent worker dislocation in the other 
three experiments. New Jersey had the most rigorous worker disloca-
tion screening. 
In the Washington State experiment it was recognized that an opera-
tional program would likely need more rigorous screening to better tar-
get dislocated workers. As was seen above, the evaluation considered 
the impact of restricting eligibility to dislocated workers, but its analysis 
only dealt with one factor associated with dislocation, i.e., job tenure. 
While the Washington Experiment did little targeting analysis, 
other analysis has shown that selection of dislocated workers to par-
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ticipate in reemployment bonuses and other reemployment services 
could be more effective and efficient. The six-year follow-up study of 
the New Jersey Experiment (Corson and Haimson 1996) revealed the 
impact that profiling could have on the net impact results of the UI 
Experiments. The study conducted a simulation of what would have 
been the impact on the original New Jersey evaluation findings if the 
operational profiling mechanism adopted for use in New Jersey starting 
in 1994 for the WPRS program had been in use during the experimental 
period in 1986–1987. It found that “using a profiling model to target 
reemployment services on workers with high probabilities of UI benefit 
exhaustion directs reemployment services to a group of workers who 
are likely to benefit from the services. These estimates also imply this 
approach to targeting is a relatively efficient way to provide services. 
Services are directed to a specific group of displaced workers who 
can benefit more from the services than a broader group of displaced 
workers, thereby generating relatively large savings in UI receipt for 
the given level of expenditures on services” (Corson and Haimson
1996, p. 75). 
The original Pennsylvania reemployment bonus evaluation (Cor-
son et al. 1991) included no analysis of targeting bonuses to dislocated 
workers. Corson and Decker (1996), however, found that the effective-
ness of the reemployment bonuses offered in Pennsylvania would have 
increased if profiling had been used to select participants rather than 
using the broad screens that were used in the experiment. Setting the 
minimum probability of exhaustion at 0.7 for eligibility for a bonus, 
profiled workers were found to experience a longer duration of unem-
ployment than unprofiled workers. The unemployment duration results 
were statistically significant. 
This analysis suggests that the impacts and cost-effectiveness of a 
reemployment bonus could be increased by focusing on using worker 
profiling. It also suggests that some of the concerns about the external 
validity of these experiments could be reduced by targeting a perma-
nent program with worker profiling. External validity concerns could 
be allayed in a number of ways, including these three: worker profiling 
would 1) target a small group of workers; 2) target only permanently 
separated, laid-off workers having characteristics of dislocated work-




Without profiling, potentially all UI beneficiaries could be eligible 
for an offer of a reemployment bonus, much as was the case in the 
Washington Experiment. Potentially about eight million U.S. benefi-
ciaries could have been offered a bonus in 2007. With a bonus receipt 
rate of, say, 25 percent, approximately 2 million (8 million beneficia-
ries × 0.25) UI beneficiaries a year might receive a bonus. By contrast, 
while virtually all new UI claimants are profiled, only about 10 per-
cent of them are referred to reemployment services. These workers are 
referred to a variety of reemployment services, and those that are not 
job-ready are referred to education and training services. Only a portion 
of these profiled UI claimants would be likely to be offered a reemploy-
ment bonus. However, assuming that all referred workers were offered 
reemployment bonuses, and again assuming a 25 percent receipt rate, 
approximately 200,000 (8 million × 0.1 × 0.25) reemployment bonuses 
would be paid each year, to less than 3 percent of UI beneficiaries. In 
general, for any group of laid-off workers applying for UI benefits, only 
a small portion would be offered a bonus. Such a small program would 
result in unemployed workers’ having less knowledge about the pro-
gram and a likely small behavioral response. 
Targeting permanently separated, laid-off workers would be done 
in the first part of the worker profiling process. Workers would then 
be selected using a statistical model with input of personal and labor 
market characteristics. The result is that workers who would be offered 
a reemployment bonus would not be on temporary layoff and would be 
less likely to be among the short-term unemployed. 
Employees and employers would not be certain whether individual 
unemployed workers would be referred to reemployment services or 
not. Furthermore, they would not be sure which of these referred work-
ers would be offered a reemployment bonus. For permanently separated 
workers, referral to reemployment services would depend on the per-
sonal and labor market characteristics that go into the worker profiling 
model. Referral would further depend on the budget constraint of the 
state workforce agency, which can refer varying numbers of workers, 
either to reemployment services or to reemployment bonus offers. With 
worker profiling, labor representatives, employers, or fellow workers 
would not be likely to advise workers to collect a reemployment bonus, 
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An analysis simulating profiling of reemployment bonuses was 
conducted with data for the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, 
the two experiments that seemed to have the greatest policy relevance 
(O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 1998, 2005). The analysis made use of 
profiling of reemployment bonuses for two reasons: First, reemploy-
ment bonuses seemed to be policy-appropriate only for permanently 
separated dislocated workers. This conclusion had already been con-
firmed by the adoption of worker profiling as a component of the Clin-
ton administration’s 1994 targeted reemployment bonus proposal. Sec-
ond, the Pennsylvania and Washington state results were modest, with 
half of the treatments in those two states found to be cost-effective to 
society and to the government sector, but only two treatments found to 
be cost-effective for the UI system. As a result, no optimum reemploy-
ment bonus design had been found. 
Worker profiling was conducted using the model proposed by the 
USDOL (1994b), estimated separately for Pennsylvania and Washing-
ton based on data from the experiments from 1988 to 1989. Profiling 
was applied to individuals in both the treatment and control groups in 
each state. Two thresholds for profiling were applied, setting the likeli-
hood of exhausting entitlement to UI at 50 and 75 percent. Starting 
with the full sample of participants in the two experiments, profiling 
reduces the samples to those who meet the profiling probability levels. 
The results presented in Table 10.5 reflect the model for the experiment 
period, with a likelihood of exhaustion set at 50 percent. 
The net benefit results of the analysis of the profiled reemployment 
bonus data showed that profiling improved the results from the perspec-
tive of the UI program. When using mean values across all treatments 
in each state, results with profiling generally were stronger than results 
without. Setting the profiling threshold at 50 percent was more cost-
effective than at 75 percent. The result of comparing bonus amounts 
(high and low in Pennsylvania and high, medium, and low in Washing-
ton) and eligibility period (short and long in both states) showed that 
the combination of low bonus amount and long eligibility period was 
the most cost-effective. These estimates “suggest that such a targeted 
bonus offer would yield appreciable net benefits to the UI trust fund 
if implemented as a permanent national program” (O’Leary, Decker, 
and Wandner 1998). The policy recommendation was for adoption of a 
low bonus amount of about three times the weekly benefit amount and 
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Table 10.5  Pennsylvania and Washington Reemployment Demonstrations,
Summary of Net Benefits from the Perspective of UI System ($) 
Based on Based on claimants 
full sample above 50th percentile 
Demonstration and treatment (no profiling) using profiling model 
Pennsylvania bonus offers 
Low bonus/short qualification 40 −119 
Low bonus/long qualification 24 108 
High bonus/short qualification −56 −138 
High bonus/long qualification −28 68 
Washington bonus offers 
Low bonus/short qualification −62 −2 
Low bonus/long qualification 9 110 
Medium bonus/short qualification −88 6 
Medium bonus/long qualification −129 −141 
High bonus/short qualification −76 −97 
High bonus/long qualification −132 −94 
SOURCE: O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1998). 
a long qualification period of about 12 weeks. Using the 2008 national 
average weekly benefit amount, the bonus amount would average $900. 
External Validity Concerns: Response to the 
Demonstration Findings 
Overview 
In evaluating and reviewing the reemployment bonus experiments, 
researchers have pointed to four types of external validity concerns: 1) 
low take-up rates for qualified treatment group members, 2) potential 
for induced insured unemployment, 3) subsidizing short-term layoffs, 
and 4) potential and unknowable displacement effects. 
In the evaluation of the Illinois Experiment, the possible impacts 
of external validity issues were discussed, including take-up rates and 
displacement, but only the take-up issue was analyzed (Woodbury and 
Spiegelman 1987, pp. 526–528). Later studies have looked at all of 
these issues. Different researchers have placed emphasis on different 
external validity concerns. 
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Increased bonus take-up rates 
The reemployment bonus experiments leave unresolved the ques-
tion of what the actual rate of receipt of a reemployment bonus would 
be in an ongoing program. While that question cannot be answered, 
an upper limit can be estimated by determining what the increase in 
receipt would be if the take-up rate were 100 percent. This approach 
takes into consideration the fact that in an ongoing program, UI claim-
ants eligible for a reemployment bonus would be far more likely to be 
aware of the bonus offer, and that they would be more likely to apply 
for and receive the bonus. Such an estimate is clearly an upper bound 
estimate because some eligible workers did not apply for reasons other 
than lack of information, and ongoing programs never experience 100 
percent participation rates. 
For the Illinois Experiment, Woodbury and Spiegelman examine 
the issue of take-up rates. Of the 4,186 treatment group members, 25 
percent qualified for the bonus but only 13.6 percent received the bonus. 
Thus, since only 54 percent of the treatment group members who quali-
fied for the bonus collected it, Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987, pp. 
527–528) estimate what would have happened if take-up rates had risen 
to 100 percent with no accompanying decline in UI benefit receipt or 
unemployment. They calculate that the result would be a decline in the 
benefit-cost ratio from 2.32 to 1.26. 
Among the four reemployment bonus experiments, the range of 
take-up rates varied from 53 to 80 percent. This implies that if all eli-
gible claimants collected the reemployment bonus, the cost of the pro-
gram would increase by as little as one-fifth and by as much as one-half. 
Induced insured unemployment: delayed switchers 
While it is possible that reemployment bonuses could induce the 
incidence of a spell of unemployment (“induced incidence”) that would 
not occur in the absence of the bonus, this issue has not been raised 
or analyzed. Rather, the chief concern of policymakers has been the 
potential for a delay in switching from an old job to a new job (“delayed 
switching”), which would create a brief period of unemployment dur-
ing which a bonus could be collected. 
Delayed switching of jobs might result in the offer of a reemploy-




offer could be made only to workers who suffer a layoff. They cannot 
voluntarily quit and qualify to receive UI. Workers also cannot have 
sought and secured a job prior to the date of the layoff. In the absence 
of the reemployment bonus, these workers would have taken new jobs 
without an intervening period of unemployment. To take advantage of 
the potential reemployment bonus offer, these workers would then have 
to delay the start date of the job or reject the job offer. 
Meyer (1996, p. 48) addresses the issue of delayed switching 
because he finds that the fraction of layoffs that do not result in unem-
ployment range from 18 to over 30 percent.3 Delayed switching would 
be of particular concern if laid-off workers could search for new work 
prior to their layoff date, accept a job offer only after a period of inter-
vening unemployment, and collect a reemployment bonus for taking 
the new job. Delayed switching could be discouraged, however, if one 
reemployment bonus administrative step were expanded. Namely, prior 
to the payment of a bonus, the UI agency would have to determine from 
the new employer whether the employee had experienced continuous 
employment for three or four months. At the same time, the date of 
the employer’s job offer could be collected, with a bonus eligibility 
requirement that the job offer date could be no earlier than the date of 
the reemployment bonus offer. 
The concern about induced unemployment is related to the con-
cern that employed workers could self-select into the program once it 
became operational. This occurrence would be of particular concern 
if a reemployment bonus program was untargeted and open to all UI 
recipients. Workers might know with certainty that if they met the pro-
gram criteria they would qualify for and receive the bonus. With use of 
worker profiling for targeting, however, a small portion of permanently 
laid-off workers would be offered a reemployment bonus, and this con-
cern should be greatly reduced. 
Induced filing: nonfilers for UI benefits 
A large portion of potentially UI-eligible unemployed workers
never file for benefits—especially those unemployed workers who 
experience short spells of unemployment. Introduction of a reemploy-
ment bonus would raise the value of UI receipt and likely induce some 
UI nonfilers to file for benefits. Meyer (1996, pp. 43–44) discusses this 
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ing an estimated “fraction of eligibles receiving UI ranging from 0.55 
to 0.83.”4 Meyer goes on to estimate that the increase in the percentage 
of unemployed workers filing for benefits would be between 7 percent 
and 12 percent, while the actual percentage could be higher because of 
the likely disproportionately heavy participation rate by short-duration 
unemployed workers, who previously would not have found applying 
worthwhile. 
The goal of a reemployment bonus program, however, is to shorten 
the duration of long-term unemployed workers. Using worker profil-
ing to make reemployment bonus offers, nonfilers might be encouraged 
to apply for UI benefits in the hope of being offered a reemployment 
bonus. However, to the extent that induced filers represent short-term 
unemployed workers, the worker profiling process is likely to assign 
them a low probability of exhausting their UI benefit entitlement, and 
they would not receive a reemployment bonus offer. Given a low bonus 
offer (e.g., three or four times the UI weekly benefit amount) and a low 
probability of being offered the reemployment bonus, short-duration 
unemployed workers may continue to find little incentive to file for UI 
benefits. 
Subsidizing short-term layoffs 
Unemployment insurance is an important supplement to wages in 
layoffs. It can affect the behavior of employers and employees. For 
example, employers and employees formerly counted on workers 
receiving UI benefits each July in the automobile industry because of 
model changeovers. Meyer (1996, p. 45) suggests that reemployment 
bonuses could become an incentive to lay workers off. He notes that 
under the eligibility criteria of the experiments, reemployment bonuses 
cannot be provided to workers who return to their previous employer.
He notes, however, that some workers on layoff are not subject to recall, 
and they might receive a bonus. It is doubtful that this incentive would 
come into play for at least three reasons under any likely potential fed-
eral legislation. First, under the eligibility conditions, workers on tem-
porary layoff would not be on permanent layoff, would not pass the 
profiling screening, and therefore would not be offered a bonus. Sec-
ond, if workers on temporary layoff eventually were informed that they 
were not subject to recall, a bonus would not be offered to them because 
they would no longer be newly unemployed. Third, the worker profiling 
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mechanism is likely to exclude them from eligibility whether they are 
subject to recall or not, since they are not likely to have the characteris-
tics of the long-term unemployed. 
Displacement effect 
A reemployment bonus could result in displacement if workers 
responding to the bonus offer sought and took jobs that would have oth-
erwise gone to other unemployed workers. In an ongoing program, this 
adverse effect could affect those unemployed workers who were offered 
a bonus but did not find a job or those who were never offered a bonus. 
The displacement effect could be small if bonus recipients found jobs 
with little or no impact on other unemployed workers. Alternatively,
the effect could be so great that there would be little or no increase in 
total employment; there would be a redistribution of jobs from other 
workers to reemployment bonus recipients. 
The displacement effect was seriously examined in connection with 
the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments. In the Pennsylvania 
Experiment (Corson et al. 1991, pp. 205–216), the evaluation explicitly 
attempted to estimate displacement effects. Analysis of these estimates, 
however, found that their statistical power for detecting a significant 
displacement effect was extremely limited. The results were not statisti-
cally significant. 
Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimated the displacement effect 
of the reemployment bonus experiments using a partial equilibrium 
matching model of the labor market. They found that there would be lit-
tle displacement of UI-eligible workers who were not offered a bonus. 
They found larger impacts for UI-ineligible workers who were never 
offered the bonus. Overall, they found that 30–60 percent of the gross 
employment effect of a reemployment bonus program would be offset 
by displacement of the UI-ineligible workers. Even though the gains to 
UI-eligible workers would be greater than the losses to the UI-ineligible 
workers, there would be no way of offsetting the losses in a reemploy-
ment bonus program. 
In an earlier study, Davidson and Woodbury (1990) concluded that 
“reductions in covered (program participant) unemployment do not come 
at the expense of increased uncovered (nonparticipant) unemployment, 
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The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) 
reviewed the results of the reemployment bonus experiments. It 
expressed concern about the potential displacement effect of reemploy-
ment bonuses, especially in a world of involuntary unemployment in 
which job openings are sufficient for only a small number of job seek-
ers. They dismissed the effects of reemployment bonus incentives as 
“marginal at best.” 
It seems difficult to believe that there would be a substantial dis-
placement effect for a reemployment bonus, particularly during non-
recessionary times when the U.S. labor market is characterized by rea-
sonably strong employment growth. In addition, the potential size and 
impacts of a narrowly targeted reemployment bonus program appear to 
be too small to have an appreciable displacement effect. In an economy 
where annual new hires averaged over 50 million between 2001 and 
2007 (BLS 2008), it would not be likely that offers of reemployment 
bonuses in an ongoing program would be as high as 500,000, and bonus 
receipt would be far lower. Generally, the displacement effect of an 
ongoing reemployment bonus program seems likely to be very small. 
The effect of targeting reemployment bonuses 
Offering a large, untargeted reemployment bonus as a permanent 
part of the UI program could certainly encourage entry into the UI pro-
gram. Workers would know that they are eligible for a bonus, and fil-
ing for UI benefits could increase as a result. However, the application 
of worker profiling to reemployment bonuses decreases the number of 
individuals who are potentially eligible for reemployment bonus offers 
and increases the uncertainty that the offer will be made. A program 
with targeting that uses worker profiling thus is likely to “temper any 
potential entry effect” (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 1998, 2005). 
Summary 
External validity issues regarding reemployment bonuses were 
raised as part of the evaluation of the Illinois Experiment, but with 
considerable confidence of a positive net outcome because of the large 
positive impact of the experiment in general. With the weak Pennsyl-
vania and Washington results that followed, the tide turned. The Illi-







not clearly cost-effective. Analysis of external validity turned opinion 
against the reemployment bonuses. 
While these concerns about external validity appear to be exagger-
ated, they are real. In particular, take-up rates in an ongoing program 
would clearly increase and would result in small increases in filing for 
UI benefits. The other effects appear likely to be small. 
Given some external validity concerns, the cost-effectiveness of 
the largely untargeted reemployment bonuses would have to be raised 
appreciably before they could be recommended for public policy use. 
Worker profiling is a targeting device that would substantially increase 
this cost-effectiveness. 
POLICy ImPLICATIONS OF REEmPLOymENT BONUSES 
While reemployment bonuses have not been implemented as a part 
of the UI program, bipartisan policy interest in establishing them as a 
federal initiative has emerged since the early 1990s. Two legislative 
proposals were developed by the executive branch and introduced by 
members of Congress. The Clinton administration proposed the Reem-
ployment Act of 1994, and the Bush administration proposed Personal 
Reemployment Accounts in 2003. 
Reemployment Act of 1994: A Failed Legislative Proposal 
The next year the department proposed to implement reemployment 
bonuses as part of the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 (USDOL
1994a); the bill was introduced but never enacted because the Demo-
crats lost their majority in Congress later that year. Part E of the leg-
islative proposal contained UI flexibility provisions that would have 
amended the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. The amendment would 
have permitted states to change their state UI laws to allow the payment 
of reemployment bonuses to certain workers and short-time compensa-
tion to workers who are working reduced hours for an employer. It also 
would have made the self-employment assistance program permanent, 
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The UI flexibility provisions arose from late-night brainstorm-
ing sessions held by Secretary Reich at the department. The sessions 
developed solutions to alleviate a jobless recovery from the 1990–1991 
recession. The UI flexibility provisions offered a way to help the unem-
ployed and, at the same time, work around funding problems that were 
hindering the providing of reemployment services. They presented an 
initial opportunity to use UI funds—“a big pile of money,” as Reich 
characterized the funds—in an environment in which funding was 
scarce. Reich hoped to use more UI funds in the future to fund the 
retraining for dislocated workers, but the opportunity never presented 
itself.5 
Reich reviewed the evidence supporting the reemployment bonuses 
and was convinced that they would be effective, if there was careful tar-
geting using the worker profiling mechanism. He was also involved in 
discussions about the potential moral hazard problem that would exist 
if an operating reemployment bonus program encouraged entry into the 
UI program by workers who were seeking only to obtain the bonuses.6 
Section 252 of the proposed Reemployment Act contained a reem-
ployment bonus provision that would have allowed states to enact 
reemployment bonus provisions in such a way that the bonuses could 
have been as large as four times the weekly benefit amount. (The U.S. 
average weekly benefit in 2008 was approximately $300, so the aver-
age maximum bonus offer under that bill would have been approxi-
mately $1,200.) Eligibility for the program was restricted to individuals 
who met four conditions: 1) they were unemployed, eligible for UI, and 
determined as likely to exhaust their entitlement to UI; 2) they found 
full-time employment in no more than 12 weeks; 3) they found employ-
ment with a new employer; and 4) they retained full-time employment 
for not less than four months. 
Thus, the reemployment bonus provisions of the proposed Reem-
ployment Act were modeled after the design of the Pennsylvania and 
Washington reemployment bonus experiments in all of their key com-
ponents (Table 10.6). The program would have had four characteristics: 
1) it was targeted to UI beneficiaries who were likely to exhaust their 
UI benefits as determined by the worker profiling mechanism; 2) the 
benefit level for the bonus was set at the most cost-effective level; 3) 





to encourage wide participation; and 4) a single delayed payment was 
made to try to assure that good, long-term job matches were made. 
The reemployment bonus provisions of the Reemployment Act 
did not look like the provisions of the Pennsylvania and Washington 
Reemployment Bonus Experiments by accident. Policymakers at the 
department were intent on learning from the experiments and designing 
actual programs that were likely to be cost-effective when applied in 
the field. The evaluators of the reemployment bonus experiments were 
asked to share the policy implications that came from their evaluations. 
The researchers and policy analysts in the department worked closely 
with the departmental policymakers to develop the final proposals. 
Department staff had read Bruce Meyer’s analysis of the reemploy-
ment bonuses and had tried to deal with his questions about UI pro-
gram entry effects in an ongoing program. In the department’s 1994 
reemployment bonus proposal, staff members added worker profiling 
to the proposal to attempt to prevent entry problems. Department staff 
believed that applying the worker profiling mechanism to reemploy-
ment services would result in a more targeted, more cost-effective pro-
gram that would limit or eliminate entry effects. However, their beliefs 
were not supported by analysis until 1998, when O’Leary, Decker, and 
Wandner (1998) “profiled the bonus.” The authors had conducted this 
study because they wanted to simulate profiling the bonus to estimate 
whether a more targeted reemployment bonus program would be more 
cost-effective and less subject to moral hazard problems. 
Nonetheless, in 1994 the department took a leap of faith when it 
endorsed the reemployment bonus policy. The results from the research 
showed that UI recipients responded to the offer of reemployment 
bonuses and went back to work sooner and did not take lower-wage 
jobs. However, the bonus offers without the targeting of worker pro-
filing were not cost-effective for the Unemployment Trust Fund. 
Meyer argued that reemployment bonuses without targeting would 
perform worse in an ongoing program than in the experiments. Larry 
Katz believed that reemployment bonuses were a good idea and that 
they would be more cost-effective when the offer of the bonuses was 
contingent upon participants’ being profiled. He was wary, however, 
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Pennsylvania Washington ment Act PRAs
demonstration demonstrationa of 1994 (HR 444) 
Eligibility 
UI eligibility Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dislocated worker Screens Screens Profiling Profiling 
selection criteria 
Design options 
Bonus amountb ($) 900 600 1,200 3,000 
1,800 1,200 
1,800 
Bonus calculation WBA WBA multiple WBA Flat
multiple multiple amount 
Qualification period 6 wks. 6 wks. 12 wks. 13 wks. 
12 wks. 11 wks. 
Reemployment 16 wks. 4 mos. 4 mos. 0 wks./ 
period 6 mos. 
Number of payments 1 1 1 2 
Most cost-effective 
profiled design 
Bonus amount ($) 900 900 
Qualification period 12 wks. 11 wks. 
a For the Washington demonstration, the qualification period was based on UI potential 
duration. Qualification period here is based on assumption that individuals qualified 
for full 30 weeks. 
b Pennsylvania and Washington demonstration bonus amounts were determined as mul-
tiples of the UI weekly benefit amount. Here, bonus amounts are calculated as mul-
tiples of the early 2008 national average weekly benefit amount of about $300. 
SOURCE: Corson et al. (1991); O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2005); Spiegelman, 
O’Leary, and Kline (1992); USDOL (1994b); HR 444. 
 
 






Krueger became chief economist in August 1994, the decision to pro-
ceed with reemployment bonuses had already been made; otherwise he 
would have advised against it. He too was convinced by Meyer’s argu-
ments.8 Both Katz and Krueger believed that the research results for 
reemployment bonuses were weaker than those for comprehensive job 
search assistance and self-employment assistance. It was not until four 
years after the Reemployment Act was proposed that O’Leary, Decker, 
and Wandner (1998) demonstrated that profiling the bonus could raise 
reemployment bonuses’ cost-effectiveness and narrow their targeting in 
a manner that could reduce concerns about UI program entry effects. 
By proposing the Reemployment Act of 1994, policymakers anticipated 
the research. 
The academic community had been on a roller coaster regarding 
reemployment bonuses. The high point was in 1987, when the Ameri-
can Economic Review featured the Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987) 
article on the Illinois reemployment bonus experiment. In the next few 
years, however, further analysis clouded the optimism. Economists 
developed great doubts about the Illinois—and later the Pennsylvania 
and Washington—results. By 1994 the doubters predominated.9 The 
analysis of O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1998, 2005) did not show 
up as a working paper until 1998 and did not appear in an economic 
journal until 2005. By that time, most economists had lost interest in 
reemployment bonuses. 
The reemployment bonus provisions of the proposed Reemploy-
ment Act show that public policy can study a set of carefully designed 
demonstration projects and develop policy in a manner that combines 
a close look at the research results with—as happened in 1994—a leap 
of faith. 
Personal Reemployment Accounts: Another Failed
Legislative Proposal 
President Bush announced Personal Reemployment Accounts 
(PRAs) as part of an economic stimulus package on January 7, 2003. 
On January 29, 2003, legislation to create PRAs was introduced in the 
House of Representatives as H.R. 444, the Back to Work Incentive Act 
of 2003.10 Under H.R. 444, UI claimants deemed likely to exhaust their 
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used to purchase reemployment services, including training, or could 
be used as a reemployment bonus. Reemployment services could be 
bought from public or private providers. Each reemployment service 
purchased would be drawn down against the $3,000 PRA. Workers 
would be eligible for a reemployment bonus if they became employed 
within 13 weeks of becoming unemployed, but they could continue to 
collect UI benefits until they became reemployed. The amount available 
to pay the bonus would be $3,000 or the PRA balance, if reemployment 
services were purchased. A reemployed worker would be immediately 
eligible for 60 percent of the bonus upon becoming reemployed. The 
remaining 40 percent would be payable if the worker retained the job 
for six months (Levine and Lordeman 2005). 
Conceptually, PRAs have two components. One is a human capital 
account to help workers improve their human capital while they search 
for work, providing them with their choice of training and intensive 
services, as well as support services, including transportation and child 
care services. The other component is an incentive to search for work 
in the form of a reemployment bonus. Together, the PRAs “offer a new, 
innovative approach designed to provide unemployed Americans addi-
tional flexibility, greater choice, and more control over their employ-
ment search, as well as a reemployment bonus for those who find a job 
quickly” (House Education and Workforce Committee 2005). 
Personal Reemployment Accounts: Policy Development 
The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), under the leadership of 
its chair, R. Glenn Hubbard, developed the concept and design of PRAs 
in late 2002.11 The intent of Hubbard’s proposal was to make employ-
ment and training programs more market-oriented. A proposal that 
linked a training and reemployment service voucher offer and a cash 
bonus offer as an incentive to speed the return to work was an attractive 
market-oriented package. But a reemployment service voucher and a 
reemployment bonus are conceptually very different. The key to mak-
ing the PRAs work would be how they were meshed together. 
PRA also served another function. Because the United States was 
coming out of a recession, PRAs were part of a larger proposal to dis-
tribute approximately $10 billion to the states as an economic stimulus 
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stimulus, even though most of the stimulus package disappeared as the 
economy improved. Nonetheless, the $3.2 billion for PRAs survived. 
The market orientation of PRAs continued to make them an attractive 
proposal. 
In the rush to give President Bush a new economic proposal by the 
beginning of 2003, the CEA had very little time to conduct the staff 
work necessary to develop the PRA proposal. Tom DeLeire was the 
staff labor economist at the CEA that year, on leave from Michigan State 
University. Under time constraints, DeLeire reviewed the literature on 
the reemployment bonus experiments. He consulted with Meyer, 
who had written a journal article on the UI Experiments—including 
the reemployment bonus experiments—that was widely read (Meyer 
1995). Meyer provided broad policy advice about reemployment bonus 
legislation. He did not recommend an optimal reemployment bonus 
design for incorporation into the PRAs.12 The Mathematica and Upjohn 
Institute researchers who conducted and evaluated the reemployment 
bonus experiments were not consulted—even though they could have 
provided practical advice on program design—nor were departmental 
staff who had worked on the reemployment bonus experiments. 
The CEA had done enough analysis to get the basic design of the 
PRA reemployment bonus component right. The CEA justified PRAs 
based on the four reemployment bonus experiments that had been 
conducted as random assignment experiments. The evaluations of the 
experiments “showed that a bonus of $300–$1,000 motivated the recip-
ients to become reemployed, reduced the duration of UI by almost a 
week, and resulted in new jobs that were comparable in earnings to 
those obtained by workers who were not eligible for the bonus and 
remained unemployed longer” (Council of Economic Advisers 2003). 
The targeting of the PRA program design was taken from the reem-
ployment bonus experiments: PRA offers were to be made to UI claim-
ants who were likely to exhaust their benefits, using the same worker 
profiling methodology being used by the WPRS and SEA programs. 
In its annual report, the CEA described PRAs as “not intended as a 
replacement for UI but rather . . . as a new component of the UI system. 
They would be offered as an additional option to those UI recipients who, 
under current UI rules, are referred to reemployment services” (Council 
of Economic Advisers 2003, pp. 123–126). Thus, PRAs would be a sup-
plement to the UI program, and they would be targeted to workers using 
existing methods for referring UI claimants to reemployment services. 
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Most of the design decisions about the PRAs were driven by bud-
getary concerns and by the primacy of the voucher portion of the PRAs. 
There would be no entitlement to PRAs. They would only be offered 
up to the exhaustion of a total appropriation of $3.6 billion. This appro-
priation was estimated to be sufficient to serve 1.2 million beneficiaries 
(in Program Year 2003) who were “very likely” to exhaust their entitle-
ment to UI benefits. Qualifying unemployed workers would be given an 
account valued at $3,000 that could be used to purchase reemployment 
services, training, and supportive services, although core reemployment 
services would continue to be provided free of charge. Workers who 
found a job within 13 weeks of receiving their first UI payment would 
be able to retain the balance of the account as a reemployment bonus. 
In the 2003 Economic Report of the President, the council left open 
the timing and number of payments under the PRAs: “States would 
have the option of providing the cash balance as a single lump sum or in 
two installments of 60 percent and 40 percent, the latter after the recipi-
ent had been on the new job for six months” (Council of Economic 
Advisers 2003). Thus, the CEA would have permitted a single delayed 
lump sum payment as in the experiments, but in the interest of rapid 
infusion of funds into a weak U.S. economy, supporters of H.R. 444 
opted for the second approach. 
It is not possible to reconcile the CEA’s reading of the reemploy-
ment bonus experiment literature with the Bush legislative proposal. 
CEA staff believed that the bonus amount was too large and that it was 
being paid too soon. As the proposal moved from an early public pol-
icy initiative to a legislative proposal, a series of changes were made 
that had more to do with ideology than rigorous public policy analysis. 
These decisions certainly did not reflect the findings of the research. 
Once the CEA had completed its analytical work, most of the devel-
opment of PRA legislation was turned over to the Domestic Policy 
Council. The Domestic Policy Council worked with the ETA’s political 
staff to complete the development of the legislative proposal. USDOL
research and policy staff who had worked on the experiments and on 
the development of the reemployment bonus proposal in the UI flexibil-
ity component of the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 were aware 
of the development of the PRA proposal. They were requested to supply 
some background materials, but they were not included in discussions 










In the fall of 2002, I initiated a meeting with the ETA’s deputy assis-
tant secretary, Mason Bishop, to provide him with information he could 
use in developing an effective and practical PRA design. The meet-
ing did not go well. The presentation was met with disinterest, and he 
asked no questions about the information presented. No further meet-
ings occurred. The negotiations between the Domestic Policy Council 
and the department thus were not informed by the research findings. At 
one point in these discussions, DeLeire asked to speak to me. Assistant 
Secretary Emily DeRocco said no.13 
The lack of careful policy development meant that the PRAs had a 
number of design flaws. The most important was that the reemployment 
bonus offer was too large. The bonus was that large because the bonus 
offer was driven by the voucher offer amount, and no consideration 
was given to decoupling the bonus offer from the voucher amount. A
reasonable training voucher amount would have been much larger than 
the reemployment bonus offer. The bonus offer should have been in the 
range that the reemployment bonus experiments found to be most cost-
effective. (The national UI average weekly benefit amount in 2003 was 
$254, so the reemployment bonus offer should have been no more than 
three or four times that amount, or no more than $1,000. Thus, the PRA
bonus offer was at least three times as great as it should have been.) 
In 2003, it appeared that the PRAproposal might be enacted. Depart-
mental research staff suggested that further analysis be conducted to 
support the PRA initiative: analyses based on prior experiments could 
help anticipate what would happen if PRAs were implemented, could 
allow the department to give guidance about how states could design 
and implement the bonus component of the PRAs, and could provide 
detailed administrative procedures for offering and paying the bonuses. 
Of particular concern was the fact that the department was proceeding 
with PRA demonstrations without prudent planning: the demonstra-
tions were announced without careful consideration of how they should 
be designed and implemented. 
Analysis of Personal Reemployment Accounts 
Thus, to prepare for the implementation of PRAs, either as demon-
stration projects or as a national program, the department commissioned 
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which the program could be implemented. The studies built upon exist-
ing data sets and evidence about the two components of the PRAs: the 
reemployment bonuses and the training vouchers.14 
Decker and Perez-Johnson (2004) of Mathematica based their 
analysis on the ongoing ITA training voucher experiment as well as 
the Pennsylvania reemployment bonus experiment that Mathematica 
had conducted. The training voucher experiment tested a pure voucher 
option that looked much like the human capital account voucher portion 
of the proposed PRA program. Individuals could use the pure vouchers 
in the manner they thought best to purchase training. Counselors in the 
One-Stop Career Centers would meet with pure voucher recipients, but 
the recipients were free to make training decisions on their own about 
what kind of training to buy and whom to buy it from. The preliminary 
findings from the interim evaluation were that unemployed workers 
who were offered a pure voucher were more likely to receive training 
than individuals who received more counseling and direction, but they 
took training in similar areas to individuals offered the other voucher 
designs. 
Decker and Perez-Johnson divided their study into three parts. The 
first part dealt with predicted impacts of the PRA reemployment bonus 
offers with respect to bonus receipt rates, impacts on UI receipt, and 
entry effects into the UI program. These were compared to the results 
under the reemployment bonus experiments. Decker and Perez-Johnson 
estimated that a $3,000 bonus offer would substantially increase the 
rate of receipt of the bonus, from as little as 11–22 percent up to about 
30 percent. The increase in participation was expected both because of 
the higher bonus offer amount and because the first installment of the 
bonus would be payable immediately rather than after four months on 
the new job. They also predicted that reductions in UI receipt would be 
greater because the bonus offer would be larger and because it would 
target a population that was likely to have longer UI durations in the 
absence of a bonus offer. 
The second part of the study dealt with PRA design, trying to help 
states decide how large to make the PRA offer, whether it should be 
$3,000 or set at a lower amount. Decker and Perez-Johnson pointed out 
trade-offs in setting the PRA level: a level of $3,000 was approximately 
twice as great as the largest reemployment bonus level set under the 







ing Account offers under WIA. Lowering the overall offer below $3,000 
would bring the reemployment bonus offer closer to tested levels, but 
it would exacerbate the inadequacy of a training voucher. However, 
lowering the offer would also allow PRAs to serve more UI recipients. 
The third part of the study developed recommended procedures for 
states to follow in developing and implementing their PRA programs. 
Decker and Perez-Johnson developed procedures that could make it 
easier for states to implement PRAs. They opted for simplicity to allow 
quick implementation and to accommodate a temporary three-year pro-
gram that would be established under H.R. 444. They adapted proce-
dures from the Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Experiment, thus 
providing procedures for offering bonuses, verifying employment, and 
making payments; the procedures were similar to those that would have 
to be developed under PRAs. 
In another Personal Reemployment Account study, O’Leary and 
Eberts (2004) simulated the effects of PRAs using detailed transaction-
level administrative data from the state of Georgia. They first estimated 
the costs for intensive, training, and supportive services based on state 
expenditure levels, relative utilization of each service, and relative val-
uations for the services. The simulations estimated the average cost per 
offer of a $3,000 PRA to help states estimate how many offers to make 
during an enrollment cycle. The simulations also determined the likely 
pattern of use of the reemployment bonus, reemployment services, and 
income maintenance payments. Estimates were made under a baseline 
that assumed no behavioral response to the bonus offer, as well as esti-
mates assuming a one- or two-week reduction in UI receipt. 
Under the baseline estimate, O’Leary and Eberts (2004) determined 
that 40 percent of workers would receive a first payment under the reem-
ployment bonus, while only 27 percent would remain employed and 
receive the second payment. They estimated the costs associated with 
the PRA offers for the bonus, purchase of services, and UI exhaustee 
payments at approximately $2,500, with small increases as the behav-
ioral impact increased because of higher bonus recipiency. They con-
cluded that a $3,000 bonus offer would not be cost-effective, while a 
smaller targeted bonus could be. 
O’Leary and Eberts estimated the number of PRAs that could be 
offered, assuming 100 percent take-up of the PRA offers. They also 
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the reemployment bonus experiments and the resulting increased num-
ber of PRAs that could be offered. They estimated the sensitivity of 
their estimates of the number of PRAs that could be offered to changes 
in the assumed prices for services and found that the results were quite 
stable. They found that reducing prices of services by half would result 
in the ability to increase the number of offers by roughly 20 percent. 
Because of lack of data, they could not determine, however, how the 
imposition of prices for services that were previously offered free of 
charge would change the demand for services by workers who would 
be offered the PRAs. 
O’Leary and Eberts estimated the likelihood that workers would go 
to either extreme: either only purchase services and not pursue a bonus, 
or pursue the bonus and not purchase any services. They found that an 
individual who purchased services and did not pursue the bonus would 
have to either experience an increase in earnings of 14 percent or, fail-
ing that, return to work six weeks sooner, to compensate for not receiv-
ing the full bonus offer. They determined that past research evidence 
made either of these results unlikely. Thus, as was to be expected with 
an overly generous bonus offer, the PRA design strongly encouraged 
pursuing the bonus. 
For individuals who did not receive bonuses, O’Leary and Eberts 
considered whether $3,000 would be sufficient to purchase a bundle 
of services. They found that there likely would be a shortfall of funds. 
They also estimated the increase in the number of PRAs that could be 
offered as the statewide maximum PRA offer was lowered. 
In the Washington and Pennsylvania experiments, recipients of 
bonuses did not experience lower wages than the control group. While 
O’Leary and Eberts posited that paying workers the first bonus payment 
immediately upon their becoming unemployed might result in lower 
wages, they did not have data from which to estimate whether or how 
much wages might decline. 
Thus, these two analyses predicted a number of adverse outcomes if 
PRAs were to be implemented. The PRA bonus offer was too large, so 
the reemployment bonus outcome would be cost-ineffective. Moreover, 
the overly large bonus would result in higher participation and receipt 
than a lower and more reasonable bonus offer. The training offer would 
be lower than the cap for training offers under WIA programs in most 
states, and thus use of the PRA to fund training would be limited, and 
training participation rates would be low. 
 
 








Personal Reemployment Account Demonstrations 
H.R. 444 was not enacted in 2003, but the Bush administration was 
still eager to try out PRAs. In August 2004, the USDOL announced 
plans to implement a PRA demonstration project. States were asked 
to apply. On October 29, 2004, Secretary Elaine Chao announced that 
seven states—Florida, Idaho, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Texas, 
and West Virginia—had been awarded a total of nearly $7.9 million 
to participate in a demonstration project that would allow unemployed 
workers to use personal reemployment accounts to find new jobs. The 
demonstration project was designed to test the effectiveness of PRAs 
(USDOL 2004). 
To fund the demonstration, each state had to agree to obligate its 
entire fiscal year 2005 Wagner-Peyser Reemployment Services Grant 
(RSG) allocation to the project. Nationally, the Reemployment Services 
Grants totaled $34 million in FY 2005. The PRA grant funds for these 
seven states otherwise would have been used to provide reemploy-
ment services to unemployed workers found to be likely to exhaust all 
of their entitlement to UI benefits under the WPRS system. The Bush 
administration had decided to terminate the Reemployment Services 
Grants after fiscal year 2005 funding, which for some ETA programs 
only became available for program year 2005. Thus the RSG funds 
were exhausted in June 2006. Because the administration had elimi-
nated the grants from the president’s budget request, department policy-
makers were glad to have the demonstration states terminate their fund-
ing of these WPRS reemployment services a year early. The department 
supplemented these Reemployment Services Grant funds by providing 
each state with an additional $750,000 in federal discretionary funds 
from the ETA’s budget to support the demonstration. 
Preparation for proposed PRA legislation and the PRA demonstra-
tion project was conducted by department staff and by research con-
tractors, who tried to make the best of a botched PRA design by using 
research findings to make the design and implementation of the demon-
stration projects work as well as possible. They used data and analysis 
from the reemployment bonus and training vouchers experiments, and 
they conducted simulations using state administrative data. Technical 
assistance and an evaluation were conducted by a contractor, Mathe-
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The department developed the basic demonstration design, which 
closely followed the legislative design embodied in H.R. 444. The states 
would offer PRAs of $3,000, with funding available to make a total 
of 2,000 offers for the seven participating states. States would charge 
participating workers for services other than WIA core services. They 
also had to develop their own cost list for all reemployment services. 
Reemployment bonuses would be paid to workers who received PRA
offers and found full-time jobs by their thirteenth week of UI receipt. 
The bonus consisted of two payments, one paid upon employment and 
consisting of 60 percent of the account balance, the other payable after 
six months on the job and making up the remaining 40 percent. 
The department gave the states options with respect to the design. 
They could choose the reemployment bonus amount to be the balance 
of the $3,000 PRA offered, or some lesser amount. Four states—Flor-
ida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Montana—chose to offer individuals 
the remaining balance in their account, as in the legislation. Texas, Idaho, 
and Minnesota, however, developed methods to reduce the bonus offers 
below $3,000. States also determined the cost of services. Six of the 
states developed cost lists, while Idaho chose to offer all of its services 
through community colleges which already had developed price struc-
tures. States could offer the PRAs statewide or in selected local work-
force areas. West Virginia was the only state that offered PRAs state-
wide (Hess 2004, 2005). 
The PRA demonstration project began in 2004 in the seven selected 
states. In 2006, the department awarded a second round of funding to 
three of the original states—Idaho, Minnesota, and Mississippi—and 
provided new funding for Hawaii. The eight states received a combined 
total of $12.5 million from the department to establish PRAs for a mini-
mum of 3,543 workers. In fact, since not all workers used up all of the 
funds in their individual accounts, a greater number of workers were 
allowed to enter the project—4,038 in the original seven states.15 
Claimants’ participation in the demonstration projects was volun-
tary. The average acceptance rate was 64 percent, varying from a low of 
46 percent in Minnesota to a high of 88 percent in Mississippi. 
The evaluation of the PRA demonstration found that, as expected
from the prior analyses, individuals who were offered PRAs were not 
interested in receiving training and did not expend much of their vouch-





vide funds for participants enrolled in training, and virtually no partici-
pants purchased intensive services (Table 10.7). 
Because of the overly generous reemployment bonus, participation 
in the bonus increased greatly beyond the level found in the reemploy-
ment bonus experiments, with 45 percent of disbursements going to 
the payment of reemployment bonuses. While a rigorous net impact 
and cost-benefit analysis was not conducted because of project design 
weaknesses and lack of data, the bonus offer was so large that the reem-
ployment bonus component of PRA could not have been cost-effective. 
The most flexible form of funding was “supportive services.” This 
use of funds functioned, in effect, as a piggy bank that workers could 
break open any time they wanted. Forty-six percent of disbursements 
were used to fund supportive services. Allowable supportive services 
fell into three categories: 1) assistance with respect to a specific job 
offer; 2) intensive services, training, or logistical support for job search 
(e.g., child care and transportation); and 3) general expenses relating to 
job search activities. In the states without restrictive policies regarding 
the purchase of supportive services, the great majority of disbursements 
fell into this category. The largest purchases for supportive services were 
for the following: vehicles, including mileage; utilities, rent, and mort-
gage payments; clothing, uniforms, and supplies; and health screening 
and other medical expenses. Child care was a smaller purchase amount 
(Kirby et al. 2008, p. 56). Given the chasm between the intended and 
actual uses of the PRAs, the demonstrations were a disaster. 
Personal Reemployment Accounts and Public Policy Issues 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the Bush administration’s 
reemployment bonus portion of the PRAs differed in two major ways 
from the reemployment bonuses tested in the four earlier experiments: 
1) the timing and 2) the size of the reemployment bonus payment. 
First, as tested in the experiments and as proposed in the Reemploy-
ment Act of 1994, only a single bonus payment would be made, and it 
would only be made to individuals who find a job and retain it for at 
least four months. The timing of the payment was based on what was 
learned from the three reemployment bonus experiments. The mini-
mum reemployment period before individuals would receive a single 
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Table 10.7  PRA Demonstration Project, Average Disbursement per User
as a Percentage of Total Expenditures 
States with broad
States with restricted allowable supportive
supportive purchases service purchases 
All 
MS WV FL ID MN MT TX states 
Type of 
disbursement 
Total bonuses 94 83 59 37 33 13 29 45 
Intensive 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Training 2 13 2 20 7 17 14 9 
Supportive 4 17 41 63 67 87 71 55 
Total services 6 17 41 63 67 87 71 55 
Total expenditures 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SOURCE: Kirby et al. (2008), p. 56. 
Pennsylvania, and four months in Washington. The purpose of the delay 
was to be certain that an individual obtained and retained a new job. 
For Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington, “the four-month interval 
was believed to be sufficiently long to avoid encouraging claimants to 
accept short-term employment simply to qualify for a bonus” (Robins 
and Spiegelman 2001, p. 39). The test of finding a job comparable to 
that which would have been found in the absence of the bonus offer was 
that 1) the reemployment bonus induced taking jobs that paid the same 
wage and 2) the new job was held for a reasonable period of time. 
Second, the bonus amounts tested in the Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington reemployment bonus experiments were two, three, four, and six 
times the UI weekly benefit amount. Given an average weekly ben-
efit amount of approximately $250 in the United States in 2005, these 
reemployment bonus amounts translated into $500, $750, $1,000, and 
$1,500. Analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the Pennsylvania and 
Washington reemployment bonuses after applying worker profiling to 
the original data yielded a determination that the low bonus offer was 
the most cost-effective. Thus, a reasonable maximum bonus offer based 
on the findings of these two experiments would have been no more than 








As proposed, however, a PRA bonus could be as large as $3,000, 
which was considerably outside the range of reemployment bonus 
offers experimentally tested. The offer amounts for the Pennsylvania 
and Washington state experiments were carefully selected to test the 
full range of possible cost-effective options. Thus, there was no justifi-
cation for such a large reemployment bonus offer when smaller bonus 
offers had produced a significant impact on speeding claimants’ return 
to work and smaller bonus offers were more cost-effective. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Reemployment Bonus Effectiveness 
A number of lessons were learned from the bonus experiments: 
• As predicted by job search theory, cash bonuses have a signifi-
cant impact on job search behavior and lead to a reduction in 
the average duration of unemployment, resulting in a desirable 
speeding of reemployment. Larger bonuses also had the largest 
impacts on reducing unemployment durations. 
• As expected from the empirical literature on UI work disincen-
tives, the bonuses had no effect on wages, indicating no decline 
in the quality of jobs taken in response to the offer of reemploy-
ment bonuses. There also was no evidence that the bonuses had 
any effect on worker attachment to their previous employers, as 
they had no effect on worker recall to their prior jobs. 
• On the other hand, because unemployment durations were not di-
rectly related to the dollar level of the bonus offer, there was not 
the continuously increasing effect that might have been expect-
ed. The large effect of intermediate-level bonuses makes findings 
less certain about what would be an optimum bonus. 
• Reemployment bonuses are not cost-effective if they are not tar-
geted to populations that have some or all of the characteristics 
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• A more targeted program using profiling promises to be cost-
effective and to minimize external validity problems related to 
implementation of an ongoing program. 
• The reemployment bonus experiments made sense from a public 
policy perspective. They gave legitimacy to reemployment bo-
nuses, a concept that was initially met with considerable skepti-
cism. The lessons learned from the experiments were applied in 
developing the legislative specifications for the proposed Reem-
ployment Act of 1994. 
• The design of the PRAs did not make sense. The reemploy-
ment bonus offer should have been much smaller than the PRA
amount—no more than three or four times the average weekly 
benefit amount. The reemployment bonus offer should have been 
decoupled from any training voucher and should have been of-
fered in a much smaller dollar amount than the training voucher 
component. 
Research Implications for a Reemployment Bonus Design 
and Operation 
Worker profiling. Use of worker profiling with a statistical model 
would target the appropriate population—dislocated workers who are 
likely to be unemployed for a long time. An offer of a reemployment 
bonus to workers who are likely to remain unemployed for a long 
time should result in larger reductions in compensated durations of 
unemployment. 
Worker profiling also would reduce any concern about induced 
unemployment. The program would be narrowly targeted and offered 
to a small portion of UI claimants. This targeted group would have cer-
tain characteristics—e.g., long tenure, likely long unemployment dura-
tions—that would make claimants less likely to incur a spell of unem-
ployment simply to receive the bonus. Use of a statistical model would 
also create uncertainty about eligibility even among those workers who 
might be eligible, reducing policy concern about entry into the UI pro-
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Ascertaining the job offer date. Before paying a reemployment 
bonus, the UI agency should check with the new employer to determine 
whether the employee satisfies the continuous, full-time employment 
requirement for the specified period of time. At the same time, consid-
eration should be given to determining when the job offer was made, 
and specifically whether it was made prior to the beginning of the spell 
of unemployment. This approach would reduce the risk that a worker 
would delay acceptance of a new job to incur a period of intervening 
unemployment in order to receive a bonus. 
Bonus design. A reemployment bonus should be constructed to be 
a multiple of the weekly benefit amount. It should not be in the form 
of a fixed dollar amount, in order to avoid higher usage by low-wage 
employees than by higher-wage employees. This design would be in 
accord with job search theory and labor supply models that predict that 
low-wage workers would make greater use of a fixed dollar amount 
bonus offer. Based on the Illinois data, however, there is only weak 
confirmation of this hypothesis (Meyer 1996, p. 270). 
Bonus size. The bonus size should be moderate, in order to provide 
a sufficient incentive to get unemployed workers to respond and speed 
their early return to work, but not so large as to greatly change their 
labor market behavior, e.g., prompting them to move from employment 
to unemployment. A bonus of between three and four times the weekly 
benefit amount would be reasonable. In 2008, the average bonus offer 
would have been approximately $900 if the bonus had been set at three 
times the weekly benefit amount (and approximately $1,200 if set at 
four times the weekly benefit amount). 
Bonus offer timing. The bonus should be offered as early as pos-
sible during spells of unemployment. It should be offered as soon as 
individuals are determined to be eligible to receive UI. Alternatively, 
the bonus could be conditionally offered at the time of filing a UI ini-
tial claim. It could be offered to claimants who are determined to be 
monetarily eligible and who are profiled as dislocated workers. This 
approach assumes that states can make monetary determinations and 
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conditional on claimants meeting nonmonetary eligibility stipulations, 
such as being involuntarily separated from a previous job. 
The resulting program would be an effective instrument to encour-
age job-ready, dislocated workers to accelerate their return to employ-
ment. It would be a small program, with only a modest impact on local 
labor markets. It would not be a solution to unemployment by itself 
but one of many tools to encourage and enable unemployed workers to 
return to work. 
Reemployment Bonus Policy 
The research lessons learned about reemployment bonuses were 
used by the USDOL to develop the reemployment bonus provisions 
proposed in the Reemployment Act of 1994. The reemployment bonus 
design came directly from the conclusions drawn from the evaluations 
of the Pennsylvania and Washington state experiments. 
In contrast, the reemployment bonus provisions in the Personal 
Reemployment Accounts legislative proposal and in the PRA dem-
onstration project made no sense. The bonus offer was too large: the 
offer level was twice as large as the largest bonus tested by any of the 
experiments. As a result, the PRA reemployment bonus could not be 
cost-effective. 
Reemployment bonuses still make good public policy sense. With 
refinements, reemployment bonus provisions that mirror those con-
tained in the bill that would have become the Reemployment Act of 
1994 should be adopted as a five-year sunsetting program that would be 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This book has examined the impact that research has had on U.S. 
employment and training policy and programs over the past 25 years. 
It has identified employment programs that work and employment pro-
grams that do not work. Some programs that work have been pursued, 
but so have programs that have had little objective analysis. Sometimes 
policymakers wait for the results of research before acting, but often 
they make decisions without or despite research findings. At other times 
policymakers are totally uninterested in the research findings or, for 
political reasons, want to subvert and suppress them. 
Over the past 25 years, there were two periods when interest in 
research was greatest at the Department of Labor (USDOL). In 1985– 
1987, Secretary of Labor Bill Brock sought ways to make American 
workers more competitive in the world economy and was willing to 
invest in research to find optimal approaches. Later, from 1993 to 1997, 
when Robert Reich was Secretary of Labor, the department took a par-
ticular interest in examining research findings and applying them to for-
mulate public policy. By contrast, during the George W. Bush adminis-
tration, when Elaine Chao was secretary of labor and Emily DeRocco 
was assistant secretary for employment and training, many research 
findings were ignored, misrepresented, and suppressed. 
The intellectual framework for this book has been best stated by 
Bill Brock. (See Chapter 2.) Since the 1980s, Brock has believed that 
for U.S. workers to succeed in a global economy the government must 
invest in human development. Human development requires invest-
ments in training and education, as well as in what Brock calls “job 
transition assistance.” This book has looked both at job transition 
assistance and job training. Job transition assistance includes public 
labor exchange services, comprehensive job search assistance, unem-
ployment insurance eligibility reviews, reemployment bonuses, self-
employment assistance, and work sharing. All of these job transition 
interventions seek to help workers shift from unemployment to new 
jobs smoothly, quickly, and efficiently. Job training includes skill and 
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RESEARCh USED OR mISUSED 
For most of the past decade, employment research has been ne-
glected. The USDOL’s program of applied employment research with-
ered, and existing research findings were not used to support public 
policy. Looking to the future, employment policy can and should be 
guided by research findings. While many knowledge gaps remain, 
much is known about what works and what does not work. 
PROgRAmS ThAT WORk 
Much of the analysis in this book has concentrated on program 
interventions for dislocated workers that were tested by the experiments 
and by policy-oriented research. Together, the research has revealed a 
number of programs and approaches that work. 
Comprehensive Job Search Assistance 
The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system 
was based on the New Jersey Experiment and a number of other rigor-
ous tests of the effectiveness of comprehensive job search assistance. 
The body of completed research reviewed in the USDOL (1995b) pub-
lication What’s Working (and what’s not) convinced researchers and 
policymakers that WPRS made sense and would be a cost-effective 
intervention. 
An important component of WPRS was its early intervention 
approach. Unemployed workers would receive comprehensive job 
search assistance in the first few weeks of their job loss. Since the tar-
geted workers were found to be likely to exhaust their entitlement to 
UI benefits, providing job search assistance services early offered the 
prospect of reducing the compensated unemployment of these workers 
so that WPRS would provide net benefits to the government sector. 
Another key component of the WPRS system was its narrow target-
ing to a specific group of dislocated workers—those likely to exhaust 
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an allocation and targeting device to get reemployment services to the 
unemployed workers who could make more effective and efficient use 
of the limited funding that was available. 
Meyer (1995) recommended providing comprehensive job search 
assistance to a broader group of workers, rather than targeting the
smaller group most likely to exhaust their UI entitlement. Worker pro-
filing still would be used as an allocation tool because funding for job 
search assistance and other reemployment services is likely to remain 
limited. Annual funding for the reemployment services component of 
WPRS, however, has to be permanently maintained at or above lev-
els provided for under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009. The ARRA levels were higher than the level that 
existed from 2001 through 2005, before the Bush administration termi-
nated WPRS in June 2006. 
Self-Employment Assistance 
Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) was enacted on a temporary 
basis with solid preliminary empirical research from the interim evalu-
ation report on the Massachusetts SEA Experiment (Benus et al. 1992). 
The SEA program follows the successful Massachusetts experiment 
design, which provided periodic self-employment payments, rather than 
the unsuccessful Washington State experiment design, which provided 
lump-sum payments. Uncertainty remained, however, about how the 
Massachusetts net impact and benefit-cost analyses would turn out. The 
final evaluation (Benus et al. 1995) provided strong research findings 
that the Massachusetts SEA Experiment was cost-effective, providing a 
sound basis for making SEA legislation permanent in 1998. 
Self-Employment Assistance is a small but effective program in 
a small number of states. While similar programs serve considerably 
more workers in other major industrial nations, it is not clear that the 
SEA program will expand in the United States. The program will remain 
small unless a reliable source of entrepreneurial counseling and training 
is found to provide to workers participating in the SEA program. States 
with SEA programs frequently have no steady source of entrepreneurial 
counseling and training. 
The Department of Labor currently has two entrepreneurship pro-








entrepreneurial training. Historically, only small numbers of workers 
have been interested in starting their own businesses. The department 
could help workers create their own jobs and jobs for other workers 
who are hired by new small firms. The WIA entrepreneurial training 
program has failed because of the strange way in which it assesses 
program performance: the department searches for owner-operators of 
successful unincorporated microenterprises established by WIA train-
ees among those entering wage and salary employment in the UI wage 
records. Not surprisingly, these owner-operators can never be found 
by searching the UI wage records. Entrepreneurial training should be 
assessed by conducting surveys to determine if trainees become self-
employed. The department should increase funding for WIA entrepre-
neurial training as well as create a partnership with the Small Business 
Administration so that department programs can work with the Small 
Business Development Centers—which provide entrepreneurial coun-
seling and training—at the state and local level. 
Targeted Reemployment Bonuses 
Four reemployment bonus experiments were conducted. The first 
experiment was conducted in the state of Illinois, and its results were 
hailed by economists when the results were published in the September 
1987 American Economic Review (Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987). 
Reemployment bonuses received widespread support from many 
economists in 1987 but doubt grew as further research was conducted. 
Confidence by researchers had diminished sharply by 1994 when the 
Clinton administration proposed reemployment bonuses as part of the 
Reemployment Act of 1994. 
The Clinton reemployment bonus proposal used the worker profil-
ing targeting mechanism that was already being used by the WPRS sys-
tem. The proposal consisted of a low-value bonus equal to four times 
the UI weekly benefit amount, or about $1,000. The combination of 
worker profiling and a low-value bonus made reemployment bonuses
more cost-effective, but research findings did not demonstrate its 
effectiveness. 
In 2003, reemployment bonuses were proposed again by the Bush 
administration as a component of the Personal Reemployment Accounts 
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and was not based on the research findings; e.g., the reemployment 
bonuses were too large and were paid out too early. Political rather than 
research considerations had a strong influence on the final PRA design. 
Fortunately, that PRA design was not made a permanent component of 
federal law. 
Stronger findings about targeting low-value bonuses only became 
available when a simulation analysis using the worker profiling mecha-
nism was applied to the Washington State and Pennsylvania reemploy-
ment bonus experiment data (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 2005). 
This analysis suggested that limited offers of reemployment bonuses to 
dislocated UI claimants could be a cost-effective policy option. A reem-
ployment bonus using this program design should be enacted. 
Targeted Reemployment Services 
A variety of approaches to job transition assistance (or reemploy-
ment services) have been shown to be cost-effective. They include
1) comprehensive job search assistance (discussed above and not con-
sidered here); 2) the public labor exchange function; and 3) administra-
tion of the work test—i.e., enforcing work search requirements. 
Jacobson and Petta (2000) found the public labor exchange to be 
cost-effective. Public labor exchanges administered by the state work-
force agencies also have been shown to be more cost-effective than pro-
viding these services either privately or by public agencies other than 
the state Wagner-Peyser Act agencies. The department commissioned 
an evaluation to determine whether public, merit-staff labor exchanges 
administered by the state workforce agencies were more cost-effective 
than providing the services through private providers or public agen-
cies other than the state workforce agencies. The evaluation findings 
indicated that the state workforce agencies performed far better than the 
private or public demonstration states (Jacobson et al. 2004). The eval-
uation findings should have resulted in retaining state labor exchange 
service providers and discontinuing the temporary demonstrations. The 
Bush administration elected, instead, to suppress the evaluation and 
recommend the elimination of the public employment service that pro-
vides labor exchange services. The department should reestablish the 
United States Employment Service, provide more funding for Employ-
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ment Service–funded reemployment services, and terminate the tempo-
rary demonstrations. 
Eligibility reviews of UI claimants to determine if they continue to 
be eligible for participation in the UI program are cost-effective. A vari-
ety of other work search measures are also cost-effective. Work search 
measures are particularly effective in speeding the return to work when 
combined with the provision of reemployment services (O’Leary 2006). 
The department should expand eligibility reviews in their current form 
of Reemployment and Eligibility Assessments and coordinate them 
with the provision of ES-provided reemployment services and training. 
Targeted Longer-Term Training 
Generally, education and training programs are more cost-effective 
when they are either targeted longer-term classroom training or work-
based learning programs, including on-the-job training and apprentice-
ship. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2002) examine the impact on 
dislocated workers who enrolled in community college courses. The 
study identifies “high return” classes that improved the annual earnings 
of participants. Participants experienced high economic returns from 
taking and completing courses that provided technical academic and 
vocational skills—including courses in health, engineering, math, and 
science. The study’s findings suggest that workers can greatly improve 
their economic returns to training by taking courses concentrated in the 
high-return classes. Other analyses also have shown that long-term edu-
cation and training are key to having employment and earnings gains 
(USDOL 1995b). 
PROgRAmS ThAT DO NOT WORk OR ARE UNPROVEN 
The Bush administration proposed a number of workforce develop-
ment legislative initiatives, none of which were enacted into federal 
law. Most of these proposals either flew in the face of research findings 
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Workforce Development Program Consolidation 
The Bush administration’s proposed approach of consolidating and 
block-granting employment and training programs was a bad idea. Spe-
cifically, it would have done three things: 1) eliminated the Employ-
ment Service (ES), 2) combined the WIA programs into a single pro-
gram, and 3) block-granted the remaining consolidated program. None 
of these ideas would have worked separately, and they certainly would 
not have worked in combination. 
First, eliminating the ES would have been contrary to a wide body 
of research. The ES is a highly cost-effective provider of inexpensive 
public labor exchange and other reemployment services. It has been 
shown to be more cost-effective than labor exchange services provided 
in three demonstration states (Jacobson and Petta 2000; Jacobson et 
al. 2004). The conclusion from evaluations of the ES is that it is cost-
effective and should be retained. Similar program evaluations of other 
services provided by the ES—conducting UI eligibility reviews and 
providing reemployment services—also have proven them to be cost-
effective (O’Leary 2006). 
The logic of the Bush administration’s WIA consolidation proposal 
depended on ignoring or suppressing studies that showed substantial 
state demand for public employment service programs. Each year states 
show their support of the ES by committing their own state funds to 
augment Wagner-Peyser Act grants to states. States also have commit-
ted a substantial portion of funds from the 2002 Reed Act distribution 
to supplementing Wagner-Peyser Act grants that they receive each year: 
25 states spent $438 million on ES administration (CESER 2004). A
study of rural One-Stops has shown the key role played by the ES in 
rural areas, where few other agencies join the ES in affiliated One-Stops 
(Dunham et al. 2005). 
The public employment service provides the vast majority of reem-
ployment services under the WPRS system (Dickinson et al. 1999). 
Thus, the ES is key to the effectiveness of the WPRS system. Since 
comprehensive job search assistance provided through the WPRS sys-
tem has been proven to be highly cost-effective, the reemployment ser-
vices grants to states provided under WPRS, which were discontinued 
by the Bush administration in June 2006, should be continued at or 







Second, evaluations of the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker pro-
grams also show that the programs are effective. The findings warrant 
keeping these two programs as separate categorical programs. Instead, 
the results were either ignored or suppressed (Barnow and King 2005; 
Hollenbeck et al. 2005). 
Finally, block grants—the method of providing federal employment 
services that was principally endorsed by the Bush administration— 
have tended to be a subterfuge for cutting and eliminating programs. 
The history of block grants reveals that their funding tends to be cut 
shortly after they are put in place. The programs that they support inevi-
tably become less viable as funding levels are ratcheted down (GAO 
1995). 
Personal Reemployment Accounts 
Personal Reemployment Accounts were a bad idea. The PRAs’
design combined training vouchers and reemployment bonuses. While 
training vouchers and reemployment bonuses can be effective if imple-
mented separately, combining them should have been done with care. 
The Bush administration botched combining a reemployment bonus 
with a training voucher. 
The Bush administration proposed PRA legislation in 2003. The 
legislative design ignored past research, combining a training grant that 
was not generous enough with a reemployment bonus grant that was 
too generous. The design had other flaws as well. I managed to obtain 
approval to have two analyses of PRAs done; these were conducted 
by O’Leary and Eberts (2004) and Decker and Perez-Johnson (2004). 
The studies pointed out the numerous program flaws and indicated that 
PRAs would not work. Nonetheless, the department proceeded both 
with a PRA legislative proposal and a PRA demonstration project. The 
legislation did not pass, and the demonstration did not work (Kirby et 
al. 2008). 
Career Advancement Accounts 
In 2006, the Bush administration proposed Career Advancement 
Accounts (CAAs), a component of President Bush’s larger “Owner-
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new funding, the administration carved most of the funding for CAAs 
out of WIA programs. The money for CAAs would have been made 
available to workers through training accounts that each worker would 
“own.” CAAs were training vouchers offered in the amount of $3,000 
for one year and would have been available in the same amount for 
a second year. The department recommended offering CAAs over the 
Internet, since the proposed administrative funding for the program was 
minuscule. 
Career Advancement Accounts would have required closing most 
of the One-Stop Career Centers. CAAs would have received 75 percent 
of the state workforce development grants—both WIA and Wagner-
Peyser Act state grants—and an additional 3 percent of these grants 
would have been made available for CAA administration. The remain-
ing 22 percent would not have been enough to keep many One-Stops 
open, since state funding levels would have been reduced to barely over 
one-fifth of their former levels. If CAAs had been enacted, a massive 
closure of the One-Stops would have occurred. 
The CAA proposal ignored and misread, perhaps purposefully, the 
research findings on training. The marketing of CAAs broadcast that 
they were following the “free choice” model for training vouchers, and 
that this model did not require any counseling, suggesting that having 
training vouchers on demand was a viable model. In fact, the Individual 
Training Account Experiment process evaluation found that, under the 
free choice voucher model, unemployed workers actually received a 
significant amount of counseling—an average of five hours—before 
they were offered a training voucher (McConnell et al. 2006). The 
CAA proposal also ignored evaluations showing the limited effective-
ness of short-term, untargeted, inexpensive public job training. Finally, 
the CAA proposal did not propose a rational mechanism for allocat-
ing funds for the training vouchers despite the fact that the demand for 
training vouchers would have greatly exceeded the federal funding. 
Wage Supplements 
Over the past 25 years, wage supplements (sometimes known as 
“wage insurance”) have been proposed mostly by Brookings Institution 
staff as an income transfer to respond to the wage loss of experienced 
dislocated workers (Baily, Burtless, and Litan 1993; Brainard 2007; 
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Burtless 2007; Burtless et al. 1998; Lawrence et al. 1984; Lawrence 
and Litan 1986). Wage supplement proposals provide temporary, partial 
wage supplementation to dislocated workers who lose their jobs due to 
either a domestic or an international dislocation. Under most proposals, 
affected workers usually receive up to half of their lost wages based 
on their predislocation wage, usually for a period of up to two years. 
The maximum annual supplementation is usually between $5,000 and 
$10,000 per year. 
Wage supplements have generally been proposed as a comple-
ment to UI, not as a substitute. Under these proposals, the UI program 
would continue to protect workers from wage loss while they remain 
unemployed, while wage supplements would continue to protect work-
ers from wage loss after they become reemployed. In both cases, the 
UI and wage supplement programs represent partial, temporary wage 
replacement. 
The Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA) program is a 
small wage supplement program that has been part of the Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance (TAA) programs since 2002. The ATAA program has 
been very small, and it has not been evaluated. 
However, a random assignment experiment tested wage supple-
ments in Canada in the 1990s. The results were not conclusive, and the 
design of the program was not applicable to the United States because 
of Canada’s very different institutional environment (Bloom et al. 
1999). It is not clear whether wage supplements would work in the 
United States, and, if so, what would be their optimal design. Before the 
United States expands wage supplements, the supplements should be 
tested using rigorous experimental methods to determine how Ameri-
can workers would respond behaviorally to wage supplement offers. 
Untargeted, Short-Term Training 
Research findings suggest that short-term, low-cost training is cost-
effective for adult women, but generally not for anyone else. There is 
little evidence that it works for adult men or for dislocated workers. 
Short-term training seems to be particularly ineffective for youth. These 
research findings derive from the U.S. experience, but they have been 
replicated in the other industrial nations (LaLonde 1995; Martin and 
Grubb 2001; USDOL 1995b, pp. 58–59). 
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Training tends to be more cost-effective when it is long-term 
and targeted to high-return courses. Nevertheless, most department-
sponsored training has concentrated on short-term training that is not 
necessarily targeted to high-return course work. Training must be 
rethought and tested through a variety of demonstration projects. Based 
on current research, it appears that training is likely to be more effec-
tive if it is provided more intensively over a longer period of time. Such 
training is not likely to be viable unless it provides stipends to workers 
that allow trainees to complete training. Alternatives to classroom train-
ing with stipends are programs that allow workers to earn a living while 
they are trained. The most promising options are expanded apprentice-
ship and on-the-job training. 
ImPROVINg ExISTINg PROgRAmS 
A great deal could be done to improve existing employment pro-
grams. Some programs have not been implemented as intended. Other 
programs are underfunded or need new participation incentives. Still 
others need to find more effective and efficient designs. 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
WPRS consists of two components: 1) a statistical worker profiling 
model and 2) a menu of reemployment services. While efforts to retain, 
improve, and update worker profiling models continued in the 2000s, 
the provision of a reemployment services component was neglected 
and then abandoned. Unfortunately, WPRS systems cannot function 
properly without the widespread availability of reemployment services. 
“Reemployment services” became a prohibited phrase at the Employ-
ment and Training Administration (ETA) for much of the Bush admin-
istration. Policy emphasis focused solely on training, to the neglect of 
all employment services. Indeed, the special funding for WPRS in the 
form of Reemployment Services Grants was terminated in June 2006. 
Restoring the WPRS system to functionality requires reinvigorated 
support for the provision of reemployment services and the institutions 






should be provided to the ES in the form of permanently reestablished 
Reemployment Services Grants to the states. 
Self-Employment Assistance 
Self-Employment Assistance currently is available in seven states. 
Where it exists, the program is small—mainly because of the limited 
funding for entrepreneurial training. The SEA program is mistakenly 
seen as a UI program because its authorizing legislation is contained in 
the UI section of the Social Security Act. The program is more accurately
viewed as a workforce development program under which workers can 
create a job for themselves and, possibly, for other workers. 
No stable source of funding for entrepreneurial counseling and 
training exists in most states. Funding for training should be provided 
by the Workforce Investment Act and Small Business Administration 
(SBA) programs. The department should work with the SBA to gain the 
cooperation of the SBA’s microenterprise program to provide counsel-
ing and training to SEA participants. The department should also ensure 
that its WIA Dislocated Worker Program participates in SEA. 
Work Sharing 
The current work sharing program suffers from two problems. 
These problems have potential solutions. First, the department has 
interpreted the 1992 federal legislation as technically deficient because 
it did not explicitly give the department the ability to expand the scope 
of work sharing beyond the five provisions specified in the federal stat-
ute. This issue can be addressed either by a federal statutory amend-
ment or by a more expansive interpretation of the law by the secretary. 
The department also should provide the states with technical assistance 
and encourage states to adopt and use the work sharing programs, espe-
cially in recessionary times. 
Second, the federal government should encourage businesses to use 
work sharing, particularly during recessions, by providing incentives 
for firms to participate. The federal government could greatly increase 
participation if the cost of work sharing benefits were borne by the Fed-
eral Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)–governed account—instead of by 
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also would be freed from paying the cost of work sharing (i.e., benefits 
would not be charged to employers’ UI accounts), and work sharing 
would be treated as if it were a part of the extended benefit program 
rather than the basic regular UI programs. The change is warranted for 
work sharing programs, particularly during recessionary periods. 
Job Training 
Public training programs in the United States have relied on short-
term training, which generally does not work. While short-term training 
helps to employ adult women, it has not worked well for men and youth. 
It is time to shift attention to longer-term training for some, particularly 
making use of community colleges and four-year colleges. 
Nonetheless, a large-scale effort should be taken to determine how 
public job training can be improved and expanded. There is a lack of 
information about what works. A great deal of additional research must 
be conducted before the most cost-effective forms of training emerge 
and a consensus develops about what works. The key to finding more 
cost-effective training programs is conducting a series of large-scale 
demonstrations and evaluations of various approaches to training. Giv-
en that much public job training is general, untargeted, and short-term, 
these program characteristics should be reexamined and variations 
should be tested. Demonstrations should examine particular types of 
training (e.g., on-the-job training, apprenticeship, customized, class-
room), targeting of training (e.g., high-return training courses, training 
by type of provider), and longer-term and more concentrated training. 
TARgETINg EmPLOymENT SERVICES 
Targeting employment services to those workers who can most ben-
efit from them is important both as an allocation tool and as a way 
to increase the cost-effectiveness of employment services. The recent 
acute shortage of funding for employment services calls out for a more 
rational method of allocating services among the many individuals who 




Targeting is also a key tool for increasing the cost-effectiveness of 
reemployment services in general. Targeting in the form of worker pro-
filing has been developed for use in operating the WPRS system as well 
as the SEA programs. Worker profiling also would be available for use 
by a reemployment bonus program if federal legislation were enacted 
to permit the operation of such a program. 
Targeting has been shown to make various treatments more 
cost-effective, including comprehensive job search assistance, self-
employment assistance, and reemployment bonuses. More recently, 
targeting methods have been used for a number of programs such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), welfare-to-work, 
and training and education programs (Eberts, O’Leary, and Wandner 
2002). Better uses of targeting methods can improve the effectiveness 
of existing programs. Targeting also should be considered for use by 
other employment and training programs. 
Targeting can be applied more comprehensively to provide a broad 
array of employment services, including job matching, provision of 
labor market information, and selection of cost-effective employment 
services. The Frontline Decision Support System (FDSS) was tested as 
a demonstration in Georgia to provide decision support to unemployed 
workers in the provision of reemployment services. The FDSS incor-
porated a comprehensive approach to targeting reemployment services 
for workforce development programs at local One-Stops. The FDSS 
systematically helped dislocated workers return to work by matching 
them with job openings, by helping them search for work, and by refer-
ring them to targeted, cost-effective reemployment services (Eberts and 
O’Leary 2002). The public workforce system requires a substantial 
increase in funding. Targeting is not a substitute for more funding, but 
it can make the limited funds more cost-effective. 
FUNDINg 
The responsibilities of the workforce development system have 
greatly expanded since the mid-1990s. The implementation of One-
Stop Career Centers provided for the availability of core services to all 
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ing in the labor force. The demand for reemployment services also has 
grown as the problem of worker dislocation has spread. Researchers 
and policymakers have increasingly understood that American work-
ers must improve their skills to compete in a global economy. Yet new 
programs, such as WPRS, and new systems, such as the One-Stop 
Career Centers, have been created but have not been reasonably funded. 
Moreover, while federal funding has declined in monetary terms, it has 
declined even more sharply in real terms. (See Table 6.1.) To provide 
the services to American workers that Congress has deemed critical, the 
federal workforce system must have a sustained increase in funding. 
ThE NEED FOR mORE RESEARCh 
A book on the impact of research on employment and training 
policy cannot possibly end without a call for more rigorous research 
and evaluation. After a period of profound neglect, research on getting 
America’s workers back to work is especially needed. The new research 
should be applied research that aims at helping to improve American 
human resources. Once again, public policymakers should pay atten-
tion to the research findings. 
As Bill Brock told me, the success of the U.S. economy depends 
upon its workers, and the federal government must do a great deal more 
to improve human development, including education, training, and 
transition assistance.1 Training and transition assistance come, in part, 
from USDOL-funded programs, and these programs must be updated 
and improved. Research, demonstrations, and evaluations can ensure 
that the states and localities administering these programs have the 
information about what works and what does not. For program admin-
istration to be effective, however, the federal government must release 
the research results, provide technical assistance, encourage states to 
carefully consider the research findings, and then make use of the find-
ings to guide its own public policy and programs. 
The research capacity of the ETA was sharply reduced during the 
Bush administration. Secretary Chao, Assistant Secretary DeRocco, 




had been built over half a century. It will not be easy to revive and rein-
vigorate it. But it needs to be done. 
Research needs to be conducted to better understand workforce 
development programs: how they work, whom they serve, and what 
the short- and long-term impacts of the programs are on individuals and 
their families. 
Employment programs will work better if they are guided by evalu-
ations that are conducted frequently and at regular intervals, e.g., every 
five years, using administrative data and quasiexperimental methods. 
Random assignment evaluations should be used, but only for large, 
nonentitlement programs, such as the WIA and Job Corps programs. 
Smaller programs should have more modest evaluations and should use 
more modest methods (Balducchi and Wandner 2009). 
Demonstrations should be widely used to look for new, modified, 
and improved programs, and they should be used for the major popu-
lations that are served by the department and other federal agencies, 
including disadvantaged adults and youth, dislocated workers, and UI 
recipients. Large demonstration projects should use random assign-
ment methods so that the findings are convincing when they identify 
cost-effective treatments. Some demonstrations that are needed include 
the following: wage supplements; employment bonuses for low-wage 
workers; various types of training (by training type, training duration, 
and types of training courses); and employment and retention services 
for former TANF recipients, prisoners reentering the labor force, and 
other low-wage workers. 
Other, more qualitative research is needed as well. Since training is 
provided by many federal and state agencies other than those sponsored 
by the USDOL (Mikelson and Nightingale 2005), the relationship of 
these training programs to department-sponsored programs should be 
studied closely. The department should pay particular attention to cus-
tomized training, which is funded by an offset against state UI taxes in 
some states (Duscha and Graves 1999, 2007). Research is also needed 
on the close relationship between job training and education programs, 
as well as on institutions such as community colleges, which provide 
both education and workforce training in one place. 
The central message of this book is that employment, unemploy-
ment, and training programs are too important to be the product of 
weak data, poor analysis, and callous marketing. Research and analysis 
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should be carefully designed and used to determine what works and 
what does not. This analysis should be the basis for federal and state 
policy. Policy should follow good research—and, one hopes, good pol-
icy is good politics. 
The Department of Labor should provide the major funding for 
employment and training research. The department should provide 
technical assistance to the states for the twin purposes of 1) assuring 
that they have the best information for use in designing, implementing, 
and refining programs that will help all workers have an opportunity 
to achieve the American Dream, and 2) serving American workers and 
their employers, who are, after all, the key to the economic success of 
the U.S. economy. 
The Great Recession has presented many public policy challenges 
to the United States, particularly given the prospects of a weak and 
slow job recovery. Workforce public policy will be particularly critical 
during a period of labor market weakness. Workforce policy must be
guided by solid research and evaluation, and new research and evalu-
ations should be conducted to help shape public policy in the years to 
come. 
Note 
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